*568The defendant, Frank McGee, appeals following the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly rejected his claim that the imposition of separate sentences upon him on two counts of robbery in the second degree, each prosecuted in connection with the robbery of a single victim, but under a different subdivision of the second degree robbery statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-135 (a), violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy. We are not persuaded.

The following factual background and procedural history are relevant to our consideration of the defendant's claim on appeal. The defendant was charged in a seven count substitute information as follows: in count one, with larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123(a)(3) ; in count two, with robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a-135 (a) (1); in count three, with robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a-135 (a) (2); in count four, with conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48(a) and 53a-135(a)(2) ; in count five, with sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a(a)(1)(A) ; in count six, with sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a(a)(2) ; and in count seven, with breach of the peace in *497the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181(a)(3).1 *569Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on both counts of robbery in the second degree and on the separate counts charging him with conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and breach of the peace in the second degree. He was acquitted on the individual counts charging him with larceny in the second degree and sexual assault in the third degree. Thereafter, on July 8, 2008, the defendant was sentenced as follows: on each count of robbery in the second degree, to a term of ten years of incarceration, to run concurrently with his other sentence for second degree robbery; on the count of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree, to a term of ten years of incarceration, to run consecutively to his sentences for second degree robbery; and on the counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree and breach of the peace in the second degree, to terms of one year of incarceration and six months of incarceration, respectively, to run concurrently with his sentence for conspiracy to commit second degree robbery, for a total effective sentence of twenty years of incarceration. The defendant's convictions were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. McGee , 124 Conn.App. 261, 4 A.3d 837, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 911, 10 A.3d 529 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 945, 131 S.Ct. 2114, 179 L.Ed.2d 908 (2011).

In its opinion on direct appeal, this court summarized the facts underlying the defendant's convictions as follows: "At approximately 1 a.m. on March 23, 2007, the victims, D and T, were on Pine Street in Waterbury, where they purchased a small amount of cocaine from an unidentified individual. Soon thereafter, a silver Lexus, driven by the defendant, pulled up to the victims. When the victims started to drive away in D's car, the defendant continued to follow them closely until D

*570pulled over and the victims got out of the car. The defendant began asking D and T if they wanted to 'get shot.' The defendant reached into his car, took out a case and told D and T that he had something for them. D and T both testified that they assumed that there was a gun in the black case. The defendant started going through D's pockets and found $6, which he took from him. The defendant then searched T for cocaine by placing his hands on different parts of her body. He lifted up her shirt and began touching T's breasts roughly under her bra, which later caused bruising to that area. D went to his home, two houses away, and called 911. Police officers arrived and found a car matching the description given by D on Congress Avenue. D and T went to Congress Avenue and positively identified the defendant and the other occupants of his car, who were arrested." (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 263-64, 4 A.3d 837.

On July 5, 2015, seven years after his sentencing, the defendant, acting on his own behalf, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his motion, the defendant alleged that "the imposition of sentences for both robbery convictions violates the multiple punishment prohibition of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution because both convictions [on the two separate (subdivisions) of § 53a-135(a) ] relate *498to one robbery."2 The defendant argued, in his motion to correct, that the two subdivisions of the robbery in the second degree statute under which he was charged and convicted were alternative ways of committing a single criminal offense, and thus *571that his "right against double jeopardy [was] violated when he was sentenced for two counts of robbery in the second degree in this case."3 (Emphasis added.)

Subsequently, under the procedure prescribed by State v. Casiano , 282 Conn. 614, 627, 922 A.2d 1065 (2007),4 a public defender appointed by the court conducted a preliminary analysis of the defendant's double jeopardy claim and concluded, under the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932),5 that there was a sound *572basis for that claim, and thus that counsel should be appointed to represent the defendant on his motion to correct. Counsel concluded her analysis as follows: "[B]ecause the defendant was convicted and sentenced [for] two robberies that arose out of the same act, the defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted and sentenced [for] two counts of robbery. As a result, the court must vacate one of the robbery convictions and sentences."

After counsel was appointed, the court conducted a hearing on the merits of the *499defendant's motion to correct. Thereafter, by memorandum of decision filed October 7, 2015, the trial court dismissed the defendant's motion on the ground that the defendant's convictions on two counts of robbery in the second degree did not violate his right against double jeopardy because the defendant's conduct in committing the robbery in question constituted two separate criminal offenses. In reaching this determination, the court expressly relied on Blockburger v. United States , supra, 284 U.S. at 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, as applied by this court in State v. Underwood , 142 Conn.App. 666, 64 A.3d 1274, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 927, 78 A.3d 146 (2013), in which we determined that imposing separate sentences for attempted robbery in the first degree in connection with a single attempted robbery, based on separate charges brought under different subdivisions of the attempt and first degree robbery statutes, General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-134, did not violate the defendant's double jeopardy rights. Id., at 683, 64 A.3d 1274. This appeal followed.

Practice Book § 43-22 provides that "[t]he judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition *573made in an illegal manner." Our Supreme Court has stated that an "illegal sentence is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence , 281 Conn. 147, 156, 913 A.2d 428 (2007).6 *574*500"Ordinarily, a claim that the trial court improperly denied a defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence is reviewed pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard. ... In the present case, however, the defendant's claim presents a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary." (Citations omitted.) State v. Tabone , 279 Conn. 527, 534, 902 A.2d 1058 (2006). "In undertaking this interpretation, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital , 308 Conn. 338, 355-56, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). *575"Double jeopardy attaches where multiple punishments are imposed for the same offense in a single trial. ... The question to be resolved is whether the two offenses charged are actually one." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago , 145 Conn.App. 374, 380-81, 74 A.3d 571, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 942, 79 A.3d 893 (2013). "Traditionally we have applied the [test set out in Blockburger v. United States , supra, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180 ] to determine whether two statutes criminalize the same offense. ... Under that test, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. ... This test is a technical one and examines only the statutes, charging instruments, and bill of particulars as opposed to the evidence presented at trial. ... Thus, [t]he issue, though essentially constitutional, becomes one of statutory construction." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Alvaro F ., 291 Conn. 1, 7, 966 A.2d 712, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 882, 130 S.Ct. 200, 175 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009).

"Our analysis of [the defendant's] double jeopardy [claim] does not end, however, with a comparison of the offenses. The Blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction, and because it serves as a means of discerning [legislative] purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of *501contrary legislative intent. ... Thus, the Blockburger test creates only a rebuttable presumption of legislative intent, [and] the test is not controlling when a contrary intent is manifest. ... When the conclusion reached under Blockburger is that the two crimes do not constitute the same offense, the burden remains on the defendant to demonstrate a clear legislative intent to the contrary." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 12-13, 966 A.2d 712. *576In this case, the state agrees that the first prong of Blockburger is satisfied because the defendant's conviction of two counts of robbery in the second degree arose out of the same act or transaction, the robbery of D. The state claims, however, that the defendant's claim fails under the second prong of Blockburger because each robbery offense charged in the information, of which the defendant was convicted, requires proof of a fact the other does not. We agree.7

In considering the defendant's double jeopardy challenge, we are guided by State v. Underwood , supra, 142 Conn.App. at 666, 64 A.3d 1274, wherein this court rejected the defendant's claim that two convictions for attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, arising out of a single act or transaction against a single victim, under two subdivisions of General Statutes § 53a-134(a), the first degree robbery statute, violated his right against double jeopardy. The court reasoned: "To convict the defendant of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree under §§ 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-134(a)(1), the state was required to prove, as alleged in count three *577of the information, that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state and took a substantial step toward committing first degree robbery, and that he or another, during the attempted robbery or flight therefrom, '[c]ause[d] serious physical injury' to a nonparticipant in the crime. To convict the defendant of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree under §§ 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-134(a)(2), the state was required to prove, as alleged in count one of the information, that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state and took a substantial step toward committing first degree robbery, and that he or another, during the attempted robbery or flight therefrom, was 'armed with a deadly weapon ....' Count three did not require the defendant to use a deadly weapon to cause serious physical injury, and count one did not require that serious physical injury was caused by the defendant being armed with a deadly weapon. Because each of the charged offenses requires proof of an element the other does not, the charges against and subsequent conviction of the defendant of two counts of attempted first *502degree robbery did not violate the defendant's right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense pursuant to the Blockburger test." Id., at 683-84, 64 A.3d 1274.

