*286 The petitioner, Hudel Gamble, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly rejected *230 his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We are not persuaded by the petitioner's arguments, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court. *287 The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the petitioner's appeal. On November 29, 2005, Daniel Smith was driving a borrowed BMW in New Haven while Ricardo Ramos was seated in the front passenger seat. The petitioner later joined Ramos and Smith, and sat in the back seat. The petitioner, Ramos, and Smith proceeded to joyride around the "Hill" section of New Haven 1 while smoking marijuana. At that time, both the petitioner, who was seventeen years old, and Ramos, who was fifteen years old, were residents of the "Hill" section of New Haven. Ramos had known the petitioner and Smith for two to three years and would see both the petitioner and Smith on a daily basis.

At some point, Smith drove into the "Tre" section of New Haven. 2 Ramos noticed an acquaintance of his on Kensington Street, and Smith stopped the BMW. The woman stated in a loud voice that a man with whom Ramos had a "beef" was in the area. Smith drove around the block and upon returning to Kensington Street, Ramos spotted the victim, whom he believed had killed his cousin in the "Hill" section over a month earlier.

The victim was with a group of four or five individuals who were standing to the right of the BMW. Someone from the group fired shots at the BMW. The petitioner, Ramos, and Smith all returned fire. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds due to the entry, exit, and reentry of bullets, and ultimately died. The medical examiner recovered three different types of bullets from the victim's body. Ballistics evidence revealed that one of the *288 three bullets recovered from the victim's body was damaged, but that it had the characteristics of a .22 long rifle caliber bullet. Ballistics testing of the damaged bullet revealed that it could have been fired from various handguns, revolvers, semi-automatic pistols, and several types of long arms. This bullet entered the victim's right knee. A .38 caliber bullet, which ballistics testing revealed could have been fired from either a .38 revolver or a .357 magnum caliber revolver, entered the victim's right hip. A .30 caliber bullet, which ballistics testing established was fired from an SKS semiautomatic rifle that the police found under Ramos' bed following the shooting, traveled through the victim's right arm, reentered the right side of his chest, went through his right lung and grazed his diaphragm and liver. The official cause of the victim's death was from multiple gunshot wounds. The medical examiner testified that the victim's injuries to his knee and hip were treatable, but that the medical personnel were unable to treat successfully the victim's chest injury. The day after the shooting, Ramos learned that the victim was unknown to him and was not the individual with whom he had a "beef." The police did not find any latent fingerprints on the SKS rifle or its magazine.

The jury found the petitioner guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and *231 53a-8. The petitioner was also charged with, and found not guilty of, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (3), murder and murder as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-8, conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-48 (a), possession of an assault weapon in violation of General Statutes §§ 53-202c and 53a-8, and conspiracy to possess an assault weapon in violation of §§ 53-202c and 53a-48 (a). The court, Holden , J. , sentenced the petitioner to thirty-seven and one-half years incarceration. *289 The petitioner, represented by Attorney William Westcott, unsuccessfully appealed his conviction. 3 See State v. Gamble , 119 Conn. App. 287 , 987 A.2d 1049 , cert. denied, 295 Conn. 915 , 990 A.2d 867 (2010).

On August 25, 2016, the petitioner filed a third amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 4 He alleged that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim of insufficient evidence on direct appeal.

At the habeas trial, Westcott testified that he did not raise a sufficiency claim on direct appeal because he had not prevailed on a similar claim in a different appeal in which a defendant, who was convicted as an accessory, was part of a group of individuals who all fired shots at the victim, who they were "out to get." Attorney Daniel Krisch testified for the petitioner as an expert in appellate practice. He testified that the only evidence of the petitioner's aiding the principal was that he had handed Ramos a .22 caliber pistol which had caused the treatable injury to the victim's knee. He further testified that no reasonable jury could have convicted the petitioner of manslaughter as an accessory, and *290 there was a reasonable probability that an insufficiency claim would have been successful on direct appeal.

