The defendant was convicted of speeding in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a. On appeal, he claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the presence of attorneys in the General Assembly violates the dual office ban of the constitution of Connecticut, article third, § ll,1 thereby rendering null and void all statutes enacted since 1958, including that under which he was charged and those statutes reorganizing the court system.2 The defendant argues that, because of their status as commis*826sioners of the Superior Court,3 attorneys are precluded by law from serving in the General Assembly and therefore any General Assembly whose membership includes attorneys can pass no valid law. We disagree.

An attorney’s designation as a commissioner of the Superior Court in and of itself does not constitute an “office” or “appointive position” as those terms have been defined by our Supreme Court, so as to disqualify him or her from serving in the legislature. See Murach v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 196 Conn. 192, 198, 491 A.2d 1058 (1985); Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 594, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981); Housing Authority v. Dorsey, 164 Conn. 247, 251, 320 A.2d 820, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043, 94 S. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1973); Bredice v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 287, 293, 206 A.2d 433 (1964); Kelly v. Bridgeport, 111 Conn. 667, 671, 151 A. 268 (1930); see also General Statutes § 51-80 (attorneys “admitted” rather than “appointed” to practice in Superior Court). On the basis of the foregoing authority, the court did not err in refusing the defendant’s request to dismiss the case.

There is no erroi.