Opinion

This case, in which the plaintiff claims that she was injured while participating in a tennis tournament on municipally owned property, comes to us on remand from our Supreme Court. Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 680 A. 2d 242 (1996) (Conway II). The Supreme Court reversed our decision in Conway v. Wilton, 39 Conn. App. 280, 664 A.2d 327 (1995) (Conway I), in which we held that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants in light of Manning v. Barenz, 221 Conn. 256, 603 A.2d 399 (1992). In Manning, our Supreme Court determined that a municipality could be immune from *19liability pursuant to the Recreational Land Use Act (act), General Statutes §§ 52-557f through 52-557h,1 if it met the requirements of the act. Id.

*20In Conway II, however, the court reversed Manning and held that the legislature never intended for the act to confer immunity on municipalities. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed Conway I and remanded the case to us with direction to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings as to the defendant town and the defendant parks and recreation director. As to the remaining defendant, the Connecticut Association of Secondary Schools (association), the Supreme Court directed us to consider “whether the association is an ‘owner’ under § 52-557f (3) in order to define the scope of the association’s liability . . . .” The Supreme Court stated that this question arises because it did not certify any question as to “what duty the association would owe if Manning is indeed overruled, thereby stripping the town of its immunity, and concomitantly, whether the association can nevertheless be an ‘owner’ under the act even though it has not opened its property to the public. Although the Appellate Court concluded that the association was an ‘owner’ under the act; [Conway I], supra, 39 Conn. App. 287; that decision was made in the context of our holding in Manning, which we have now overruled.” Conway II, supra, 238 Conn. 681.2 We now conclude that the summary judgment in favor of the association should be reversed because Conway II creates potential issues of material fact that are different from those addressed by the trial court in Conway I.

The relevant facts are set out in Conway II, supra, 238 Conn. 655. “The plaintiff, Amy Jeanne Conway, *21brought this action against the town of Wilton (town), David Dixon, the parks and recreation director for the town, and the [association], for personal injuries sustained while participating in a state high school tennis tournament sponsored by the association on premises owned by the town. The plaintiff alleged that on June 9,1986, the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (conference) held a championship tennis tournament for high school girls at the Wilton High School tennis courts. No fee had been charged for the use of the tennis courts. The plaintiff further alleged that, while competing in the tournament, she fell as a result of a defect in the courts and sustained serious injuries to her knee and ankle. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that the proximate cause of her injuries was the negligence of Dixon and his staff in maintaining the tennis courts, and the negligence of the association in failing to inspect the courts in order to ensure that the town repair any unsafe conditions and in failing to supervise the administration of the tournament.”

In Conway II, the Supreme Court held that the word “owner,” as used in § 52-5571 (3), contains a latent ambiguity. After a comprehensive review of the legislative history, the court concluded that the legislature intended that “owner” means “private, not municipal, fee owners.” Id., 676. In addition, because municipalities “are in the business of providing parks, pools, ball fields, etcetera, the legislature had less incentive to dangle the carrot of immunity to encourage municipalities to do what they historically have always done.” Id., 671-72. “At the time the act was enacted, the legislature was interested in increasing the availability of land for public recreational use. . . . Consequently, municipalities would have had to identify additional land and pay large sums to purchase and maintain it in order to accomplish that goal had the legislation not succeeded. The legislature’s sole motive [in granting immunity] was *22to encourage private citizens to donate their land as an alternative to this costly enterprise.” Id., 673.

The association conducted the tennis tournament at a recreation facility owned by a municipality. On the basis of the municipal-private owner dichotomy that underpins Conway II, we conclude that it is necessary to know the nature of the association, its functions and its relationship to the municipality before we can determine whether the act applies.

The material fact about which the trial court found there was no genuine issue was whether the association was in control of the premises during the relevant time period. Such control was conceded3 by the plaintiff for purposes of the act. At that time, there were no issues as to what kind of entity the association is or what its relationship to the municipality was. The plaintiff contended in the trial court and in this court that the association was subject to liability despite its control of the premises pursuant to the act.

We are persuaded that Conway II creates other potential issues of material fact that are relevant to the question of immunity for the association. Whether the association is funded by municipalities, whether it performs municipal functions and whether it acts as an agent of the municipalities that it serves are among the factual issues that could be relevant in determining whether immunity is consistent with the purpose of the recreational use statute as interpreted by our Supreme Court.

*23The question presented to us on remand is one of law. It requires, however, a factual predicate involving a material fact that can be established only in the trial court. Although the remand does not specifically direct us to remand any issues with respect to the association to the trial court,4 we construe the order as implicitly allowing a remand to the trial court if necessary.

The summary judgment in favor of the defendants is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.