SR Holdings I, LLC v. Cannavo

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ SR HOLDINGS I, LLC v. JOSEPH CANNAVO ET AL. (AC 46673) (AC 46880)

Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment ordering the remit- titur of the damages the jury had awarded to the plaintiff in connection with its claims of fraudulent transfer relating to certain real property that was formerly owned by the defendant W Co. and transferred to the defendant B Co. The plaintiff claimed that the court had abused its discretion in reducing the award. W Co., B Co. and their defendant managing members separately appealed from the trial court’s judgment, following its denial of their motion to set aside the verdict in its entirety. The defendants claimed that the court abused its discretion because, inter alia, B Co. provided reasonably equiva- lent value to W Co. in exchange for the transferred real property. This court consolidated the appeals. Held:

This court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion, as the plaintiff accepted the remittitur and did not avail itself of the opportunity to decline the remittitur and pursue an appeal from the trial court’s order pursuant to statute (§ 52-228a).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict, as the jury could have reasonably found from the evidence in the record that the value of the liens encumbering the transferred properties did not exceed the total value of the properties, that the trans- ferred properties therefore were not overleveraged and, instead, constituted assets under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (§ 52-552a et seq.), and that there was not reasonably equivalent value exchanged for the transferred properties because the total consideration furnished by B Co. was less than the market value of the properties.

Argued January 7—officially released June 9, 2026 Procedural History Action, in each case, to recover damages for, inter alia, fraudulent conveyance of real property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Povodator, J., granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendant Provident Bank; thereafter, the court, Genuario, J., consolidated the cases; subsequently, the cases were tried to the jury before Hon. Kenneth B.

Povodator, judge trial referee; verdict for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, denied the motion for judgment notwith- standing the verdict filed by the named defendant et al. and conditionally denied the motion to set aside the verdict filed by the named defendant et al. and the plain- tiff appealed to this court; subsequently, the plaintiff accepted and consented to the decision of the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, reducing the amount of the jury verdict award; thereafter, the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the named defen- dant et al. appealed and the plaintiff filed an amended appeal; subsequently, this court consolidated the appeals, and the named defendant et al. filed an amended appeal. Appeals dismissed in AC 46673; affirmed in AC 46880. Danielle J. B. Edwards, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 46673 and the appellee in Docket No. AC 46880 (plaintiff).

Andrew D. Brodnick, with whom was Jan A. Marcus, for the appellees in Docket No. AC 46673 and the appel- lants in Docket No. AC 46880 (named defendant et al.).

Opinion ELGO, J. In these consolidated appeals,1 we address claims that arise from the trial court’s resolution of the postverdict motion filed by the defendants Joseph Cannavo, Leonard Cannavo, Carmela Cannavo, Blue Mountain Partners, LLC (Blue Mountain Partners), and Western Greenwich Holdings, LLC (Western Greenwich Holdings)2 in the two related civil actions underlying these appeals.3 In Docket No. AC 46673, the plaintiff, SR Holdings I, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the court ordering a remittitur, claiming that the court abused its discretion by reducing the award entered in accordance with the jury’s verdict.4 We dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Docket No. AC 46880, the defendants appeal from the judgment of the court denying their postverdict motion to set aside the verdict in its entirety. They claim that the court abused its discretion by denying their motion to set aside the verdict because (1) two parcels of real property that had been owned by Western Greenwich Holdings and transferred to Blue Mountain Partners5 did not constitute assets under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), General Statutes thereof is not at issue on appeal. As such, we refer to the Cannavo siblings, Western Greenwich Holdings, and Blue Mountain Partners collectively as the defendants in these consolidated appeals.

§ 52-552a et seq., and (2) Blue Mountain Partners pro- vided reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfers.6 With respect to the defendants’ appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. At all relevant times, the Cannavo brothers were real estate investors that invested in primarily multi- family residential and mixed-use residential properties. To effectuate their overarching real estate investment business, the Cannavo brothers formed multiple enti- ties, predominantly limited liability companies, which they used to obtain loans to purchase distressed proper- ties.7 The Cannavo brothers would subsequently repair these distressed properties, refinance them, and use the refinancing to purchase additional distressed proper- ties.8 They also leased and managed the properties they repaired.9 By 2008, they owned and managed approxi- mately seventy properties.

One of the Cannavo brothers’ companies, Western Greenwich Holdings, purchased the Greenwich proper- ties in 2001. On or about October 31, 2006, Western Greenwich Holdings refinanced the Greenwich proper- ties, procuring two loans from Washington Mutual Bank. One loan was evidenced by a note in the original principal amount of $1,320,000 and was secured by a mortgage on the Pemberwick Road property. The other loan was evidenced by a note in the original principal amount of $790,000 and was secured by a mortgage on the South Water Street property. After various transfers, ECP Port Chester, LLC (ECP), purchased a portfolio of loans, which contained the notes secured by the mortgages on the Greenwich properties, and those notes were subse- quently assigned to ECP.10

In April 2007, Western Greenwich Holdings acquired two additional loans of $150,000 each from Branca Realty, LLC, one of which was secured by a mortgage on the Pemberwick Road property and one of which was secured by a mortgage on the South Water Street prop- erty (Branca mortgages). The Branca mortgages were subordinated to the other mortgages on the Greenwich properties.

On November 30, 2010, ECP sent two letters to West- ern Greenwich Holdings, which provided that the notes on both the Greenwich properties were in default and demanded the entire balances due. According to those letters, the total amount due on the note secured by the Pemberwick Road property was $1,386,570.80 and the total amount due on the note secured by the South Water Street property was $830,252.09. Through a purchase agreement dated December 22, 2010 (purchase agreement), ECP agreed to sell the portfolio back to the Cannavo brothers, or one of their entities, provided the Cannavo brothers made a down payment and made additional monthly interest payments on the notes in the portfolio. Pursuant to that purchase agreement, the Cannavo brothers had until June 2011 to secure financing to purchase the portfolio, which included the notes secured by mortgages on the Greenwich proper- ties.11 Joseph testified that the purchase agreement was “an interest only payment [agreement] to hold the deal together while we looked for financing.”

Joseph formed Blue Mountain Partners sometime in 2010 and apparently attempted to use it to secure the nec- essary financing to purchase the ECP portfolio but was unable to do so because of his poor credit rating. Joseph testified that, “by this time, we were falling behind on all of our mortgage payments, so the credit was bad.” After unsuccessfully attempting to secure financing, Joseph transferred Blue Mountain Partners to his sister Carmela sometime in 2011. Carmela then became the sole member of Blue Mountain Partners. Leonard testified that Carmela “was always interested in real estate” and she had a high credit rating and assets, which would help secure the necessary financing to purchase the ECP portfolio. In exchange, Leonard testified that he would manage the properties Carmela purchased.

Leonard testified that he used Carmela’s credit to nego- tiate a loan with Provident Bank. Regarding Provident Bank’s loan, Grace Sabino’s prior testimony was read into the record.12 She testified that Leonard contacted her to “refinance” the existing debt on the Greenwich properties so that Carmela could purchase them through Blue Mountain Partners. Sabino testified that gener- ally Provident Bank would loan up to 75 percent of the loan-to-value ratio for property refinancing and that the bank hired appraisers to value the Greenwich prop- erties.13 Provident Bank agreed to loan $1,745,000 to Blue Mountain Partners for the refinancing.14 As the Cannavo siblings attempted to secure financ- ing for the Greenwich properties, Sovereign Bank com- menced two foreclosure actions in a New York court against several defendants, including the Cannavo broth- ers and Western Greenwich Holdings.15 Blue Mountain Partners was not named as a defendant in either of those New York foreclosure actions. Sovereign Bank assigned its full interest in the two New York foreclosure actions and its interest “in the underlying notes, mortgage, and related loan documents” to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was thereafter substituted for Sovereign Bank in both of the New York foreclosure actions. On November 14, 2011, a judgment of foreclosure by sale was rendered in both actions.

On January 24, 2012, ECP sent Western Greenwich Holdings a letter, which stated in relevant part: “In anticipation of the loan payoff this week, the current outstanding balance on the loans to Western Green- wich Holdings . . . which are secured by mortgages on the [Greenwich] properties, is $1,500,000.” Provident Bank disbursed, inter alia, $1,500,000 of the loan to ECP and $150,000 of the loan to Branca Realty, LLC.16 By an agreement dated January 24, 2012, ECP agreed, inter alia, to release certain mortgages securing loans that had been paid off, including the mortgages on the Greenwich properties.

On January 25, 2012, the Greenwich town clerk recorded the releases of the ECP mortgages, the Branca mortgages, and a cross-collateralization agreement secured by the Greenwich properties.17 On the same day, the town clerk recorded Western Greenwich Holdings’ transfer of title to the Greenwich properties to Blue Mountain Partners, for the recited consideration of $10 each and conveyance taxes received.18

On April 3, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for a defi- ciency judgment in both New York foreclosure actions. On September 24, 2012, the New York court rendered a deficiency judgment against, among others, the Can- navo brothers and Western Greenwich Holdings, jointly and severally, for $2,836,459.42 in the first New York foreclosure action. On January 7, 2013, the New York court rendered a deficiency judgment against, among others, the Cannavo brothers and Western Greenwich Holdings, jointly and severally, for $1,618,929.82 in the second New York foreclosure action.

In January 2016, the plaintiff commenced the two underlying actions against the defendants.19 The New York deficiency judgment of $2,836,459.42 in the action filed in the New York Supreme Court in Westchester County under Index No. 20492-10 formed the basis of the plaintiff’s first action against the defendants in Connecticut, which was filed in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk under Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. The New York deficiency judg- ment of $1,618,929.82 in the action filed in the New York Supreme Court in Westchester County under Index No. 20493-10 formed the basis of the plaintiff’s second cross-collateralized the Greenwich properties and two other properties in Bridgeport, was signed on January 24, 2012. action against the defendants in Connecticut, which was filed in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk under Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.