Similarly, it is clear from the plain language of the relevant portions of § 53a-135(a)(1) and (2), as charged in this case, that each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not. To satisfy the elements of § 53a-135(a)(1), the state was required to prove that, while committing a robbery in violation of General Statutes § 53a-133, the defendant was aided by another person actually present at the time. To convict the defendant under § 53a-135(a)(2), by contrast, the state was required to prove that, in the course of commission of a robbery in violation of § 53a-133, he or another participant in the crime displayed or threatened the use of what he represented by his words or conduct to *578be a deadly weapon. Because each of these statutory subdivisions requires proof of different facts-subsection (a) (1) requiring proof that the defendant was aided by another person actually present, but not that he or another participant displayed or threatened the use of what he represented by his words or conduct to be a deadly weapon, and subsection (a) (2) requiring proof that the defendant or another participant in the robbery displayed or threatened the use of what he represented by his words or conduct to be a deadly weapon, but not that he was aided by another person actually present-they are two separate offenses. Moreover, § 53a-135 contains no language indicating the legislature's intent to bar multiple punishments for the perpetrators of single second degree robberies who, in committing such offenses, violate multiple subdivisions of the second degree robbery statute, and the defendant has failed to direct this court to any evidence of such a legislative intent.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the defendant was properly sentenced on two separate counts of robbery in the second degree in connection with the robbery he committed on March 23, 2007, without violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Because, however, the defendant's claim that the two sentences were imposed upon him for one second degree robbery was a procedurally proper double jeopardy claim over which the court had jurisdiction on a motion to correct, the court should have denied, rather than dismissed, his motion to correct. See State v. Santiago , supra, 145 Conn.App. at 379-80, 74 A.3d 571.

The form of judgment is improper, the judgment of dismissal is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to deny the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.

In this opinion DiPENTIMA, C.J., concurred.

*579Finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the motion to correct an illegal sentence filed by the defendant, Frank McGee, my colleagues in the majority analyze the defendant's claim on the merits and, finding none, reverse the court's dismissal and remand the case to the trial court with direction to deny the motion. Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear this motion, as I view it as no more than a collateral attack on the defendant's conviction.1 Therefore, I would affirm the *503dismissal of the motion, albeit not for the reasons stated by the trial court.

This case began with the July 5, 2015 filing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence by the (then) self-represented defendant. In that motion, the defendant claimed that his sentences for two counts of robbery in the second degree were illegal because they constituted two punishments for the commission of one offense. Nowhere in his motion did he make any argument that his sentences, themselves, violated double jeopardy *580except for his argument that they flowed from convictions that he claimed violated his right not to be convicted twice for one offense.

Also, it is notable that nowhere in his motion or any of the supporting documents that he filed, either personally or through counsel, did the defendant specify the relief he sought except by the caption of his motion to "correct an illegal sentence." After being appointed, pursuant to State v. Casiano , 282 Conn. 614, 627-28, 922 A.2d 1065 (2007), to review the defendant's petition, counsel filed a report in which she indicated her belief that there was a sound basis to the motion. Counsel's analysis consisted entirely of a discussion of whether the offenses of which the defendant was convicted were, in fact, the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. From her analysis, counsel concluded that the two counts of robbery constituted only one offense and, therefore, the defendant's double jeopardy rights were violated when he was convicted and sentenced on both counts. In reaching this conclusion, counsel asserted no claim that the sentences, themselves, violated double jeopardy apart from the fact that they flowed from flawed convictions. On the basis of her assessment, counsel concluded: "As a result, the court must vacate one of the robbery convictions and sentences."2

