Luis Salaman v. Frank Sanchez and Frank Grillo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT LUIS SALAMAN, : Plaintiff, : : v. : 3:23-cv-639 (KAD) : FRANK SANCHEZ and : FRANK GRILLO, : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 57) Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Luis Salaman asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation against New Haven Department of Police Service (“NHDPS”) Sergeant Francisco (Frank) Sanchez and Officer Frank Grillo in their individual capacities. See Initial Review Order (“IRO”), ECF No. 12, at 6.

Defendants Sanchez and Grillo filed a motion for summary judgment. Mot. for Summ.

Judgment, ECF No. 57. In support of their motion, Defendants have submitted a memorandum of law, ECF No. 57-1, and a Rule 56(a)1 Statement of Facts, ECF No. 58, with exhibits, ECF No. 59-1 through 59-10. Plaintiff filed an opposition with a memorandum of law, ECF No. 60-1, a Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement of Disputed Facts, ECF No. 60, at 5–7, his affidavit, ECF No. 60, at 8–14, and exhibits, ECF No. 60, at 15–150.

For the following reasons, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Facts1 On initial review, the Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed for further development of the record on his claim that Sergeant Sanchez and Officer Grillo retaliated against him due to his having filed lawsuits concerning misconduct by NHDPS officers, including by Sanchez’s alleged ex-partner Luis Lopez and/or by Officer Grillo, who Plaintiff recorded on November 3, 2021. IRO at 2; see Compl. ¶¶ 14, 28. Specifically, the Court permitted Plaintiff to pursue First Amendment claims based on the following alleged retaliatory actions: “(1) Sergeant Sanchez and Officer Grillo stopped him for a traffic violation on May 14, 2020; (2) Sergeant Sanchez arrested him in 2021 at his girlfriend’s residence; and (3) his cell phone was confiscated, a false search warrant was issued, and Sanchez and Grillo arrested him on November 16, 2021.”2 IRO at 2.

Defendants informed Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the motion for summary judgment and the contents of a proper response. See Defs.’ Notice to Self-Represented Litigant, ECF No. 57-2. Rather than filing a Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement in compliance with the local rule, Plaintiff filed a Local Rule 56(a)1 statement of facts that he asserts are disputed, along with several exhibits. See ECF No. 60. The fact that Plaintiff is unrepresented does not excuse him from complying with the Court’s procedural and substantive rules. See Wu v. Nat’l Geospatial Intel.

Agency, No. 3:14-CV-1603 (DJS), 2017 WL 923906, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 8, 2017) (noting in context of pro se plaintiff’s failure to submit a Local Rule 56(a)2 statement, that “pro se parties are not excused from abiding by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (quotation omitted)). To the extent a party opposing a motion for summary judgment fails to submit a Local Rule 56(a)2 statement, the Court may consider a Local Rule 56(a)1 statement of fact to be admitted if supported by evidence. See Wright v. Quiros, No. 3:23-CV-949 (SRU), 2025 WL 2783699, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2025). Thus, Defendants’ facts, when supported by the evidence of record, are deemed admitted.

Small v. Clements, No. 3:18-CV-1731 (KAD), 2019 WL 5727388, at *1 n.1 (D. Conn. Nov. 5, 2019) (deeming uncontroverted facts admitted where a litigant failed to file a responsive statement of facts); see D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)3 (“Failure to provide specific citations to evidence in the record as required by this Local Rule may result in the Court deeming admitted certain facts that are supported by the evidence in accordance with Local Rule 56(a)1, or in the Court imposing sanctions . . . .”).

On May 14, 2020, Plaintiff was stopped for a traffic violation after he pulled away from the curb at 215 Rosette Street and turned onto King Place in New Haven, Connecticut. Defs.’ L.R. ¶ 1;5 see Compl. ¶ 15. An Incident/Investigation Report states that NHDPS Officer Joshua Castellano conducted the traffic stop because Plaintiff was observed pulling away from a curb without using his turn signal. Defs.’ L.R. ¶¶ 2, 4. As a result of the traffic stop, Plaintiff was issued a verbal warning for driving without a license and was permitted to leave without any charges against him. Id. ¶ 5.

In the reporting narrative, Officer Castellano stated: On 5/14/2020 at approximately 2219 hours Det. Glynn and I were patrolling the area of Rosette Street in an unmarked police vehicle equipped with lights and sirens. We observed a red Toyota Corolla pull off of the curb in front of 215 Rosette Street into traffic without using its turn signal. warrant, and arrest on November 16, 2021. The Court will, however, analyze below whether Plaintiff may proceed beyond the motion for summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim—as set forth in his opposition memorandum—that Grillo used Plaintiff’s son’s “illegally confiscated phone” to harass Plaintiff, and that three days after Plaintiff recorded Grillo on “Facebook live,” Grillo used a confidential informant to further harass and fabricate a case against him. Pl.’s Mem. at 6, 10; see Compl. ¶¶ 28–29.