On September 5, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the operative complaint, in both actions. In those complaints, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants transferred the Greenwich properties from Western Greenwich Holdings to Blue Mountain Part- ners in violation of CUFTA.20 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants transferred the Greenwich properties to Blue Mountain Partners “for less than fair consideration” and “for the purposes of avoiding pay- ment” of the New York deficiency judgments, and that the conveyances rendered Western Greenwich Holdings insolvent. The plaintiff further alleged that no amount of either of the New York deficiency judgments had been paid.21

The trial court, sua sponte, consolidated these two cases on March 28, 2019, which proceeded to trial in January 2023.22 At trial, the jury heard testimony from the Can- navo siblings and certain witnesses, including Michael House and Gene Branca. The jury also heard the previous testimony of various individuals, including Sabino and Joseph, which was read into the record.23 Additionally, the jury was presented with several exhibits, including the various mortgages, transfers, forbearance agree- ments, cross-collateralization agreements, and releases regarding the Greenwich properties.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on January 24, 2023. In response to the jury interrogato- ries, the jury found that, at the time Western Greenwich Holdings transferred the Greenwich properties to Blue Mountain Partners, the plaintiff had a claim pending against Western Greenwich Holdings. The jury found that the transfers were made with the “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the plaintiff as a creditor of Western Greenwich [Holdings].” The jury further found that the combined value of the Greenwich properties 17, 2023 supplemental judgment order, “the complaint[s] contain[ed] allegations seemingly invoking [the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act]. The case[s] [were] tried solely on the basis of claims of fraudulent conveyance . . . . The court was never asked to charge the jury in accordance with any aspect of [the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act] and the court was never asked to provide any relief under that [act].” totaled $2,490,000. The jury determined that the Green- wich properties constituted assets and that they had a combined value of $745,000 in excess of any valid liens on the Greenwich properties.24 The jury found that Blue Mountain Partners furnished a total of $1,745,000 in consideration for the Greenwich properties, including cash paid and liabilities assumed. The jury then found that the difference between the combined value of the Greenwich properties and the consideration furnished by Blue Mountain Partners for the Greenwich properties was $745,000. Finally, the jury concluded that Western Greenwich Holdings did not receive reasonably equiva- lent value in exchange for the Greenwich properties and that Western Greenwich Holdings was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfers. The court accepted the verdict on the same day.

On February 2, 2023, the defendants filed a combined motion requesting that the judgment be set aside and that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict be granted in their favor, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 16-3525 and 16-37.26 The plaintiff objected to the defendants’ motion. On March 6, 2023, the court held a hearing on that motion.

By memorandum of decision dated June 20, 2023, the court conditionally denied the defendants’ combined motion to set aside the verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In ruling on those motions, the court noted an inconsistency with the jury’s find- ings regarding the two Branca mortgages. Specifically, the court found that there was “no reasonable basis for the jury to have omitted the second [$150,000] Branca [mortgage] in its determination of valid liens . . . .” The court thus issued “an order in the nature of remittitur” and reduced the jury finding of the net equity trans- ferred, by the amount of the omitted Branca mortgage, to $595,000. The court conditioned this reduction on the plaintiff’s acceptance and stated that, if the plaintiff declined, it would grant the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.

On June 26, 2023, the plaintiff accepted the remittitur. Specifically, the plaintiff filed a pleading with the court, in which it averred in relevant part: “In accordance with the decision of [the court] . . . dated June 20, 2023, the plaintiff accepts and consents to the decision reducing the jury verdict award from $745,000 to $595,000.”

On July 11, 2023, the plaintiff filed an appeal from the court’s June 20, 2023 decision to conditionally deny the defendants’ combined motion to set aside the verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This appeal was filed under AC 46673.

On July 11, 2023, the trial court scheduled a status conference and requested supplemental briefing on the issue of the proper remedy to be awarded to the plaintiff rendered thereon set aside and have judgment rendered in accordance with his or her motion for a directed verdict . . . . If a verdict was returned, the judicial authority may allow the judgment to stand or may set the verdict aside and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. . . .” The defendants’ counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, arguing that the plaintiff “failed to fulfill its burden of proof in establishing a fraudulent conveyance.” Specifi- cally, the defendants’ counsel argued that the plaintiff failed to meet its evidentiary burden of establishing that the two Greenwich properties were assets under CUFTA and that the plaintiff failed to establish that there was not reasonably equivalent value exchanged for the Greenwich properties. The court denied the defendants’ motion. in light of the jury’s verdict and the plaintiff’s decision to accept the remittitur. The plaintiff filed its brief regard- ing remedies on August 8, 2023, and the defendants filed their brief regarding remedies on August 15, 2023. The court then issued a supplemental order dated August 17, 2023, in which it ordered the attachment of liens on the two Greenwich properties, totaling the reduced verdict award of $595,000.27 The court ordered the attachment of a lien on the South Water Street property in the amount of $240,000 and a lien on the Pemberwick Road property in the amount of $355,000.28 The court declined to award any additional legal or equitable relief to the plaintiff. The court subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff based on that supplemental order.

On August 31, 2023, the defendants filed an appeal of the August 17, 2023 supplemental order and judgment with this court. This appeal was filed under AC 46880.29 On September 6, 2023, the plain- tiff amended its appeal filed under AC 46673 and indicated that the subject of that appeal was the August 17, 2023 supplemental order and judgment.30 As a result of that amendment, both of the plaintiff’s appeals, as well as the defendants’ appeal, challenge the propriety of the court’s August 17, 2023 supplemental order and judgment. a lack of a final judgment. Practice Book § 17-2 provides in relevant part: “If no motions under Section 16-35 or 17-2A are filed, upon the expira- tion of the time provided for the filing of such motions, judgment on the verdict shall be rendered in accordance with the verdict, and the date of the judgment shall be the date the verdict was accepted. If motions are filed pursuant to Section 16-35 or 17-2A, judgment shall be rendered at the time of and in accordance with the decision on such motions. . . .” “It is well settled that the acceptance of the jury verdict at the time it is [returned] is deemed to constitute a final judgment . . . unless a motion to set aside is later filed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Georges v. OB-GYN Services, P.C., 335 Conn. 669, 678, 240 A.3d 249 (2020); see also Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 333 Conn. 60, 73–74, 214 A.3d 345 (2019) (“Thus, the trial court’s ruling on that postverdict motion becomes the controlling disposition for purposes of appeal. The appeal itself is taken from the judgment rendered by the trial court after it denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and disposed of any other pending motions that may require a ruling before the judgment becomes final.” (Footnote omitted.)); Stroi- ney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84–86, 495 A.2d 1063 (1985) (dismissing appeal when trial court order failed to fully dispose claims for, inter alia, damages). The plaintiff appealed before the court fully resolved the claims for damages and prior to rendering judgment in its favor. We thus conclude that the plaintiff’s original appeal was not properly before this court and dismiss it accordingly. Although we dismiss the plaintiff’s original appeal, the plaintiff’s amended appeal, filed on September 6, 2023, was taken from the court’s August 17, 2023 supplemental order regarding judgment, and it remains pending. Practice Book § 61-9 provides in relevant part: “If the origi- nal appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, any amended appeal shall remain pending if it was filed from a judgment or order from which an original appeal properly could have been filed.” See Stevens v. Khalily, 220 Conn. App. 634, 641 n.9, 298 A.3d 1254 (“Although the plaintiff’s original appeal was jurisdictionally defective for a lack of a final judgment, [the plaintiff] properly filed an amended appeal under Practice Book § 61-9 from a judgment from which an original appeal could have been filed. Accordingly, we dismiss the original appeal for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The amended appeal is properly before this court.”), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 915, 303 A.3d 260 (2023). Notwithstanding the jurisdictional defect in the plaintiff’s original appeal, the plaintiff’s amended appeal is properly before this court and encompasses all of its claims on appeal. See, e.g., Featherston v. Katchko & Son Construction Services, Inc., 201 Conn. App. 774, 780–83, 244 A.3d 621 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 923, 246 A.3d 492 (2021); Before considering the specific claims raised in those appeals, we note as a preliminary matter that the policy underlying CUFTA is to “[protect] unsecured creditors from debtors who place assets beyond the reach of their unsecured creditors . . . .” (Footnote omitted.) Geriatrics, Inc. v. McGee, 332 Conn. 1, 15, 208 A.3d 1197 (2019). CUFTA was “enacted for the suppression of fraud, the advancement of justice and the promotion of the public good, it should be liberally and beneficially construed to suppress the fraud, abridge the mischief and enlarge the remedy. . . . [T]he common law . . . supplements the statute to the end that justice may be done.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 15–16.

General Statutes § 52-552e (a) sets forth the follow- ing test to determine whether a transfer is fraudulent: “A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, if the creditor’s claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred and if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without receiv- ing a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor (A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreason- ably small in relation to the business or transaction, or (B) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.”31 As this court has observed, Rosa v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, 145 Conn. App. 275, 282 n.9, A.3d 534 (2013). “[t]he question of whether a fraudulent conveyance took place is solely a question of fact to be determined by the trier.” Davenport v. Quinn, 53 Conn. App. 282, 303, A.2d 1184 (1999).

I

We must first determine whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s amended appeal, in which it challenges the propriety of the remittitur it accepted. We conclude the plaintiff’s acceptance of remit- titur deprived this court of subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, dismiss its amended appeal.

