Paul v. McPhee Electrical Contractors

*19 Opinion

The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the apportionment defendants’ motion to strike the apportionment complaint. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly held that (1) pursuant to General Statutes § 52-1021),1 a defendant sued in negligence could not implead apportionment defendants under a product liability theory, and (2) pursuant to the Product Liability Act, General Statutes § 52-572m et seq., the defendant was not a “product seller” and thus the defendant had no right to implead third party defendants for indemnification purposes.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The underlying facts are as follows. The plaintiff, Carla Paul, was struck in the head by a light fixture that fell from the ceiling of the Foxwoods Casino, a building located on reservation land of the Mashan-tucket Pequot Tribe. The plaintiff made a claim against the tribe in the tribal court. She also brought a claim in Superior Court against the defendant, McPhee Elec*20trical Contractors, which had installed the light fixture in question.3 The defendant impleaded Lighting Affiliates Ltd., the seller of the light fixture, and Lightolier Company, Inc., the manufacturer of the light fixture. The defendant did not move for permission to implead under General Statutes § 52-102a,4 but served an apportionment complaint on the apportionment defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102b.5 In the apportionment complaint, the defendant claimed that pursuant to the Product Liability Act,6 the apportionment defendants were hable for an apportionment of damages claimed by the plaintiff, as well as for indemnification. The apportionment defendants moved to strike the apportionment complaint. The trial court granted the apportionment defendants’ motion to strike. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly held that, pursuant to § 52-102b,7 a defendant in a negligence claim brought under General Statutes § 52-572h cannot implead apportionment defendants on the basis of a product liability theory. We are unpersuaded.

*21Subsection (a) of § 52-102b provides in relevant part: “A defendant in any civil action to which section 52-572h applies may serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable pursuant to said section for a proportionate share of the plaintiffs damages in which case the demand for relief shall seek an apportionment of liability. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Subsection (f) of § 52-102b further provides: “This section shall be the exclusive means by which a defendant may add a person who is or may be liable pursuant to section 52-572h for a proportionate share of the plaintiffs damages as a party to the action.” Thus, the statute unambiguously provides that a defendant may implead apportionment defendants under § 52-102b only if they are liable on a negligence basis pursuant to § 52-572h.

Here, the defendant attempted to use § 52-102b to implead apportionment defendants liable, if at all, only under § 52-572m et seq., the Product Liability Act. A product liability claim is exclusively controlled by § 52-572m et seq., and thus can never be a claim arising under § 52-572h. See General Statutes § 52-572n (a);8 Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., 212 Conn. 462, 469-71, 562 A.2d 517 (1989); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 570-72, 512 A.2d 893 (1986).

We are not called upon to decide whether it would be good policy to permit negligence defendants to implead apportionment defendants on product liability theories. What we are called upon to do is to construe a statute, and “[w]e must construe the act as we find it, without reference to whether we think it would have been or could be improved by the inclusion of other provisions. *22. . . Where statutory language is clearly expressed, as here, courts must apply the legislative enactment according to the plain terms and cannot read into the terms of a statute something which manifestly is not there in order to reach what the court thinks would be a just result.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 315, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S. Ct. 813, 88 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1986).

Section 52-102b is clear and unambiguous. Section 52-102b sets forth its exclusive application for apportionment purposes and restricts its applicability to claims under § 52-572h. The defendant’s apportionment complaint is not within the ambit of the statutory parameters. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly granted the motion to strike the apportionment complaint.8 9

II

The defendant next argues that the trial court improperly held that he had no right to implead third party defendants for indemnification under General Statutes § 52-577a (b). The defendant specifically argues that he qualifies as a “product seller” under the Product Liability Act, and thus, under that act, he has the right to implead third party defendants for indemnification. We disagree.

*23Section 52-577a (b) provides that in any product liability claim “a product seller may implead any third party who is or may be liable for all or part of the claimant’s claim . ...” A “product seller” in a product liability case is defined in General Statutes § 52-572m (a) as “any person or entity, including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer who is engaged in the business of selling such products whether the sale is for resale or for use or consumption. The term ‘product seller’ also includes lessors or bailors of products who are engaged in the business of leasing or bailment of products.” (Emphasis added.)

Here, the defendant installed the light fixture at issue. Nowhere is it alleged that the defendant was in the business of selling or leasing light fixtures, or was engaged in the bailment of such light fixtures, or was involved in placing light fixtures into the stream of commerce. See Rodia v. Tesco Corp., 11 Conn. App. 391, 396, 527 A.2d 721 (1987). The defendant, thus, was not a product seller as that term is defined in § 52-572m (a) and used in § 52-577a (b). We conclude, therefore, that under § 52-577a (b), the defendant did not have the right to implead third party defendants for indemnification purposes, and thus the trial court properly struck the indemnification claim contained in the defendant’s apportionment complaint.10

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.