Taylor v. Taylor
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Schwarz v. Schwarz (Conn. App. Ct. 2010)
- Mihalyak v. Mihalyak (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)
- McKeon v. Lennon (Conn. App. Ct. 2015)
- McKeon v. Lennon (Conn. App. Ct. 2015)
- In re Marriage of Weisbruch (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
- In re Marriage of Weisbruch (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
- McLean v. McLean, No. Fa 91-0104976 (Oct. 1, 1998) (Connecticut Superior Court 1998)
- Diviesta v. Diviesta, Fa95 052561 (Oct. 27, 1997) (Connecticut Superior Court 1997)
- Horan v. Horan, No. 65729 (Jan. 28, 1993) (Connecticut Superior Court 1993)
- Clark v. Clark, No. Fa 77 0044102 (Nov. 9, 1998) (Connecticut Superior Court 1998)
- Muniz v. Kravis, No. Cv 94 0065789 (Sep. 6, 1995) (Connecticut Superior Court 1995)
- Wood v. Wood, No. Fa91 0114454 S (Apr. 11, 1994) (Connecticut Superior Court 1994)
- Genero v. Genero, No. Fa86 23 10 37 S (Jul. 10, 1992) (Connecticut Superior Court 1992)
- Mucherino v. Mucherino, (Sep. 20, 1990) (Connecticut Superior Court 1990)
- In the Matter of Marriage of Tower (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This is the defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion for modification of unallocated alimony and child support, which he filed on the ground of the plaintiff’s cohabitation with another person. The defendant claims the trial court erred in concluding (1) that the plaintiff was not living with another per
The following facts are dispositive of this appeal. The marriage of the parties was dissolved by the Superior Court on October 3,1983, and the parties’ separation agreement was incorporated by reference into the dissolution decree. Article III of the agreement provided that unallocated alimony and support payments would terminate “if the wife shall marry or cohabit prior to June 30, 1991.”
In September, 1986, the plaintiff purchased a house as a joint tenant with right of survivorship with another woman whose marriage had also been dissolved. The plaintiff lives in the house with her two children as does the cotenant and her son. Each woman has her own bedroom and there is no allegation of a sexual relationship between them. Both women and their children share in common all areas of the house with the exception of their respective bedrooms. The women set up a joint checking account from which the mortgage, utilities and household maintenance expenses are paid. Otherwise, each family pays for its own food, clothing and personal expenses.
In seeking modification of the alimony and support order, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was cohabiting with another person as prohibited by the separation agreement. The memorandum of decision discloses, however, that the court did not look to the separation agreement in denying the modification. Rather, it found that the plaintiff was not living together with another person, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86 (b).
We find, however, that the error was harmless because it is evident that the trial court’s analysis would reach the same result if applied to the separation agreement. There, the term “cohabit” was not defined and the court was left to construe it according to its ordinary use. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has defined cohabiting as “a dwelling together of man and woman in the same place in the manner of husband and wife.” Wolk v. Wolk, 191 Conn. 328, 332, 464 A.2d 780 (1983); see also 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adultery and Fornication § 1.
The court’s finding that the plaintiff was not living with another person as expressed in § 46b-86 (b) and as interpreted by our courts; see Lupien v. Lupien, 192 Conn. 443, 472 A.2d 18 (1984); Connolly v. Connolly, supra; Kaplan v. Kaplan, 186 Conn. 387, 441 A.2d 629 (1982); O’Bymachow v. O’Bymachow, 12 Conn. App.
In View of our disposition of the first claim of error, we do not reach the second claim.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 46b-86 (b) provides: “In an action for divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment brought by a husband or wife in which a final judgment has been entered providing for the pay
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.