In its June 20, 2023 memorandum of decision, the court conditionally denied the defendants’ combined motion to set aside the verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court found that there was “no reasonable basis for the jury to have omitted the second Branca [mortgage] in its determination of valid liens . . . . [T]he court believes its only recourse is to enter an order in the nature of a remittitur, allowing the plaintiff to accept an equity determination in a reduced amount, reflective of the validity of the second Branca [mortgage] that was transferred to another property.” Accordingly, the court ordered: “[T]he [defendants’] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied; the motion to set aside the verdict is denied, subject to the agreement of the plaintiff that the net equity available in the [Greenwich] properties at the time of the transfers was $150,000 less than as stated in the jury interrogatories, for an ‘adjusted’ net equity of $595,000 (effectively modifying the responses to the jury interrogatories [numbers 4 and 6] to reflect a correction of the excessive as a matter of law figure returned by the jury); if not accepted, the motion to set aside the verdict is granted. If the plaintiff agrees to this adjustment, a incurred, (9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, (10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred, and (11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.” pleading reflecting such consent must be filed no later than 20 days from the issuance of this decision.” On June 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed its formal acceptance of remittitur, providing in relevant part: “In accordance with the decision of [the court] . . . dated June 20, 2023, the plaintiff accepts and consents to the decision reduc- ing the jury verdict award from $745,000 to $595,000.” Following the commencement of these appeals, this court, sua sponte, issued an order permitting the parties to brief whether the plaintiff may properly argue, in the amended appeal, that the trial court erred in reducing the jury finding of the net equity in the Greenwich prop- erties, considering it filed a notice of acceptance of that decision, citing Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 260 Conn. 747, 800 A.2d 499 (2002), and Civiello v. Owens- Corning Fiberglass Corp., 208 Conn. 82, 544 A.2d 158 (1988).32 The plaintiff thereafter filed a brief with this court, in which it maintained that its “full amended appeal” was properly before this court.

We begin with our standard of review. “The issue of whether the plaintiff may appeal from the judgment rendered after his acceptance of a remittitur implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, and there- fore presents an issue of law. Accordingly, our review is plenary.” Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 260 Conn. 754. A plaintiff, by accepting remittitur, is barred from appealing the propriety of that accepted remittitur. See id., 760 (“[T]o challenge the decisions of the trial court on appeal, the plaintiff was required to decline the remittitur and appeal from the trial court’s order granting a new trial. The plaintiff, having failed to do so, his appeal is therefore dismissed.”); E. Prescott, Con- necticut Appellate Practice & Procedure (6th Ed. 2019) § 3-1:11.2, p. 154 (“If a court has ordered a remittitur . . . a plaintiff may either accept or reject the remittitur. If he accepts it, he cannot thereafter appeal from the judgment ordering the remittitur, even if he accepted the remittitur under protest.”).

The plaintiff argues that it is not barred from challeng- ing the remittitur even though it accepted it because the remittitur was not ordered pursuant to the remittitur statutes, General Statutes §§ 52-216a33 and 52-228b.34 Relying on Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 89, the plaintiff argues that, because the defendants did not file a motion requesting remit- titur and because the trial court did not hold a hearing on that motion, this court has subject matter jurisdic- tion to review the court’s remittitur order, despite the plaintiff’s acceptance.

We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the remittitur was not ordered pursuant to the remittitur statutes. Although the court did not cite the remittitur statutes in its August 17, 2023 supplemen- tal order, the court referred to its order as one “in the nature of a remittitur . . . .” The court characterized the order as an adjustment to the jury verdict, and it found the verdict to be “excessive as a matter of law,” which mirrors the language of § 52-216a. Moreover, the form of the order satisfied the requirements in § 52-228b, notably that, upon the court’s conclusion that the verdict was excessive as a matter of law, the “prevailing party” must be given the “opportunity to have the amount of the judgment decreased by so much thereof as the court deems excessive.” Likewise, the court’s order satisfied the requirement that, “upon failure of the party so ordered to remit the amount ordered by the court, [the court] shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial.”35 General Statutes § 52-216a. We also note that the court followed the precedent of our Supreme Court requiring it to “set forth in the memorandum of decision clear, definite and satisfactory reasons for” ordering remittitur.36 Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 303 Conn. 276, 283, 32 A.3d (2011).

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s reliance on Civiello for the proposition that this court has jurisdiction over an appeal taken from an accepted remittitur order is misplaced. The plaintiffs in Civiello did not appeal the propriety of a remittitur order after accepting it. Rather, those plaintiffs appealed a separate determination by the court declining to award interest on the judgment pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 52-192a.37 Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 87–88. In Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, Conn. 747, our Supreme Court clarified its holding in Civiello, stating: “[T]he refusal to award interest was a separate determination from the judgment rendered upon the plaintiff’s acceptance to the remittitur. . . . This court’s conclusion in Civiello was in accordance with well established authority holding that the Donovan [v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649, 97 S. Ct. 835, 51 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1977)]38 rule does not prevent the appeal of issues that are separate or distinct from the issue on which a plaintiff has accepted a remittitur.” (Citation omitted; footnote added.) Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 756; see also Semrau v. Herrick, 72 Conn. App. 327, 332 n.5, 805 A.2d 125 (2002).

The analysis in Cohen informs our resolution of the plaintiff’s claim. In Cohen, the trial court, upon the defendant’s motion for remittitur, determined that the jury’s damages award of certain noneconomic damages was excessive and ordered the plaintiff either to accept remittitur or to submit to a new trial with respect to damages. Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, Conn. 750. The plaintiff accepted remittitur, and judgment was rendered in accordance with the remit- titur. Id. The plaintiff appealed, seeking to both retain the favorable judgment and “attempting to procure additional damages pursuant to a new trial on the issue” of those certain noneconomic damages. Id., 755. Our Supreme Court determined that “the issue before us therefore turns on whether the issues that the plaintiff seeks to raise on appeal are separate and distinct from the issue upon which he accepted the remittitur.” Id., 757. section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney’s fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.”

It concluded that the issues of the varying noneconomic and economic damages were not separate and distinct. Id., 757–58. It further concluded that, “to challenge the decisions of the trial court on appeal, the plaintiff was required to decline the remittitur and appeal from the trial court’s order granting a new trial. The plaintiff having failed to do so, his appeal is therefore dismissed.” Id., 760; see also E. Prescott, supra, § 3-1:11.2, p. 154 (“If a court has ordered a remittitur . . . a plaintiff may either accept or reject the remittitur. If he accepts it, he cannot thereafter appeal from the judgment order- ing the remittitur, even if he accepted the remittitur under protest.”).

We note that, when faced with remittitur, a plaintiff is not without recourse from this court, as it can decline the remittitur and appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-228a.39 See, e.g., Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospi- tal, supra, 260 Conn. 760; Johnson v. Chaves, 78 Conn. App. 342, 345, 826 A.2d 1286, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 911, 832 A.2d 70 (2003). In the present case, the plaintiff did not avail itself of the option to decline the remitti- tur and pursue an appeal in accordance with § 52-228a. Rather, the plaintiff elected to accept the remittitur contained in the court’s June 20, 2023 memorandum of decision. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the plaintiff’s decision to accept the remittitur deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised in its amended appeal.40 We therefore dismiss the plaintiff’s amended appeal. See Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 754, 760.

II In AC 46880, the defendants claim that the court abused its discretion in denying their postverdict motion to set aside the verdict. They assert that the jury’s ver- dict should have been set aside in its entirety because it is “completely belied by the evidence . . . .” Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) the Greenwich properties could not be considered assets under CUFTA because they were overleveraged and (2) Blue Mountain Partners provided reasonably equivalent value for the transfers of the Greenwich properties.41 We are unpersuaded.

We begin by noting that “[t]he proper appellate stan- dard of review when considering the action of a trial court in granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict is the abuse of discretion standard. . . . In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or [when] injustice appears to have been done. . . . [T]he role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict is not to sit as [an added] juror . . . but, rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favor- able to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC, 232 Conn. App. 733, 748, 338 A.3d 404 (2025). We are further mindful that we “do not presume error on the part of the trial court. . . . Rather, we presume that the trial court, in rendering its judgment . . . undertook the proper analysis of the law and facts.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) National Waste Associates, LLC v. Scharf, 183 Conn. App. 734, 744, 194 A.3d 1 (2018). A

The defendants first argue that the court abused its discretion by declining to set aside the verdict because the Greenwich properties did not constitute assets under CUFTA. Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) the Greenwich properties were overleveraged and there- fore could not be considered assets under CUFTA and (2) the principal amounts due under the mortgages on the Greenwich properties were not reduced prior to the transfers and, thus, the total amount of valid liens on the properties exceeded their value. We disagree.

CUFTA defines a transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involun- tary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an inter- est in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.” Gen- eral Statutes § 52-552b (12). An asset is, inter alia, the “property of a debtor, but the term does not include . . . (A) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien . . . .” General Statutes § 52-552b (2). Property is “anything that may be the subject of ownership.” Gen- eral Statutes § 52-552b (10). A lien is “a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common law lien or a statutory lien.” General Statutes § 52-552b (8). A valid lien is “a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equi- table process or proceedings.” General Statutes § 552b (13). “Thus, a transfer cannot be considered fraudulent if, at the time of the transfer, the transferred property is encumbered by valid liens exceeding the property’s value because the property would no longer be considered an asset under § 52-552b (2), and only assets may be trans- ferred fraudulently.” Smith v. Marshview Fitness, LLC, Conn. App. 1, 10, 212 A.3d 767 (2019).

