Connor v. Peerless Insurance Company, No. Cv94 031 49 51 S (Sep. 7, 1994)
Opinion of the Court
Peerless designated as its arbitrator Attorney Carl Cella. On July 18, 1994, Connor filed a motion to disqualify Attorney Cella on the ground that he is not impartial since he has been retained by Peerless in other matters. On July 28, 1994, Peerless filed an objection to the motion to disqualify.
Due process requires that individuals who serve in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity be impartial. Rado v. Boardof Education,
[A] presumption of impartiality attends administrative determinations, and the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest on the part of an adjudicator rests upon the one seeking disqualification. To overcome the presumption, the plaintiff must demonstrate actual bias, rather than mere potential bias . . . unless the circumstances indicate a probability of such bias too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barnett v.Fairfield Board of Education, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 299249, (October 25, 1993, Fuller, J.) (quoting Rado v. Board of Education, supra, and applying it to case involving three person arbitration panel).
In addition, courts have recognized that it is inherent in a system where each party appoints an arbitrator that the arbitrator selected by a party may side with that party. Barnettv. Fairfield Board of Education, supra; Metropolitan Property Cas. v. J.C. Penney Cas.,
In support of her motion to disqualify, Connor argues that all arbitrators must be completely impartial, having no connection to the parties or the litigation itself. In support of this proposition, Connor cites Peerless Ins. Co. v. Roberto,
It is noted by the court that the case which forms the basis of Connor's argument involves the court's disqualification of the third, or neutral arbitrator, in a tripartite arbitration. It is therefore evident that the court's reasoning in PeerlessIns. Co. v. Roberto, supra,
It is clear that in arbitration proceedings in which the parties each appoint an arbitrator it is inevitable that the parties will appoint arbitrators who are more likely to favor their position. If the arbitrator at issue was the third arbitrator, a more rigorous analysis of his potential bias would apply. Nevertheless, in the present situation, it is clear that unless the court determines that Peerless' retention of the arbitrator in other insurance defense cases creates a probability of bias too high to be constitutionally tolerable, the court should deny the motion to disqualify. The court finds the probability of bias not to be too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
The motion to disqualify is denied.
WILLIAM J. McGRATH, JUDGE CT Page 8955
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.