The Court’s consideration of the motion for summary may rely on evidence, including police records, that are admissible at trial. See, e.g., Smith v. City of New York, 697 F. App’x 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2017) (district court may rely on police reports at summary judgment because statements therein “could readily be reduced to admissible form at trial through the testimony of the defendant officers as to the underlying events in question”). In addition, as previously noted, Plaintiff has not filed a Local Rule 56(a)2 statement that complies with Local Rule 56(a). See supra at n.1.

Det. Glynn ran the vehicle[’]s marker plate through the records division of the New Haven Police Department. While we were waiting for the results the vehicle made a series of turns[,] left and right turns driving around in circles with no apparent destination in mind. We initiated a motor vehicle stop as the vehicle pulled onto Kings Place to address the violation.

The driver, Luis Salaman, immediately informed me that he did not have a valid license because he just got out of jail. His passenger . . . informed me that she had a valid CT drivers license.

I asked Luis to step out of the vehicle so that they could switch seats. While speaking with Luis I asked if there was anything illegal inside the vehicle. Luis stated there was not an[d] asked if I would like to search it. A search of the vehicle did not yield any illegal contraband.

Luis was given a verbal warning for operating a motor vehicle without a license.

Both subjects were negative for any active wants, warrants or protective orders.

Nothing further at this time.

Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 59-1, at 4.

In November 2020, a state warrant signed by a Connecticut Superior Court judge was issued for Plaintiff’s arrest on a charge of Criminal Possession of a Firearm. Defs.’ L.R. ¶ 6. In May 2021, a state warrant signed by a Connecticut Superior Court judge was issued for Plaintiff’s arrest on a charge of Violation of Probation. Id. ¶ 7. In June 2021, a State of Connecticut Paperless Arrest Warrant Network (“PRAWN”) warrant was issued for Plaintiff on charges of Criminal Possession of a Firearm and Failure to Appear.6 Id. ¶ 8.

On June 24, 2021, NHDPS Sergeant Sanchez and other NHDPS officers arrested Plaintiff on the warrants issued charging Criminal Possession of a Firearm, Failure to Appear, and Violation of Probation. Id. ¶ 9; see Defs.’ Ex. G, ECF No. 59-7 (arrest report dated June 24, 2021).7 NHDPS Sergeant Sanchez and Officer Grillo have submitted affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment. Defs.’ Ex. I (Sanchez Aff.), ECF No. 59-9; Defs.’ Ex. J (Grillo Aff.), ECF No. 59-10. Both aver that they had no knowledge of, and had no participation in, the motor vehicle stop on May 14, 2020. Sanchez Aff. ¶ 7; Grillo Aff. ¶ 6. Both declare that they were not aware Plaintiff had filed two lawsuits related to misconduct by Lopez at the time of Plaintiff’s traffic stop on May 14, 2020, or at the time of his arrest on June 24, 2021. Sanchez Aff.

¶¶ 4–5; Grillo Aff. ¶¶ 4–5. Sergeant Sanchez avers he never worked with Lopez as a partner, but that he had worked with Lopez in the past on cases in the Narcotics Unit and had been assigned to the same section for a period of time. Sanchez Aff. ¶ 6.

Standard of Review A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2017). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Nick’s Garage, 875 F.3d at 113–14 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Which facts are material is determined

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the admissible evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth “specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011).

He cannot “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nor can he rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).

Discussion Defendants maintain Plaintiff cannot prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim as a matter of law because (1) neither Defendant was involved in the motor vehicle stop on May 14, 2020, and (2) there was probable cause to support both the motor vehicle stop on May 14, 2020, and the arrest on June 24, 2021. Defs.’ Mem. at 7–10. Alternatively, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 15.8 First Amendment Retaliation “[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (quotation omitted). For a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) he has a right protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated or substantially caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions caused him some injury.” Rupp v. Buffalo, 91 F.4th 623, 634 (2d Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).

The official’s retaliatory motive “must be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Nieves, 587 U.S. at 399; see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006) (recognizing that although it “may be dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional motive,” an official’s “action colored by some degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that action would have been taken anyway”); accord Handsome, Inc. v. Town of Monroe, No. 23-711, 2024 WL 2747142, at *5 (2d Cir. May 29, 2024) (summary order); Burden v. Inc. Vill. of Port Jefferson, 664 F. Supp. 3d 276, (E.D.N.Y. 2023).

