Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21 Douglas County District Court Case No. 21CR60 Honorable Victoria Klingensmith, Judge

          ORDER MADE ABSOLUTE

          Attorneys for Plaintiff: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Kelley M. Dziedzic, Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado

          Attorneys for Defendant: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender Michael C. Mattis, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado

          Ara Ohanian, Deputy Public Defender Elizabeth Orton, Deputy Public Defender Castle Rock Colorado

          Attorneys for Respondent Douglas County District Court: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Lauren M. Dickey, First Assistant Attorney General Brady J. Grassmeyer, Senior Assistant Attorney General Conor A. Kruger, Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado

          Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Office of the Alternate Defense Counsel: Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP John Partridge Al Kelly NoahLani Litwinsella Denver, Colorado

          JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

          OPINION

          HART JUSTICE

         ¶1 In this original proceeding, we consider whether a show-cause hearing under section 24-72-305(7), C.R.S. (2024) ("subsection 305(7)"), of the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act ("CCJRA"), can be held in a district court outside of the district where the requested records are located. The question presents itself here because the Colorado Bureau of Investigations ("CBI") is located in Jefferson County, where it maintains its records, and some of those records are being sought in a criminal case in Douglas County District Court.

         ¶2 Subsection 305(7) provides that a party who is denied access to inspect a record covered by the CCJRA may submit an application "to the district court of the district wherein the record is found for an order directing the custodian of such record to show cause why said custodian should not permit the inspection of such record." The parties' dispute here turns on two questions: (1) whether the word "may," as used in the subsection, is mandatory or permissive; and (2) whether the Douglas County District Court has ancillary jurisdiction over a CCJRA application, independent of the statutory provision.

         ¶3 We conclude that the plain language of the statute requires that a CCJRA show-cause hearing take place in the district court of the district where the records are found, and that ancillary jurisdiction is unavailable because the statutory

provision squarely applies. Accordingly, we make the order to show cause absolute.

         I. Facts and Procedural History

         ¶4 Adetayo Sotade is a defendant in an ongoing criminal case in Douglas

         County, where he is represented by counsel from the Office of the State Public Defender ("OSPD"). He is charged with second degree kidnapping, sexual assault, and unlawful sexual contact. As part of the underlying criminal investigation, the CBI conducted forensic laboratory testing. During the pendency of Sotade's criminal case, however, the CBI learned that one of its DNA analysts, Yvonne "Missy" Woods, had tampered with DNA testing in numerous cases over the course of decades. Though another CBI analyst conducted the testing in Sotade's case, Woods was the technical reviewer.

         ¶5 Sotade endorsed Woods as a witness and, in April 2024, issued two Subpoenas Duces Tecum ("SDTs") to the CBI for its internal affairs investigation records related to Woods, as well as other lab records relating to the primary analyst in his case. The CBI produced responsive documents, which the district court reviewed and provided to the parties subject to a protective order.

         ¶6 In July and September 2024, the OSPD submitted two records requests to the CBI, pursuant to the CCJRA, seeking records related to (1) "any and all" cases in which Woods was the analyst or technical reviewer and (2) "all" of the cases in

which Woods had testified in a courtroom since 2007. The CBI's custodian of records responded to both CCJRA requests, (1) explaining that the custodian had made the discretionary choice to withhold the records of cases in which Woods was an analyst or technical reviewer; and (2) providing a list of jurisdictions and dates where Woods had given courtroom testimony during the requested timeframes, but with the case names and numbers redacted.

         ¶7 Sotade subsequently filed an Application to Show Cause ("the Application") in his criminal case, contesting the CBI's denial of the OSPD's records request. Within days, the CBI responded by filing a Motion to Quash or Dismiss Public Defender's Application to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction. It argued that the Douglas County District Court lacked jurisdiction over the Application because the records at issue were located at the CBI's headquarters in Jefferson County.

         ¶8 The district court held a hearing on the Application to determine whether it could exercise jurisdiction under subsection 305(7) or ancillary jurisdiction under Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff's Office, 2022 CO 56, 528 P.3d 899. The court concluded that it could exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the Application and scheduled a show-cause hearing.

         ¶9 The CBI thereafter filed a Petition for Rule to Show Cause in this court, pursuant to C.A.R. 21, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the

application because (1) the CCJRA requires anyone who is denied access to inspect a criminal justice record to submit an application in the district court of the district where the records are located, and (2) ancillary jurisdiction is unavailable under the circumstances presented here. We granted the CBI's petition.^[1]

         II. Analysis

         ¶10 We begin by explaining why exercising our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is appropriate. Then, we address the core tenets of statutory interpretation and conclude that the plain language of subsection 305(7) requires a person whose records request was denied to seek a CCJRA show-cause hearing in the district court of the district where the records are found. We then discuss the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and hold that it is inapplicable here because subsection 305(7) applies. We therefore make the order to show cause absolute.

