Packwood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, No. Cv93 30 31 71 S (Dec. 13, 1993)
Opinion of the Court
As in the prior appeal, the appellants are owners of abutting property, and have standing to take this appeal because they have proven statutory aggrievement. Section
The plaintiffs have briefed the following issues in this appeal: (1) The Board failed to state on the record the reasons for its decision granting the variance; (2) The applicant failed to prove hardship; (3) Lack of personal notice to the named plaintiff, an adjacent property owner and (4) The granting of the prior variance did not justify this one. To the extent the appeal raised other issues, since they have not been briefed they are abandoned. CT Page 10790 Shaw v. Planning Commission,
As determined in Packwood I, the plaintiffs as abutting property owners were not legally entitled to personal notice of the application under the Norwalk Zoning Regulations, and notice of the public hearing adequately complied with
The minutes of the executive session indicate that the Board did give reasons for granting the variance. They state:
"Whereas the applicant has demonstrated to the Board the requirement to demolish and rebuild the structure in compliance with the side yard regulations but in difference to the placement of the property closer to the farm creek tidal area which creates attractive views and is of greater importance to the surrounding property owners that this open space be maintained, and whereas the adjacent property owner is at a lesser setback at the front setback and thus the placement of this house at the 20 foot setback would not be adverse to the character of the neighborhood and the site distances, the chairman moved to grant the variance to remove a nonconforming one family dwelling for new construction access and to rebuild nonconforming structure, 118-100BC, with addition as granted per earlier variance."
This motion was passed unanimously.
There is a typographical error in the minutes and resolution, which is apparent from the legal notice and the report of the Zoning Inspector which show that the variance was to 118-800B(6) of the Norwalk Zoning Regulations. That regulation provides:
CT Page 10791"A nonconforming structure or a structure devoted to a nonconforming use which is destroyed by any means to the extent of more than fifty percent (50%) of its market value at the time of its destruction shall not thereafter be reconstructed except in conformance with these regulations."
Since the Board did assign reasons for granting the variance, the question on appeal is whether the reasons assigned by the Board are reasonably supported by the record and are pertinent considerations for granting a variance. Chevron Oil Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
After the prior variance was granted, there were problems obtaining access to the rear of the existing building to construct the portion of the addition that did not require a variance. The Board had indicated when it considered the prior variance that the applicant would have to reapply if the existing building would be destroyed by over 50%. In addition, because of soil conditions on the site, which abuts a tidal marsh, pilings were needed for the foundation. For these reasons, the owners decided to remove the existing structure and rebuild it on essentially the same footprint but at a location which did not require a side yard variance. The nonconforming building was still standing at the time of the hearing on the variance which is the subject of this appeal, but it has since been demolished. Without a variance of 118-800B(6) of the Zoning Regulations any new building on the property must conform with the existing zoning regulations. While
The property owner defendants rely upon Archambault v. Wadlow,
A zoning board of appeals may grant a variance where two basic conditions are met: (1) the variance is shown not to affect substantially the comprehensive zoning plan, and (2) adherence to the strict letter of the zoning regulation is shown to cause unusual hardship unnecessary to the carrying out of the general purpose of the zoning plan. Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
A zoning board of appeals cannot grant a variance for a use which is inconsistent with the general purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance or which impairs the integrity of the CT Page 10793 comprehensive plan. Whittaker v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
The property owners contend that the small size of the lot, the fact that it abuts a tidal wetland, and the special engineering problems for putting an authorized addition on the building considered together amount to a unique hardship which justified the Board in granting the variance. The reason the property owners requested the variance, as stated in their application, was that after completing a soil analysis it was determined that pilings were necessary but that construction of pilings required removal of the house. The Board was aware of the conditions on the property from the prior variance application. The second variance requested permission to remove the existing rundown building and rebuild it on the previously approved front setback line. The Board's resolution must be viewed in that context. The demolition and reconstruction of the building would not extend the existing nonconforming structure. Most of the original, proposed addition (the subject of Packwood I) was located at the rear of the building and did not require either side yard or rear yard variances. In other words, even without a variance, the property owners could lawfully enlarge the building in the rear of the property. The soil conditions in that area required pilings for the addition and the existing building blocked access to the rear of the lot to. install them, which was the reason the second variance was requested. The undersized lot was not, standing alone, justification for the variance, since it was not unique to the neighborhood, but it was a factor in precluding construction in the rear of the property because the location of the nonconforming building on the lot effectively prevented access to the rear of the property to construct the addition.
The hardship which justifies a zoning board of appeals in CT Page 10794 granting a variance must be one that originates in the zoning ordinance, and arises directly out of the application of the ordinance to circumstances or conditions beyond the control of the party involved. Whittaker v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 658; Archambault v. Wadlow, supra, 381. The applicant must prove hardship affecting his land occurs by the application of the zoning ordinance to it. Kelly v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
Since aesthetics is not a proper consideration for zoning, DeMaria v. Planning Zoning Commission,
The proposed building conformed with the side yard setbacks, reducing the nonconforming location of the existing structure, while at the same time not extending the building any further into the front setback. Not allowing a variance would have reduced the size of the building considerably in a situation where the lot coverage by the building did not violate the zoning regulations. The earlier variance upheld the location of a building over the front setback line even if it was improperly granted for an extension of the second story over the setback. Difficulties of construction in the rear of the property could be considered as a CT Page 10795 topographic hardship. Under the circumstances, the board could reasonably conclude that conditions unique to the subject property existed which amounted to hardship2 if the applicant could not rebuild at the same location. Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 280; Stillman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 636, 637. On appeal, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the board. Stankiewicz v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
The application itself requested the re-granting of a variance for three purposes: (1) to remove an existing structure; (2) to rebuild on the previously approved front setback3; and (3) to re-approve the two off street parking spaces. No variance was required to demolish the existing building. Since there was no time limit or condition attached to the variance for parking, which was upheld in Packwood I, it is puzzling why the property owners made a second request for the same variance. Moreover, the board's resolution does not discuss it. Since the board failed to act on a parking variance, presumably because it was academic, it is not before the court for review.
The appeal is dismissed.
ROBERT A. FULLER, JUDGE
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.