As relevant to this case, the Supreme Court explained that a “plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest,” Nieves, 587 U.S. at 402, because “the presence of probable cause should generally defeat a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim,” id. at 405; see, e.g., Picard v. Torneo, No. 3:16-CV-1564 (WWE), 2019 WL 4933146, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 4, 2019) (granting summary judgment on First Amendment

In reviewing a challenged arrest, the Court should determine “whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,” and if so justified, the Court should conclude that the challenged action “was reasonable whatever the subjective intent motivating the relevant officials.” Nieves, 587 U.S. at 403 (quotation omitted).9 The Supreme Court elaborated that “probable cause speaks to objective reasonableness of an arrest,” and “its absence will—as in retaliatory prosecution cases—generally provide weighty evidence that the officer’s animus caused the arrest, where the presence of probable cause will suggest the opposite.” Id. at 402. The Supreme Court qualified that probable cause “generally” defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim because the rule does not apply to a plaintiff who “presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.” Id. at 406–07; see also Hernaiz v. Carlson, No. 24-CV-116 (SFR), 2025 WL 2173932, at *7 (D. Conn. July 31, 2025) (citing Nieves, 587 U.S. at 407).

As he is seeking damages from the Defendants, Plaintiff must also prove that Sanchez and Grillo were personally involved in the alleged First Amendment retaliation. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”).

Retaliatory Motor Vehicle Stop on May 14, 2020 Plaintiff asserts that on May 14, 2020, he pulled away from the curb at 215 Rosette Street in New Haven while in a red Toyota when he noticed an unmarked police vehicle that followed him with its lights activated when he turned onto King Place in New Haven. Pl.’s Mem. at 12–13;

Plaintiff asserts that Sanchez and Grillo first stopped the motor vehicle he was driving and later called Officer Castellano to search the car and file the incident report. Pl.’s L.R. ¶¶ 3–6; see Pl.’s Aff. ¶¶ 5–7. He argues that the evidence shows both Sanchez and Grillo were “on shift” during the time of his motor vehicle stop, and therefore, there “would be evidence to corroborate” his claims of their involvement “if they stop[ped] hiding the evidence and tampering with it.” Pl.’s Mem. at 13.11 Both Defendants Sanchez and Grillo attest that they were not present and did not participate in the motor vehicle stop of Plaintiff on May 14, 2020. See Sanchez Aff. ¶¶ 7–8; Grillo Aff. ¶¶ 6– 7. Because Plaintiff avers to both Defendants’ involvement in the motor vehicle stop, see Pl.’s Aff. ¶¶ 5–6, and identifies evidence which he argues supports his averment, the Court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sanchez and Grillo were present for and initiated the motor vehicle stop on May 14, 2020. That does not end the inquiry, however. The Court must also consider whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of

Upon review, the Court concludes that there simply is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that, even if Defendants initiated the motor vehicle stop on May 14, 2020, they did so because he had previously filed lawsuits asserting NHDPS officer misconduct, including by Lopez. Plaintiff presents no evidence to dispute the Defendants’ evidence that the motor vehicle stop occurred after he was observed pulling away from the curb without using his turn signal.

Defs.’ L.R. ¶¶ 1–4; see Pl.’s L.R. ¶¶ 3–4. Thus, the undisputed record demonstrates that— consistent with the Fourth Amendment—the motor vehicle stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe he had committed a traffic violation. See U.S. v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2017); Arpino v. Tourjee, No. 22-CV-765 (KAD), 2024 WL 3455839, at *3–4 (D. Conn. July 18, 2024). Because the non-retaliatory reasons for the motor vehicle stop were sufficient to support a legitimate motor vehicle stop, Plaintiff cannot show that a retaliatory animus was the “but for” reason for the stop. See Arpino, 2024 WL 3455839, at *4; see also Lilly v. Swick, No. 19-CV-176V, 2023 WL 3901566, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2023) (“In as much as the Court has found that plaintiff’s plea to a parking violation in satisfaction of the speeding ticket precludes him from arguing that the traffic stop was not based upon reasonable suspicion, plaintiff cannot question the motivation of PO Ullery and PO Trapasso in stopping his vehicle.”).

In addition, no evidence creates a question of fact regarding whether Plaintiff was stopped for a traffic violation while “otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.” Nieves, 587 U.S. at 407–08 (requiring “objective evidence” that the plaintiff was targeted where other similarly situated individuals were not); see, e.g., Martinez v. Browne, No. 20-CV-111 (AMD), 2023 WL 2667075, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2023) (granting summary judgment for defendants in “the absence of any showing that the defendants treated [plaintiff] differently than similarly situated [people]”). And the record fails to support any factual dispute as to whether Defendants were even aware of Plaintiff’s lawsuits concerning Lopez and NHDPS officer misconduct which were filed prior to May 14, 2020.12 See Sanchez Aff. ¶ 5; Grillo Aff. ¶ 5. It is axiomatic that without such knowledge, that causal connection cannot be established. Plaintiff’s conclusory or speculative assertions about Defendants’ motivation to retaliate against him for his prior litigation are not sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim. Kemp v. Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 117 F.4th 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[S]peculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.”); Jordan v. Olsten Corp., 25 F. App’x 45, 47 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[Plaintiff’s] suggestion that Russell persuaded Markiewicz to fire her for racial reasons is mere speculation and thus insufficient to defeat Olsten’s well supported motion for summary judgment.”).