         A. Our C.A.R. 21 Jurisdiction

         ¶11 Whether we exercise original jurisdiction pursuant to C.A.R. 21 is a matter entirely within our discretion. People v. Hernandez, 2021 CO 45, ¶ 13, 488 P.3d 1055, 1060. "An original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary remedy that is

limited in both its purpose and availability." Accetta v. Brooks Towers Residences Condo. Ass'n, 2019 CO 11, ¶ 11, 434 P.3d 600, 602. Exercise of our original jurisdiction, however, is appropriate to review a trial court's pretrial orders when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, see, e.g., Ortega v. Colo. Permanente Med. Grp., P.C., 265 P.3d 444, 447 (Colo. 2011); C.A.R. 21(a)(2) (providing that "relief will be granted only when no other adequate remedy is available, including relief available by appeal"), or when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm. See People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195. We have previously heard cases involving the issue of venue under C.A.R. 21 because they "directly affect the trial court's jurisdiction and authority to proceed with a case" and "review of a venue determination serves to avoid the delay and expense involved in re-trial should this court deem venue improper." Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 1033, 1036 (quoting Hagan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2015 CO 6, ¶ 13, 342P.3d 427, 432).

         ¶12 An appellate remedy would not be adequate to address the issue presented in this case. If the district court holds a show-cause hearing, the CBI will have no choice but to attend that hearing in Douglas County, regardless of whether venue was proper there. Further, if the district court determines that the CBI custodian's response to the records requests constitutes an abuse of discretion, the CBI will have to produce the records irrespective of whether the district court was

permitted to hold a show-cause hearing in the first place; and disclosure of records through the CCJRA forecloses the opportunity to seek a protective order or to file a motion to quash through the normal pretrial discovery procedures. See People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662, 666-67 (Colo. 2010) (holding that the People have standing to seek protective orders or to move to quash SDTs served on third parties). No appellate review could sufficiently redress these harms.

         ¶13 Further, we generally opt to invoke our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 to address issues of first impression that are of significant public importance. See Accetta, ¶ 11, 434 P.3d at 602. No Colorado appellate court has yet addressed whether section 24-72-305(7) permits a CCJRA show-cause hearing to take place outside of the jurisdiction where the records are located. And, if the district court's invocation of ancillary jurisdiction is correct, all public agencies who maintain criminal justice records subject to the CCJRA could be subjected to show-cause hearings in jurisdictions across the state.

         ¶14 For these reasons, we exercise our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21.

         B. Section 24-72-305(7) Requires that an Application Be Filed in the District Court of the District Where the Records Are Located

         ¶15 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Thomas v. People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 58, 500 P.3d 1095, 1108. When interpreting a statutory provision, we "give 'its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning'" and read them

"in context and in accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage." Id. (quoting McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10, 463 P.3d 254, 257). Our aim in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the General Assembly's intent. Arvada Vill. Gardens LP v. Garate, 2023 CO 24, ¶ 9, 529 P.3d 105, 107. If a statute is unambiguous, we apply it as written. Id.

         ¶16 Subsection 305(7) provides, in relevant part:

Any person denied access to inspect any criminal justice record covered by this part [three] may apply to the district court of the district wherein the record is found for an order directing the custodian of such record to show cause why said custodian should not permit the inspection of such record.

(Emphasis added.)

         ¶17 The CBI argues that the statute unambiguously requires that any person seeking an order directing a custodian of records to show cause for their denial of a CCJRA request may do so only in the district court of the district where the records are located. It observes that the use of "may," rather than "shall" or "must," in the statutory provision is logical because a person is not required to seek a show-cause order, which the more mandatory language in the same sentence would suggest-instead, whether to seek a show-cause order is a choice. However, if a person does choose to seek a show-cause order, the statute provides that they "may" do so only in the designated location.

         ¶18 Sotade reads the statutory language differently, arguing the word "may" makes the entire subsection permissive, not mandatory. He asserts that this permissive language gives a record seeker an option, but not the only option, to seek a right to inspect records covered by the CCJRA. If this is not a limiting provision, however, as the CBI notes, then a person seeking review of records could file anywhere in the state and the word "may" would become superfluous.

         ¶19 Both Sotade and the district court rely heavily on our decision in People v. Sprinkle, 2021 CO 60, 489 P.3d 1242, to support their argument that "may" is permissive rather than mandatory as used in subsection 305(7). Sprinkle examined a different provision of the CCJRA-one focused on internal investigation files-that uses language that is nearly identical to that at issue here. See Sprinkle, ¶ 16, 489 P.3d at 1245-46 ("Any person who has been denied access to any information in a completed internal affairs investigation file may file an application in the district court in the county where the records are located . . . ." (emphasis added) (quoting § 24-72-303(4)(f), C.R.S. (2024))).

