Renita Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Norwalk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT RENITA CRAWFORD, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) 3:24-CV-2059 (OAW) BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE ) CITY OF NORWALK, ) Defendant. ) ) ) ) RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS THIS ACTION is before the court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. (“Motion”). The court has reviewed` the Motion, Plaintiff’s opposition brief, ECF No. 21, Defendant’s reply, ECF No. 24, and the record in this matter, and is thoroughly advised in the premises. After careful review, the Motion hereby is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiff is an African American, Black woman who has been working for Defendant since 2018.1 In 2020, she was promoted to the position of assistant instructional leader (“AIL”), which is an administrative role. As an AIL, she was paid substantially less than her male counterparts “who were also working as assistant principals.”2 In February 2022, Plaintiff was passed over to replace a principal who was taking medical leave. Apparently despite this, in March 2022, Plaintiff was taken to task for failing to perform the principal’s duties during that absence.

In March 2022, Defendant also demoted Plaintiff back to a teacher and attempted to refuse to renew her contract by claiming she was a probationary employee (which non- renewal later was rescinded as Plaintiff was not a probationary employee). She contends the demotion was discriminatory because Plaintiff is Black, and retaliatory because Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s wage discrimination.3 A white employee replaced Plaintiff as AIL.

Plaintiff grieved the demotion through her union. While that grievance was proceeding to a hearing, Defendant and the union separately entered into a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) that eliminated the AIL position entirely. Plaintiff contends the union lawyer described the MOU as “pretextual.” Plaintiff asserts that the elimination of the AIL position was designed to prevent Plaintiff from being promoted to assistant principal.4 The MOU required the two incumbent AILs to apply and interview for assistant principal positions, while other positions eliminated in the MOU were moved to assistant principal positions automatically (although those other positions had less responsibility than the AIL role). But the only other AIL, a man, was promoted to assistant principal without interviewing for the position.

Further, one of Defendant’s Deputy Superintendents treated Plaintiff less favorably than her white co-workers, and even once told Plaintiff that he expected more of her as an African American.

Plaintiff first grieved Defendant’s treatment of her with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”). The CHRO conducted an

“Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a defendant raises claim preclusion . . . as an affirmative defense and it is clear from the face of the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff's claims are barred as a matter of law.” Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int'l, 231 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000).

Further, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the non- movant’s favor. Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 2007).

Defendant first makes the argument that the claims under Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 must be dismissed because the CHRO proceedings should be given preclusive effect. Though Defendant concedes with respect to the Title VII claim, precedential authority entitled Plaintiff to judicial review of the CHRO’s determination, it contends that the mere availability of judicial review is adequate for preclusion doctrine to attach.

The court disagrees as to the Title VII claim. It is well settled that unreviewed state agency determinations do not have preclusive effect on subsequent proceedings.

Howard v. Connecticut Dep't of Transportation, No. 3:14-CV-947 (RNC), 2015 WL 5797013, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2015) (“It is thus well established that an unreviewed state administrative determination does not preclude de novo federal court consideration of a Title VII claim.”)). The Supreme Court of the United States has found that administrative actions do not have preclusive effect on Title VII claims, even, as Plaintiff points out, in cases where the claimant had the option to appeal to a state court. See, e.g., Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795 (1986). And the Supreme Court also has observed in dicta that “[n]o provision of Title VII requires claimants to pursue in state court an unfavorable state administrative action . . . .” Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 469 (1982). Thus, the court finds that the Title VII claim is not precluded by the CHRO proceedings.

As to the § 1983 claims, under federal common law, “when a state agency ‘acting in a judicial capacity . . . resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,’ federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.” Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). Connecticut appellate courts have held that “a party who fails to appeal from an agency decision may not use a different action as a substitute for that appeal ‘to achieve a de novo determination of a matter upon which they failed to take a timely appeal.’” Peck v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 198 Conn. App. 233, 248 (2020) (quoting Honis v. Cohen, 18 Conn. App. 80, 84 (1989)); accord Off. of Chief Disciplinary Couns. v. Vaccaro, 353 Conn. 793, 820 (2025).

The court finds this to be binding authority preventing Plaintiff from making any § 1983 claims predicated upon the same conduct that was presented to the CHRO. Plaintiff argues, though, that her complaint presents broader claims than were presented to the state agency.

The claim the CHRO investigated was that Defendant “discriminated and retaliated against [Plaintiff], demoted her and threatened her with termination on the basis of her race . . . and previous opposition to discrimination.” ECF No. 20-1 at 85. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for discrimination and retaliation are predicated upon her demotion, the attempt to fire her, the elimination of the AIL position, the failure to reappoint her to an administrative position, and the refusal to promote her to assistant principal. Clearly, the CHRO already has made factual findings with respect to the § 1983 claims insofar as they are predicated upon Plaintiff’s demotion and the attempt to terminate her employment. The Motion therefore is granted with respect to those theories of the claims. But the remaining three theories may proceed.

With respect to the EPA claims, Plaintiff alleges that (1) she was paid less in the role of assistant instructional leader than her male counterparts and was demoted for her opposition to the pay disparity; and (2) she was paid less during the 2024-2025 school year than a man with the same title and job responsibilities and similar qualifications.

Defendant asserts that the MOU itself, which Plaintiff appended to her operative pleading, shows that a woman also was paid more than Plaintiff was.6 But, as Plaintiff points out

Therefore, the Motion is denied as to the EPA claims.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 20, is DENIED in part and is GRANTED in part. a. The Motion is granted with respect to Counts Two and Three, for discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, respectively, only insofar as those claims are predicated upon Plaintiff’s demotion and the attempt to terminate her. b. The Motion to Dismiss is denied as to all other claims.

2. Given this disposition, the court also grants Plaintiff’s motion to modify the litigation schedule, see ECF No. 25, as follows Defendant shall answer the amended complaint on or before April 27, 2026.

raised in a reply brief. But also, this argument presents a question of fact that is more appropriately addressed in a motion for summary judgment. See Isbell v. City of New York, 316 F. Supp. 3d 571, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (declining to address at the dismissal phase whether a collective bargaining agreement is a basis other than sex for payment disparities). For both these reasons, the court will not discuss this argument herein. a. All discovery shall be completed on or before December 1, 2026, and the parties are instructed to confer and set their own interim discovery deadlines, which deadlines may be amended by mutual agreement of the parties without the court’s approval, provided they do not affect the deadline for completion of all discovery.

b. Dispositive motions shall be filed on or before February 1, 2027. c. The parties’ joint trial memorandum shall be filed on or before April 1, 2027, if there is no dispositive motion filed, or within the timeframe set by the court in its ruling disposing of any dispositive motions that are filed.

3. Finally, given the age and substance of the claims in this case, the court hereby refers this action to a United States Magistrate Judge for settlement discussions. The Clerk of Court is asked to please assign a Magistrate Judge for this purpose.

IT IS SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut, this 6th day of April, 2026.

/s/ OMAR A. WILLIAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE