The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

Supreme Court Case No. 21SC930 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 20CA298

Petitioners:

Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP; Mari Newman; and Towards Justice,

v.

Respondents:

BKP, Inc.; Ella Bliss Beauty Bar LLC; Ella Bliss Beauty Bar-2, LLC; and Ella Bliss Beauty Bar-3, LLC.

Judgment Reversed en banc September 11, 2023

Attorneys for Petitioners Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLC and Mari Newman: Treece Alfrey Musat P.C. Reza D. Rismani Denver, Colorado

Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP Thomas Kelley Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Petitioner Towards Justice: Law Offices of Brian D. Gonzales, PLLC Brian D. Gonzales Fort Collins, Colorado Harter Secrest & Emery LLP Brian M. Feldman Rochester, New York

Attorneys for Respondents: Sherman & Howard LLC Brooke A. Colaizzi Raymond M. Deeny Heather Fox Vickles John T. Melcon Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Association: Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP John M. Palmeri John R. Mann Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Press Association, Colorado Broadcasters Association, Colorado Freedom of Information Coalition, Gannett Co., Inc., and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado: Hutchinson Black and Cook, LLC Matthew A. Simonsen Daniel D. Williams Boulder, Colorado

Tierney Lawrence Stiles LLC Edward T. Ramey Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association: Martinez Law Colorado, LLC Anna N. Martinez Denver, Colorado

Martinez Law, LLC Esteban A. Martinez Longmont, Colorado

2 Attorneys for Amici Curiae Impact Fund, Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, Disability Law Colorado, Legal Aid at Work, Public Counsel, and Public Justice: Fox & Robertson, PC Amy F. Robertson Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

3 JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 In this case, we granted certiorari to consider whether the common law

litigation privilege for party-generated publicity in pending class action litigation

excludes situations in which the identities of class members are ascertainable

through discovery.

¶2 We now conclude that the division erred in conditioning the applicability of

the litigation privilege in pending class action litigation on whether the identities

of class members are ascertainable through discovery. We reach this conclusion

for two reasons. First, ascertainability is generally a requirement in class action

litigation, and imposing such a condition would unduly limit the privilege in this

kind of case. Second, the eventual identification of class members by way of

documents obtained during discovery is not a substitute for reaching absent class

members and witnesses in the beginning stages of litigation.

¶3 The question remains, however, whether the litigation privilege applies on

the facts before us. We conclude that it does and that the five allegedly defamatory

statements at issue, which merely repeated, summarized, or paraphrased the

allegations made in the class action complaint, and which served the purpose of

notifying the public, absent class members, and witnesses about the litigation,

were absolutely privileged.

¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below.

4 I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5 In 2018, two law firms, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP and Towards Justice

(collectively, along with attorney Mari Newman of Killmer, Lane & Newman, “the

attorneys”), filed on behalf of former employee and nail technician Lisa Miles and

those similarly situated a federal class action lawsuit. This lawsuit named as

defendants BKP, Inc.; Ella Bliss Beauty Bar LLC; Ella Bliss Beauty Bar-2, LLC; and

Ella Bliss Beauty Bar-3, LLC (collectively, “the employer”), among others. The

employer operates three beauty bars in the Denver metropolitan area.

¶6 Pertinent here, the class action complaint alleged that the employer’s

business operation was “founded on the exploitation of its workers.” In support

of this assertion, the class action complaint alleged that, in violation of the Fair

Labor Standards Act and the Colorado Wage Claim Act, the employer

did not pay Lisa Miles or any of the other Service Technicians at any of its three stores any amount whatsoever for the hours that they spent cleaning and performing other mandatory chores. In fact, [the employer] did not employ janitors or a cleaning service and relied exclusively on the unpaid labor of its nail technicians and other Service Technicians to clean the salon.

¶7 The class action complaint further alleged that the employer exercised

substantial control over the terms and conditions of the service technicians’ work

and “co-determined the policies, procedures, and rules, including those relating

to compensation, benefits, and hours” governing the service technicians.

