The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s denial of an application for an order to direct the taking of a deposition in an arbitration proceeding. The plaintiff has filed a complaint for the mismanagement of the deceased’s account against the defendant and has submitted the matter, as required by a prior agreement between the deceased and the defendant, to the department of arbitration of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (arbitration department). The plaintiff seeks to depose the deceased’s broker, Fred C. Leonard, who managed the deceased’s account as part of his duties while employed with the defendant. The defendant refused to allow the taking of Leonard’s deposition and the plaintiff has sought an order to direct the taking of the deposition pursuant .to General Statutes § 52-412.1

*128The trial court denied the plaintiffs application on several grounds. First, the parties agreed to proceed according to the rules of the arbitration department, which do not provide for discovery depositions. Second, § 52-142 (c) does not authorize the taking of discovery depositions, but only evidentiary depositions. The plaintiff failed to show that Leonard would not be available to testify at the arbitration proceeding and did not establish that the deposition was “for use as evidence in an arbitration.” Considering the policies favoring alternative dispute resolutions and the plaintiffs failure to offer any compelling reason for taking Leonard’s deposition, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny the application.2

The parties have voluntarily bound themselves to arbitration according to the rules and procedures of the arbitration department. Because Leonard is a member of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., he may be compelled to appear and testify in this dispute.3 The arbi*129tration department procedures do not, however, provide for discovery depositions. In agreeing to proceed according to arbitration and the arbitration department rules, the parties have limited their access to the full panoply of procedures available in ordinary litigation. Thus, the parties are bound to this limitation by their agreement. See Visselli v. American Fidelity Co., 155 Conn. 622, 625, 237 A.2d 561 (1967).

If an agreement for arbitration lacks any special provisions for the conduct of proceedings then resort may be had to the applicable provisions of General Statutes §§ 52-408 through 52-424. See Marsala v. Valve Corporation of America, 157 Conn. 362, 254 A.2d 469 (1969). If we assume, as the plaintiff argues, that the arbitration department’s omission of provisions relating to depositions would permit a party to resort to § 52-412 (c), the deposition would nonetheless be limited for “use as evidence in an arbitration.” The trial court specifically found that the plaintiff had not shown that Leonard was unavailable for the arbitration proceedings, and therefore the deposition request was purely for discovery purposes.

In denying the plaintiff’s application, the trial court exercised its sound discretion, in accord with this state’s public policy, favoring arbitration so as to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and vexation of ordinary litigation. See Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police Local 1159, 183 Conn. 102, 107, 438 A.2d 1171 (1981).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.