The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered after the defendant’s conditional plea of nolo contendere1 to two counts of *251assault in the first degree, one count of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree, and one count of criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress* 2 certain evi*252dence that he claimed resulted from telephone conversations intercepted in violation of the Connecticut wiretapping statutes, General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. We are not persuaded and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

It is alleged in count one of the information that the defendant conspired with a number of other persons, including Pedro Milan and other gang members, to commit assault in the first degree. In the second and third counts of the information, the defendant is accused of having aided and abetted in the commission of an assault in the first degree against Jose Garcia and Edwin Nunez. In the fourth count of the information, the defendant is accused of criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree against Hector Vasquez. The conspiracy is alleged to have occurred in Waterbury or Meriden during April, 1992, and the assaults are alleged to have occurred in Meriden on April 26, 1992.

After a full evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court found the following facts. During the month of April, 1992, Milan was an inmate at the federal prison at Raybrook, New York. Milan had been incarcerated in a Pennsylvania state prison, as well as in another federal prison, before his transfer to Raybrook. When Milan was taken into the prison at Raybrook, he was advised that telephone calls made from the prison were monitored. This information was given to Milan in writing, and he signed a document that acknowledged the fact that telephone calls made from the prison were monitored and recorded. Additionally, a sign in both English and Spanish was located at each telephone in the prison, advising the person using the telephone that all calls were monitored and recorded.

The prison facility at Raybrook consisted of five housing units. Each unit had four telephones. The device *253that monitored and recorded the telephone calls made by the inmates ran twenty-four hours a day and could record all twenty telephones simultaneously.

The monitoring system in place at the prison was a hotel-motel system. Any inmate who wanted to make an outside call would pick up one of the twenty telephones in the institution and place a collect call. The operators who placed the calls for the inmates were New York Telephone Company employees and not employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

When an inmate picked up a telephone receiver, the recording started immediately, without regard to whether anyone was speaking. The telephone number called by an inmate was recorded when it was dialed. The recording could be retrieved by computer and transcribed. When an inmate hung up the telephone, the recording stopped.

When Milan was sent to the institution at Raybrook, Lieutenant Michael Cross, the special investigative supervisor at the prison, was notified that Milan was a high profile inmate and that Cross was required to monitor him. Milan’s calls were monitored and recorded, and no effort was made to minimize either the recording or monitoring.

The trial court found that the defendant’s motion to suppress was based solely on noncompliance with the Connecticut wiretapping statutes.3 The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The court found that the Connecticut wiretapping statutes do not apply to this interception because it occurred in a federal prison in New York state, and the Connecticut wiretapping statutes have no extraterritorial effect.

The defendant, at oral argument in the trial court, expressly eschewed any constitutional privacy claim as *254the basis for the motion to suppress.4 Further, the trial court determined that, had it been called on to decide the privacy issue, it would have found that Milan consented to having his telephone calls from prison monitored and recorded.

I

As the defendant has suggested, we must determine as a threshold matter whether this appeal is properly before the court under General Statutes § 54-94a.5 The statute limits appeals under a conditional plea of nolo contendere to those situations where a motion to suppress is predicated on an unreasonable search or seizure or on the involuntariness of a statement. The defendant claims that because his statements were recorded in violation of the Connecticut wiretapping statutes, there was an unreasonable search and seizure and § 54-94a applies.

We do not resolve this issue on that basis, however, but conclude that this appeal is properly before us under the provisions of Practice Book § 4003 (b).6 “If, at any time before the close of evidence—in short, either before or after the commencement of trial—the court denies any motion of the defendant, including but not limited to a motion specified in subsection (a), the provisions of subsection (b) come into play. In that instance, in order for the defendant to secure appellate review of the ruling without going through a full trial, *255the following requirements apply: (1) the defendant must reserve in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of the adverse determination made by the trial court; (2) the motion [that yielded the adverse determination] must be specified in such written reservation; (3) the trial court must give its approval; (4) the ruling must have had a significant impact on the disposition of the case; and (5) there must be an adequate record for appellate review. Practice Book § 4003 (b).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Piorkowski, 236 Conn. 388, 418, 672 A.2d 921 (1996). We conclude that the conditions have been met, and that this appeal is properly before us pursuant to Practice Book § 4003 (b).

II

The defendant asserts that the trial court improperly determined that the Connecticut wiretapping statutes have no extraterritorial effect and thus do not apply to telephone calls that originate from a federal prison in New York state. We disagree.

We turn first to an examination of the Connecticut wiretapping statutes to determine whether they can be interpreted to regulate wiretap practices in other states. We conclude that the statutes regulate only practices within this state and do not apply to wire interceptions conducted outside the territorial limits of the state of Connecticut. General Statutes § 54-41b7 permits “[t]he Chief State’s Attorney or the state’s attorney for the judicial district in which the interception is to be con*256ducted” to make application to a panel of judges for an authorization to conduct the interception of wire communications. See State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 26, 404 A.2d 873 (1978). The panel of judges may authorize the interception of wire communications “within the state of Connecticut.” See General Statutes § 54-41d.8 Thus, it is clear that the Connecticut wiretapping statutes are designed to regulate the interception of wire communications within the state of Connecticut, and not to regulate the method that a sister state or the federal government may employ in regulating the interception of wire communications under their respective jurisdictions.

“To determine the intent of the legislature, we first consider whether the statutory language yields a plain and unambiguous resolution. . . .If the words are clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that [they] express the intention of the legislature . . . and we need inquire no further. . . . The words of a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning unless their context dictates otherwise.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mattioli, 210 Conn. 573, 576, 556 A.2d 584 (1989).

The clear and unambiguous language of General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. leads us to conclude that the legislature did not intend an extraterritorial application of our wiretapping statutes. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court correctly determined that the Connecticut wiretapping statutes were inapplicable to a wire communication interception that occurred at a federal prison in New York state, and thus the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.9

*257The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.