5 ¶8 In addition, the class action complaint alleged a number of purported illegal

pay practices, including a failure to pay for downtime, a failure to pay for pre- and

post-shift work, the withholding of tips to compel service technicians to finish

their additional “chores,” and the failure to pay contractually mandated

commissions, all of which resulted in unpaid overtime.

¶9 Lastly, the class action complaint alleged that the class members were

“low-wage, hourly workers . . . who are unsophisticated, are unlikely to seek legal

representation, cannot realistically navigate the legal system pro se, and whose

small claims make it difficult to retain legal representation if they do seek it.”

¶10 On the same day that the federal lawsuit was filed, Newman spoke at a press

conference and made the following four statements:

For no pay whatsoever, they [i.e., the service technicians] have to clean the business, including the bathrooms, because Ella Bliss Beauty Bar is simply too cheap to pay its workers the money they deserve.

Instead of paying the workers for every hour that they work they [i.e., the employer] pick and choose and only pay for the hours they feel like paying.

It is time for businesses to quit financially exploiting women. Oppression of vulnerable workers remains all too common, and this is a particularly audacious case.

It’s [i.e., conduct like that alleged is] fairly common in industries that employ populations they think they can take advantage of, like women or immigrants.

6 ¶11 The attorneys also issued a press release that, in addition to repeating the

third statement quoted above, stated, “Ella Bliss Beauty Bar forced its service

technicians to perform janitorial work without pay, refused to pay overtime,

withheld tips, and shorted commissions.”

¶12 At least two Denver-based television stations aired stories that included

video clips from the press conference, and at least four Denver-based news

organizations printed stories about the press conference. In each such story, the

media repeated one or more of the above-quoted statements.

¶13 Exactly one year later, the employer sued the attorneys in Denver district

court, asserting that the five aforementioned statements were defamatory and

intentionally interfered with contractual relations. The attorneys responded by

moving to dismiss the employer’s claims pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), arguing,

among other things, that the suit was barred by the litigation privilege. Ultimately,

the district court dismissed the employer’s complaint without addressing the

litigation privilege.

¶14 The employer appealed, and a division of the court of appeals reversed the

district court’s dismissal order. BKP, Inc. v. Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP,

,

. The division began its analysis by discussing the

litigation privilege, as described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 586

(Am. L. Inst. 1977) (“Section 586”), case law from Colorado discussing the scope of

7 the litigation privilege, and case law from other jurisdictions discussing the extent

to which the litigation privilege applies to attorney press statements. BKP, Inc.,

¶¶ 14–36, 506 P.3d at 90–93. Based on its reading of these authorities, the division

assumed without deciding that “even if Colorado were one of the states that would

generally deny the litigation privilege to any and all statements that lawyers make

to the press,” the cases on which the attorneys relied “would create a narrow

exception to that general rule for some statements concerning class action cases.”

Id. at ¶ 37,

. The division ultimately concluded, however, that this

narrow exception did not extend to press statements concerning class action

lawsuits when, as here, the class action complaint “undermine[d] the need to

engage in that form of communication.” Id. at ¶ 40,

.

¶15 On this last point, the division explained that the attorneys’ purported

purpose in speaking at the press conference and issuing the press release was to

promote their class action and potentially reach service technicians who had

worked for the employer, so that such technicians “could join the suit as class

members or additional class representatives, step forward as witnesses, or pursue

the claims themselves outside the class action.” Id. at ¶ 39,

. In the

division’s view, however, the class action complaint undermined this stated

purpose because it alleged that “[t]he exact size of the class will be easily

ascertainable from [the employer’s] records” and “[t]he contours of the class will be

8 easily defined by reference to the payroll documents [the employer was] legally

required to create and maintain.” Id. at ¶ 41,

(alterations in original)

(quoting the class action complaint). If this were so, the division reasoned, then

there would be no “need” to communicate with the public and potential class

members and witnesses through the press. Id. at ¶ 40,

. Specifically,

because “the attorneys had a ‘feasible way’ of figuring out who in their audience

had an interest in the case,” given the class action complaint’s allegation that

“finding the nail technicians who had an interest in the case would be ‘easy,’” the

attorneys had “no rational reason to make the statements to the general public.”

at ¶¶ 42–43,

. Accordingly, the division concluded that the

litigation privilege did not apply. Id. at ¶ 42,

.

