The issues presented on this appeal from a judgment of possession in a summary process action are (1) whether proof of a landlord’s retaliatory motive or intent constitutes a defense to a summary process action,2 and (2) whether a tenant may interpose constitutional issues in an attempt to defeat the action of summary process.

The record in this case discloses that no finding was made and none was requested. Practice Book § 979.3 The trial court’s rather lengthy memorandum of decision contains much dictum as to which we decline to express an opinion one way or the other. It is sufficient for present purposes to point out that the court did not formulate its memorandum of decision in the form of a finding. Practice Book §§ 993, 980; see Lurie v. Sweedler, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 17; Malt-*209bie, Conn. App. Proc. § 126. The memorandum of decision is, of course, a part of the record on appeal; Practice Book ^ 992; but it “may not be used by us as a substitute for a finding of facts.” Shannon v. Mereness, 89 Conn. 284, 285. And “‘[w]hile the memorandum of decision cannot supplant the finding, we may consult the memorandum for a better understanding of the basis of the court’s decision. . . .’” Craig v. Dunleavy, 154 Conn. 100, 105; see Goldblatt v. Ferrigno, 138 Conn. 39, 40.

Our refusal to anticipate constitutional questions is peculiarly appropriate in the circumstances of this case. These questions come to us unillumined by a finding of facts; we are asked to decide them in the abstract. “Again, only an adjudication on the merits [with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law reached in accordance with our established appellate procedure] can provide the concrete factual setting that sharpens the deliberative process especially demanded for constitutional decision.” United States v. International Union, 352 U.S. 567, 591. As the court pointed out in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016, a leading ease dealing with retaliatory eviction, “[t]he question of permissible or impermissible purpose is one of fact for the court or jury, and while such a determination is not easy, it is not significantly different from problems with which the court must deal in a host of other contexts . . . .” There is no basis whatsoever in the record before us for a finding of either permissible or impermissible motive or purpose on the part of the landlord; indeed, the trial court was of the opinion “that the defense of ‘retaliatory action’ has no place whatsoever in the . . . summary process action. It is not a valid defense.” The trial court concluded that “it is immaterial as to whether or not the landlord in this action sought to evict the tenant as retaliation for complaints to various *210local and staite agencies.”4 Added to the procedural problems which beset this case is federal court dictum to the effect that “the evidence [in this case] failed to sufficiently demonstrate that . . . [the Hoyts] are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that eviction proceedings were brought for retaliatory purposes. Rather, if anything, the evidence supported LaChances’ contention that they proceeded to seek an eviction only after the inspection of Mr. Gardner [a housing code enforcement officer for the city of Hartford] brought to their attention rather serious and damaging misuse of the premises by . . . [the Hoyts] themselves. Thus, there would be ample reason to find on the merits that the LaChances believed that the Hoyts were undesirable as tenants and sought to evict them for that reason. There has been no showing thus far in the case that the eviction proceedings resulted from any scheme or interest to suppress the rights of the Hoyts, or others, to exercise their First Amendment rights to complain to the authorities about the violation of tenement house laws by the LaChances.”5

*211The questions presented for our determination on this appeal cannot be resolved on the state of the record. We recognize that counsel are prone to shape litigation, so far as it is within their control, to secure comprehensive rulings. But this court has its responsibilities. It is not our function to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, nor to declare principles or rules of law. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, § 761. The defendants are seeking advisory opinions upon broad claims of rights protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. “This court is not required to advise on abstract principles of law.” Norwalk Teachers’ Assn. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 272.

It follows that want of a finding of the essential facts precludes review of the judgment of the court below.

There is no error.

In this opinion Wise, Deaecngton' and Macdohald, Js., participated.