On November 28, 2016, the habeas court, Sferrazza, J., issued a memorandum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court stated that "[w]here multiple shooters intentionally fire at someone, all the shooters can properly be convicted, through accessorial liability, of the homicide even though it was a companion's bullet that killed the victim. State v. Delgado , 247 Conn. 616 , 627, [ 725 A.2d 306 ] (1999). Such a show of force aids the killer by eliminating or reducing methods of escape, by deterring others from attempting to assist the victim, and by thwarting detection through the confusion generated by such a fusillade." The court concluded that the petitioner could not prevail on his claim because he failed to prove prejudice under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The court granted the petition for certification to appeal. This *232 appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that he failed to establish that his appellate counsel was ineffective by not raising insufficiency of evidence as an issue in his direct appeal. He contends that the court improperly concluded that he failed to prove that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel's performance. We disagree.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review and the legal principles applicable to the petitioner's appeal. "Although a habeas court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review ... [w]hether the representation a defendant received at trial was constitutionally inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact.... As such, that question requires plenary review by this court unfettered by the clearly *291 erroneous standard." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Commissioner of Correction , 301 Conn. 697 , 706, 23 A.3d 682 (2011).

"In Strickland v. Washington , [supra, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ], the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction .... That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense [by establishing a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's mistakes, the result of the proceeding would have been different].... Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parrott v. Commissioner of Correction , 107 Conn. App. 234 , 236, 944 A.2d 437 , cert. denied, 288 Conn. 912 , 954 A.2d 184 (2008). With respect to the prejudice prong, "we must assess whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on appeal, the petitioner would have prevailed [on] ... appeal, i.e., [obtaining] reversal of his conviction or granting of a new trial." Small v. Commissioner of Correction , 286 Conn. 707 , 722, 946 A.2d 1203 , cert. denied sub nom. Small v. Lantz , 555 U.S. 975 , 129 S.Ct. 481 , 172 L.Ed.2d 336 (2008). "[T]he task before us is not to conclude definitively whether the petitioner, on appeal, would have prevailed on his claim .... Rather, the task before us is to determine, under Strickland , whether there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have prevailed on appeal." (Emphasis omitted.) Id., at 731, 946 A.2d 1203 . "To ascertain whether the petitioner can demonstrate such a probability, we must consider the merits of the underlying claim." Id., at 728, 946 A.2d 1203 .

*292 Underlying the petitioner's claim of ineffectiveness by appellate counsel is that there was insufficient evidence to support the petitioner's conviction of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory. "In reviewing a sufficiency [of the evidence] claim, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Abraham , 64 Conn. App. 384 , 400, 780 A.2d 223 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 917 , 782 A.2d 1246 (2001).

*233 "A person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender." General Statutes § 53a-8 (a). This court has explained accessorial liability as follows: "To be guilty as an accessory, one must share the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with the perpetrator of the crime and one must knowingly and wilfully assist the perpetrator in the acts which prepare for, facilitate or consummate it.... Whether a person who is present at the commission of a crime aids or abets its commission depends on the circumstances surrounding his presence there and his conduct while there....

"Since under our law both principals and accessories are treated as principals ... if the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, establishes that [the defendant] committed the [crime] charged or did some act which forms ... a part thereof, or directly or indirectly counseled or procured *293 any persons to commit the offenses or do any act forming a part thereof, then the [conviction] must stand." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez , 135 Conn. App. 101 , 107-108, 41 A.3d 340 (2012), aff'd, 311 Conn. 408 , 87 A.3d 1101 (2014). "[A]ccessorial liability is predicated upon the actor's state of mind at the time of his actions, and whether that state of mind is commensurate to the state of mind required for the commission of the offense." State v. Foster , 202 Conn. 520 , 532, 522 A.2d 277 (1987).

General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when ... (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person." Accordingly, to be guilty of manslaughter as an accessory under this subsection, the petitioner must recklessly engage in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and intentionally aid in the death of the victim.

At the center of the petitioner's claim on appeal is the testimony of Ramos, a key witness for the state, and the only person who was in the BMW at the time of the shooting who testified. 5 Ramos testified that the petitioner had given him a loaded .22 caliber pistol earlier on the day of the shooting when the two had met on the street. According to Ramos' testimony, Ramos fired a .22 caliber pistol two or three times, Smith reached across Ramos and fired a .357 caliber gun two or three times out of the open passenger side window and the petitioner fired shots from an SKS rifle while it rested on the open backdoor window of the BMW.

