The state of Connecticut appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Geoffrey M., Jr., 1 affirming in part the decision of the family support magistrate (magistrate) that opened an acknowledgment of paternity. On appeal, the state claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) Ragin v. Lee , 78 Conn. App. 848 , 829 A.2d 93 (2003), provided a nonstatutory ground for opening an acknowledgment of paternity, apart from the statutory grounds set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (2) 2 ; and (2) the magistrate had the inherent authority to grant the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment on the basis of the best interests of the child. We agree with the department and, accordingly, reverse the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On April 26, 2011, the plaintiff and the defendant, Asia A. M., executed a written acknowledgment of paternity (acknowledgment) for the minor child, who was born in February, 2011. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (1). On October 28, 2014, the state filed a support petition against the plaintiff in the name of the defendant. On December 9, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment pursuant to § 46b-172, 3 challenging the validity of the acknowledgment on the grounds of fraud, mistake of fact, and duress. Specifically, in his affidavit accompanying his motion to open, the plaintiff averred that (1) the defendant committed fraud by "intentionally conceal[ing] the fact that she had sexual relations with other men" and "represent[ing] to the plaintiff that they were in a sexually exclusive relationship"; (2) a DNA test demonstrated "that there is a 0 percent chance that [the plaintiff] could be the biological father of the minor child" and "[t]he fact of the plaintiff being the biological father is ... a mistake of fact"; and (3) "[t]he plaintiff was under duress from the pressure being applied to him by the defendant and other family members, and [he] felt compelled to sign this acknowledgment due to this duress." The plaintiff further averred in his affidavit that "[t]he plaintiff does not have a [parent-child] relationship with the minor child at this time ... and it is in the best interests of the minor child" to establish the biological father.

On January 6, 2015, the state's support petition and the plaintiff's motion to open were consolidated for a hearing. On February 24, 2015, a hearing was held on the plaintiff's motion to open before a magistrate. On March 3, 2015, relying on Ragin v. Lee , supra, 78 Conn. App. at 848 , 829 A.2d 93 , the magistrate granted the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment, ordered a judgment of nonpaternity, and ordered the dismissal of the department's support petition. In its written order, the magistrate concluded that "[t]he plaintiff clearly and convincingly proved it is in the best interest of the minor child to open the judgment. A minor child has a fundamental and independent right and compelling interest in an accurate determination of paternity. [ Id., at 863, 829 A.2d 93 ].... While the plaintiff did prove it is in the best interest of the child to open the judgment, he failed to prove any of the statutory grounds of fraud, duress or ... mistake. See [General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) ] § 46b-172 (a) (2).... The credible evidence clearly indicates the plaintiff was aware he was not the biological father of the minor child when he executed the acknowledgment. The defendant did not defraud the plaintiff at the time he signed the acknowledgment. The plaintiff was not under duress when he signed the acknowledgment. The parties were not ... mistaken when the acknowledgment was executed. The motion to open is granted solely based upon the best interest of the minor child."

On March 17, 2015, the state appealed from the decision of the magistrate to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-231 (n) 4 and Practice Book § 25a-29, 5 claiming, inter alia, that "[i]n the absence of fraud, duress or mistake, the [m]agistrate lacked the [authority] to open the judgment of paternity ...." A hearing took place on May 5, 2015, before the court, and the parties filed posthearing briefs. On March 29, 2016, the court affirmed the decision of the magistrate in part, and remanded the case to the magistrate to hear additional evidence with respect to the best interests of the child. In its memorandum of decision, the court held that (1) Ragin v. Lee , supra, 78 Conn. App. at 848 , 829 A.2d 93 , provided a fourth, nonstatutory ground to open a judgment of paternity, apart from the statutory requirements set forth in § 46b-172 (a) (2); and (2) the magistrate had the inherent authority to open the judgment on the basis of the best interests of the minor child. The court further held, however, that "it was an error of law for the magistrate to open the judgment ... based solely on the results of genetic testing, without sufficient evidence as to other factors affecting the best interests of the child."

