This is an appeal from the dismissal of a petition for termination of parental rights which was filed in the Probate Court and transferred to the Superior Court. We find no error.

On December 3, 1984, the adoptive parents of Jason filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 45-61c in the Court of Probate for the district of Newington. The attorney for the minor child contested the petition and requested that the matter be transferred to the Superior Court under the provisions of § 45-61c (g). The matter was transferred to the Superior Court on January 21, 1987. On June 13, 1987, the commissioner of the department of children and youth services (DCYS), the previously appointed guardian of Jason, moved to dismiss the petition. The motion to dismiss was granted, and the adoptive parents have appealed. They claim that the trial court erred (1) in holding that the adoptive parents have no standing to petition for termination of their parental rights with respect to a child committed to the DCYS, (2) in holding that a child over the age of fourteen years cannot be estopped to deny *628his consent to a petition for the termination of parental rights, and (3) in holding that the child’s failure to join in the petition did not constitute a waivable jurisdictional defect.

The trial court found inter alia, the following among other facts. Jason was born on October 21,1970, and, the parental rights of his biological parents having been terminated, was adopted by the petitioners on January 12, 1981. After a year of escalating conflicts and runaways, the adoptive parents asked DCYS to place Jason in foster care. On February 8, 1984, the adoptive parents admitted that Jason was homeless and agreed to his commitment to DCYS. The commitment continued to the time of the hearing. In response to a petition for support filed by the bureau of collection services, the adoptive parents agreed to a support order. When no payment was made on the order, the bureau filed a motion for contempt. Two days before the scheduled hearing on the motion, the adoptive parents initiated the action for termination of their parental rights.

DCYS moved to dismiss the petition claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for two reasons. The first claim was that the youth was committed to DCYS at the time of the petition, and the petition was neither brought in the Superior Court for juvenile matters which pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-1211 *629has jurisdiction over such matters, nor was it brought by any of the persons authorized by General Statutes § 17-43a2 to petition for termination of parental rights with reference to a committed child. The second claim was that the minor child had not joined in the petition as required by General Statutes § 45-61c.

In a well reasoned memorandum of decision, the trial court considered the relevant statutory provisions and their legislative history. It then reached the following conclusions: (1) the Superior Court, sitting as a Court *630of Probate following transfer of a contested termination petition filed under § 45-61c, lacks jurisdiction to entertain such petition when the subject child is committed to DCYS under § 46b-129; (2) only DCYS or the attorney for a committed child may file petitions to terminate parental rights of committed children, which petitions must originate in the Superior Court; (3) neither the Probate Court nor the Superior Court may entertain petitions to terminate the parental rights of any child over the age of fourteen who has not affirmatively joined in such petition.

We find that the third of these conclusions is dispositive of this appeal. Even if we assume without deciding that the parents may petition the Court of Probate to terminate their parental rights over a committed child pursuant to the provisions of § 45-61c (a), as the petitioners maintain they are entitled to do, § 45-61c (a) contains the proviso that where the minor child with respect to whom the petition is brought has attained the age of twelve,3 the minor child shall join the petition. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the *631parents may petition the Court of Probate in such circumstances because the petitioners do not assert any authority other than § 45-61c for their petition, and the record is clear that the child was over fourteen and did not join in the petition. The jurisdiction of the Court of Probate is governed entirely by statute and it may only act as authorized by statute. Palmer v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 160 Conn. 415, 428, 279 A.2d 726 (1971). A court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation. Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44 (1963). Where the petition does not show that the minor child joined in the petition, the Court of Probate lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. Since the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, so too did the Superior Court after the transfer to it of the petition, and the court was correct in dismissing the petition.

The claim by petitioner that the statutory requirement that a child of a certain age join in the petition may be satisfied by evidence of the child’s conduct or behavior, or that the child should be estopped from denying consent by his conduct or behavior, we find unpersuasive. The legislative requirement that the child join in the petition is clearly expressed, and we agree with the trial court that this consent cannot be waived by conduct.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.