In the present case, the jury found that the Greenwich properties collectively had a total value of $2,490,000. The jury also found that the Greenwich properties col- lectively had “a combined value in excess of the total of the valid liens on the properties” of $745,000. In other words, the jury found that the amount of valid liens on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,745,000.42 The court conditionally denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict; see part I of this opinion; and it explicitly stated that “the defendants are not disputing the existence of evidence from which the jury could have found the existence of valid liens of at least [$1,895,000] . . . . Rather, the defendants are arguing that the jury was required to find an aggregate of valid liens that sub- stantially/materially exceeded that amount, and could not, as a matter of law, have found the aggregate liens to be ‘only’ that amount.” The court further noted that the evidence indicated “a lack of accurate accounting of the loan balances for the two Greenwich properties in question” and notably a lack of specificity “as to the actual principal and interest due, as of the time of the transaction in question, as to each of the properties.” The court further noted that the defendants “do not address (adequately, if at all) the significance of ‘valid’ as a modifier. They do not address why the jury could not have applied a commonsense meaning to the term, and necessarily have not addressed why the jury could not have determined that the $1,500,000 combined loan balance, plus the disbursements made at closing and as reflected on the disbursement sheet . . . represented the sum total of all ‘valid’ liens.” The court therefore conditionally denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.

The defendants contend that the jury’s calculation was improper and they are thus entitled to have the ver- dict set aside. The defendants argue that the Greenwich properties were encumbered, collectively, by at least $2,516,822 of valid liens, which exceeded the jury finding of $2,490,000 in total value of the Greenwich properties. Specifically, the defendants contend that the Greenwich properties were encumbered by valid liens, including the mortgage on the Pemberwick Road property secur- ing the $1,320,000 note, the mortgage on the South Water Street property securing the $790,000 note, the $150,000 mortgage on the Pemberwick Road property, and the second $150,000 mortgage on the South Water Street property.43 The defendants further argue that the jury disregarded the cross-collateralization agreement, which would have increased the total encumbrances on the Greenwich properties by a prorated amount of $375,000.44 Thus, the defendants argue that the jury failed to correctly calculate the amount of the valid liens, and, as such, the verdict should be set aside.

Our review of the record reveals that the jury had before it evidence from which it reasonably could have found that the amount of the valid liens totaled $1,895,000. Notably, the record included ECP’s January 24, 2012 letter to Western Greenwich Holdings, which provides in relevant part: “In anticipation of the loan payoff this week, the current outstanding balance on the loans to Western Greenwich Holdings . . . which are secured by mortgages on the [Greenwich] properties, is $1,500,000.” Nothing in that letter suggests that the $1,500,000 was a reduced amount or part of a conditional agreement.45 not address why the jury was required to credit ECP’s November 30, 2010 letters as the correct amount of the balance due on the notes in ECP’s portfolio, especially in light of ECP’s January 24, 2012 letter, which stated that the “current outstanding balance” due on the notes secured by mortgages on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,500,000.

Furthermore, the record included Provident Bank’s loan disbursement sheet, evidence of the Branca mortgages, testimony, and the various releases of the mortgages and cross-collateralization agreements on the Greenwich properties. In sum, there existed evidence in the record for the jury to reasonably conclude, as it did, that the sum total of the valid liens on the Greenwich properties equaled $1,895,000.

The defendants rely on Smith v. Marshview Fitness, LLC, supra, 191 Conn. App. 1, for the proposition that the notes were not reduced as a matter of law prior to the transfer of the Greenwich properties and, therefore, a reduced amount of the liens could not be used to calculate the total amount of valid liens on the Greenwich proper- ties.46 The defendants argue that the January 24, 2012 letter recorded a reduced amount of the valid liens, and the jury was required to credit the November 30, 2010 default letters that ECP sent to Western Greenwich Holdings.47 Thus, the defendants argue the Greenwich properties could not be considered assets under CUFTA. N.A. Those agreements each permitted, inter alia, the defendants to purchase the portfolio for a discounted price. The existence of these conditional agreements, however, does not undermine the jury’s find- ings, as the agreements themselves do little to clarify the total amount of valid liens on the Greenwich properties, much less at the time of transfer. Furthermore, it is not clear that these agreements represent a conditionally discounted mortgage on the individual Greenwich prop- erties, especially in light of the plain language of ECP’s January 24, 2012 letter, which stated in relevant part that the “current outstand- ing balance on the loans” secured by the mortgages on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,500,000. As such, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.

The defendants, however, overstate the holding in Smith. The trial court in Smith determined that there was no dispute that the property in question was encumbered by a valid lien in excess of its value. Id., 11. Although the lender in Smith agreed to release its lien on the property in exchange for, inter alia, $100,000; id., 6; the court denied the plaintiff’s argument that there existed a disputed fact as to the value of the valid lien pursuant to the lender’s agreement to receive less than the value of the lien for its release. Id., 11.

The defendants’ reliance on Smith is thus misplaced because, in the present case, there existed a dispute as to the sum total of valid liens on the Greenwich properties. The jury was presented with evidence of, inter alia, three letters from ECP to Western Greenwich Holdings regard- ing the total amount due on the loans. The letters that the defendants argue should have been credited were sent approximately two years before the transfer. One letter, the January 24, 2012 letter, was sent immediately prior to the transfer. The jury was entitled to credit whichever letter it deemed credible, and it presumably credited the plain language of the January 24, 2012 letter, which provided in relevant part that the “current outstand- ing balance” on the notes secured by mortgages on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,500,000. Nowhere in that letter does it suggest that the $1,500,000 is a reduced or discounted amount owed to ECP on the notes as secured by the mortgages on the Greenwich proper- ties. The jury, in turn, could have reasonably added the disbursements recorded on Provident Bank’s disburse- ment sheet with the two Branca mortgages and found that the valid liens on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,895,000. We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when denying the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.48 B

The defendants next argue that the court abused its dis- cretion by declining to set aside the jury verdict because Blue Mountain Partners provided reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfers. Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) Carmela satisfied existing debt on the Greenwich properties, which constituted reasonable value and (2) reasonably equivalent value was paid for the transfers when comparing the value paid with the distressed value of the Greenwich properties. We disagree.

In the present case, the jury found that the “[t]otal consideration furnished by Blue Mountain [Partners]” to Western Greenwich Holdings for the transfers, inclusive of “cash paid, liabilities of Western Greenwich [Holdings] that were assumed, [and] liabilities of Western Greenwich [Holdings] that were paid,” totaled $1,745,000. The court, although it never explicitly ruled on the defen- dants’ argument that the jury’s finding of the total consideration furnished was unreasonable, implicitly found that the jury could have reasonably reached the verdict that it did when it denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.49

Similar to our resolution of the defendants’ arguments in part II A of this opinion, the defendants’ contention certain conditions. Those conditions include, among other things, that the sale be at arm’s length (that is, between strangers), with the selling homeowner surrendering residency. If the conditions are not met, a bank can refuse to approve the short sale and might well opt to see if the borrower’s desire to avoid foreclosure and stay in the home causes the borrower to continue making payments.” United States v. Jiménez, 946 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2019). In the present case, there existed no evidence in the record to suggest that ECP agreed to a short sale or ever referred to the various purchase agreements or forbearance agreements as such. Furthermore, the membership of Western Greenwich Holdings and Blue Mountain Partners is comprised solely of the Cannavo siblings, either wholly or in part. Moreover, the jury, in returning a plaintiff’s verdict, clearly disagreed with the defendants’ argument that the transfer of the Greenwich properties constituted a short sale. is, in essence, an argument that the jury should have viewed the record in a light more favorable to them. Specifically, the defendants argue that Carmela, through Blue Mountain Partners, secured the total debt owned by ECP in its portfolio and that such securitization and eventual forgiveness of that debt constituted reason- ably equivalent value for the Greenwich properties. The defendants also contend that the Greenwich properties should have been valued at $1,990,000 and that the jury finding of $1,745,000 total consideration paid is a reasonably equivalent value to the distressed values of the Greenwich properties.

The jury’s findings, however, are supported by the record. The record includes evidence, such as ECP’s January 24, 2012 letter, which provided that the “cur- rent outstanding balance on the loans” secured by mort- gages on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,500,000. Furthermore, the evidence includes the appraisals dated June 7, 2011, which listed both the distressed value ($1,990,000) and the market value ($2,490,000) of the Greenwich properties. The defendants have not addressed why it would be unreasonable for the jury to credit the market value of the Greenwich properties.50 The record also includes Provident Bank’s disbursement sheet, rel- evant testimony, and the various releases of the liens on the Greenwich properties. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found was unreasonable, our review of the court’s memorandum of decision and its denial of the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict accord- ingly convinces us that the court implicitly rejected the defendants’ argument. See, e.g., Pryor v. Brignole, 231 Conn. App. 659, 695, 333 A.3d 1112 (2025) (concluding, on basis of trial court’s memorandum of decision and record, that trial court had implicitly granted defendants’ motions). Moreover, the defendants did not seek an articulation of the court’s denial of their motion to set aside the verdict. See Practice Book § 66-5; Doe v. Bemer, 215 Conn. App. 504, 517 and n.7, 283 A.3d 1074 (2022). that the total consideration furnished by Blue Moun- tain Partners for the Greenwich properties equaled the $1,745,000 listed in Provident Bank’s disbursement sheet. The jury also could have reasonably credited the market value of the Greenwich properties, which is con- sistent with the jury finding that the value of the Green- wich properties totaled $2,490,000. The jury, likewise, could have reasonably calculated that the difference between the market value of the Greenwich properties and the total consideration furnished was $745,000 and thus found that there was not reasonably equivalent value exchanged.51 We reiterate that we do not presume error on the part of the trial court; National Waste Associates, LLC v. Scharf, supra, 183 Conn. App. 744; and apply a deferential standard of review for reviewing the denial of a motion to set aside the verdict. Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC, supra, 232 Conn. App. 748. We thus conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.

