Page v. Camp

An action for perjury is not sustainable .by a single minister of law, unless for damages consequent upon conviction; and there is no averment in tbe declaration, of science in tbe party who testified, tbat bis testimony was false, without wbicb it could not be perjury. But tbe action was brought against a party to a former suit for supporting *9facts by Ms own testimony, which, it is averred would be found untrue upon new evidence. This wouM have been a ground for a new trial, had the cause been of sufficient magnitude: But the law doth not admit of new trials before a justice of the peace, nor doth it subject the decisions of one justice of the peace to the re-examination or impeachment of another, to which, an affirmance of the judgment in this case would be giving countenance.

The authority of Mncfarlan’s case, cited and relied on in support of the judgment, does not apply; the cases materially differ. Indebitatus assumpsit was there maintained for money recovered before a court of conscience; but maintained on grounds of which the court of conscience had no cognizance, and to which their decision had no relation. In this case, one justice re-examines the truth of facts, over the head of another justice, of similar jurisdiction, and, in fact, tries the same case, a second time.

dissenting. In this case there is a fraud alleged of the highest Mnd — a taking of property by willful false swearing in a court of justice. Why, then, should there not-be a remedy, and why is not this a proper one? The reason, that the public will sustain an inconvenience by such a practice, does not counterbalance the injury that will be sustained by leaving such injustice remediless; therefore, the suit ought to be supported on principles of public policy as well as public justice. The objection that there is not enough alleged in the declaration, is not a solid one. We rarely allege more in any declaration for fraud. The facts stated are such, that the science and intention of the defendant must follow as a necessary and unavoidable conclusion.

*10It is said if tbis action prevails, it will establish a principle, by which one justice will interfere with the decisions of another. That consequence will not follow. The first justice was undoubtedly right, and decided upon good reasons: The second may adjudge in favor of the opposite party, and be equally right; for the question before the last is a very different one from the former. Here is ño interference of jurisdiction — no clashing of judgments. This action is well supported by the general principles of common law. It is a strong case; for it is agreed there is no remedy for the injury complained of, unless the present action be supported: Therefore we cannot say the judgment is erroneous.