¶16 The attorneys petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we granted

their petition.

II. Analysis

¶17 We begin by discussing the applicable standard of review and the litigation

privilege, as that privilege is defined in Section 586. We then discuss and reject

the “ascertainability exception” to the litigation privilege that the division adopted

and applied. Finally, we consider whether the litigation privilege, when properly

construed, applies to the facts before us, and we conclude that it does.

9 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶18 The applicability of the litigation privilege presents a question of law that

we review de novo. Belinda A. Begley & Robert K. Hirsch Revocable Tr. v. Ireson

(“Begley II”),

,

; Club Valencia Homeowners

Ass’n v. Valencia Assocs.,

(Colo. App. 1985).

¶19 Although we do not appear to have spoken on the issue, the majority of

other jurisdictions, including divisions of our court of appeals, to have considered

the litigation privilege appear to have adopted the articulation of that privilege

that is set forth in Section 586. See, e.g., BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., L.L.C.,

(5th Cir. 2017) (“In nearly every state, . . . courts rely on the

formulation of the privilege in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”); Belinda A.

Begley & Robert K. Hirsch Revocable Tr. v. Ireson (“Begley I”),

,

(“Colorado courts have applied a litigation privilege without a

good faith requirement—the substantive rule articulated in section 586—to

statements made after litigation has commenced.”); Club Valencia,

(applying Section 586).

¶20 The parties here appear to agree that Section 586 recites the prevailing

articulation of the privilege. And they further appear to agree that “[t]he purpose

of this privilege . . . is to afford litigants the utmost freedom of access to the courts

to preserve and defend their rights and to protect attorneys during the course of

10 their representation of clients.” Club Valencia,

; see also Section 586

cmt. a (“The privilege stated in this Section is based upon a public policy of

securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to

secure justice for their clients. Therefore the privilege is absolute.”). We also agree,

and thus, we will apply Section 586’s articulation of the privilege here.

¶21 Section 586 provides:

An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.

¶22 To be privileged, then, the statement at issue must have “some reference to

the subject matter of the proposed or pending litigation, although it need not be

strictly relevant to any issue involved in it.” Section 586 cmt. c; accord Club

Valencia,

. Thus, “[t]he pertinency required is not technical legal

relevancy, but rather a general frame of reference and relation to the subject matter

of the litigation.” Club Valencia,

. Accordingly, “the privilege

embraces anything that possibly may be relevant.”

¶23 As the division below explained in articulating the concerns to which the

privilege is directed, a rule permitting a defendant in a civil action to institute

“parallel litigation seeking to impose liability” on a plaintiff’s lawyer could lead to

“adverse consequences includ[ing] impairing colorable claims by ‘disrupting

11 access to counsel,’ intimidating counsel with ‘an almost certain retaliatory

proceeding,’ distracting counsel by forcing counsel to ‘defend[] a personal

countersuit’ as well as the original lawsuit, and ‘dampening . . . the unobstructed

presentation of claims.’” BKP, Inc., ¶ 15,

(alterations in original)

(quoting Rubin v. Green,

(Cal. 1993)).

¶24 The privilege, however, is not without limits. As noted above, to fall within

the privilege’s protection, the statements at issue must have “some relation to the

subject matter of the . . . litigation.” Club Valencia,

. In addition,

the statements must be “made in furtherance of the objective of the litigation.”

And although the litigation privilege may encompass statements that an attorney

makes “prior to trial such as conferences and other communications preliminary

to the proceeding,”

, it applies to such pre-litigation statements “only if

they have some relation to a proceeding that is actually contemplated in good

faith,” Merrick v. Burns, Wall, Smith & Mueller, P.C.,

(Colo. App.

