delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 In 2000, a jury convicted Atorras Rain-er of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of firsUdegree assault, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and crime of violence. Rainer was seventeen at the time of the charged offenses, and he was charged and tried as an adult. Upon the jury’s verdict, the trial court sentenced Rainer to forty-eight years for each attempted murder charge, thirty-two years for each assault charge, and thirty-two years each for the charges of burglary and aggravated robbery. The sentences for the two counts of attempted murder were subsequently ordered to ran concurrently, as were the sentences for the two counts of assault, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 112 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

¶2 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), which categorically banned sentences of life without parole for juveniles who were not convicted of homicide, Rainer filed a motion with the district court arguing that his aggregate term-of-years sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole and is therefore unconstitutional under Graham. The district court denied Rainer’s motion. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the *1143 district court, holding that, because Rainer will be eligible for parole at age seventy-five, and thus not eligible for parole within his expected natural lifetime, his sentence denies him a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” and is unconstitutional under Graham and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). People v. Rainer (Rainer II), 2013 COA 51, ¶ 38, — P.3d — . The court concluded that Rainer must be resen-tenced in a manner consistent with the principles announced in Graham and Miller. Id. at ¶¶ 81 -82.

¶3 We granted certiorari and now reverse. For reasons discussed at length in our lead companion ease, Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, 394 P.3d 1128, also announced today, 1 we hold that Graham and Miller do not apply to, and therefore do not invalidate, Rainer’s aggregate term-of-years sentence.

I.

¶4 In 2000, when he was seventeen, Rainer and a companion burglarized an apartment and stole a stereo. During the burglary, Rainer shot one of the home’s inhabitants four times and another inhabitant three times, leaving both in critical condition. Rain-er was charged and tried as an adult, and a jury convicted him of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and sentence-enhancement counts for crimes of violence. Rainer was initially sentenced to a total of 224 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed his convictions, but ordered that the two sentences for attempted murder and the two sentences for assault run concurrently rather than consecutively. See People v. Rainer, No. 01CA1401, slip op. at 30-31, 2004 WL 1120876 (Colo. App. Feb. 5, 2004). On remand, Rainer’s aggregate sentence was reduced to 112 years.

¶5 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), holding that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. Rainer subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief in district court pursuant to Rule 35(c) 2 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing, in pertinent part, that his aggregate sentence is unconstitutional under Graham because it is the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole and denies him a meaningful opportunity for release. The district court denied the motion.

¶6 Rainer appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the district court and vacated Rainer’s sentence. Rainer II, ¶ 83. After first finding that Graham applies retroactively and Rainer’s motion was timely and not successive, the court of appeals turned to the merits of Rainer’s Graham claim. Id. at ¶¶ 13-35. The court noted that, according to statistics in the record from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Rainer’s life expectancy is between sixty-three and seventy-two years, but he will not be eligible for parole until he is seventy-five. IA at ¶ 67. Citing what it found to be the “expansive language” and “broad nature” of Graham, the court concluded that the opinion’s holding and reasoning apply to any sentence that “denies a juvenile offender any meaningful opportunity for release within his or her life expectancy” or fails to recognize that juveniles are more capable of change than adults. Id. at ¶¶ 72-73. The court then determined that Rainer’s 112-year sentence, with parole eligibility at age seventy-five, is the “functional equivalent of life without parole,” and, therefore, violates the Eighth Amendment under Graham and Miller. Id. at ¶¶ 67, 79. The court concluded that Rainer must be resenteneed in a manner consistent with the principles announced in Graham and Miller. Id. at ¶¶ 81 -82. In reaching its holding, the court of appeals also declared that Graham renders the Eighth Amendment proportion *1144 ality analysis adopted by this court; in Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528 (Colo. 2002), invalid as applied to juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Rainer II, ¶ 68.

¶7 We granted certiorari 3 and now reverse.

II.

¶8 Rainer, like the defendant in our lead companion case, Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, 394 P.3d 1128, was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Instead, he was sentenced to consecutive terms of years for six separate convictions, enhanced as crimes of violence. As set forth in more detail in Lucero, we hold that Graham and Miller do not apply to, and therefore do not invalidate, Rainer’s aggregate term-of-years sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 4