With respect to the relief the defendant seeks, his brief provides no more illumination than his motion or counsel's sound basis analysis. While the defendant repeats his claim that his double jeopardy rights were *581violated when he was sentenced for two counts of robbery in the second degree, his entire analysis focuses on whether his underlying conduct constituted two offenses, as charged and found by the jury, or simply two alternative ways of committing the same offense. In the concluding portion of his brief, the defendant states: "For the same reasons articulated by [the Appellate Court] and the Supreme Court, the defendant's conviction for two counts of robbery, second, violates the double jeopardy clause by receiving multiple punishments for the same crime."3 *504I first turn to the general principles that guide my analysis of the court's lack of jurisdiction to hear the defendant's motion. At common law, once a court renders a judgment of conviction and sentences a defendant, the court loses jurisdiction over the defendant and the sentence, unless the court expressly has been authorized to act. State v. Lawrence , 281 Conn. 147, 154, 913 A.2d 428 (2007). We know, as well, that there *582is no legislative or constitutional grant of continuing jurisdiction to give the trial court power to correct a sentence. Id. Finally, we know that there is, however, a common-law exception to this rule, which permits a court, at any time, to correct an illegal sentence. Id., at 154-55, 913 A.2d 428. Practice Book § 43-22 is the embodiment of that common-law exception. It provides: "The judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner."4 Practice Book § 43-22. *505It is axiomatic in Connecticut jurisprudence that "Practice Book rules do not ordinarily define subject *583matter jurisdiction. General Statutes § 51-14(a) authorizes the judges of the Superior Court to promulgate rules regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings .... Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence , supra, 281 Conn. at 155, 913 A.2d 428. Thus, "[b]ecause the judiciary cannot confer jurisdiction on itself through its own rule-making power, [Practice Book] § 43-22 is limited by the common-law rule that a trial court may not modify a sentence if the sentence was valid and its execution has begun. ... Therefore, for the trial court to have jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claim of an illegal sentence, the claim must fall into one of the categories of claims that, under the common law, the court has jurisdiction to review." (Citation omitted.) Id.

Our decisional law teaches that there are four categories of claims cognizable under Practice Book § 43-22. "[A]n illegal sentence is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory. ... In accordance with this summary, Connecticut courts have considered four categories of claims pursuant to § 43-22. The first category has addressed whether the sentence was within the permissible range for the crimes charged. ... The second category has considered violations of the prohibition against double jeopardy. ... The third category has involved claims pertaining to the computation of the length of the sentence and the question of consecutive or concurrent prison time. ... The fourth category has involved questions as to which sentencing statute was applicable." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 156-57, 913 A.2d 428.5

*584*507From my review of decisional law on this topic, it is apparent that confusion abounds on the question of the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear a motion to correct an illegal sentence. On one hand, there is a stream of cases which hold that the focus of a motion to correct an illegal sentence must be on the sentencing procedure and not on the trial proceedings. But, there is also a countercurrent of cases which appear to suggest that a motion to correct an illegal sentence may properly be utilized to correct dual convictions for single offenses. The disarray is palpable from the number of reversals by this court on the basis of our determination, on review, that the trial court either incorrectly determined it had no jurisdiction when it did, or it exercised jurisdiction when it was lacking.6 My colleagues in the *585majority *508have not righted the ship. Thus, our course in this jurisprudence remains aimless, lending confusion and uncertainty to litigants and the trial bench as well. It is high time to find the proper course.

We and our Supreme Court, have opined that a motion to correct an illegal sentence must focus on the sentencing proceedings, and may not be used as a collateral attack on one's conviction. In State v. Mollo , 63 Conn.App. 487, 776 A.2d 1176, cert. denied, 257 Conn. 904, 777 A.2d 194 (2001), we affirmed the trial court's decision holding that Practice Book § 43-22 does not authorize the trial court to vacate a conviction. In Mollo , we concluded: "The defendant does not claim that the court imposed the sentence in an illegal manner but, rather, that the concept of illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 includes any sentence based on a voidable conviction. We do not agree." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 491, 776 A.2d 1176. In State v. Koslik , 116 Conn.App. 693, 977 A.2d 275, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 930, 980 A.2d 916 (2009), we expressly followed Mollo and observed: "Our Supreme Court has concluded that to invoke successfully the court's jurisdiction with respect to a claim of an illegal sentence, the focus cannot be on what occurred during the underlying conviction. ... In order for the court to have jurisdiction *586over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed, the sentencing proceeding, and not the trial leading to the conviction, must be the subject of the attack." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 699, 977 A.2d 275.