2001). Thus, an attorney cannot make a defamatory statement and then “cloak it

in the privilege by subsequently filing a bad faith and meritless claim related to

the otherwise tortious statement.” Begley I, ¶ 16,

.

¶25 Finally, in light of the privilege’s above-described purpose, although an

attorney’s publication of defamatory statements that are “plainly irrelevant and

impertinent” would not be privileged, any doubts about whether a statement is

12 privileged “should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or pertinency.” Club

Valencia,

; see also

(“No strained or close construction will be

indulged to exempt a case from the protection of privilege.”). Attorneys do,

however, remain accountable to the tribunals in which they appear for improper

statements that they make, and attorneys may face sanctions or disciplinary action

for violations of applicable court rules and rules of professional conduct in

connection with their public statements. See, e.g., People v. Ellis,

, 959,

962 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2023) (approving the parties’ stipulation to discipline for an

attorney who violated the Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct by “repeatedly

mak[ing] misrepresentations on national television and on Twitter” regarding the

2020 presidential election).

¶26 Having thus set forth the applicable law, we turn to the issues before us.

B. No Ascertainability Exception

¶27 The attorneys first assert that the division below erred in concluding that

the litigation privilege did not apply in this case because the attorneys had alleged

in the class action complaint that the “exact size” and “contours” of the class would

be “easily ascertainable from [the employer’s] records” and “payroll documents,”

thereby undermining any need to speak with the press and issue the press release.

BKP, Inc., ¶¶ 41–42,

(alteration in original). We agree with the

attorneys and conclude that conditioning the applicability of the litigation

13 privilege on whether class counsel has alleged that the class is ascertainable is

unworkable in practice and would unduly limit the litigation privilege in class

action cases. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

¶28 First, in the context of class action litigation, “ascertainability” has a specific

meaning. It refers to the requirement that a proposed class be defined by objective

criteria “so that it is administratively feasible to ascertain whether or not a

particular individual is a member of the class.” BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson,

(Colo. 2011); accord Jackson v. Unocal Corp.,

(Colo. 2011). Notably, many federal courts, including the District of Colorado in

which the underlying class action lawsuit was filed, require that the class be

ascertainable, even though “ascertainability” is not specifically mandated by

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Warnick v. Dish Network

LLC,

(D. Colo. 2014) (“[A]lthough not specifically mentioned in

Rule 23, there must be an ascertainable class.”); see also Sandusky Wellness Ctr.,

LLC v. MedTox Sci., Inc.,

(8th Cir. 2016) (“It is elementary that in

order to maintain a class action, the class sought to be represented must be

adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.”) (quoting Ihrke v. N. States Power

Co.,

, 573 n.3 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot,

(1972));

Brecher v. Republic of Arg.,

(2d Cir. 2015) (“Like our sister Circuits,

we have recognized an ‘implied requirement of ascertainability’ in Rule 23 of the

14 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”) (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.,

(2d Cir. 2006)); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,

, 592–93

(3d Cir. 2012) (“Many courts and commentators have recognized that an essential

prerequisite of a class action, at least with respect to actions under Rule 23(b)(3), is

that the class must be currently and readily ascertainable based on objective

criteria.”).

¶29 In light of this requirement, it is unsurprising that the attorneys alleged in

the class action complaint that the class would be ascertainable, and we cannot

agree that such an allegation removed the case from the protection that the

litigation privilege affords for public statements like those at issue. If it did, then

the efficacy of the privilege would be substantially diminished in class action

litigation. We, however, perceive no basis for limiting the privilege in this way.

