dissenting. While I agree that the matter should be reversed and remanded, I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to consider this appeal on its merits and to remand it for “further consideration of the exemption claim.”

“If a party shall fail to defend against an appeal with proper diligence, the court may set aside in whole or in part the judgment under attack, with costs, and direct the entry of an appropriate final judgment by the trial court against the party guilty of the failure. . . .” Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 85-1, formerly § 4184A. Other “[ajctions which may result in the imposition of sanctions include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Failure to comply with rules and orders of the court. . . .” Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 85-2, formerly § 4184B.

In addition to the power to sanction conferred by published rules of the court, courts have an inherent *510power that exists independently of the rules “because of the control that must necessarily be vested in courts in order for them to be able to manage their own affairs so as to achieve an orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Srager v. Koenig, 42 Conn. App. 617, 620, 681 A.2d 323, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 935, 936, 684 A.2d 709 (1996); Feuerman v. Feuerman, 39 Conn. App. 775, 777, 667 A.2d 802 (1995). The inherent powers of courts are those that are necessary to the exercise of all others. In the Matter of Presnick, 19 Conn. App. 340, 347, 563 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 801, 567 A.2d 833 (1989).

By failing to file a brief and by failing to appear before this court on February 25, 1998, the defendant, an attorney, has not only failed to defend against this appeal with proper diligence, but has also shown his disregard of appellate procedure and lack of respect for this court.

I would set aside the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with direction to deny the defendant’s claim of exemption from execution.

Opinion

The plaintiff, the commissioner of environmental protection (commissioner), appeals from the trial court’s order exempting certain moneys of the defendant, James F. Altham, Jr., from execution. Ultimately, two bank executions were issued, one which was untimely and one timely served. The trial court held that the moneys were exempt from execution because, for a period of time, the moneys were improperly held as a result of the untimely execution. On appeal, the commissioner claims that the trial court improperly created an exemption not otherwise provided for by statute. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On January 31, 1992, the trial court, Hon. Norris L. O’Neill, judge trial referee, found that Altham had violated Connecticut hazardous waste laws and regulations in connection with his company. Judgment issued against Altham in the form of injunctive relief and $18,000 in civil penalties. Altham failed to pay the civil penalties, and the commissioner applied for a bank execution to levy Altham’s funds.

*505On February 3, 1997, the trial court issued a bank execution in the amount of $18,000, which was not served on Altham’s bank until April 29, 1997. On May 21,1997, Altham sent a facsimile of his exemption claim form to the bank, which the bank properly forwarded to the Superior Court. A hearing on these issues was held before the trial court, Berger, J., on August 25, 1997. At this time, the trial court questioned the timeliness of the service of the execution on the funds. On August 29, 1997, the trial court determined that the service of the first bank execution by the sheriff was untimely and, therefore, void.

On August 26,1997, prior to his knowledge of the trial court’s ruling on the first execution, the commissioner applied for and received a second bank execution to levy Altham’s funds. Altham was notified on August 29, 1997, of the second execution, and on September 11, 1997, Altham properly filed an exemption claim form asserting that the funds were exempt from execution because the moneys had been improperly held by the first execution.

On October 20, 1997, a hearing on the second execution was held before Judge Berger. The trial court ruled that the funds should be exempt from the second execution because but for the fact that the funds had been held improperly under a stale execution, the funds would have been available to Altham to spend. The trial court reasoned that if the funds had been available, they would not have existed at the time the second execution was served. Therefore, the moneys should not now be subject to a properly served execution.1 *506The trial court signed the hearing transcript in accordance with Practice Book § 4059, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 64-1 (a) (6), in lieu of filing a memorandum of decision. The commissioner appeals from that judgment.

On February 25, 1998, the parties were ordered to appear before this court to explain why Altham had not filed a brief in response to the commissioner’s appellate brief. Altham failed to appear, and the commissioner requested, as a sanction, that this court vacate the trial court judgment pursuant to Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 85-1, formerly § 4184A, and Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 85-2, formerly § 4184B.2 This court declined the commissioner’s request; however, we ordered that the appeal be considered on the basis of the commissioner’s brief and the record only, thereby precluding Altham, the appellee, from presenting oral argument. The order *507from this court stated: “It appearing that this appeal has not been defended with proper diligence, it is hereby ordered, sua sponte, that the appeal will be considered on the basis of the appellant’s brief and the record only. The appellee will not be allowed to present oral argument.”

“[General Statutes §] 52-367b governs the execution against debts due from banks. Once a judgment debtor claims an exemption from execution pursuant to § 52-367b (e),3 the court must schedule a short calendar hearing on the exemption claim. The exemption claim filed by the debtor is considered prima facie evidence that the claimed exemption exists. General Statutes § 52-367b (f). The court, after conducting this hearing, must decide whether the exemption claim is meritorious; General Statutes § 52-367b (i); and, if so, whether all or only part of the money deposited in the subject account is exempt. General Statutes § 52-367b Q).” People’s Bank v. Perkins, 22 Conn. App. 260, 262-63, 576 A.2d 1313, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 813, 580 A.2d 58 (1990).

Section 52-367b sets forth the circumstances under which execution against debts due to a creditor, which are held by a banking institution, may be levied. Section 52-367b (a) provides in relevant part that “[ejxecution may be granted pursuant to this section against any debts due from any banking institution to a judgment debtor who is a natural person, except to the extent such debts are protected from execution by [statute] *508. . . .” Here, the trial court improperly created an exemption not otherwise provided by statute. People’s Bank v. Perkins, supra, 22 Conn. App. 260. Specifically, the trial court found that the entire account was exempt from execution because of the proceedings related to the service of the first execution, which was untimely and therefore improper. This exemption is not provided for in the General Statutes. To the contrary, General Statutes § 52-352b sets forth the list of statutory exemptions.4 We conclude that the trial court’s exemption is *509not provided for by statute and, accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further consideration of the exemption claim.

In this opinion LAVERY, J., concurred.