Later, in State v. Smith , 150 Conn.App. 623, 92 A.3d 975, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 904, 99 A.3d 1169 (2014), we reaffirmed our view of the narrow scope of Practice Book § 43-22 in our statement that: "The purpose of ... [Practice Book] § 43-22 is not to attack the validity of a conviction by setting it aside but, rather to correct an illegal sentence or disposition, or one imposed or made in an illegal manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 635, 92 A.3d 975 ; accord State v. Starks , 121 Conn.App. 581, 591-92, 997 A.2d 546 (2010). The same point was made, again, in a slightly different manner in State v. Saunders , 132 Conn.App. 268, 270, 50 A.3d 321 (2011), cert. denied, 303 Conn. 924, 34 A.3d 394 (2012) ; accord State v. Parker , 295 Conn. 825, 835, 992 A.2d 1103 (2010). In State v. Saunders , supra, 132 Conn.App. at 271, 50 A.3d 321, we restated language found in Mollo that "the relief allowed by ... [Practice Book] § 43-22... require[s], as a precondition, a valid conviction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

We have held, as well, that the fact that the defendant frames his motion as an attack on his sentence, if, in reality, his focus is on his underlying conviction, the court will not have jurisdiction pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. State v. Wright , 107 Conn.App. 152, 944 A.2d 991, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 933, 958 A.2d 1247 (2008). In Wright , a case with significant parallels to the case at hand, a panel of this court found that the trial court had no jurisdiction even though the defendant assailed his sentence as a violation of his protection *587against double jeopardy. Id., at 157-58, 944 A.2d 991. There, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence approximately three and one-half years after his sentencing, in which he *509claimed that his sentence violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Id., at 154-56, 944 A.2d 991. A panel of this court agreed with the trial court's dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. In its opinion, the panel observed: "The defendant claims that the court had jurisdiction to correct his sentence because it violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Specifically, he argues that he could not be convicted as an accessory to murder because the information did not include an accessorial liability charge. He claims that the polling of the jurors demonstrated that he was 'acquitted' as being the principal in the crime. For that reason, he argues that the sentence imposed for his conviction as an accessory to murder violates the prohibition against double jeopardy." (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 155, 944 A.2d 991. In concluding that the trial court had correctly determined it had no jurisdiction, the panel in Wright observed: "In the present case, the defendant's claim, by its very nature, presupposes an invalid conviction. The defendant does not claim that the sentence he received exceeded the maximum statutory limits prescribed for the crime for which he was convicted. He also does not claim that he was denied due process at his sentencing hearing or that his sentence is ambiguous or internally contradictory. If the defendant's claim were to fall into any of those categories, Practice Book § 43-22 would be the proper vehicle by which he could invoke the trial court's jurisdiction. Because the defendant's claim falls outside that set of narrow circumstances in which the court retains jurisdiction over a defendant once that defendant has been transferred into the custody of the commissioner of correction to begin serving his sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claim pursuant to a *588motion to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22....

"We conclude that the defendant's claim that his sentence is illegal because it violates his constitutional protection against double jeopardy is actually a claim of an improper conviction, which is, in reality, a collateral attack on his conviction and does not fall within the purview of Practice Book § 43-22." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., at 157, 944 A.2d 991.

In State v. Starks , supra, 121 Conn.App. at 590, 997 A.2d 546, this court expressly followed Wright in holding that, not-withstanding a defendant's nominal attack on his sentence, where his claim is, in reality, an attack on his conviction, the court lacks jurisdiction under Practice Book § 43-22 to hear the motion. There, we stated: "Our Supreme Court has concluded that to invoke successfully the court's jurisdiction with respect to a claim of an illegal sentence, the focus cannot be on what occurred during the underlying conviction. ... In order for the court to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed, the sentencing proceeding, and not the trial leading to the conviction, must be the subject of the attack." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court in Starks concluded: "Insofar as this portion of the defendant's motion to correct constituted a collateral attack on his conviction and, thus, was outside of the court's jurisdiction, the court should have dismissed, rather than denied, this portion of the motion. See, e.g., State v. Wright , [supra, 107 Conn.App. at 157-58, 944 A.2d 991]." State v. Starks , supra, at 590, 997 A.2d 546.