The plaintiff’s original and amended appeals in AC 46673 are dismissed; the judgment in AC 46880 is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ SR HOLDINGS I, LLC v. JOSEPH CANNAVO ET AL. (AC 46673) (AC 46880)

Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment ordering the remit- titur of the damages the jury had awarded to the plaintiff in connection with its claims of fraudulent transfer relating to certain real property that was formerly owned by the defendant W Co. and transferred to the defendant B Co. The plaintiff claimed that the court had abused its discretion in reducing the award. W Co., B Co. and their defendant managing members separately appealed from the trial court’s judgment, following its denial of their motion to set aside the verdict in its entirety. The defendants claimed that the court abused its discretion because, inter alia, B Co. provided reasonably equiva- lent value to W Co. in exchange for the transferred real property. This court consolidated the appeals. Held:

This court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion, as the plaintiff accepted the remittitur and did not avail itself of the opportunity to decline the remittitur and pursue an appeal from the trial court’s order pursuant to statute (§ 52-228a).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict, as the jury could have reasonably found from the evidence in the record that the value of the liens encumbering the transferred properties did not exceed the total value of the properties, that the trans- ferred properties therefore were not overleveraged and, instead, constituted assets under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (§ 52-552a et seq.), and that there was not reasonably equivalent value exchanged for the transferred properties because the total consideration furnished by B Co. was less than the market value of the properties.

Argued January 7—officially released June 9, 2026 Procedural History Action, in each case, to recover damages for, inter alia, fraudulent conveyance of real property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Povodator, J., granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendant Provident Bank; thereafter, the court, Genuario, J., consolidated the cases; subsequently, the cases were tried to the jury before Hon. Kenneth B.

Povodator, judge trial referee; verdict for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, denied the motion for judgment notwith- standing the verdict filed by the named defendant et al. and conditionally denied the motion to set aside the verdict filed by the named defendant et al. and the plain- tiff appealed to this court; subsequently, the plaintiff accepted and consented to the decision of the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, reducing the amount of the jury verdict award; thereafter, the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the named defen- dant et al. appealed and the plaintiff filed an amended appeal; subsequently, this court consolidated the appeals, and the named defendant et al. filed an amended appeal. Appeals dismissed in AC 46673; affirmed in AC 46880. Danielle J. B. Edwards, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 46673 and the appellee in Docket No. AC 46880 (plaintiff).

Andrew D. Brodnick, with whom was Jan A. Marcus, for the appellees in Docket No. AC 46673 and the appel- lants in Docket No. AC 46880 (named defendant et al.).

Opinion ELGO, J. In these consolidated appeals,1 we address claims that arise from the trial court’s resolution of the postverdict motion filed by the defendants Joseph Cannavo, Leonard Cannavo, Carmela Cannavo, Blue Mountain Partners, LLC (Blue Mountain Partners), and Western Greenwich Holdings, LLC (Western Greenwich Holdings),2 in the two related civil actions underlying these appeals.3 In Docket No. AC 46673, the plaintiff, SR Holdings I, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the court ordering a remittitur, claiming that the court abused its discretion by reducing the award entered in accordance with the jury’s verdict.4 We dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Docket No. AC 46880, the defendants appeal from the judgment of the court denying their postverdict motion to set aside the verdict in its entirety. They claim that the court abused its discretion by denying their motion to set aside the verdict because (1) two parcels of real property that had been owned by Western Greenwich Holdings and transferred to Blue Mountain Partners5 did not constitute assets under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), General Statutes thereof is not at issue on appeal. As such, we refer to the Cannavo siblings, Western Greenwich Holdings, and Blue Mountain Partners collectively as the defendants in these consolidated appeals.

§ 52-552a et seq., and (2) Blue Mountain Partners pro- vided reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfers.6 With respect to the defendants’ appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. At all relevant times, the Cannavo brothers were real estate investors that invested in primarily multi- family residential and mixed-use residential properties. To effectuate their overarching real estate investment business, the Cannavo brothers formed multiple enti- ties, predominantly limited liability companies, which they used to obtain loans to purchase distressed proper- ties.7 The Cannavo brothers would subsequently repair these distressed properties, refinance them, and use the refinancing to purchase additional distressed proper- ties.8 They also leased and managed the properties they repaired.9 By 2008, they owned and managed approxi- mately seventy properties.

One of the Cannavo brothers’ companies, Western Greenwich Holdings, purchased the Greenwich proper- ties in 2001. On or about October 31, 2006, Western Greenwich Holdings refinanced the Greenwich proper- ties, procuring two loans from Washington Mutual Bank. One loan was evidenced by a note in the original principal amount of $1,320,000 and was secured by a mortgage on the Pemberwick Road property. The other loan was evidenced by a note in the original principal amount of $790,000 and was secured by a mortgage on the South Water Street property. After various transfers, ECP Port Chester, LLC (ECP), purchased a portfolio of loans, which contained the notes secured by the mortgages on the Greenwich properties, and those notes were subse- quently assigned to ECP.10

In April 2007, Western Greenwich Holdings acquired two additional loans of $150,000 each from Branca Realty, LLC, one of which was secured by a mortgage on the Pemberwick Road property and one of which was secured by a mortgage on the South Water Street prop- erty (Branca mortgages). The Branca mortgages were subordinated to the other mortgages on the Greenwich properties.

On November 30, 2010, ECP sent two letters to West- ern Greenwich Holdings, which provided that the notes on both the Greenwich properties were in default and demanded the entire balances due. According to those letters, the total amount due on the note secured by the Pemberwick Road property was $1,386,570.80 and the total amount due on the note secured by the South Water Street property was $830,252.09. Through a purchase agreement dated December 22, 2010 (purchase agreement), ECP agreed to sell the portfolio back to the Cannavo brothers, or one of their entities, provided the Cannavo brothers made a down payment and made additional monthly interest payments on the notes in the portfolio. Pursuant to that purchase agreement, the Cannavo brothers had until June 2011 to secure financing to purchase the portfolio, which included the notes secured by mortgages on the Greenwich proper- ties.11 Joseph testified that the purchase agreement was “an interest only payment [agreement] to hold the deal together while we looked for financing.”

Joseph formed Blue Mountain Partners sometime in 2010 and apparently attempted to use it to secure the nec- essary financing to purchase the ECP portfolio but was unable to do so because of his poor credit rating. Joseph testified that, “by this time, we were falling behind on all of our mortgage payments, so the credit was bad.” After unsuccessfully attempting to secure financing, Joseph transferred Blue Mountain Partners to his sister Carmela sometime in 2011. Carmela then became the sole member of Blue Mountain Partners. Leonard testified that Carmela “was always interested in real estate” and she had a high credit rating and assets, which would help secure the necessary financing to purchase the ECP portfolio. In exchange, Leonard testified that he would manage the properties Carmela purchased.

Leonard testified that he used Carmela’s credit to nego- tiate a loan with Provident Bank. Regarding Provident Bank’s loan, Grace Sabino’s prior testimony was read into the record.12 She testified that Leonard contacted her to “refinance” the existing debt on the Greenwich properties so that Carmela could purchase them through Blue Mountain Partners. Sabino testified that gener- ally Provident Bank would loan up to 75 percent of the loan-to-value ratio for property refinancing and that the bank hired appraisers to value the Greenwich prop- erties.13 Provident Bank agreed to loan $1,745,000 to Blue Mountain Partners for the refinancing.14 As the Cannavo siblings attempted to secure financ- ing for the Greenwich properties, Sovereign Bank com- menced two foreclosure actions in a New York court against several defendants, including the Cannavo broth- ers and Western Greenwich Holdings.15 Blue Mountain Partners was not named as a defendant in either of those New York foreclosure actions. Sovereign Bank assigned its full interest in the two New York foreclosure actions and its interest “in the underlying notes, mortgage, and related loan documents” to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was thereafter substituted for Sovereign Bank in both of the New York foreclosure actions. On November 14, 2011, a judgment of foreclosure by sale was rendered in both actions.

On January 24, 2012, ECP sent Western Greenwich Holdings a letter, which stated in relevant part: “In anticipation of the loan payoff this week, the current outstanding balance on the loans to Western Green- wich Holdings . . . which are secured by mortgages on the [Greenwich] properties, is $1,500,000.” Provident Bank disbursed, inter alia, $1,500,000 of the loan to ECP and $150,000 of the loan to Branca Realty, LLC.16 By an agreement dated January 24, 2012, ECP agreed, inter alia, to release certain mortgages securing loans that had been paid off, including the mortgages on the Greenwich properties.

On January 25, 2012, the Greenwich town clerk recorded the releases of the ECP mortgages, the Branca mortgages, and a cross-collateralization agreement secured by the Greenwich properties.17 On the same day, the town clerk recorded Western Greenwich Holdings’ transfer of title to the Greenwich properties to Blue Mountain Partners, for the recited consideration of $10 each and conveyance taxes received.18

On April 3, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for a defi- ciency judgment in both New York foreclosure actions. On September 24, 2012, the New York court rendered a deficiency judgment against, among others, the Can- navo brothers and Western Greenwich Holdings, jointly and severally, for $2,836,459.42 in the first New York foreclosure action. On January 7, 2013, the New York court rendered a deficiency judgment against, among others, the Cannavo brothers and Western Greenwich Holdings, jointly and severally, for $1,618,929.82 in the second New York foreclosure action.

In January 2016, the plaintiff commenced the two underlying actions against the defendants.19 The New York deficiency judgment of $2,836,459.42 in the action filed in the New York Supreme Court in Westchester County under Index No. 20492-10 formed the basis of the plaintiff’s first action against the defendants in Connecticut, which was filed in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk under Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. The New York deficiency judg- ment of $1,618,929.82 in the action filed in the New York Supreme Court in Westchester County under Index No. 20493-10 formed the basis of the plaintiff’s second cross-collateralized the Greenwich properties and two other properties in Bridgeport, was signed on January 24, 2012. action against the defendants in Connecticut, which was filed in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk under Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.