¶30 Second, when, as here, the purpose of making the press statements was to

promote the class action lawsuit and to contact unknown potential class members

early in the litigation, it is immaterial whether the attorneys expected the class to

be ascertainable from the employer’s business records. Although the division

perceived “no rational reason” for the attorneys to use the press to promote the

class action and reach absent class members given the allegation that the class

would be “easily ascertainable” from the employer’s records and payroll

documents, BKP, Inc., ¶¶ 41, 43,

, the division appears to have

15 overlooked the fact that at the time the attorneys made the statements at issue, the

employer’s records and payroll documents would not yet have been available to

the attorneys. Indeed, the parties do not appear to dispute that such records are

not typically available to class counsel until discovery, which occurs later in the

litigation process. And as the attorneys argue, the eventual identification of class

members by way of documents obtained during discovery is not a substitute for

reaching absent class members and witnesses in the beginning stages of litigation

when class counsel is shoring up their pleadings, locating additional class

representatives, planning discovery, and crafting litigation strategy. Accordingly,

early outreach through the press can benefit a class action regardless of whether it

will ultimately be “easy” to ascertain the class members from the employer’s

records and documents that will be produced later during discovery.

¶31 For these reasons, we conclude that the division erred in adopting and

applying an ascertainability exception to defeat the protections of the litigation

privilege in this case.

¶32 In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by the trio of cases from

other jurisdictions, Norman v. Borison,

(Md. 2011), Helena Chem. Co. v.

Uribe,

(N.M. 2012), and Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Stewart, Estes &

Donnell,

(Tenn. 2007), on which the employer relies. Specifically,

the employer argues that these cases stand for the proposition that the litigation

16 privilege applies only to “large-scale” class action and mass-tort cases in which

there are no feasible or economical means of reaching potential class members (i.e.,

only when the class is not readily ascertainable). For several reasons, we disagree.

¶33 First, contrary to the employer’s attempt to cabin the reasoning of these

cases to “large-scale” class action and mass-tort cases, neither the reasoning of, nor

the conclusions reached in, these cases turned or even relied on the scale or size of

the class. Rather, all three cases turned on whether the statements were made by

counsel during the course of and were related to an ongoing (or proposed) court

proceeding. See Norman,

, 716–18 (concluding that the litigation

privilege extended to an attorney’s republication of the class action pleadings as

well as to the attorney’s public comments about that case because the statements

served to notify potential class members of the contemplated proceeding, were

made in the course of that proceeding, and were sufficiently related to the subject

matter of the complaint); Helena Chem. Co., 281 P.3d at 239 (“[T]he absolute

privilege doctrine applies to pre-litigation statements made by attorneys in the

presence of the press, if (1) the speaker is seriously and in good faith contemplating

class action or mass-tort litigation at the time the statement is made, (2) the

statement is reasonably related to the proposed litigation, (3) the attorney has a

client or identifiable prospective client at the time the statement is made, and

(4) the statement is made while the attorney is acting in the capacity of counsel or

17 prospective counsel.”); Simpson Strong-Tie,

(“[A]n attorney is

privileged to publish what may be defamatory information prior to a proposed

judicial proceeding even when the communication is directed at recipients

unconnected with the proposed proceeding. In order for the privilege to apply,

(1) the communication must be made by an attorney acting in the capacity of

counsel, (2) the communication must be related to the subject matter of the

proposed litigation, (3) the proposed proceeding must be under serious

consideration by the attorney acting in good faith, and (4) the attorney must have

a client or identifiable prospective client at the time the communication is

published.”).

¶34 Second, neither Norman, Helena Chemical Co., nor Simpson Strong-Tie

considered or discussed whether class counsel in those cases had alleged that the

class was “ascertainable.” Nor did any of those cases consider or address whether

it would have been feasible to use the defendant’s business records to identify

potential class members. In Norman, as here, however, class counsel had alleged

in their class certification memorandum that the “[c]lass can be identified from the

Defendants’ own records.” Pls.’ Mem. in Support of Pls.’ Amended Mot. to Certify

a Class Against the Defs. at 43, Proctor v. Metro. Money Store Corp.,

No. 07-cv-01957-RWT, Doc. 151-1 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2008). Accordingly, nothing in

these cases supports an assertion that if the class could be identified from the

18 defendant’s records, then the litigation privilege is inapplicable. The cases, in fact,

suggest the opposite conclusion.