         ¶20 There, in preparation for trial, a defense investigator filed a CCJRA records request with the El Paso County Sheriff's Office ("EPCSO") seeking information about two deputies who had been involved in Sprinkle's case. Id. at ¶ 4, 489 P.3d at 1244. EPCSO denied the request. Id. Sprinkle then filed an SDT for the same

deputies' internal records, and EPCSO moved to quash the SDT. Id. at ¶ 5, 489 P.3d at 1244.

         ¶21 At the hearing, the court sua sponte noted that the request seemed to fall under the CCJRA, so Sprinkle was entitled to a show-cause hearing. Id. at ¶ 6, 489 P.3d at 1244. EPCSO agreed and requested a show-cause hearing. Id. Sprinkle's attorney also agreed, and the district court scheduled the hearing, despite the fact that Sprinkle had not filed the application. Id. Days before the hearing was set to occur, EPCSO filed a motion claiming that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 7, 489 P.3d at 1244.

         ¶22 On appeal to this court, EPCSO argued that the statutory language, "may file an application," created a jurisdictional prerequisite for a show-cause hearing under section 24-72-303(4)(f), which Sprinkle had not met. Id. at ¶¶ 13-19, 489 P.3d at 1245-46. We disagreed. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19, 489 P.3d at 1246. We concluded that the application requirement was non-jurisdictional and therefore could be-and was-waived when EPCSO requested the show-cause hearing. Id. Accordingly, we held that Sprinkle's failure to file an application did not divest the district court of jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 20, 489 P.3d at 1246.

         ¶23 Contrary to Sotade's contention, Sprinkle does not answer the question posed in this case. We stand by our conclusion that the district court in El Paso County-where the records were located-could hold a show-cause hearing

regarding access to those records even though it was the county, and not Sprinkle, who brought the issue to the court's attention. The El Paso County court was the correct location to resolve the record inspection issue.

         ¶24 Here, we must resolve whether subsection 305(7) permits a show-cause hearing for inspection of records in a district other than where those records are located-that question was not at issue in Sprinkle, and we had no occasion to consider it there. The plain language of subsection 305(7) gives authority "to the district court of the district wherein the record is found." It does not add contingencies or exceptions to allow for another district court to exercise jurisdiction when the requested records relate to a proceeding before it. And, again, though Sotade's criminal case is before the Douglas County District C ourt, the OSPD's requests sought CCJRA records located at the CBI headquarters in Jefferson County. Therefore, the plain language of subsection 305(7) required that Sotade file the Application in the Jefferson County district court.

         ¶25 The district court points out that subsection 305(7) does not divest other district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the question as a general matter, and we agree. District courts in Colorado are courts of general jurisdiction, see, e.g., Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, ¶ 70, 2350 P.3d 883, 898, and any district court might have authority to hear a CCJRA show-cause proceeding-if the relevant

records are located in that court's district. Subsection 305(7) is more analogous to a venue provision than to a jurisdictional one. But that does not make it less of a legislative limitation on where claims may be brought.

         ¶26 Logistically, it would make little sense to conclude otherwise. In this case, for example, given the statewide impacts of Woods's misconduct on past and pending criminal cases, the CBI could potentially be forced to attend show-cause hearings in any number of Colorado jurisdictions to defend the custodian's denial of the CCJRA request. It is far more practical and consistent with the statute that a show-cause hearing be held in Jefferson County, where the records are located, especially given that the OSPD-not a specific defendant or their counsel-made the broad CCJRA requests underlying this dispute. Should an individual defendant wish to access relevant criminal justice records from a public entity, the normal discovery tools are available to that defendant. Sotade, in fact, did as much through his use of SDTs and by endorsing Woods as a witness. The CCJRA, however, is not a discovery tool.

         ¶27 Accordingly, we hold that the plain language of subsection 305(7) means what it says: A person who is denied access to inspect criminal justice records under the CCJRA must seek an order directing the custodian of records to show cause in the district court of the district where the records are located.

         C. Ancillary Jurisdiction Is Not Available Here

         ¶28 The district court, however, did not suggest that it had jurisdiction under subsection 305(7). Instead, the court concluded that it had ancillary jurisdiction under Woo, ¶¶ 28-41, 528 P.3d at 906-09. The CBI argues that this was error because (1) ancillary jurisdiction is not available when there is a governing statute or rule that controls; and (2) even if ancillary jurisdiction could apply when there is a statute on point, the four criteria required to invoke ancillary jurisdiction are not present here.^[2] Sotade and the district court counter that ancillary jurisdiction is proper in this case for purposes of judicial economy and that the criteria for exercising ancillary jurisdiction are met. We agree with the CBI on its first contention, so we do not address whether the elements for ancillary jurisdiction are met here.

