*39 The plaintiff, ARC Capital, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this action against the defendants, Asia Pacific Limited (Asia Pacific) and Aashish Kalra, to enforce a judgment rendered in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (Cayman court). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that the judgment the plaintiff sought to enforce could be enforced only through chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code; see 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. (2012) ; and, therefore, improperly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Knowledge of the following undisputed facts, as set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the related case of Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Chugh , 846 F.3d 22 (2017), is necessary for the resolution of this appeal. "[Trikona Advisors Ltd. (TAL) ] is an investment advisory company. Its two beneficial owners, [Rakshitt] Chugh and Aashish Kalra, formed the company in 2006 as a vehicle for helping foreign investors invest in Indian real estate and infrastructure. Each man held a [50] percent equity stake in TAL through entities controlled by them. Chugh's shares were owned by ARC Capital LLC ... and Haida Investments ... and Kalra's shares were owned by Asia Pacific Investments, Ltd." Id., at 26 . By 2009, the relationship between Chugh and Kalra had deteriorated *40 to the point where they could no longer work together. Id., at 27 . Eventually, TAL's board of directors voted to remove Chugh as a director, leaving Kalra to treat TAL and its assets as his own. Id.

"On February 13, 2012, ARC [Capital, LLC] and Haida [Investments], which held Chugh's TAL shares and were controlled by Chugh, filed a petition in the [Cayman court] seeking to 'wind up' TAL, a Cayman corporation. The [petition] sought to liquidate the business and divide its assets between Chugh and Kalra. Asia Pacific, which held Kalra's TAL shares and was controlled by Kalra, opposed Chugh's petition.... The Cayman court tried the wind-up proceeding over seven days in January of 2013. At the trial's conclusion, the court granted Chugh's petition. It found that each of Chugh's allegations was supported by evidence, and that these allegations taken *97 together supported a finding that it was just and equitable to wind up TAL. It also rejected each of Kalra's affirmative defenses, concluding that there was no merit whatsoever in the allegations made against Mr. Chugh. Kalra appealed from this judgment, first to the Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands, and then to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. Both tribunals affirmed the judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 27-28 .

The plaintiff brought the present action against Asia Pacific 1 and Kalra, 2 seeking to domesticate and enforce *41 a subsequent costs order of the Cayman court. According to the complaint and accompanying exhibits, on February 7, 2013, the plaintiff and Haida applied to the Cayman court for attorneys' fees and litigation expenses incurred as petitioners in the winding up proceedings of TAL. On February 14, 2013, the Cayman court issued a costs order requiring that Asia Pacific reimburse the plaintiff and Haida for their litigation expenses. On May 15, 2013, the Cayman court issued a "default costs certificate" setting the final amount payable to the plaintiff and Haida at $760,067.65. In this action, the plaintiff sought to domesticate and enforce this order.

On August 24, 2015, the court, Hon. Richard P. Gilardi , judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy and ordered a disclosure of assets within two weeks of the date of the order. On August 27, 2015, the defendants filed an application to refer this case to the Complex Litigation Docket. The plaintiff consented to this referral and, on September 3, 2015, the court transferred the case to the Complex Litigation Docket.

On September 10, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dissolve and/or modify the ex parte prejudgment remedy entered by Judge Gilardi and to dismiss the action in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 24, 2015, the court, Miller , J. , dissolved the prejudgment remedy. On May 31, 2016, the court, Miller , J. , granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the action in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that "[t]he foreign 'judgment' which the plaintiff seeks to enforce can only be *42 enforced through chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, the Cayman 'Winding-Up' proceeding could never qualify, under chapter 15, as a type of proceeding (main or nonmain) subject to judicial review." The plaintiff then filed the present appeal, in which it argues that the court erred in dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

"We first set forth the applicable standard of review and general principles *98 of law. The standard of review for a court's decision on a motion to dismiss [under Practice Book § 10-30 ] is well settled. A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [O]ur review of the court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.... When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.... In undertaking this review, we are mindful of the well established notion that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange , 315 Conn. 606 , 614, 109 A.3d 903 (2015).

The plaintiff argues that the court erred in holding that chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 3 *43 prevented it from deciding this action for enforcement of a money judgment between private Connecticut parties. According to the plaintiff, a plain reading of chapter 15 shows that it does not apply to the present case. We agree.

"Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code ... requires that under certain *99 circumstances, before *44 foreign liquidation proceedings may be recognized in United States courts, a bankruptcy court in the United States must approve an application for recognition from a 'foreign representative' appointed in connection with that foreign proceeding.... Chapter 15, enacted by Congress in 2005, incorporated into United States law the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade.... The statute's primary purpose was to facilitate the consolidation of multinational bankruptcies into one single proceeding.... Chapter 15 addressed a persistent problem in cross-border liquidations: creditors would initiate multiple bankruptcy proceedings to recover assets from a debtor in jurisdictions other than the site of the principal liquidation.... This caused administrative inefficiency and also allowed creditors to bypass the priority restraints of the main bankruptcy proceeding and attempt to recover more than their fair share of the debtor's assets.... In the interests of uniformity and efficiency, Chapter 15 provides for the coordination of domestic and foreign proceedings into a single bankruptcy and ... allows foreign representatives appointed in connection with foreign proceedings to seek recognition of those proceedings in United States courts as a means of requesting United States assistance in administering the main liquidation." (Citations omitted.) Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Chugh , supra, 846 F.3d at 30 .

In Trikona Advisers Ltd. , a related action involving some of the same parties, the Second Circuit addressed whether chapter 15 prevented the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut from giving preclusive effect to the Cayman court's factual findings. Id., at 29-31 . In that case, TAL brought an action against Chugh, ARC Capital and other related corporate entities, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by Chugh, a former partner and 50 percent owner of TAL, and the other *45 defendants. Id., at 26 . The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that TAL's claims previously had been determined in Chugh's favor in the proceeding in the Cayman court, and that TAL was collaterally estopped from asserting them in the District Court action. Id. On appeal, TAL argued, inter alia, that chapter 15 prevented the District Court from giving preclusive effect to the Cayman court's factual findings. Id.

In affirming the judgment of the District Court and concluding that chapter 15 did not apply, the Second Circuit stated: "Consistent with its limited purpose, 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (b) specifies four circumstances in which Chapter 15 applies. These are cases in which: (1) assistance is sought in the United States by a foreign court or a foreign representative in connection with a foreign proceeding; (2) assistance is sought in a foreign country in connection with a case under this title; (3) a foreign proceeding and a case under this title with respect to the same debtor are pending concurrently; or (4) creditors or other interested persons in a foreign country have an interest in requesting the commencement of, or participation in, a case proceeding under this title." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Chugh , supra, 846 F.3d at 30-31 . The court noted that "[t]hese scenarios assume that (1) a United States court is being asked either to assist in the administration of a foreign liquidation proceeding or to administer a liquidation proceeding itself, or (2) a foreign court is being asked to assist in administering a liquidation proceeding in the United States.

"Moreover, 11 U.S.C. § 1515 does not apply generally to parties, but, by its terms, requires only 'foreign representatives'

*100 to apply for recognition of a foreign judgment in bankruptcy. A 'foreign representative' is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (24) [2012] as 'a person or body ... authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the *46 reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor's assets or affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding.' 4

"No party to the district court proceeding is a 'representative' of a 'foreign proceeding,' as those terms are defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (24) and (23) [2012]. And no party to the district court proceeding is seeking the assistance of the district court in enforcing or administering a foreign liquidation proceeding, 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (b) (1) [2012] ; nor is any party seeking the assistance of a foreign country, 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (b) (2) [2012] ; nor does the case involve a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code pending concurrently with a foreign liquidation proceeding, 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (b) (3) [2012] ; nor are foreign creditors seeking to commence an action under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (b) (4) [2012]. The instant nonbankruptcy action, brought in the District of Connecticut and governed by Connecticut law, is unconnected to any foreign or United States bankruptcy proceeding. Even assuming, arguendo, that the wind-up proceeding is the type of case that Chapter 15 would ordinarily cover, Chapter 15 does not apply when a court in the United States simply gives preclusive effect to factual findings from an otherwise unrelated foreign liquidation proceeding, as was done here." (Footnote in original.) Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Chugh , supra, 846 F.3d at 31 .

As in Trikona Advisers Ltd. , the present action does not fall within any of the limited situations outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (b) in which chapter 15 would apply. In *47 its complaint, the plaintiff alleges that it is a corporation incorporated in the United States, not a foreign representative as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. This is an action by the plaintiff, a private party, to enforce a money judgment that is unconnected to any foreign or United States bankruptcy proceeding. 5 The court *101 erred, therefore, in dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the judgment only could be enforced through chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. 6 *48 The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.