On September 5, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the operative complaint, in both actions. In those complaints, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants transferred the Greenwich properties from Western Greenwich Holdings to Blue Mountain Part- ners in violation of CUFTA.20 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants transferred the Greenwich properties to Blue Mountain Partners “for less than fair consideration” and “for the purposes of avoiding pay- ment” of the New York deficiency judgments, and that the conveyances rendered Western Greenwich Holdings insolvent. The plaintiff further alleged that no amount of either of the New York deficiency judgments had been paid.21

The trial court, sua sponte, consolidated these two cases on March 28, 2019, which proceeded to trial in January 2023.22 At trial, the jury heard testimony from the Can- navo siblings and certain witnesses, including Michael House and Gene Branca. The jury also heard the previous testimony of various individuals, including Sabino and Joseph, which was read into the record.23 Additionally, the jury was presented with several exhibits, including the various mortgages, transfers, forbearance agree- ments, cross-collateralization agreements, and releases regarding the Greenwich properties.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on January 24, 2023. In response to the jury interrogato- ries, the jury found that, at the time Western Greenwich Holdings transferred the Greenwich properties to Blue Mountain Partners, the plaintiff had a claim pending against Western Greenwich Holdings. The jury found that the transfers were made with the “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the plaintiff as a creditor of Western Greenwich [Holdings].” The jury further found that the combined value of the Greenwich properties 17, 2023 supplemental judgment order, “the complaint[s] contain[ed] allegations seemingly invoking [the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act]. The case[s] [were] tried solely on the basis of claims of fraudulent conveyance . . . . The court was never asked to charge the jury in accordance with any aspect of [the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act] and the court was never asked to provide any relief under that [act].” totaled $2,490,000. The jury determined that the Green- wich properties constituted assets and that they had a combined value of $745,000 in excess of any valid liens on the Greenwich properties.24 The jury found that Blue Mountain Partners furnished a total of $1,745,000 in consideration for the Greenwich properties, including cash paid and liabilities assumed. The jury then found that the difference between the combined value of the Greenwich properties and the consideration furnished by Blue Mountain Partners for the Greenwich properties was $745,000. Finally, the jury concluded that Western Greenwich Holdings did not receive reasonably equiva- lent value in exchange for the Greenwich properties and that Western Greenwich Holdings was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfers. The court accepted the verdict on the same day.

On February 2, 2023, the defendants filed a combined motion requesting that the judgment be set aside and that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict be granted in their favor, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 16-3525 and 16-37.26 The plaintiff objected to the defendants’ motion. On March 6, 2023, the court held a hearing on that motion.

By memorandum of decision dated June 20, 2023, the court conditionally denied the defendants’ combined motion to set aside the verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In ruling on those motions, the court noted an inconsistency with the jury’s find- ings regarding the two Branca mortgages. Specifically, the court found that there was “no reasonable basis for the jury to have omitted the second [$150,000] Branca [mortgage] in its determination of valid liens . . . .” The court thus issued “an order in the nature of remittitur” and reduced the jury finding of the net equity trans- ferred, by the amount of the omitted Branca mortgage, to $595,000. The court conditioned this reduction on the plaintiff’s acceptance and stated that, if the plaintiff declined, it would grant the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.

On June 26, 2023, the plaintiff accepted the remittitur. Specifically, the plaintiff filed a pleading with the court, in which it averred in relevant part: “In accordance with the decision of [the court] . . . dated June 20, 2023, the plaintiff accepts and consents to the decision reducing the jury verdict award from $745,000 to $595,000.”

On July 11, 2023, the plaintiff filed an appeal from the court’s June 20, 2023 decision to conditionally deny the defendants’ combined motion to set aside the verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This appeal was filed under AC 46673.

On July 11, 2023, the trial court scheduled a status conference and requested supplemental briefing on the issue of the proper remedy to be awarded to the plaintiff rendered thereon set aside and have judgment rendered in accordance with his or her motion for a directed verdict . . . . If a verdict was returned, the judicial authority may allow the judgment to stand or may set the verdict aside and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. . . .” The defendants’ counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, arguing that the plaintiff “failed to fulfill its burden of proof in establishing a fraudulent conveyance.” Specifi- cally, the defendants’ counsel argued that the plaintiff failed to meet its evidentiary burden of establishing that the two Greenwich properties were assets under CUFTA and that the plaintiff failed to establish that there was not reasonably equivalent value exchanged for the Greenwich properties. The court denied the defendants’ motion. in light of the jury’s verdict and the plaintiff’s decision to accept the remittitur. The plaintiff filed its brief regard- ing remedies on August 8, 2023, and the defendants filed their brief regarding remedies on August 15, 2023. The court then issued a supplemental order dated August 17, 2023, in which it ordered the attachment of liens on the two Greenwich properties, totaling the reduced verdict award of $595,000.27 The court ordered the attachment of a lien on the South Water Street property in the amount of $240,000 and a lien on the Pemberwick Road property in the amount of $355,000.28 The court declined to award any additional legal or equitable relief to the plaintiff. The court subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff based on that supplemental order.

On August 31, 2023, the defendants filed an appeal of the August 17, 2023 supplemental order and judgment with this court. This appeal was filed under AC 46880.29 On September 6, 2023, the plain- tiff amended its appeal filed under AC 46673 and indicated that the subject of that appeal was the August 17, 2023 supplemental order and judgment.30 As a result of that amendment, both of the plaintiff’s appeals, as well as the defendants’ appeal, challenge the propriety of the court’s August 17, 2023 supplemental order and judgment. a lack of a final judgment. Practice Book § 17-2 provides in relevant part: “If no motions under Section 16-35 or 17-2A are filed, upon the expira- tion of the time provided for the filing of such motions, judgment on the verdict shall be rendered in accordance with the verdict, and the date of the judgment shall be the date the verdict was accepted. If motions are filed pursuant to Section 16-35 or 17-2A, judgment shall be rendered at the time of and in accordance with the decision on such motions. . . .” “It is well settled that the acceptance of the jury verdict at the time it is [returned] is deemed to constitute a final judgment . . . unless a motion to set aside is later filed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Georges v. OB-GYN Services, P.C., 335 Conn. 669, 678, 240 A.3d 249 (2020); see also Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 333 Conn. 60, 73–74, 214 A.3d 345 (2019) (“Thus, the trial court’s ruling on that postverdict motion becomes the controlling disposition for purposes of appeal. The appeal itself is taken from the judgment rendered by the trial court after it denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and disposed of any other pending motions that may require a ruling before the judgment becomes final.” (Footnote omitted.)); Stroi- ney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84–86, 495 A.2d 1063 (1985) (dismissing appeal when trial court order failed to fully dispose claims for, inter alia, damages). The plaintiff appealed before the court fully resolved the claims for damages and prior to rendering judgment in its favor. We thus conclude that the plaintiff’s original appeal was not properly before this court and dismiss it accordingly. Although we dismiss the plaintiff’s original appeal, the plaintiff’s amended appeal, filed on September 6, 2023, was taken from the court’s August 17, 2023 supplemental order regarding judgment, and it remains pending. Practice Book § 61-9 provides in relevant part: “If the origi- nal appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, any amended appeal shall remain pending if it was filed from a judgment or order from which an original appeal properly could have been filed.” See Stevens v. Khalily, 220 Conn. App. 634, 641 n.9, 298 A.3d 1254 (“Although the plaintiff’s original appeal was jurisdictionally defective for a lack of a final judgment, [the plaintiff] properly filed an amended appeal under Practice Book § 61-9 from a judgment from which an original appeal could have been filed. Accordingly, we dismiss the original appeal for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The amended appeal is properly before this court.”), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 915, 303 A.3d 260 (2023). Notwithstanding the jurisdictional defect in the plaintiff’s original appeal, the plaintiff’s amended appeal is properly before this court and encompasses all of its claims on appeal. See, e.g., Featherston v. Katchko & Son Construction Services, Inc., 201 Conn. App. 774, 780–83, 244 A.3d 621 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 923, 246 A.3d 492 (2021); Before considering the specific claims raised in those appeals, we note as a preliminary matter that the policy underlying CUFTA is to “[protect] unsecured creditors from debtors who place assets beyond the reach of their unsecured creditors . . . .” (Footnote omitted.) Geriatrics, Inc. v. McGee, 332 Conn. 1, 15, 208 A.3d 1197 (2019). CUFTA was “enacted for the suppression of fraud, the advancement of justice and the promotion of the public good, it should be liberally and beneficially construed to suppress the fraud, abridge the mischief and enlarge the remedy. . . . [T]he common law . . . supplements the statute to the end that justice may be done.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 15–16.

General Statutes § 52-552e (a) sets forth the follow- ing test to determine whether a transfer is fraudulent: “A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, if the creditor’s claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred and if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without receiv- ing a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor (A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreason- ably small in relation to the business or transaction, or (B) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.”31 As this court has observed, Rosa v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, 145 Conn. App. 275, 282 n.9, 74 A.3d 534 (2013). “[t]he question of whether a fraudulent conveyance took place is solely a question of fact to be determined by the trier.” Davenport v. Quinn, 53 Conn. App. 282, 303, 730 A.2d 1184 (1999).

I

We must first determine whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s amended appeal, in which it challenges the propriety of the remittitur it accepted. We conclude the plaintiff’s acceptance of remit- titur deprived this court of subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, dismiss its amended appeal.

In its June 20, 2023 memorandum of decision, the court conditionally denied the defendants’ combined motion to set aside the verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court found that there was “no reasonable basis for the jury to have omitted the second Branca [mortgage] in its determination of valid liens . . . . [T]he court believes its only recourse is to enter an order in the nature of a remittitur, allowing the plaintiff to accept an equity determination in a reduced amount, reflective of the validity of the second Branca [mortgage] that was transferred to another property.” Accordingly, the court ordered: “[T]he [defendants’] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied; the motion to set aside the verdict is denied, subject to the agreement of the plaintiff that the net equity available in the [Greenwich] properties at the time of the transfers was $150,000 less than as stated in the jury interrogatories, for an ‘adjusted’ net equity of $595,000 (effectively modifying the responses to the jury interrogatories [numbers 4 and 6] to reflect a correction of the excessive as a matter of law figure returned by the jury); if not accepted, the motion to set aside the verdict is granted. If the plaintiff agrees to this adjustment, a incurred, (9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, (10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred, and (11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.” pleading reflecting such consent must be filed no later than 20 days from the issuance of this decision.” On June 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed its formal acceptance of remittitur, providing in relevant part: “In accordance with the decision of [the court] . . . dated June 20, 2023, the plaintiff accepts and consents to the decision reduc- ing the jury verdict award from $745,000 to $595,000.” Following the commencement of these appeals, this court, sua sponte, issued an order permitting the parties to brief whether the plaintiff may properly argue, in the amended appeal, that the trial court erred in reducing the jury finding of the net equity in the Greenwich prop- erties, considering it filed a notice of acceptance of that decision, citing Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 260 Conn. 747, 800 A.2d 499 (2002), and Civiello v. Owens- Corning Fiberglass Corp., 208 Conn. 82, 544 A.2d 158 (1988).32 The plaintiff thereafter filed a brief with this court, in which it maintained that its “full amended appeal” was properly before this court.

We begin with our standard of review. “The issue of whether the plaintiff may appeal from the judgment rendered after his acceptance of a remittitur implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, and there- fore presents an issue of law. Accordingly, our review is plenary.” Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 260 Conn. 754. A plaintiff, by accepting remittitur, is barred from appealing the propriety of that accepted remittitur. See id., 760 (“[T]o challenge the decisions of the trial court on appeal, the plaintiff was required to decline the remittitur and appeal from the trial court’s order granting a new trial. The plaintiff, having failed to do so, his appeal is therefore dismissed.”); E. Prescott, Con- necticut Appellate Practice & Procedure (6th Ed. 2019) § 3-1:11.2, p. 154 (“If a court has ordered a remittitur . . . a plaintiff may either accept or reject the remittitur. If he accepts it, he cannot thereafter appeal from the judgment ordering the remittitur, even if he accepted the remittitur under protest.”).

The plaintiff argues that it is not barred from challeng- ing the remittitur even though it accepted it because the remittitur was not ordered pursuant to the remittitur statutes, General Statutes §§ 52-216a33 and 52-228b.34 Relying on Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 89, the plaintiff argues that, because the defendants did not file a motion requesting remit- titur and because the trial court did not hold a hearing on that motion, this court has subject matter jurisdic- tion to review the court’s remittitur order, despite the plaintiff’s acceptance.

We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the remittitur was not ordered pursuant to the remittitur statutes. Although the court did not cite the remittitur statutes in its August 17, 2023 supplemen- tal order, the court referred to its order as one “in the nature of a remittitur . . . .” The court characterized the order as an adjustment to the jury verdict, and it found the verdict to be “excessive as a matter of law,” which mirrors the language of § 52-216a. Moreover, the form of the order satisfied the requirements in § 52-228b, notably that, upon the court’s conclusion that the verdict was excessive as a matter of law, the “prevailing party” must be given the “opportunity to have the amount of the judgment decreased by so much thereof as the court deems excessive.” Likewise, the court’s order satisfied the requirement that, “upon failure of the party so ordered to remit the amount ordered by the court, [the court] shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial.”35 General Statutes § 52-216a. We also note that the court followed the precedent of our Supreme Court requiring it to “set forth in the memorandum of decision clear, definite and satisfactory reasons for” ordering remittitur.36 Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 303 Conn. 276, 283, 32 A.3d 318 (2011). Furthermore, the plaintiff’s reliance on Civiello for the proposition that this court has jurisdiction over an appeal taken from an accepted remittitur order is misplaced. The plaintiffs in Civiello did not appeal the propriety of a remittitur order after accepting it. Rather, those plaintiffs appealed a separate determination by the court declining to award interest on the judgment pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 52-192a.37 Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 87–88. In Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 260 Conn. 747, our Supreme Court clarified its holding in Civiello, stating: “[T]he refusal to award interest was a separate determination from the judgment rendered upon the plaintiff’s acceptance to the remittitur. . . . This court’s conclusion in Civiello was in accordance with well established authority holding that the Donovan [v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649, 97 S. Ct. 835, 51 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1977)]38 rule does not prevent the appeal of issues that are separate or distinct from the issue on which a plaintiff has accepted a remittitur.” (Citation omitted; footnote added.) Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 756; see also Semrau v. Herrick, 72 Conn. App. 327, 332 n.5, 805 A.2d 125 (2002). The analysis in Cohen informs our resolution of the plaintiff’s claim. In Cohen, the trial court, upon the defendant’s motion for remittitur, determined that the jury’s damages award of certain noneconomic damages was excessive and ordered the plaintiff either to accept remittitur or to submit to a new trial with respect to damages. Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 260 Conn. 750. The plaintiff accepted remittitur, and judgment was rendered in accordance with the remit- titur. Id. The plaintiff appealed, seeking to both retain the favorable judgment and “attempting to procure additional damages pursuant to a new trial on the issue” of those certain noneconomic damages. Id., 755. Our Supreme Court determined that “the issue before us therefore turns on whether the issues that the plaintiff seeks to raise on appeal are separate and distinct from the issue upon which he accepted the remittitur.” Id., 757. section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney’s fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.”

It concluded that the issues of the varying noneconomic and economic damages were not separate and distinct. Id., 757–58. It further concluded that, “to challenge the decisions of the trial court on appeal, the plaintiff was required to decline the remittitur and appeal from the trial court’s order granting a new trial. The plaintiff having failed to do so, his appeal is therefore dismissed.” Id., 760; see also E. Prescott, supra, § 3-1:11.2, p. 154 (“If a court has ordered a remittitur . . . a plaintiff may either accept or reject the remittitur. If he accepts it, he cannot thereafter appeal from the judgment order- ing the remittitur, even if he accepted the remittitur under protest.”).

We note that, when faced with remittitur, a plaintiff is not without recourse from this court, as it can decline the remittitur and appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-228a.39 See, e.g., Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospi- tal, supra, 260 Conn. 760; Johnson v. Chaves, 78 Conn. App. 342, 345, 826 A.2d 1286, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 911, 832 A.2d 70 (2003). In the present case, the plaintiff did not avail itself of the option to decline the remitti- tur and pursue an appeal in accordance with § 52-228a. Rather, the plaintiff elected to accept the remittitur contained in the court’s June 20, 2023 memorandum of decision. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the plaintiff’s decision to accept the remittitur deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised in its amended appeal.40 We therefore dismiss the plaintiff’s amended appeal. See Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 754, 760.

II In AC 46880, the defendants claim that the court abused its discretion in denying their postverdict motion to set aside the verdict. They assert that the jury’s ver- dict should have been set aside in its entirety because it is “completely belied by the evidence . . . .” Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) the Greenwich properties could not be considered assets under CUFTA because they were overleveraged and (2) Blue Mountain Partners provided reasonably equivalent value for the transfers of the Greenwich properties.41 We are unpersuaded.

We begin by noting that “[t]he proper appellate stan- dard of review when considering the action of a trial court in granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict is the abuse of discretion standard. . . . In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or [when] injustice appears to have been done. . . . [T]he role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict is not to sit as [an added] juror . . . but, rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favor- able to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC, 232 Conn. App. 733, 748, 338 A.3d 404 (2025). We are further mindful that we “do not presume error on the part of the trial court. . . . Rather, we presume that the trial court, in rendering its judgment . . . undertook the proper analysis of the law and facts.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) National Waste Associates, LLC v. Scharf, 183 Conn. App. 734, 744, 194 A.3d 1 (2018). A

The defendants first argue that the court abused its discretion by declining to set aside the verdict because the Greenwich properties did not constitute assets under CUFTA. Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) the Greenwich properties were overleveraged and there- fore could not be considered assets under CUFTA and (2) the principal amounts due under the mortgages on the Greenwich properties were not reduced prior to the transfers and, thus, the total amount of valid liens on the properties exceeded their value. We disagree.

CUFTA defines a transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involun- tary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an inter- est in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.” Gen- eral Statutes § 52-552b (12). An asset is, inter alia, the “property of a debtor, but the term does not include . . . (A) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien . . . .” General Statutes § 52-552b (2). Property is “anything that may be the subject of ownership.” Gen- eral Statutes § 52-552b (10). A lien is “a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common law lien or a statutory lien.” General Statutes § 52-552b (8). A valid lien is “a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equi- table process or proceedings.” General Statutes § 552b (13). “Thus, a transfer cannot be considered fraudulent if, at the time of the transfer, the transferred property is encumbered by valid liens exceeding the property’s value because the property would no longer be considered an asset under § 52-552b (2), and only assets may be trans- ferred fraudulently.” Smith v. Marshview Fitness, LLC, 191 Conn. App. 1, 10, 212 A.3d 767 (2019).