         ¶29 Ancillary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine, the core purpose of which is judicial efficiency. Id. at ¶¶ 36-39, 528 P.3d at 908-09. We have noted, though, that "[ancillary jurisdiction is not a substitute for subject matter jurisdiction; it is a supplement to subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at ¶ 38, 528 P.3d

at 909. In cases where ancillary jurisdiction applies, it may be invoked subject to a four-part test:

(1) the ancillary matter arises from the same transaction which was the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during the course of the main matter, or is an integral part of the main matter; (2) the ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial new factfinding proceeding; (3) determination of the ancillary matter through an ancillary order would not deprive a party of a substantial procedural or substantive right; and (4) the ancillary matter must be settled to protect the integrity of the main proceeding or to insure that the disposition in the main proceeding will not be frustrated.

Id. at ¶ 28, 528 P.3d at 907 (quoting People v. Hargrave, 179 P.3d 226, 229-30 (Colo.App. 2007)). "[A]ll courts, absent some specific statutory denial of power, possess ancillary powers to effectuate their jurisdiction." Id. at ¶ 39, 528 P.3d at 909 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Morrow v. D.C., 417 F.2d 728, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).

         ¶30 In Woo, after the defendant was sentenced for first degree murder, he brought a civil action seeking the return of his property that had been lawfully seized by the government as part of his criminal case. ¶ 5, 528 P.3d at 902-03. That action, however, was dismissed by the district court as barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA"). Id., 528 P.3d at 903. Woo appealed, arguing that the CGIA rendered him without any remedy and therefore violated his state and federal due process rights. Id. We disagreed. Id. at ¶ 52, 528 P.3d at 912. In so doing, we expressly acknowledged that there was no statute or rule

allowing a criminal defendant to seek the return of government-seized property. Id. at ¶ 24, 528 P.3d at 906. We emphasized that "requiring defendants to file a motion for return of property before sentencing would likely be an illusory remedy" at best, and that "challenging hurdles" existed for a criminal defendant seeking the return of their property through a civil action. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35, 528 P.3d at 908. Accordingly, we concluded that ancillary jurisdiction could be applicable in that case and applied a four-part test to determine if it was appropriate. Id. at ¶¶ 24-36, 528 P.3d at 906-08.

         ¶31 By setting venue in the district where the records reside, subsection 305(7) squarely applies to divest courts outside of that district of authority to consider a show-cause application. Consequently, ancillary jurisdiction is not an option. The concerns we enumerated in Woo are simply not present. There are no "illusory remed[ies]" or "challenging hurdles" here. Subsection 305(7) provides a clear statutory scheme under which a person can request a CCJRA show-cause hearing in a specific venue-where the records are located. Further, an individual in Sotade's position has other avenues available by way of discovery tools. And notably in the context of this case, unlike a criminal defendant seeking the return of his seized property, Sotade does not seek to address a matter particular to him. In fact, Sotade did not file the CCJRA request at issue here-the OSPD did.

         ¶32 We therefore hold that, given the applicability of subsection 305(7), ancillary jurisdiction is not available under these circumstances. Thus, because it is not necessary to do so, we do not evaluate whether the four-part test for assessing the appropriateness of exercising ancillary jurisdiction under these specific circumstances is satisfied.

         III. Conclusion

         ¶33 The plain language of subsection 305(7) requires a litigant to request a CCJRA show-cause hearing in the district court of the district where the requested records are located. Further, ancillary jurisdiction is unavailable where a rule or statute specifically applies. Subsection 305(7) establishes a clear venue for requesting CCJRA records, so ancillary jurisdiction has no application here. Accordingly, we make absolute the order to show cause and remand this case for further proceedings in the district court.

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Notes:

^[1] Specifically, we granted review of the following issue:

1. Whether the district court exceeded its jurisdiction and violated section 24-72-305, C.R.S. (2024), when it ordered a show-cause hearing in [Sotade]'s criminal case in Douglas County, rather than in a separate civil proceeding where the requested records reside in Jefferson County.

^[2]Sotade argues that the CBI waived these arguments because, after the district court concluded it could invoke ancillary jurisdiction here, the CBI refused to make a record. We disagree. The CBI expressly argued at the motions hearing that the Jefferson County District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the CCJRA show-cause hearings, and the district court should not turn to ancillary jurisdiction in light of subsection 305(7)'s express requirements.

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