¶35 Third, contrary to the employer’s assertion, the courts in Norman, Helena

Chemical Co., and Simpson Strong-Tie each seemed to recognize that when a class

action complaint is, or is about to be, filed, reaching potential litigants through the

press is consistent with the purpose of the litigation privilege. See Norman, 17 A.3d

at 715–18 (concluding that class counsel was absolutely privileged to republish the

class action pleadings the day after the action was filed and to make allegedly

defamatory statements in the press in connection with the lawsuit because

republishing or reporting on the pleadings served a “judicially-cognizable

purpose—the notification of potential class members of ongoing litigation, in

which they may have a stake”); Helena Chem. Co., 281 P.3d at 245–46 (concluding

that class counsel was absolutely privileged to make allegedly defamatory press

statements both before and after filing a toxic tort lawsuit because, “[i]n the context

of class action or mass-tort litigation, the most economical and feasible method of

informing potential litigants of prospective litigation affecting their interests may

be through the press”); Simpson Strong-Tie,

(concluding that class

counsel was absolutely privileged to make allegedly defamatory statements in the

press and on the internet in connection with a proposed but not yet filed class

action lawsuit because “limiting the privilege” to exclude such public statements

19 could “inhibit potential parties or witnesses from coming forward and impede the

investigatory ability of litigants or potential litigants, thereby undermining the

reasons for the privilege”).

¶36 For these reasons, we conclude that the authority on which the employer

relies is inapposite on the issue of ascertainability and, if anything, supports the

applicability of the privilege in the present context.

¶37 Having concluded that the division erred in adopting and applying an

ascertainability exception to the litigation privilege, the question remains whether

the litigation privilege applies to the five press statements at issue. We turn to that

question next.

C. Application

¶38 As noted above, Section 586 provides that attorneys are “absolutely

privileged” to publish defamatory statements “in the institution of, or during the

course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding” in which they participate as counsel

if the statements (1) have “some relation to the subject matter of the . . . litigation,”

and (2) are “made in furtherance of the objective of the litigation.” Club Valencia,

712 P.2d at 1027–28.

¶39 Here, although the attorneys urge us to adopt a broad, bright-line rule that

would always allow defamatory statements in the context of announcing a class

action, we need not—and, thus, do not—adopt such a rule. Instead, we can decide

20 this case more narrowly, by considering whether, on the facts before us, the

allegedly defamatory statements had some relation to and were made in

furtherance of the objective of the class action litigation. We have little difficulty

concluding that they did.

¶40 As an initial matter, we agree with the division’s observations that, “[i]n this

case, the statements made at the press conference and in the press release merely

described the federal lawsuit” and “the statements and the press release were

simply a means of publicizing it.” BKP, Inc., ¶ 52,

. Accordingly, on

their face, the statements had some relation to the subject matter of the litigation.

See, e.g., Helena Chem. Co., 281 P.3d at 246 (concluding that statements made to the

press that summarize, republish, repeat, or explain the allegations of a class action

complaint are absolutely privileged).

¶41 In addition, and related to our first point, we agree with the view of the

majority of jurisdictions to have considered the issue that attorney press

statements that merely repeat and explain a class action complaint serve to notify

the public, absent class members, and witnesses about the litigation, thereby

furthering the object of the litigation. See Norman,

& n.23

(explaining that “[b]y republishing or reporting on” class action pleadings, “the

press could be seen as a tool assisting in the notification to potential class members

of the contemplated proceedings,” which may legitimately be seen as “a step in

21 the administration of justice”); Helena Chem. Co., 281 P.3d at 246–47 (concluding

that statements made to the press that summarized a filed complaint “furthered

the object of th[e] mass-tort litigation by educating others in the affected

community about the need for and availability of legal representation”); Simpson

Strong-Tie,

(concluding that the litigation privilege applies to

what may be defamatory statements in the newspaper and on the internet

soliciting clients in anticipation of litigation because precluding such

communications might inhibit “potential parties or witnesses from coming

forward” and “impede the investigatory ability of litigants or potential litigants”).

