Homeside Lending v. Kelsey, No. Cv 99-0079111s (Oct. 4, 2000)
Opinion of the Court
This action was brought by the plaintiff by writ dated February 15, 1999, seeking a foreclosure of a certain mortgage or. property belonging to the defendant, Lucille Kelsey, located at 37 Walnut Street, Winsted, Connecticut. The defendants have raised by Special Defense that the plaintiffs failed to provide the defendants an opportunity to cure and reinstate their mortgage as provided for in the mortgage.
The standard of review of a court's decision granting a motion for summary judgment is well settled. "Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A `material fact' is a fact that will make a difference in the result of a case." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co.,
"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact." Witt v. St. Vincent's MedicalCenter,
The defendant's affidavit indicates that at the direction of an agent or employee of the plaintiff, the defendants caused monies to be delivered to the plaintiff in an amount sufficient to reinstate her mortgage on or after October 6, 1988. The plaintiff's affidavit is silent as to the circumstances regarding the defendant's right to reinstate.
Since there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants reinstated the mortgage, the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Matasavage, J.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.