Notwithstanding Wright , our subsequent express adherence to it, and the several cases in which we have held that a Practice Book § 43-22 motion may not be utilized as a vehicle to attack one's conviction, we appear to have sanctioned just that approach in *589State v. Santiago , 145 Conn.App. 374, 74 A.3d 571, cert. denied, *510310 Conn. 942, 79 A.3d 893 (2013), a case which I am unable to distinguish from Wright . Both Wright and Santiago involve defendants who filed motions to correct illegal sentences on the basis of double jeopardy, but resulted in different outcomes on appeal. In Wright , the trial court dismissed the defendant's motion as a collateral attack on his conviction, over which the court had no continuing jurisdiction. We affirmed the court's determination on appeal. State v. Wright , supra, 107 Conn.App. at 158, 944 A.2d 991. In Santiago , the trial court also dismissed the defendant's motion for lack of jurisdiction, but on appeal, we reversed, ordering instead that the court deny the motion on the basis that the defendant had made a double jeopardy claim even though it, too, attacked his conviction. State v. Santiago , supra, at 384, 74 A.3d 571. From my perspective Wright and Santiago cannot be harmonized.

To be sure, the defendant in Santiago , unlike the defendant in the case at hand who received concurrent sentences, alleged that the imposition of consecutive sentences on the two charges of which he was convicted, which arose out of the same incident, violated his rights against double jeopardy. Id., at 377, 74 A.3d 571. In Santiago , we determined that the trial court did have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence because he had founded his claim on an allegation of double jeopardy, language which we apparently then thought adequate to confer jurisdiction. Id., at 379-80, 74 A.3d 571. Having further reviewed the underpinnings to Santiago , I have concluded that it is inconsistent with our prior jurisprudence that a motion to correct an illegal sentence may not be used as a vehicle to attack one's conviction even if framed as an illegal sentence claim. Thus, I have concluded, with respect, that our decision in Santiago was incorrect and should not be followed.7

*590I believe that the holding in Wright is applicable to the case at hand. In opining that a motion to correct an illegal sentence may not be used as a vehicle to collaterally attack a sentence, the court in Wright stood on solid ground and within the parameters of its common law antecedents.

That said, Santiago does not represent the only cross-current to the view that a court, pursuant to a motion to correct an illegal sentence, may not affect a conviction. Rather, it finds some support in a few decisions in which Practice Book § 43-22 appears to have been legitimized as a vehicle to alter a conviction and not merely a sentence. In *511State v. Cator , 256 Conn. 785, 781 A.2d 285 (2001), the defendant had been convicted of murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit murder, kidnapping in the second degree and conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the second degree. Id., at 787-88, 781 A.2d 285. On direct appeal to our Supreme Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that his convictions and sentences for both *591murder and felony murder violated his right to the protection of double jeopardy as did his convictions for conspiracy to commit kidnapping and conspiracy to commit murder, because the murder and felony murder convictions were for the same act, and his two conspiracy convictions were supported by evidence of a single agreement to kidnap and murder the victim. Id., at 803-808, 781 A.2d 285. In its opinion, our Supreme Court observed, with apparent approval, that, after trial, the trial court, pursuant to the state's motion to correct an illegal sentence, had merged the defendant's convictions for murder and felony murder and imposed one sentence for the merged offenses. The court opined: "In this case, the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the defendant's sentences pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22.... Both the trial court and this court, on appeal, have the power, at any time, to correct a sentence that is illegal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 803-804, 781 A.2d 285.8 The court in Cator stated, as well: "It is clear in this case that the trial court at first imposed an illegal sentence. That court retained jurisdiction to correct that sentence *592pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to merge the convictions for murder and felony murder pursuant to [ State v. Chicano , 216 Conn. 699, 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S.Ct. 2898, 115 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1991) ]. Once this was done, the defendant's claim of double jeopardy became moot." State v. Cator , supra, at 805, 781 A.2d 285.9 This court later appears to have applied the *512reasoning of Cator to sanction the action of the trial court in vacating a conviction pursuant to § 43-22. In State v. Brown , 153 Conn.App. 507, 101 A.3d 375 (2014), cert. granted, 319 Conn. 901, 122 A.3d 636 (2015) (appeal withdrawn August 15, 2016), on direct appeal, we observed: "The defendant ... claims that his conviction of certain charges violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy. In his reply brief and at oral argument before this court, however, the defendant subsequently withdrew certain aspects of this claim. He did so specifically because the state conceded that the failure to merge the conviction of conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree with the conviction of conspiracy to commit burglary in the third degree violated principles of double jeopardy, and because the court later granted his motion to correct an illegal sentence and vacated without prejudice the conviction of one of the two conspiracy counts." Id., at 532, 101 A.3d 375. *593While recognizing the Cator line of cases, I do not believe the intent of the court, in these cases, was to open wide the door to attacks on convictions through the guise of a Practice Book § 43-22 motion, nominally assailing a sentence. To do so, as I believe, with respect, the majority now does, would vitiate the limited purpose of § 43-22, and unreasonably expand the court's postconviction jurisdiction beyond its common-law bounds. Nevertheless, I believe that the holdings of the cases cited herein, in toto, create currents and crosscurrents in need of calming by a higher power.

The majority holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the defendant's claims in the case at hand because he claimed, as the basis of his motion, that his convictions and sentences violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. As noted, however, we know that where a defendant only nominally attacks his sentence in order to attempt to fit a conviction claim into the ambit of a Practice Book § 43-22 motion, a reviewing court will look to the substance and not the precise language of a defendant's motion to determine if it is, in fact, a sentencing issue. In this case at hand, however, as in Santiago , the majority appears to have credited the defendant's claim as a true sentencing claim even though, like Wright , it is an attack on his conviction.

In order to calm this jurisprudence, it is appropriate and useful to reflect on our Supreme Court's characterization of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. In State v. Francis , 322 Conn. 247, 259-60, 140 A.3d 927 (2016), the court opined: "A motion to correct an illegal sentence constitutes a narrow exception to the general rule that, once a defendant's sentence has begun, the authority of the sentencing court to modify that sentence terminates. ... Indeed, [i]n order for the court *594to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed, the sentencing proceeding [itself] ... must be the subject of the attack. ... Therefore, the motion is directed to the sentencing court, which can entertain and resolve the challenge most expediently." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) While the court, in Francis , assessed whether appointed counsel in a motion to correct an illegal sentence should be required to write an Anders brief10 in *513order to be relieved of further representation, in coming to the conclusion that counsel could be excused through a less rigorous process, the court characterized a motion for the correction of an illegal sentence in a manner instructive to our present analysis. There, the court opined: "In light of the limited and straightforward nature of the claims that may be raised in a motion to correct, the potential merits of such a motion frequently will be apparent to the court and appointed counsel from a simple review of the sentencing record. ... Accordingly, we can perceive no reason why appointed counsel, having carefully reviewed the record for possible sentencing errors in light of the governing legal principles and determined that none exist, must then be required to file an Anders brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support a countervailing view, or why the trial court should then be required to undertake a full and independent review of the record to determine whether it agrees *595with defense counsel's assessment of the defendant's claimed sentencing error." (Citations omitted.) Id., at 265-66, 140 A.3d 927. And yet, to decide this defendant's claim on the merits, both the trial court and the majority on review, were required to do just that.

Unfortunately, the observations of the court in Francis regarding the narrow focus and expedited process of a motion to correct an illegal sentence do not reflect the course such motions have taken over the past several years. Rather, it appears that the filing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence has gained in practice as courts on review have muddied the jurisdictional waters with a result that more and more defendants appear willing to give it a try, even though, in the main, the vast majority of them are ultimately unsuccessful.11

To be true to Francis , I believe, respectfully, we need to reset the parameters of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. If it is intended to be an expedited and limited *514review of the sentencing procedure, perhaps we should return to a time period in which such a motion must *596be filed. And, to harmonize the State v. Polanco , 308 Conn. 242, 61 A.3d 1084 (2013), and Miranda line of cases; see footnote 9 of this dissenting opinion; perhaps it should be made clear that only when it is obvious from the criminal information and verdict that convictions violate the protection against double jeopardy that a court may vacate a conviction and resentence a defendant pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22 and that such remedial action can only be taken before a defendant has commenced serving his or her sentence.12 In the absence of clarification, it is likely that an increasing number of defendants, in reliance on Santiago , this case, and the Polanco - Miranda cases will be filing motions to correct illegal sentences which are simply collateral attacks on convictions which could have been timely appealed.

Because I believe the majority has mistakenly followed Santiago , which veered from its antecedents, and because, I believe, this court has expanded the reach of Polanco and Miranda beyond their intended reach, I would affirm the trial court's dismissal.13 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.