The principal issue in this appeal is whether an investigative demand of Mary M. Heslin, the Connecticut Commissioner of Consumer Protection (commissioner), issued to attorneys suspected of engaging in deceptive trade practices, exceeds the commissioner’s statutory authority and unlawfully exercises a power vested by the constitution of Connecticut exclusively with the state judiciary. The case arose when the defendant, Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, refused to comply with an investigative demand issued to it by the plaintiff commissioner pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. *512General Statutes §§ 42-110a through 42-110q1 (CUTPA, the act). Upon the defendant’s refusal to comply, the commissioner sought an order requiring compliance from the Superior Court.2 The trial court, holding the regulation of attorney conduct to be a matter exclusively within the control of the judicial branch of the state government, dismissed the commissioner’s application. From this judgment of dismissal, the commissioner has appealed. We find error and remand for further proceedings.

*513The investigative demand in controversy, in accordance with General Statutes § 42-110d (c),3 provided the defendant with a description of the alleged practices under investigation. These alleged practices included unfair or deceptive use of the terms “clinic” and “law clinic” in the defendant’s advertising, misrepresentations by the defendant as to its fees and as to the fees of other attorneys performing the same services, and referrals by the defendant to the law firm of Trantolo & Trantolo, which caused those referred to pay higher legal fees than the fees advertised by the defendant. The commissioner’s demand required the defendant to respond to interrogatories and produce documentation concerning: the number of persons employed by the defendant, contracts and fee agreements between the defendant and its clients, fees actually paid to the defendant by its clients, advertisements placed by the defendant, and the defendant’s relationship with the law firm of Trantolo & Trantolo.

Under CUTPA, issuance of an investigative demand upon any person must be predicated upon the commissioner’s suspicion that the person is using, has used or is “about to use any method, act or practice declared by section 42-110b to be unlawful,” or upon the commissioner’s wish to obtain assurance from the person “that section 42-110b has not, is not or will not be violated.” General Statutes § 42-110d (c). The aforementioned § 42-110b, which is the substantive keystone of the act, provides, in subsection (a): “No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” On appeal, the defendant urges us to hold, as did the trial court, that application of § 42-110b (a) to attorney conduct would violate *514the doctrine of separation of powers, and that consequently an investigation into such conduct may not be enforced by the courts.

I

Preliminarily, it is necessary to consider the commissioner’s claim that the trial court acted prematurely by inquiring, in the context of proceedings to enforce an investigative demand, into the commissioner’s ultimate authority to regulate attorney conduct. In support of her contention, which was considered and rejected by the trial court, the commissioner relies on our decision in In re Application of Ajello v. Moffie, 179 Conn. 324, 426 A.2d 295 (1979). In that case, which involved a proceeding initiated by the attorney general to enforce an investigative subpoena based on suspected violations of the Connecticut Anti-Trust Act; General Statutes § 35-42; we held: “While courts which enforce such subpoenas may inquire into most questions of legality, they may not inquire into questions concerning the coverage or even the probable coverage of the statute under which the attorney general is acting.” Id., 326.

The holding in Ajello was based on our recognition that the legislature, when it endows an administrative body with responsibility for a statute’s enforcement, may authorize that body, rather than the trial court, “to determine the question of coverage in the preliminary investigation of possibly existing violations.” Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614 (1946); New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1975). An administrative body so empowered may, by virtue of such authority, develop, without interference or delay, a factual basis for the determination of whether particular activities come *515within its regulatory authority. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributing Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973). It is presumed that, in authorizing such investigations, the legislature has delegated to the administrative body a power which the legislature lawfully possesses. Where, however, a color-able claim is made that the preliminary investigation is not “within the power of [the legislature] to command”; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra, 209; that presumption is rebutted. It then becomes necessary and proper for the trial court to determine, before proceeding further, “the authority of [the] administrative agency to act.” Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 178 Conn. 173, 178, 422 A.2d 290 (1979).

We observe in the present case that the defendant’s motion to dismiss did not merely dispute the coverage of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, but questioned as well the legislature’s constitutional power to regulate attorney conduct. The commissioner concedes that, absent such a power in the legislature, the commissioner had no authority to issue the investigative demand in question. We conclude that in response to the defendant’s constitutional claim, the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss was not premature. We therefore turn to the merits of that ruling.

II

Although the trial court, in addressing the constitutional question, assumed that CUTPA applies to the defendant, our inquiry on review must begin with whether the act authorizes the commissioner to regulate attorney conduct. We conclude that it does.

CUTPA was designed by the legislature to “put Connecticut in the forefront of state consumer protection.” 16 H. R. Proc., Pt. 14, 1973 Sess., p. 7324 (remarks of *516Representative Howard A. Newman). It endows the commissioner with broad powers: to investigate suspected violations of the act; General Statutes § 42-110d (a)-(c); to define, through the promulgation of regulations, what may constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices; General Statutes § 42-110b (c); and to subpoena witnesses, conduct hearings, and issue cease-and-desist orders to persons determined to have violated the act. General Statutes § 42-110d (d). The commissioner may also seek enforcement of the act in the Superior Court; id.; which is authorized to enjoin violations of the act and to “make such additional orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any practices prohibited by this chapter . . . .” General Stat-0 utes § 42-110d (e).4

CUTPA contains no language expressly including or excluding attorneys from its purview. Since the defendant does not claim that it falls within one of the act’s .general exceptions,5 the question on appeal is whether *517the provision of legal services constitutes “the conduct of any trade or commerce.” General Statutes § 42-110b (a). The act defines trade or commerce as “the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state.” General Statutes § 42-110a (4).

It is not surprising that CUTPA is textually inconclusive on the question of whether the practice of law is included within the conduct of trade or commerce. In 1973,6 before lawyers engaged in advertising and when few lawyers were incorporated, existing precedents tended to exclude the work of the legal profession from the category of trade or commerce. See, e.g., Federal Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 209, 42 S. Ct. 465, 66 L. Ed. 898 (1922); Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 414, 165 A. 211 (1933). CUTPA antedated, by several years, the seminal case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-82, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977), which held that advertising by lawyers was protected as commercial speech within the ambit of the first amendment. The court there noted that any historical foundation for restraints on advertising has crumbled, “[s]ince the belief that lawyers are somehow ‘above’ trade has become an anachronism.” Id., 371-72. At the same time, it recognized that, in order to cope with the risks of misleading or deceptive advertising, “the vigiiance of a regulatory agency will be required.” Id., 379.

We need not speculate about the intent of CUTPA’s drafters, because the act contains its own guide to *518statutory construction. It provides, in § 42-110b (b): “It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection (a) of this section, the commissioner [of consumer protection] and the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts to Section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. [§] 45 (a) (l)),7 as from time to time amended.”

Although the federal courts have not directly addressed the issue of whether the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) applies to attorneys, the existing decisions provide considerable guidance. The United States Supreme Court has recently affirmed application of the FTC Act to other professionals. American Medical Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 455 U.S. 676, 102 S. Ct. 1744, 71L. Ed. 2d 546 (1982) (per curiam) (divided court), aff'g. mem., 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980).8 That court, furthermore, has, since the *519passage of CUTPA, decided that the practice of law may constitute the conduct of a trade or commerce under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-88, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1975). Lower federal courts have construed the FTC Act as jurisdictionally in pari materia with the Sherman Act. E.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 363 F.2d 757, 770 (6th Cir. 1966); see also Island Tobacco Co. v. R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 513 F. Sup. 726, 737 (D. Hawaii 1981). In light of the above, it is reasonable to conclude that the federal courts would construe the FTC Act as applying to attorneys.

If we look to interpretations of the FTC Act given by the federal trade commission itself, we need exercise fewer cautions. As early as 1964, an attorney who had prepared a dunning letter and had participated in a collection scheme violative of 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) was held to have himself violated the FTC Act and was enjoined from using threats of legal action in connection with the unlawful scheme. In re Wilson Chemical Co., 64 F.T.C. 168, 186-87, 190 (1964).9 More recently, the federal trade commission has unequivocally stated its official position that state-regulated professions, including the practice of law, are not and should not be *520exempted from coverage of the FTC Act. Reauthorization of the Federal Trade Commission, 1982 Hearings on S. 1984 Before the Senate Comm, on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 32-36 (letter, by direction of the Federal Trade Commission, of James C. Miller III, Chairman).

Federal law thus provides us with strong precedents for concluding that CUTPA applies to attorneys. Such a conclusion is buttressed by the fact that it comports with the decisions of other jurisdictions construing substantially similar legislation. Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d 1067, 1068-69 (La. Ct. App. 1979); DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); see also Matthews v. Berryman, 637 P.2d 822, 826 (Mont. 1981). It comports as well, obviously, with the enforcing agency’s view of the statute, a recognized aid to statutory construction. Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 544, 551-52, 436 A.2d 266 (1980); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 176 Conn. 191, 198, 405 A.2d 638 (1978). It comports, finally, with the liberal construction to which a remedial statute such as CUTPA is entitled. Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corporation, 184 Conn. 607, 615 n.4, 440 A.2d 810 (1981); see General Statutes § 42-110b (d). As Professor Davis has pointed out, complex new business arrangements inevitably “bring forth equally intricate governmental mechanisms requiring effective exercise of the administrative power of investigation.” Davis, Administrative Law Text (3d Ed.) § 3.08, p. 67; see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra.

We need not in this case decide whether every provision of CUTPA permits regulation of every aspect of the practice of law by every member of the bar of this state. For now, we need conclude only that *521CUTPA’s regulation of “the conduct of any trade or commerce” does not totally exclude all conduct of the profession of law. For the purpose of sustaining an investigatory demand, we conclude that CUTPA applies to the conduct of attorneys.