*294 The petitioner claims that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel's failure to raise a sufficiency claim because the evidence was insufficient to convict him of manslaughter under an accessorial theory of liability. Specifically, he argues that because Ramos testified that the petitioner fired the SKS rifle from which the fatal shot was fired, the evidence could only support conviction of manslaughter as a principal and could not support his conviction under an accessorial theory of liability. He further argues that the only evidence *234 that he acted as an accessory was Ramos' testimony that the petitioner had handed Ramos a loaded .22 pistol prior to the shooting. 6 That event, the petitioner argues, could not establish the element of aiding in the victim's death because the .22 caliber bullet caused a nonfatal knee injury. He further argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he was acquitted on the other charges and, in so arguing, raises the issue of collateral estoppel. 7 *295 The petitioner's arguments are unavailing. Ramos' testimony that the petitioner handed him a loaded .22 caliber pistol is not, as the petitioner argues, the only evidence supporting an accessorial theory of liability. In examining the underlying claim, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction of manslaughter as an accessory under a concert of action theory. Under a concert of action theory, it is immaterial who fired the fatal shot; what is material is whether the evidence shows that the petitioner acted with others to bring about the death of the victim. "[A] showing of concert of action between a defendant and [others] can provide a sufficient basis for accessorial liability." State v. Ashe , 74 Conn. App. 511 , 518, 519, 812 A.2d 194 (evidence that defendant acted in concert with others with intent to kill rival gang members sufficient to support murder conviction under accessorial theory of liability), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 949 , 817 A.2d 108 (2003) ; see also State v. Diaz , 237 Conn. 518 , 544, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) ("Although the evidence did not clearly demonstrate which of the perpetrators actually fired the shot that fatally injured [the victim], the evidence did establish that the defendant and his companions together prepared and readied themselves for the ambush ... [and] fir[ed] repeatedly into the vehicle with the intent to kill one or more of the passengers.... [Thus, the evidence] show[ed] sufficient concert of action between the defendant and his companion[s] to support ... the accessory allegation *235 ...." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ).

The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, shows the following. The *296 petitioner, Ramos, and Smith were joyriding together in the "Hill" section of New Haven. Smith drove to the "Tre" section of New Haven where a woman informed Ramos that the victim was in the area. Ramos believed that the victim had killed his cousin over a month earlier in the "Hill" section of New Haven. The three young men searched for the victim. Smith circled the block and Ramos spotted the victim on Kensington Street. A member of the victim's group fired shots at the BMW. The petitioner, Ramos, and Smith all fired shots at the victim. Medical and ballistics evidence revealed that the victim sustained gunshot wounds from three different caliber bullets which had been fired from three different model guns. The habeas court aptly stated: "Where multiple shooters intentionally fire at someone, all the shooters can properly be convicted, through accessorial liability, of the homicide ...."

The petitioner argues that the concert of action theory, as expressed in State v. Delgado, supra, 247 Conn. at 622 , 725 A.2d 306 , is inapplicable to the present case. In Delgado, the victim was shot in the back of his leg and the back of his arm, and died from loss of blood due to the gunshot wounds. Id., at 620, 725 A.2d 306 . This court concluded that "[a]lthough the evidence did not reveal whether it was the defendant or [a fellow gang member] who had fired the shot that fatally injured the victim, the jury reasonably could have determined that there was sufficient concert of action between the defendant and [the fellow gang member] to support the accessory allegation." Id., at 623, 725 A.2d 306 . The petitioner argues that because there was no confusion in the present case that the fatal shot was fired from the SKS rifle, the concert of action theory could not support his conviction under an accessorial theory of liability. We are not persuaded.

The fact that medical and ballistics evidence revealed that the fatal shot was fired from an SKS rifle does not prevent the application of the concert of action theory.

*297 The jury reasonably could have been uncertain as to which individual fired the fatal shot from the SKS rifle. 8 Moreover, the jury did not need to determine who fired the fatal shot in order to find the petitioner guilty of manslaughter under an accessorial theory of liability. 9

*236 The gravamen of the petitioner's argument is that the evidence supported a conviction of him as the principal and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of manslaughter as an accessory. In State v. Hamlett , 105 Conn. App. 862 , 867, 939 A.2d 1256 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 901 , 947 A.2d 343 (2008), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in denying *298 his motion for acquittal on his conviction of assault in the first degree because the evidence showed that he was the principal shooter and, therefore, he could not be found guilty as a "mere" accessory. Id., at 867, 939 A.2d 1256 . This court noted that it was reasonable that the jury was unable to determine who shot the victim and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of assault as a principal or accessory because the defendant and another man confronted the victim with guns and the victim suffered gunshot wounds. Id., at 867-68, 939 A.2d 1256 . The court rejected the defendant's argument that evidence sufficient to convict the defendant as a principal would be insufficient to convict him under an accessorial theory of liability. Id., at 869, 939 A.2d 1256 . The court concluded: "Connecticut long ago adopted the rule that there is no practical significance in being labeled an accessory or a principal for the purpose of determining criminal responsibility.... The modern approach is to abandon completely the old common law terminology and simply provide that a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when he is an accomplice of the other person in the commission of the crime.... Connecticut has taken the same approach through General Statutes § 53a-8.... There is no meaningful distinction between principal and accessory liability; they are simply theories for proving criminal liability. Given that a defendant may be convicted as an accessory even though he was charged only as a principal ... we reject his argument that evidence sufficient to convict a defendant as a principal would be insufficient for a conviction under the theory of accessory liability." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 868-69, 939 A.2d 1256 .

In this case, the jury expressed uncertainty as to principal and accessorial liability. The court instructed the jury on the manslaughter charge under both principal and accessorial theories of liability. The jury initially *299 indicated on the verdict form that the petitioner was not guilty on all counts. The foreperson then explained that "something [was] wrong." The court informed the jury to communicate its concerns to the court via a note. The foreperson stated in a note that the jury had reached a verdict on manslaughter as an accessory, and was waiting to hear the clerk read that charge. The court recalled the jury and the verdict was vacated and rerecorded. The court then divided the manslaughter charge into principal and accessorial liability. The jury found the petitioner not guilty of manslaughter as a principal and guilty of manslaughter as an accessory. The jury's concern and the court's resultant division of the manslaughter charge does not alter the longstanding principle expressed in Hamlett that, as a matter of law, there is no meaningful distinction *237 between principal and accessorial liability. See id., at 869, 939 A.2d 1256 . We conclude that there was sufficient evidence that the petitioner acted in concert with Ramos and Smith to achieve the intended result, the death of the victim.

The petitioner also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of manslaughter as an accessory because the jury acquitted him of both manslaughter as a principal and possession of an assault weapon. The petitioner argues that because of his acquittals, this court is collaterally estopped from examining the issue of whether he possessed or fired the SKS rifle, which the legislature defines as an "assault weapon." See General Statutes § 53-202a et seq. The petitioner further argues that this court, when reviewing the sufficiency claim, likewise cannot examine whether he fired the .22 pistol or the .357 revolver because the court granted the petitioner's motion for acquittal as to the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit. 10

*300 The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to a review of the sufficiency of the evidence. "[C]ollateral estoppel principles do not apply in a single trial to preclude a verdict of guilty on an offense which includes elements in common with an offense for which the jury has returned a verdict of not guilty." State v. Ortiz , 29 Conn. App. 825 , 836 n.6, 618 A.2d 547 (1993). As a result, the petitioner's acquittals do not preclude this court from examining all the evidence presented at trial when analyzing a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. ; see also State v. Stevens , 178 Conn. 649 , 653-56, 425 A.2d 104 (1979) (jury verdict acquitting defendant of larceny does not bar conclusion on appeal that sufficient evidence existed to support conviction of conspiracy to commit larceny).

Furthermore, we cannot review any inconsistencies among the verdicts in this case. "In [ State v. Arroyo , 292 Conn. 558 , 583, 585-86, 973 A.2d 1254 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 911 , 130 S.Ct. 1296 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1086 (2010) ] the Supreme Court affirmed its holdings in State v. Whiteside , 148 Conn. 208 , 169 A.2d 260 , cert. denied, 368 U.S. 830 , 82 S.Ct. 52 , 7 L.Ed.2d 33 (1961), and State v. Rosado , 178 Conn. 704 , 425 A.2d 108 (1979), that factually and logically inconsistent verdicts are permissible.... The Arroyo court also held that legally inconsistent verdicts are permissible and, thus, not reviewable, adopting the rule of United States v. Powell , 469 U.S. 57 , 69, 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984)." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Acosta , 119 Conn. App. 174 , 187, 988 A.2d 305 , cert. denied, 295 Conn. 923 , 991 A.2d 568 (2010). "The law permits inconsistent verdicts because of the recognition that jury deliberations necessarily involve negotiation and compromise.... [I]nconsistency of the verdicts is immaterial.... That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts *301 cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Knight , 266 Conn. 658 , 670, 835 A.2d 47 (2003).

We conclude that it was not reasonably probable that the petitioner would have prevailed on direct appeal on a sufficiency claim and, therefore, the petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced *238 by Westcott's failure to raise that claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court properly rejected the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 11

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.