For these reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the First Amendment retaliation claim arising out of the May 14, 2020 motor vehicle stop.

Retaliatory Arrest on June 24, 2021 There is no factual dispute that Sergeant Sanchez was involved in Plaintiff’s arrest on June 24, 2021, pursuant to warrants for criminal possession of a firearm, failure to appear, and violation of probation. See Defs.’ Exs. F, G, Arrest Reports; Sanchez Aff. ¶ 10.

“Unsupported conclusory allegations of falsehood or material omission cannot support a challenge to the validity of the warrant; rather, the plaintiff must make specific allegations supported by an offer of proof.” Calderon v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 3d 593, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); Parker v. Zugibe, No. 16-CV-4265 (KMK), 2017 WL 4296795, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017) (“Plaintiff’s bald assertion that the warrant contained false statements does not plausibly state a claim that Officer Fantasia knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Here, it is utterly unclear the extent to which Plaintiff claims that the arrest warrants, signed by a judicial authority and served on June 24, 2021, lacked probable cause or were procured by the knowing or reckless use of false information. There are allegations of “fake” warrants resulting in the search of Plaintiff’s son’s cell phone. See Compl. ¶ 29. There are allegations of false statements in the application for an arrest warrant made to Magistrate Judge Spector,13 see id. ¶¶ 44, 46–47, but the warrant signed by Judge Specter was related to Plaintiff’s second federal indictment (initiated in April 2022), and thus, it has no connection to the warrant executed on June 24, 2021. And Plaintiff does not offer any evidentiary support for these assertions even if they had some bearing on the June 24, 2021 arrest. Accordingly, there is no evidentiary basis upon which to rebut the presumption of probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest pursuant to those warrants on June 24, 2021. See Parker v. Fantasia, No. 16-CV-4265, 425 F. Supp. 3d 171, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting cases). Nor is there any evidence, and Plaintiff does not argue, that he is not required to defeat a finding of probable cause insofar as “otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been” arrested. Nieves, 587 U.S. at 407-08.14 Accordingly, no reasonable jury could determine after a review of the present record that Plaintiff was subjected to First Amendment retaliation when he was arrested pursuant to active warrants on June 24, 2021. The motion for summary judgment as to this claim is GRANTED.

Retaliation by Officer Grillo on November 16, 2021 In his opposition memorandum, Plaintiff represents that his son’s cell phone15 was “illegally confiscated” on October 2, 2020, and was later “used to further harass [Plaintiff] by Judge Spector issued the warrant on the criminal complaint in the case which resulted in Plaintiff’s second federal prosecution. See generally United States v. Salaman, No. 3:22-CR-76-1 (SRU).

Plaintiff’s wholly conclusory assertions that Officer Grillo subjected Plaintiff to retaliatory harassment through the use of the cell phone and by working with a confidential informant do not support a plausible claim of First Amendment retaliation by Officer Grillo. Nor does the actual evidence suggest any First Amendment retaliation by Officer Grillo. Plaintiff cites to evidence showing Officer Grillo worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding the confidential informant, but there is no information in these documents from which a jury could infer that Officer Grillo was motivated to work with a confidential informant and the FBI because a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence from the cell phone. See Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 9; United States v. Salaman, No. 3:20-CR-192 (JAM), 2021 WL 5298075, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 15, 2021). In his ruling on the motion to suppress, Judge Meyer concluded that the protective sweep and the cell phone seizure were lawful but also expressed the following: I am . . . concerned about the testimony of Officer Grillo that there is a “common practice” to engage in a “secondary sweep” of a home as a form of “busy work” after agents have already completed an “initial sweep of the house,” just “to make sure that nothing was missed.” If so, this practice conflicts with Buie’s command that a protective sweep must last “no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” 494 U.S. at 335–36; see also Robertson, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 450– 52, 458–59 (suppressing evidence where ATF unlawfully prolonged protective sweep of defendant’s residence for improper purpose of searching for narcotics evidence).

Salaman, 2021 WL 5298075, at *4. Judge Meyer’s concerns about Officer Grillo’s testimony were not about Officer Grillo’s credibility or his motivations. The concern was regarding what was described as a common police practice.

As such, Judge Meyer’s decision bears no relevance as to whether Officer Grillo took retaliatory action against Plaintiff for his prior litigation.

To the extent Plaintiff is asserting any state law claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and the Court dismisses any such claims without prejudice.18

The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and to close this case.

SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 29th day of January, 2026.

/s/ Kari A. Dooley KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE