In re: Servicom, LLC; JNET Communications, LLC; Vitel Communications, LLC
In re: Servicom, LLC; JNET Communications, LLC; Vitel Communications, LLC
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
NEW HAVEN DIVISION
In re: Chapter 7
SERVICOM, LLC Case No. 18-31722 (AMN)
JNET COMMUNICATIONS, LLC Case No. 18-31723 (AMN)
VITEL COMMUNICATIONS, LLC Case No. 18-31724 (AMN)
(Jointly Administered Under 18-31722)
Debtors
ECF Nos. 2354, 2372, 2384
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION REGARDING A REQUEST FOR A
DETERMINATION REGARDING THE NEED FOR FURTHER MONETARY DAMAGES,
AWARDS, SANCTIONS, PENALTIES, ATTORNEY’S FEES OR OTHER PAYMENTS
These jointly administered Chapter 7 cases for Servicom, LLC, JNET
Communications, LLC, and Vitel Communications, LLC (together, “Debtors”) commenced
as Chapter 11 cases on October 19, 2018 (case number 18-31722 is the “Main Case”).
The Court granted the Debtors’ motion to convert their cases to cases under Chapter 7
in early 2019. The docket for the Main Case now exceeds 2,300 docket entries and
familiarity with the present dispute is assumed, including the Court’s earlier decisions
relating to various secured claims, the various cash collateral orders entered during the
Chapter 11 phase of the bankruptcy cases, a decision precluding evidence of a cash
management system as irrelevant to the issues presented here, and a decision
disallowing an early termination fee under the Debtors’ pre-petition Factoring Agreement.
ECF Nos. 279, 319, 2033, 2162, 2187.
Chapter 7 Trustee Barbara H. Katz (the “Trustee”), Coral Capital Solutions LLC
(“Coral”), creditor VFI KR SPE I, LLC (“VFI”), and interested parties Rev. Dr. David
Jefferson and Mr. Eugene Caldwell (“J&C”) (collectively, the “Mediation Parties”) have
been embroiled in a years-long legal dispute regarding the nature, extent, priority and
numerous collateral issues that flowed from Coral’s litigation stance. Coral alleged the
Debtors owed Coral $3,152,850.86, excluding attorneys’ fees and costs, based upon a
secured claim arising from certain pre- and post-petition factoring agreements. ECF No.
1940. Some of the Mediation Parties also disputed the validity, extent, priority and
enforceability of the VFI and J&C claims.
After the Court entered a Memorandum of Decision and Order Determining
Amount of Coral Capital Solutions LLC’s Pre-Petition and Post-Petition Factoring
Agreement Claims and Pre-Petition Term Loan Claim (ECF No. 2187, the “Coral Claim
Decision”) and after a lengthy, sustained mediation effort by court-appointed mediator
United States Bankruptcy Judge James Tancredi1, the Trustee seeks authority pursuant
to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9019(a) to enter into a substantial global settlement agreement (the
“Settlement and Release Agreement”, ECF No. 2372). If approved, the Settlement and
Release Agreement would result $0 being paid to Coral for its $3,152,850.86 claim, and
instead Coral will pay $2,468,995.42 to the other Mediation Parties. The three pending
adversary proceedings among these parties (19-3005, 19-3006, and 22-3010) would be
dismissed, as well as all pending District Court appeals. See ECF Nos. 2354, 2372, 2375.
The Trustee would make substantial distributions on account of allowed claims to VFI and
J&C.
Tucked into the Settlement and Release Agreement in paragraph 3(b), without
explanation, is the following set of conditions:
(b) For the avoidance of doubt, and without limiting the language of Section 2 of
this Agreement, the Coral Settlement Payments are contingent upon the following
two conditions precedent, which together are referred to as the “Settlement
Conditions”: (1) the Effective Date shall have occurred; and (2) the Bankruptcy
Court determining that it will not pursue, impose or assess any further damages,
1 The Mediation Parties were unanimous in their appreciation and regard for Judge Tancredi’s efforts
awards, sanctions, penalties, attorney’s fees or other payments against Coral, or
its counsel, related to the Factoring Agreement, the Term Note, the Side Collateral,
the Litigations or any other matter concerning or related to the Debtors and these
bankruptcy proceedings. If either Settlement Condition is not satisfied, then this
Agreement will not become effective, the Parties will return to the status quo ante,
Coral shall have no obligation to make the Coral Settlement Payments or to
otherwise perform under this Agreement, and each and all of the Litigations and
the Appeals will resume.
ECF No. 2372-1, p. 4, ¶ 3(b)(emphasis added).
A bankruptcy court’s role in approving or disapproving a Chapter 7 trustee’s
proposed settlement of a claim is to determine whether the Trustee has canvassed all
facts and applicable law and exercised her business judgment reasonably. If so, a court
must also determine whether the proposed agreement is fair and equitable, and whether
it falls above the lowest point of reasonableness. In re: Iridium, 285 B.R. 822 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). Courts within this Circuit apply a well-known set of criteria to assist a judge in
making this determination. Based upon the record and the Trustee’s motion, it is easy to
apply the Iridium factors to the Settlement and Release Agreement and determine the
Trustee’s request should be granted, except for paragraph 3(b)(2) which asks for a court
determination for the benefit of Coral and its counsel.
No litigant may dictate how, when, or if a court or a judicial officer exercises a
court’s inherent authority to enforce federal rules, statutes or ethical codes of conduct.
Yet, among the disputes the Settlement and Release Agreement seeks to resolve is the
question of whether the Court will exercise its inherent enforcement power to impose any
monetary sanctions on Coral or its counsel. Notwithstanding Coral’s contradictory
statements during the May 14th hearing about whether it is affirmatively seeking the
determination called for in paragraph 3(b)(2), it is clear from the posture of the Settlement
and Release Agreement that Coral and its counsel seek exactly that: a determination
from the Court.
During the May 14 hearing, counsel for Coral acknowledged – though only after
pointed inquiry from the Court, as has been a regrettable pattern in this case – that the
$1,350,000 was to compensate the other Mediation Parties for their attorneys’ fees. ECF
No. 2386,2 at 00:11:03 (“…the intention was to compensate them for attorney's fees.”)
The Court construes Coral’s counsel’s statements and those of the other Mediation
Parties during the May 14th hearing to be an oral request pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P.
9013(a)(2) for an order making the determination required by paragraph 3(b)(2) of the
Settlement and Release Agreement.
Based on the record here and the representations that Coral is paying $1,350,000
and that Coral’s counsel is providing Coral with a financial accommodation detailed in
ECF No. 2384, the Court concludes the payment is a sufficient monetary resolution to
any further exercise of the Court’s inherent power and duty to enforce Fed.R.Bankr.P.
9011, Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In reaching this determination the Court
gave significant weight to the request made by each of the other Mediation Parties that
the Settlement and Release Agreement be approved and that the $1,350,000 payment
(of $450,000 to each) would be an appropriate and complete resolution of their particular
claims against Coral or its counsel.
Separately, the Court will enter an Order Granting Motion to Approve Settlement
Between and Among (1) Barbara H. Katz, Chapter 7 Trustee; (2) Coral Capital Solutions
LLC; (3) VFI KR SPE I, LLC; and (4) David Jefferson and Eugene Caldwell.
2 ECF No. 2386 is a PDF with an MP3 attachment. The MP3 file is an audio recording of the May
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.