McAllister v. Downer, No. Cv94 031 49 24 S (Dec. 24, 1998)
Opinion of the Court
In light of the delay and confusion surrounding the burial of the deceased, the deceased's remains were exhumed on July 18, 1995, so that the plaintiff could be satisfied that it was indeed William McAllister who had been buried in April of 1994. (Report of Office of the Chief Medical Examiner). The plaintiff was present at the exhumation and examination to verify the identity of the remains. (Report of Office of the Chief Medical Examiner).
On July 8, 1998, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to file a first revised complaint (proposed complaint), purporting to amplify the allegations in counts one and seven, withdrawing count five of the original complaint and alleging a new cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs request for leave to file an amended complaint, arguing that the requested amendments and new allegations do not relate back to the original complaint and therefore should not be allowed. The CT Page 15033 court notes that several of the proposed amendments to the complaint are premised on the subsequent disinterment of the deceased's body and the plaintiff's identification of the same.
Pursuant to Practice Book §
The plaintiff argues that the proposed changes do not state new facts, but rather "clean up" the original complaint and amplify the causes of action stated therein. The plaintiff's position is that all of the proposed changes to count one are amplifications to the allegations made in the original complaint, rather than entirely new causes of action. The defendant argues that the inclusion of facts regarding the exhumation will force him to defend against entirely new claims. The defendant contends that under the original complaint, the negligence allegations made in count one went only to the delay in burial, rather than claims concerning the manner in which the burial was conducted, the transfer of the remains or supervision and custody of the remains. Therefore, the defendant contends, there is no nexus between the proposed amendments and the original allegations. The defendant also contends that he will be prejudiced by the delay in bringing the additional proposed claims in count one at this stage of the proceedings, and that due to the plaintiff's unreasonable delay in raising the proposed amendments to count one, the court should deny the request to file the amended complaint. Finally, the defendant argues that the proposed CT Page 15034 additions to count one constitute new causes of action which do not relate back to the allegations made in the original complaint, and therefore are barred by the statute of limitations.1 The defendant argues also that the damages claimed in proposed paragraphs 23 and 24 regarding the exhumation occurred after the plaintiff filed the original complaint and therefore cannot be asserted in this action.
The court finds that the additional facts regarding the exhumation of the deceased's remains alleged in proposed count one constitute facts which arise from the core set of facts at hand in this case, and therefore do not constitute a new cause of action. "A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief. . . . A right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and an invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute the cause of action. . . . A change in, or an addition to, a ground of negligence or an act of negligence arising out of the single group of facts which was originally claimed to have brought about the unlawful injury to the plaintiff does not change the cause of action. . . . It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same, but where an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, a new and different cause of action is stated. . . . Our relation back doctrine provides that an amendment relates back when the original complaint has given the party fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence, thereby serving the objectives of our statute of limitations, namely, to protect parties from having to defend against stale claims. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Danbury Hospital,
The very need to exhume the remains of the deceased was occasioned by the defendant's alleged negligence, of which the defendant has had ample notice. In essence, the proposed additional allegations amplify and expand what has already been alleged — that the defendant was negligent in failing to bury the deceased in a timely and professional manner. From this breach of duty sprang the need to exhume the remains for examination, with the plaintiff in attendance, as well as the CT Page 15035 added cost of re-interment. Thus, the proposed changes to the first count do not constitute new causes of action, but relate back to the original facts alleged, and therefore are not barred by the statute of limitations.
As to the defendant's argument that he will be prejudiced if the amendments are allowed, the court is not persuaded. "Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to be considered in passing on a motion to amend are the length of delay, fairness to the opposing parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the amendment." Connecticut National Bank v.Voog,
The allegations regarding the exhumation and examination of the deceased's remains arise out of the same occurrence or transaction as those alleged in the original complaint. Because the defendant had notice that he was being sued due to his negligent treatment of the remains of the deceased, he is not prejudiced by the introduction of additional facts concerning the exhumation and examination. Therefore, the court grants the plaintiff's request for leave to file an amended complaint as to count one. The cause of action sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress in the proposed second count of the first amended complaint, by contrast, raises an entirely new cause of action which does not relate back to the negligence claims alleged in the original complaint. These claims are now barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the court denies the plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint as to count two. The proposed amendments to count seven of the complaint amplify and expand the CUTPA claims brought in the original complaint. Therefore, the court grants the plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint as to count seven.
SKOLNICK, J.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.