Gintoli v. City of Bridgeport, No. Cv 90-0276925 S (Feb. 15, 1991)
Opinion of the Court
In the first count, the plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to General Statutes Sec.
The second count is a common law claim of nuisance against the city for creating and permitting a public nuisance.
The defendant city has moved to strike the second count on the claim that, under tort reform, General Statutes Sec.
General Statutes Sec.
Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . (C) acts of the political subdivision which constitute the creation or participation in the creation of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section
13a-149 .
The plaintiff claims that the second count is neither insufficient nor excluded by Sec.
There is no appellate court decision on whether Sec.
The trial level courts are split in their decisions. Several courts have followed the reasoning of Judge Cioffi in Kronenfeld, et al. v. City of Norwalk, 1 CtLR 103 (April 30, 1990), that a claim of nuisance based on allegations of positive acts is not excluded by General Statutes Sec.
On the other hand, there are several cases in which the trial court has held that General Statutes Sec.
When trial courts are divided on the meaning of a statute, the legislative history of that statute is of value. Judge Koletsky in Stevens, supra, has examined and set forth the legislative comments as well as the Supreme Court's interpretation of analogous statutes. His analysis and CT Page 1886 conclusion is persuasive that General Statutes Sec.
Since both parties are familiar with that case there is no need to quote it extensively except to say that this court adopts its reasoning.
In any event, absent a clear interpretation otherwise by an appellate tribunal, a litigant ought not to be deprived of the right to pursue a common law remedy unless there is a clear statutory mandate to the contrary.
The defendant's motion to strike the second count is denied.
Nigro, J.
[EDITORS' NOTE: THE CASE THAT PREVIOUSLY APPEARED ON THIS PAGE HAS BEEN MOVED TO CONN. SUP. PUBLISHED OPINIONS.] CT Page 1889
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.