Chrysalis Center, Inc. v. Hartford Zba, No. Cv92 051 83 00 (Dec. 22, 1993)
Opinion of the Court
During 1992, the plaintiff had an option to purchase the property at 36 Woodland Street. In September, the plaintiff obtained a special permit from the city's zoning administrator, who determined that the plaintiff's proposed use of the property would be "other medical and health services" or substantially similar thereto, within the meaning of § 35-852 of the Hartford zoning regulations. Without that classification, the plaintiff would not have been able to conduct its business in that residential zone. Thereafter, defendants Regency Towers Condo Association and Michael McGarry, who own abutting property, appealed the issuance of the permit to the ZBA. On October 20, 1992, the ZBA reversed the decision of the zoning administrator and revoked the plaintiff's permit, holding that the plaintiff's proposed use of the property did not constitute "other medical and health services" or substantially similar thereto. Shortly after the ZBA's decision, the plaintiff's option to purchase the property expired permanently.
The basis of the defendants' motion to dismiss is the undisputed fact that the plaintiff no longer has any legal interest in the property that is the subject of the permit. They argue that there is, therefore, no present controversy before the court and, by implication, that the plaintiff is no longer aggrieved
In Hughes v. Town Planning Zoning Commission,
In the instant case, the defendant ZBA revoked the plaintiff's special permit as it applied to the use of the property at 36 Woodland Street, and to that extent the ZBA's decision was specific to that property. However, the decision also held that the plaintiff's proposed use of the property, as a "psychiatric rehabilitation center and social clubhouse," did not fall within the permitted uses for that zone. The decision in this respect has an effect which potentially extends beyond the revocation of the permit for the specific property at 36 Woodland Street.
When a zoning board of appeals acts in a quasi judicial capacity, as in this case, it may later reverse its decision only upon a showing of a material change in circumstances. SeeCarlson v. Fisher,
For the reasons set forth above and on the basis of the few facts that are before it at this time, the court concludes that the plaintiff continues to be aggrieved by the defendant ZBA's decision and that the issues raised by its appeal are not moot. The defendants' motion to dismiss may not, therefore, be sustained. CT Page 10430-F
At the hearing before this court on the defendants' motion, the plaintiff renewed its motion to dismiss Regency Towers and McGarry as intervening defendants. The court has denied the plaintiff's motion even though these defendants no longer have standing as abutting property owners. The basis of the court's rulings on the plaintiff's motion was that these defendants have a continuing interest in the appeal so long as the plaintiff continues to allege, as a basis of its appeal, that the defendants violated its rights under federal or state civil rights laws. The court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendants from the appeal was, therefore, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to renew that motion if and when the plaintiff withdraws those allegations against these defendants and relieves them of liability.
The defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The plaintiff's motion is also denied as indicated.
Maloney, J.
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