Wooster v. Parsons
Opinion of the Court
1. When an action is brought before any court of limited and inferior jurisdiction, the declaration ought to ayer expressly, that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court (2 Ld. Raym. 1310); and the place should be particularly alleged: Neither of which was done with sufficient certainty in the present case. The note on which, etc., is alleged to have been executed in the city aforesaid; the city of New Haven, and the city of Middletown, having been, both before mentioned, therefore, uncertain to which the reference was intended. See Coke on Littleton, 20, a. “If a lease for life is made to A. remainder in tail to B. remainder to O. informa praedicta, the remainder to C. is void for uncertainty.” 2 Ld. Raym. 886-890. Judgment arrested for a like uncertainty. This author makes a distinction between praedicta, and some other relative terms, which he supposes commonly refer to the last antecedent; but that the rule admits of many exceptions.
3. As to tbe exception in tbe defendants’ plea, that errors in law and errors in fact are joined in tbe writ, tbe plaintiffs have assigned no facts in error, upon wbicb they rely, but such as appearuf record: And an assignment of errors in fact, not properly assignable, together with sufficient errors in law, will not vitiate tbe writ.
Therefore, tbe judgment of tbe City Court was reversed.
The reason of the distinction is, that aforesaid may with propriety relate to any term, that has been before used in the same instrument or writing, however remote; but the other relative terms there mentioned, can only relate to some word in the same sentence.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. As to tbe first exception in error, "that tbe plaintiff, in tbe original suit, has not alleged, with sufficient certainty, that tbe cause of action arose within tbe city of Middletown.”
Tbe averment is, that “ tbe note was executed within tbe city aforesaid.” And tbe city of Middletown was tbe next antecedent. And tbe rule in pleadings, as in grammar, is, that relation must always be to tbe next antecedent, unless tbe sense binders; wbicb in this instance cannot be pretended.
With regard to the second exception, “that the cause of action arose before the city of Middletown was incorporated.”
The act of incorporation, as appears from the journals of the house of assembly, passed and was completed the- 24th day of Hay, fourteen days preceding the date of the note: And it was afterwards revocable only as every statute is, by a concurrence of both branches of the legislature. And although had it been a penal or mandatory act, it would not have so had effect as to become obligatory on the citizens of the state at large, until they had had means of the knowledge of it, which ordinarily would not have been till the rising of the assembly, and the return of their representatives; yet being in nature of a grant, and there being no time mentioned therein when it should begin to take effect, it took effect immediately; and the jurisdiction it gave of suits, where the cause of action “ should arise,” etc., has relation to the time of the act’s passing; unless, according to the British rule of construing statutes in such
It appears, therefore, to us from the record, that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the City Court; both in point of- time and locality; and that that court did not err in taking cognizance of the cause.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.