In the present case, the jury found that the Greenwich properties collectively had a total value of $2,490,000. The jury also found that the Greenwich properties col- lectively had “a combined value in excess of the total of the valid liens on the properties” of $745,000. In other words, the jury found that the amount of valid liens on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,745,000.42 The court conditionally denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict; see part I of this opinion; and it explicitly stated that “the defendants are not disputing the existence of evidence from which the jury could have found the existence of valid liens of at least [$1,895,000] . . . . Rather, the defendants are arguing that the jury was required to find an aggregate of valid liens that sub- stantially/materially exceeded that amount, and could not, as a matter of law, have found the aggregate liens to be ‘only’ that amount.” The court further noted that the evidence indicated “a lack of accurate accounting of the loan balances for the two Greenwich properties in question” and notably a lack of specificity “as to the actual principal and interest due, as of the time of the transaction in question, as to each of the properties.” The court further noted that the defendants “do not address (adequately, if at all) the significance of ‘valid’ as a modifier. They do not address why the jury could not have applied a commonsense meaning to the term, and necessarily have not addressed why the jury could not have determined that the $1,500,000 combined loan balance, plus the disbursements made at closing and as reflected on the disbursement sheet . . . represented the sum total of all ‘valid’ liens.” The court therefore conditionally denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.

The defendants contend that the jury’s calculation was improper and they are thus entitled to have the ver- dict set aside. The defendants argue that the Greenwich properties were encumbered, collectively, by at least $2,516,822 of valid liens, which exceeded the jury finding of $2,490,000 in total value of the Greenwich properties. Specifically, the defendants contend that the Greenwich properties were encumbered by valid liens, including the mortgage on the Pemberwick Road property secur- ing the $1,320,000 note, the mortgage on the South Water Street property securing the $790,000 note, the $150,000 mortgage on the Pemberwick Road property, and the second $150,000 mortgage on the South Water Street property.43 The defendants further argue that the jury disregarded the cross-collateralization agreement, which would have increased the total encumbrances on the Greenwich properties by a prorated amount of $375,000.44 Thus, the defendants argue that the jury failed to correctly calculate the amount of the valid liens, and, as such, the verdict should be set aside.

Our review of the record reveals that the jury had before it evidence from which it reasonably could have found that the amount of the valid liens totaled $1,895,000. Notably, the record included ECP’s January 24, 2012 letter to Western Greenwich Holdings, which provides in relevant part: “In anticipation of the loan payoff this week, the current outstanding balance on the loans to Western Greenwich Holdings . . . which are secured by mortgages on the [Greenwich] properties, is $1,500,000.” Nothing in that letter suggests that the $1,500,000 was a reduced amount or part of a conditional agreement.45 not address why the jury was required to credit ECP’s November 30, 2010 letters as the correct amount of the balance due on the notes in ECP’s portfolio, especially in light of ECP’s January 24, 2012 letter, which stated that the “current outstanding balance” due on the notes secured by mortgages on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,500,000.

Furthermore, the record included Provident Bank’s loan disbursement sheet, evidence of the Branca mortgages, testimony, and the various releases of the mortgages and cross-collateralization agreements on the Greenwich properties. In sum, there existed evidence in the record for the jury to reasonably conclude, as it did, that the sum total of the valid liens on the Greenwich properties equaled $1,895,000.

The defendants rely on Smith v. Marshview Fitness, LLC, supra, 191 Conn. App. 1, for the proposition that the notes were not reduced as a matter of law prior to the transfer of the Greenwich properties and, therefore, a reduced amount of the liens could not be used to calculate the total amount of valid liens on the Greenwich proper- ties.46 The defendants argue that the January 24, 2012 letter recorded a reduced amount of the valid liens, and the jury was required to credit the November 30, 2010 default letters that ECP sent to Western Greenwich Holdings.47 Thus, the defendants argue the Greenwich properties could not be considered assets under CUFTA. N.A. Those agreements each permitted, inter alia, the defendants to purchase the portfolio for a discounted price. The existence of these conditional agreements, however, does not undermine the jury’s find- ings, as the agreements themselves do little to clarify the total amount of valid liens on the Greenwich properties, much less at the time of transfer. Furthermore, it is not clear that these agreements represent a conditionally discounted mortgage on the individual Greenwich prop- erties, especially in light of the plain language of ECP’s January 24, 2012 letter, which stated in relevant part that the “current outstand- ing balance on the loans” secured by the mortgages on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,500,000. As such, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.

The defendants, however, overstate the holding in Smith. The trial court in Smith determined that there was no dispute that the property in question was encumbered by a valid lien in excess of its value. Id., 11. Although the lender in Smith agreed to release its lien on the property in exchange for, inter alia, $100,000; id., 6; the court denied the plaintiff’s argument that there existed a disputed fact as to the value of the valid lien pursuant to the lender’s agreement to receive less than the value of the lien for its release. Id., 11.

The defendants’ reliance on Smith is thus misplaced because, in the present case, there existed a dispute as to the sum total of valid liens on the Greenwich properties. The jury was presented with evidence of, inter alia, three letters from ECP to Western Greenwich Holdings regard- ing the total amount due on the loans. The letters that the defendants argue should have been credited were sent approximately two years before the transfer. One letter, the January 24, 2012 letter, was sent immediately prior to the transfer. The jury was entitled to credit whichever letter it deemed credible, and it presumably credited the plain language of the January 24, 2012 letter, which provided in relevant part that the “current outstand- ing balance” on the notes secured by mortgages on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,500,000. Nowhere in that letter does it suggest that the $1,500,000 is a reduced or discounted amount owed to ECP on the notes as secured by the mortgages on the Greenwich proper- ties. The jury, in turn, could have reasonably added the disbursements recorded on Provident Bank’s disburse- ment sheet with the two Branca mortgages and found that the valid liens on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,895,000. We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when denying the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.48 B

The defendants next argue that the court abused its dis- cretion by declining to set aside the jury verdict because Blue Mountain Partners provided reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfers. Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) Carmela satisfied existing debt on the Greenwich properties, which constituted reasonable value and (2) reasonably equivalent value was paid for the transfers when comparing the value paid with the distressed value of the Greenwich properties. We disagree.

In the present case, the jury found that the “[t]otal consideration furnished by Blue Mountain [Partners]” to Western Greenwich Holdings for the transfers, inclusive of “cash paid, liabilities of Western Greenwich [Holdings] that were assumed, [and] liabilities of Western Greenwich [Holdings] that were paid,” totaled $1,745,000. The court, although it never explicitly ruled on the defen- dants’ argument that the jury’s finding of the total consideration furnished was unreasonable, implicitly found that the jury could have reasonably reached the verdict that it did when it denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.49

Similar to our resolution of the defendants’ arguments in part II A of this opinion, the defendants’ contention certain conditions. Those conditions include, among other things, that the sale be at arm’s length (that is, between strangers), with the selling homeowner surrendering residency. If the conditions are not met, a bank can refuse to approve the short sale and might well opt to see if the borrower’s desire to avoid foreclosure and stay in the home causes the borrower to continue making payments.” United States v. Jiménez, 946 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2019). In the present case, there existed no evidence in the record to suggest that ECP agreed to a short sale or ever referred to the various purchase agreements or forbearance agreements as such. Furthermore, the membership of Western Greenwich Holdings and Blue Mountain Partners is comprised solely of the Cannavo siblings, either wholly or in part. Moreover, the jury, in returning a plaintiff’s verdict, clearly disagreed with the defendants’ argument that the transfer of the Greenwich properties constituted a short sale. is, in essence, an argument that the jury should have viewed the record in a light more favorable to them. Specifically, the defendants argue that Carmela, through Blue Mountain Partners, secured the total debt owned by ECP in its portfolio and that such securitization and eventual forgiveness of that debt constituted reason- ably equivalent value for the Greenwich properties. The defendants also contend that the Greenwich properties should have been valued at $1,990,000 and that the jury finding of $1,745,000 total consideration paid is a reasonably equivalent value to the distressed values of the Greenwich properties.

The jury’s findings, however, are supported by the record. The record includes evidence, such as ECP’s January 24, 2012 letter, which provided that the “cur- rent outstanding balance on the loans” secured by mort- gages on the Greenwich properties totaled $1,500,000. Furthermore, the evidence includes the appraisals dated June 7, 2011, which listed both the distressed value ($1,990,000) and the market value ($2,490,000) of the Greenwich properties. The defendants have not addressed why it would be unreasonable for the jury to credit the market value of the Greenwich properties.50 The record also includes Provident Bank’s disbursement sheet, rel- evant testimony, and the various releases of the liens on the Greenwich properties. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found was unreasonable, our review of the court’s memorandum of decision and its denial of the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict accord- ingly convinces us that the court implicitly rejected the defendants’ argument. See, e.g., Pryor v. Brignole, 231 Conn. App. 659, 695, 333 A.3d 1112 (2025) (concluding, on basis of trial court’s memorandum of decision and record, that trial court had implicitly granted defendants’ motions). Moreover, the defendants did not seek an articulation of the court’s denial of their motion to set aside the verdict. See Practice Book § 66-5; Doe v. Bemer, 215 Conn. App. 504, 517 and n.7, 283 A.3d 1074 (2022). that the total consideration furnished by Blue Moun- tain Partners for the Greenwich properties equaled the $1,745,000 listed in Provident Bank’s disbursement sheet. The jury also could have reasonably credited the market value of the Greenwich properties, which is con- sistent with the jury finding that the value of the Green- wich properties totaled $2,490,000. The jury, likewise, could have reasonably calculated that the difference between the market value of the Greenwich properties and the total consideration furnished was $745,000 and thus found that there was not reasonably equivalent value exchanged.51 We reiterate that we do not presume error on the part of the trial court; National Waste Associates, LLC v. Scharf, supra, 183 Conn. App. 744; and apply a deferential standard of review for reviewing the denial of a motion to set aside the verdict. Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC, supra, 232 Conn. App. 748. We thus conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict.

The plaintiff’s original and amended appeals in AC 46673 are dismissed; the judgment in AC 46880 is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.