Nowey v. Kravitz
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Peabody Internat'l v. Coordination Tech., No. Cv890103418s (May 18, 1992) (Connecticut Superior Court 1992)
- Falk v. Schuster (Conn. 1976)
- L & R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank (Conn. 1998)
- Connecticut National Bank v. L & R Realty (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)
- First Union National Bank v. Moore, No. Cv 99-0424489 (May 31, 2000) (Connecticut Superior Court 2000)
- Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris (Mo. 1997)
- Happens v. Webster Bank, No. 251241 (Oct. 2, 1996) (Connecticut Superior Court 1996)
- Centerbank v. Fazzone, No. Cv 94 0066746 (Oct. 19, 1995) (Connecticut Superior Court 1995)
- Fleet Bank v. Blume, No. Cv93 0704321 (Jul. 27, 1994) (Connecticut Superior Court 1994)
- Bank of Boston Connecticut v. Rusconi, No. Cv 92 0507230 (Sep. 9, 1994) (Connecticut Superior Court 1994)
- Houston v. Highway Commissioner (Conn. 1965)
- Union Trust Co. v. Sirois, No. Cv94-0368058-S (Aug. 28, 1996) (Connecticut Superior Court 1996)
- Connecticut National Bank v. Swanney Toyota, No. 506919 (Jun. 9, 1993) (Connecticut Superior Court 1993)
- State v. Anonymous (Connecticut Superior Court 1971)
- State v. Dowdy (Connecticut Superior Court 1967)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing a writ of error in a summary process action. The defendant, hereinafter called the landlord, brought the action against the plaintiff, hereinafter called the tenant, before a justice of the peace. In response to a motion for oyer a copy of the lease was filed. It contained a provision: “. . . the Tenant waives and will waive all right to trial by jury in any summary proceeding hereafter instituted . . . against the Tenant in respect of the demised premises. . . The tenant filed a motion for a jury trial, but subsequently on motion of the landlord the justice struck the case from the jury docket. The only error claimed is this ruling of the justice.
In this jurisdiction summary process actions are tried to a jury only on motion of one of the parties made in accordance with the provisions of § 5973 of the General Statutes. Thompson v. Main, 102 Conn. 640, 641, 129 A. 786. A right of trial by jury even when guaranteed by the constitution may be waived; Leahey v. Heasley, 127 Conn. 332, 336, 16 A.2d 609; State v. Rankin, 102 Conn. 46, 49, 127 A. *396 916; and, where a statute provides that an action shall be tried by jury only when claimed for the jury docket, a failure to make such a claim waives the right. Noren v. Wood, 72 Conn. 96, 98, 43 A. 649. In a pending action of summary process a party can voluntarily waive trial by jury and does so unless he makes a motion that the case be so tried; a binding agreement for such a waiver made in advance of the institution of such an actioii does not violate public policy; and there is no reason why such an agreement should not be given effect, as the justice did in his ruling. Waterside Holding Corporation v. Lask, 233 App. Div. 456, 253 N.Y.S. 183; Van Leyden v. 360 East 55th Street Corporation, 39 F. Sup. 879. Both parties to the lease are residents of, and the premises are located in, Connecticut; the only “summary proceeding ... in respect of the demised premises” known to our law would be an action of summary process; and the parties must have intended the provision in the lease to apply to such an action.
There is no error.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.