Buckley v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Buckley v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Opinion of the Court
This is an action at law, asking damages for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, which is claimed to have occurred by reason of the defendant’s negligence, and the jurisdiction of the court is ample. The defendant suffered a default, gave the lawful notice, and thereupon, in accordance with our state practice, the matter has come before me on a hearing in damages; and, after listening to the evidence presented by the parties, and the arguments of counsel, I find the following facts:
On August 31, 1905, plaintiff’s intestate, Joseph Bertoni, late of •Quincy, Mass., was employed by John Cashman at Putnam, Conn., as a laborer upon a job of rock and dirt excavation, which said Cash-man was doing under a contract with defendant for the general purpose of widening a cut and reducing the curves on the railroad at that point. He began work there on August 22, 1905. He was 35 years old, in good health, and had a wife and one child. He was rarely ill, and earned on this job $2.08 per day. His wages varied on different jobs, never running higher than $2.50, nor lower than $2 per day. His particular employment was to look after and keep in condition the drills used iu boring holes for the blasts. In doing this he was obliged to keep water in the holes, so that the drills should not become overheated. There is an arch bridge over the Ouinnebaug river" about J ,000 feet south of the Putnam station. Between the bridge and the station, the single track, at that time, ran for about 400 feet through a rather deep cut upon a sharp curve. The contract work was directed toward widening this cut on the westerly side, leaving the easterly wall of the cut intact. The defendant ran a regular passenger train over the Norwich Branch of the Shore Line Division, leaving New London at 5:30 a. m., and reaching Putnam at 7:25 a. m. Prom August 22d to 31st, inclusive, this train reached the described cut at substantially the same time each morning, which was between 7:20 and 7:25. Cash-man employed about 30 men on his job, and they began work at 7 o’clock a. m. There were two engines set up on the westerly side of the cut about 250 feet apart, each operating a set of drills; the southerly one being just around the first bend of the cut after coming over the arch bridge, and back from the track, perhaps 15 feet. It operated drills which were south of it, and several feet from the track.
A fellow workman was standing on the westerly bank, some nine feet from the track, marking out places for drill holes with a long pole. He heard the warning whistle, and saw Bertoni straighten up, look around, and take a step onto the track toward his side. He dropped his pole and rushed over the nine feet of ground which separated him from the track, but finding the engine upon him, he dodged backward, and fell over upon the westerly hank. He was seen falling backward by the fireman, who, not having seen Bertoni, naturally supposed that he was the one on account of whom the engineer blew the danger signal, and whose escape led him to say, “All right.”
The law of the case is not difficult. The engineer stood in the place of the master. It was his duty to operate the train through the cut in the way that a reasonably prudent man ought to have done it. He was bound to know and take into account all the circumstances of the case and govern himself accordingly. It was a very dangerous cut and curve. It was his duty to go through it with his train under control, keeping a sharp lookout. When danger appeared he was bound to act promptly and vigorously. " Now that the thing is over, we can see that if wdien he saw Bertoni he had applied the emergency brake, the life would have been saved, but we cannot say that the error in not doing so, if it be an error, is one which should compel the defendant to pay substantial damages. There is no suggestion that he was not entirely competent. There is nothing in his actual conduct which condemns him as incompetent. As to defendant’s negligence, the case is reasonably close; but, on the whole, I am bound to find that the defendant, by the evidence, has disproved the charge of negligence, which, by our peculiar method of pleading, it had admitted. I am the more willing to do so, because on the cognate charge of the contributory negligence of plaintiff’s intestate I am unhesitatingly in accord with the defendant.
Plaintiff’s intestate had been working on the ground for a week or more. Every morning, with unusual regularity, this same train had come through that cut at practically the same moment. It was in the very beginning of Bertoni’s morning work upon the job. Whistles were not blown, except in cases of danger, and the noise of the excavating machines made it difficult to hear the ringing bell upon the engine. These things Bertoni knew, or ought to have known. The defendant’s license or invitation to him to go upon the track presupposed a condition of at least comparative safety upon the track. The risk which he ran in going there at the time he selected was an obvious one, and it was his duty in that situation to look and listen. An ordinarily prudent man would have done so; but he did not. He was so sluggish of intellect that the sharp signal of danger, which alarmed several people
There are no other questions in the case. I think that the defendant has, by a hair, disproved the allegations of negligence, and that it clearly appears from the evidence that the plaintiffs intestate was guilty of contributory negligence.
It follows, under our practice, that the plaintiff is entitled to only nominal damages, which, in this case, may be fixed at $25.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- BUCKLEY v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.
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- Published