On April 11, 2016, the state filed a motion to reargue, which the court denied on April 28, 2016. This appeal followed. 6

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. The state's claims present a question of law over which our review is plenary. See Pritchard v. Pritchard , 103 Conn. App. 276 , 283, 928 A.2d 566 (2007) ("[i]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also Commissioner of Social Services v. Zarnetski , 175 Conn. App. 632 , 637, 168 A.3d 646 (2017). "When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ragin v. Lee , supra, 78 Conn. App. at 855 , 829 A.2d 93 . I

The state claims that the "court erred in concluding that Ragin v. Lee , [supra, 78 Conn. App. at 848 , 829 A.2d 93 ], provides a fourth and independent ground to open an acknowledgment of paternity," apart from the requirements set forth in § 46b-172 (a) (2). The state contends that, pursuant to § 46b-172 (a) (2), absent a finding of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the magistrate lacked the authority to open the judgment outside of the rescission period, and that the court "erred in finding that the [f]amily [s]upport [m]agistrate ... did not have to comply with the statutory criteria of ... § 46b-172." In response, the plaintiff and the attorney for the guardian ad litem claim that the court properly concluded that the best interests of the child is a nonstatutory ground for opening an acknowledgment of paternity. We agree with the state.

Paternity may be acknowledged voluntarily and extrajudicially through a written acknowledgment of paternity. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (1). "[T]he acknowledgment procedure provides an alternative to a full scale judicial proceeding, and an agreement reached pursuant to it does not require court approval. The acknowledgment procedure may be followed [i]n lieu of or in conclusion of a paternity action initiated pursuant to [General Statutes] § 46b-160." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardona v. Negron , 53 Conn. App. 152 , 154 n.4, 728 A.2d 1150 (1999). Section 46b-172 (a) (1) sets forth the process by which an acknowledgment may be executed, including the required notices that must be provided to the parties. 7 An executed "acknowledgment of paternity ... shall have the same force and effect as a judgment of the Superior Court." General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (1). "The mother and the acknowledged father shall have the right to rescind such affirmation or acknowledgment in writing within the earlier of (A) sixty days, or (B) the date of an agreement to support such child approved in accordance with subsection (b) of this section or an order of support for such child entered in a proceeding under subsection (c) of this section. An acknowledgment executed in accordance with subdivision (1) of this subsection may be challenged in court or before a family support magistrate after the rescission period only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact which may include evidence that he is not the father, with the burden of proof upon the challenger." General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (2).

In the present case, the plaintiff and the defendant executed the acknowledgment on April 26, 2011. The plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment more than three years later, on December 9, 2014. Because the plaintiff did not rescind the acknowledgment within sixty days, he could challenge it " only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (2); see also General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (1) ("the acknowledgment cannot be challenged after sixty days, except in court upon a showing of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact"). In its written order, the magistrate explicitly found that there was no fraud, duress, or mistake of fact, stating that "[t]he credible evidence clearly indicates the plaintiff was aware he was not the biological father of the minor child when he executed the acknowledgment. The defendant did not defraud the plaintiff at the time he signed the acknowledgment. The plaintiff was not under duress when he signed the acknowledgment. [The defendant and the plaintiff] were not ... mistaken when the acknowledgment was executed." Consequently, pursuant to § 46b-172 (a) (2), the magistrate lacked the authority to consider the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment.

Despite this, the magistrate granted the plaintiff's motion to open because it concluded that it was in the child's best interests to do so. Relying on this court's decision in Ragin v. Lee , supra, 78 Conn. App. at 848 , 829 A.2d 93 , the magistrate concluded that "[t]he plaintiff clearly and convincingly proved it is in the best interest of the minor child to open the judgment." The trial court similarly concluded that Ragin created an independent ground for granting a motion to open a judgment of paternity on the basis of the best interests of the child. 8 Therefore, we first must determine whether this court held in Ragin that a court may open a judgment of paternity, absent a finding of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact as required by § 46b-172 (a) (2), solely because it is in the best interests of the child to do so. We conclude that it did not.

In Ragin , the magistrate rendered a default judgment of paternity against the defendant after he failed to appear at the paternity action, which was initiated by the Commissioner of Social Services on behalf of the state pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-162. Id., at 850, 829 A.2d 93 . Counsel for the minor child timely filed a motion to open the default judgment, alleging that (1) there was insufficient service of process on the defendant and he did not receive actual notice of the proceedings, and (2) it was in the best interests of the child to open the judgment and order genetic testing to eliminate any doubt regarding the child's biological father. Id., at 851, 852, 829 A.2d 93 . A hearing was held on the motion to open, but the magistrate did not render a decision on the motion at that time. Id., at 853, 829 A.2d 93 . The state then appealed to the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the magistrate lacked the authority to consider the merits of the child's motion to open. Id., at 854, 829 A.2d 93 . The trial court agreed with the state and reversed the decision of the magistrate. Id. Counsel for the minor child appealed to this court. Id.

On appeal, this court addressed two issues: (1) whether there was an appealable final judgment; and (2) whether the minor child had standing to file the motion to open. Id., at 850, 829 A.2d 93 . Importantly, nowhere in the opinion did this court state that the best interests of the child was a basis for opening the judgment as an alternative to the applicable statutory requirements. Rather, this court discussed the best interests of the child in considering the second issue raised on appeal-whether the minor child had standing to file the motion to open. Id., at 861-62, 829 A.2d 93 . This court held that the minor child did have standing because, inter alia, "a child who is the subject of a paternity action has a fundamental interest in an accurate determination of paternity that is independent of the state's interest in establishing paternity for the benefit of obtaining payment for the child's care and any interest that the parents may have in the child." Id., at 863, 829 A.2d 93 . Thus, this court vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case "to the ... magistrate for further proceedings with direction also to consider the child's motion to open the default judgment of paternity ...." Id., at 864, 829 A.2d 93 . Counsel for the minor child still needed to and did actually comply with the relevant statutory requirements for filing a motion to open a default judgment of paternity. See General Statutes § 52-212 (a). 9 Ragin did not, however, create an independent ground for opening a judgment of paternity on the basis of the best interests of the child, in lieu of any applicable statutory requirements. Indeed, it is not the province of this court to create an independent basis for opening a judgment that is governed by statute. It is well established that "[i]t is not the function of the courts to enhance or supplement a statute containing clearly expressed language." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc. , 320 Conn. 299 , 309, 130 A.3d 231 (2016). Rather, "[w]e are obligated to construe a statute as written. ... Courts may not by construction supply omissions ... or add exceptions .... It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute .... That is a function of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Quidanny L. , 159 Conn. App. 363 , 371, 122 A.3d 1281 , cert. denied, 319 Conn. 906 , 122 A.3d 639 (2015) ; see also Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 279 Conn. 207 , 215-16, 901 A.2d 673 (2006). Here, the legislature clearly and unambiguously has set forth the three grounds on which an acknowledgment of paternity may be challenged in court. 10 See General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (2). Absent a finding of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, an acknowledgment of paternity may not be challenged in court.

As set forth previously, the magistrate found that the plaintiff "failed to prove any of the statutory grounds of fraud, duress or ... mistake." 11 The trial court found "ample support in the record for [the] factual finding by the magistrate" that the plaintiff "was aware when he executed the acknowledgment that he was not [the child's] biological father," and the court did not disturb the magistrate's findings that the plaintiff failed to establish fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. Because the statutory criteria set forth in § 46b-172 (a) (2) were not satisfied, the magistrate lacked the authority to open the judgment of paternity.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the magistrate had the authority to open the judgment solely on the basis of the best interests of the child.

II

The state next claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the magistrate had the inherent authority to open the judgment of paternity. Specifically, the state claims that the family support magistrate division is a court of limited jurisdiction, and "such authority is not included in the magistrate's enabling statute ... § 46b-231 (m), or the acknowledgment of paternity statute ... § 46b-172." The state further contends that "[g]iven the magistrate's factual findings, specifically that fraud, mistake or duress [were] not proven, the magistrate court lacked the authority to open the judgment of paternity, pursuant to ... § 46b-172 ...." (Citation omitted.) In response, the plaintiff argues that a magistrate "may, pursuant to [its] inherent authority, open a judgment of paternity, when acting reasonably, the magistrate finds good cause to do so, regardless of finding fraud, duress, or mistake. Good cause may be based on the 'best interests of the child' standard." We agree with the state.

"[T]he legislature, by the passage of § 46b-231 (d), created the family support magistrate division of the [S]uperior [C]ourt for the purpose of the impartial administration of child and spousal support." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Toole v. Hernandez , 163 Conn. App. 565 , 572-73, 137 A.3d 52 , cert. denied, 320 Conn. 934 , 134 A.3d 623 (2016) ; see also General Statutes § 46b-231 (d). Section 46b-231 (m) lists the "powers and duties" of magistrates. "As a creature of statute, the family support magistrate division has only that power that has been expressly conferred on it." Pritchard v. Pritchard , supra, 103 Conn. App. at 284 , 928 A.2d 566 .

It is undisputed that no statutory provision exists that expressly grants the family support magistrate division the power to open an acknowledgment of paternity on the basis of the best interests of the child. The trial court determined, however, that the magistrate had the inherent authority to open the judgment. We disagree.

"The authority of family support magistrates is defined and limited by statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Toole v. Hernandez , supra, 163 Conn. App. at 573 , 137 A.3d 52 . Although "[o]ur courts have the inherent authority to open, correct, or modify judgments ... this authority is restricted by statute and the rules of practice." Jonas v. Playhouse Square Condominium Assn., Inc. , 173 Conn. App. 36 , 39, 161 A.3d 1288 (2017) ; see also Cornfield Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Cummings , 148 Conn. App. 70 , 75, 84 A.3d 929 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 929 , 110 A.3d 433 (2015). The power of the family support magistrate division is limited by § 46b-172 (a) (2), which clearly states that an acknowledgment of paternity "may be challenged in court or before a family support magistrate after the rescission period only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact ...." (Emphasis added.)

In its memorandum of decision, the court acknowledged that "§ 46b-172 (a) (2) limits the grounds for opening [a]

judgment that may be asserted belatedly by the parties to an acknowledgment of paternity," but nonetheless concluded that "[i]t does not limit the court's inherent authority" to open the judgment. See Paddock v. Paddock , 22 Conn. App. 367 , 372, 577 A.2d 1087 (1990) ("The authority to open and vacate a judgment is within the inherent power of the trial courts. ... A motion to open and vacate should be granted when the court, acting reasonably, finds good cause to do so." [Citation omitted.] ). In so holding, the court impermissibly has contravened the statutory requirements set forth in § 46b-172 (a) (2). See also General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-172 (a) (1) ("the acknowledgment cannot be challenged after sixty days, except in court upon a showing of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact"). We reiterate that "[c]ourts may not by construction supply omissions ... or add exceptions [to statutes] merely because it appears that good reasons exist for adding them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven , 285 Conn. 778 , 792, 941 A.2d 932 (2008).

The plaintiff's motion to open was governed by § 46b-172 (a) (2). Beyond the sixty day rescission period, and absent a finding of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the magistrate did not have the authority to grant the motion to open the judgment. 12 See part I of this opinion. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the magistrate had the inherent authority to open the acknowledgment on the basis of the best interests of the child.

The judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.

In this opinion, LAVINE, J., concurred.

I concur in the well reasoned analysis and result set forth in the majority opinion. In determining whether the trial court properly has opened a paternity acknowledgement, we are constrained by the statutory authority that our legislature has conferred on family support magistrates in General Statutes § 46b-172.

I write separately to draw attention to what I believe is an obvious shortcoming of our acknowledgement of paternity statute, § 46b-172, which, as the present case illustrates, easily may be abused. I do so not merely in light of my experience as an Appellate Court judge, but in light of my experience as a family support magistrate and a Superior Court judge, all of which has made me keenly aware of the late surfacing problems that frequently arise from the operation of the statute in its current form.

Simply put, questions surrounding a child's paternity readily may be resolved accurately by DNA testing. Fortunately, DNA testing is readily available and far less invasive and costly than it has been in the past. In light of the importance of the issue of a child's paternity, 1 I believe it would be worthwhile for our legislature to consider revising the statute such that it requires the Department of Public Health, as a prerequisite to accepting a paternity acknowledgement, to require the submission of DNA testing results that are consistent with the paternity acknowledgement.

In the present case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff, Geoffrey M., Jr., 2 is not the child's biological father. Under § 46b-172, an acknowledgement of paternity depends upon the accuracy of the representations of the putative father and the mother of the child, not a more reliable source, such as DNA testing. In the present case, the plaintiff and the defendant, Asia A. M., who is the mother of the child at issue, effectively utilized the statute to accomplish an adoption of the child by the plaintiff. They did so with full knowledge that the plaintiff was not the child's biological father, without first having to terminate the parental rights of the biological father, and without having to be subjected to the scrutiny that any proposed adopted parent would be subject to under our established procedures regarding termination of parental rights and adoptions in the juvenile and probate courts. And, given the restrictions in the statute, this court is compelled to perpetuate the fabrication of the plaintiff and the child's mother, the negative effects of which are likely to be deeply personal and long-lasting for the child.

Although I believe that this court has reached the correct result under the current state of our law, I remain hopeful that our legislature will take reasonable steps to ensure accuracy in the acknowledgement of paternity process, thereby preventing consequences such as those reflected in the present case.