¶42 Here, as in the above-described cases, all of the statements at issue merely

repeated, summarized, or paraphrased allegations in the class action complaint.

Accordingly, they served to notify the public, absent class members, and witnesses

about, and therefore furthered the objective of, the litigation.

¶43 For example, Newman’s statement at the press conference that “[f]or no pay

whatsoever, they [i.e., the service technicians] have to clean the business, including

the bathrooms, because Ella Bliss Beauty Bar is simply too cheap to pay its workers

the money they deserve” summarizes the allegation in the class action complaint

that the employer

did not pay Lisa Miles or any of the other Service Technicians at any of its three stores any amount whatsoever for the hours that they spent cleaning and performing other mandatory chores. In fact, [the employer] did not employ janitors or a cleaning service and relied

22 exclusively on the unpaid labor of its nail technicians and other Service Technicians to clean the salon.

¶44 Similarly, Newman’s statement that, “[i]nstead of paying the workers for

every hour that they work they [i.e., the employer] pick and choose and only pay

for the hours they feel like paying” paraphrases the class action complaint’s

allegations that the employer (1) exercised substantial control over the terms and

conditions of the work of the service technicians and “co-determined the policies,

procedures, and rules, including those relating to compensation, benefits, and

hours” governing the service technicians; and (2) engaged in a number of illegal

pay practices, including a failure to pay for downtime and pre- and post-shift

work, the withholding of tips, and the failure to pay contractually mandated

commissions, all of which resulted in unpaid overtime.

¶45 Newman’s statements, repeated in the press release, that “[i]t is time for

businesses to quit financially exploiting women” and that “[o]ppression of

vulnerable workers remains all too common, and this is a particularly audacious

case” correspond to the class action complaint’s allegations that (1) the employer’s

business operation was “founded on the exploitation of its workers” and (2) the

class members were “low-wage, hourly workers . . . who are unsophisticated, are

unlikely to seek legal representation, cannot realistically navigate the legal system

pro se, and whose small claims make it difficult to retain legal representation if

they do seek it.”

23 ¶46 Finally, Newman’s statement that conduct like that alleged in the class

action complaint is “fairly common in industries that employ populations they

think they can take advantage of, like women or immigrants” likewise

corresponds to the just-noted class action complaint’s allegations.

¶47 Because the allegedly defamatory statements at issue had some relation to

and were made in furtherance of the objective of the class action litigation, we

conclude that these statements were privileged. And because this case presents

no issue as to whether defamatory press statements that go beyond the allegations

of the complaint are actionable, we need not—and do not—express any opinion

on that inherently fact-dependent issue.

¶48 In so concluding, we necessarily reject the employer’s assertion that the

litigation privilege excludes all statements made by lawyers in press conferences

or press releases. On this point, we acknowledge that Green Acres Trust v. London,

(Ariz. 1984), on which the employer heavily relies, reaches a

conclusion contrary to ours. In that case, on facts similar to those present here, the

court determined that the attorney’s statements were not privileged because the

“recipient” of the allegedly defamatory statements was a newspaper reporter who

“had no relation to the proposed class action.” Id. at 614. We respectfully disagree

with our sister court’s determination that the “recipient” of the attorney press

statements in that case was the newspaper reporter, rather than the public, as well

24 as with that court’s ultimate conclusion, which we believe expresses a minority

view among the jurisdictions to have considered the issue before us today.

III. Conclusion

¶49 For these reasons, we conclude that the division below erred in adopting

and applying an ascertainability exception to preclude the application of the

common law litigation privilege in the present case. We further conclude that, on

the facts before us, the statements at issue, which merely repeated, summarized,

or paraphrased allegations made in the class action complaint, and which served

the purpose of notifying the public, absent class members, and witnesses about the

litigation, were protected by the litigation privilege.

¶50 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below, and we

remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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