Ill

The defendants’ final claim is that CUTPA, as applied to attorney conduct, is constitutionally infirm because it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers contained in article second of the Connecticut constitution. That article provides: “The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.”10 In its separation of powers argument, the defendant does not dispute that the substantive and procedural scheme of CUTPA, as a means of protecting consumers and prohibiting unfair trade practices, constitutes a proper exercise of the legislature’s power to define rights and prescribe remedies; State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 509-10, 353 A.2d 723 (1974); Atwood v. Buckingham, 78 Conn. 423, 428, 62 A. 616 (1905); nor does the defendant claim that the statute has no reasonable relation to the public health, safety and welfare. State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677, 680, 372 A.2d 99 (1976); State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 703, 125 A.2d 477 (1956). Rather, the defendant reads article second of the state constitution as granting the judiciary exclusive authority to regulate the professional conduct'of attorneys, and as *522thereby prohibiting the regulation of attorneys by means of a legislative enactment such as CUTPA. We disagree.

It is important, at the outset, to recognize that the challenge of any state statute on constitutional grounds imposes a difficult burden on the challenger. We have consistently held that every statute is presumed to be constitutional and have required invalidity to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Eielson v. Parker, 179 Conn. 552, 557, 427 A.2d 814 (1980); State v. Olds, 171 Conn. 395, 411, 370 A.2d 969 (1976); Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 152-53, 251 A.2d 49 (1968). In the context of challenges to statutes whose constitutional infirmity is claimed to flow from impermissible intrusion upon the judicial power, we have refused to find constitutional impropriety in a statute “simply because it affects the judicial function, so long as it is an exercise of power assigned by the constitution to the legislature.” Eielson v. Parker, supra, 560; State v. Darden, supra, 680-81. In many situations, executive, legislative and judicial powers necessarily overlap. In such situations, a statute is not unconstitutional unless “it represents an effort by the legislature to exercise a power which lies exclusively under the control of the courts; State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 507, 510-11, 353 A.2d 723 [1974]; Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652 [1961]; State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 [1958]; or if it establishes a significant interference with the orderly conduct of the Superior Court’s judicial functions. Adams v. Rubinow, [157 Conn. 150, 160-61, 251 A.2d 49 (1968)].” State v. Darden, supra, 679. In the present appeal, the defendant has claimed, and the trial court has held, that the *523statute in question governs subject matter that is not only within the judicial power but is vested exclusively within judicial control.11

We agree with the defendant that he has established the first part of the constitutional test. As applied to attorneys, CUTPA unquestionably deals with subject matter that is within the judicial power. The Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar. See State v. Jones, 180 Conn. 443, 448, 429 A.2d 936 (1980); Lublin v. Brown, 168 Conn. 212, 228, 362 A.2d 769 (1975); Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 182-83; Grievance Committee of the Bar of New Haven County v. Sinn, 128 Conn. 419, 422, 23 A.2d 516 (1941); In re Kone, 90 Conn. 440, 442, 97 A. 307 (1916); In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 147, 67 A. 497 (1907). The judiciary has the power to admit attorneys to practice and to disbar them; In re Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 252, 294 A.2d 281 (1972), rev’d on other grounds, 413 U.S. 717, 93 S. Ct. 2851, 37 L. Ed. 2d 910 (1973); Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 185-86; In re Durant, supra; to fix the qualifications of those to be admitted; In re Application of Griffiths, supra; Heiberger v. Clark, supra; and to define what constitutes the practice of law. State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra, 232. In the exercise of its disciplinary power, the Superior Court has adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility. Practice Book, pp. 1-52 (as amended 1982). Since attorney advertising, referrals by attorneys to other legal practitioners, and fee arrangements between attorneys and clients are regulated by the disciplinary rules of the code; see, e.g., DR 2-10112 (advertising); *524DR 2-10313 (referrals); DR 2-10614 (fees); enforcement of the code may provide sanctions for wrongful practices which also violate CUTPA.

We are, however, unpersuaded that the defendant has proven that CUTPA unconstitutionally operates in an area under the exclusive control of the courts. That CUTPA, a statute of general applicability, may overlap with disciplinary rules specific to attorney conduct does not render the statute unconstitutional. See Lublin v. Brown, supra, 228. It is no derogation of the judiciary’s power over attorneys to recognize that such power is not, in every respect, an exclusive one. Comparison of the judicial disciplinary system with CUTPA discloses their disparate functions.

It is their unique position as officers and commissioners of the court; In re Application of Griffiths, supra, 255; State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra, 234; which casts attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary and subjects them to its discipline. Disciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving the courts “from the official ministration of persons unfit to practise in them.” Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552 (1883); Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 183; Grievance Committee v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 265, 152 A. 292 (1930); In re Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 452, 91 A. 274 (1914). Such proceedings do not concern themselves with the rights of *525parties as between themselves. In re Durant, supra, 149. Indeed there are no adversary parties in the technical legal sense.15 Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 182. Thus the judiciary’s disciplinary machinery contains no mechanism for recompensing those who are the victims of attorney misconduct. See Grievance Committee of the Bar of New Haven County v. Sinn, 128 Conn. 419, 423, 23 A.2d 516 (1941).

We should not permit the special relationship of attorneys to the judiciary to blind us to the fundamental importance of the relationship of attorneys to their clients. Although the canons of ethics and the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility purport to govern both the official and the private aspects of the practice of law, the code’s emphasis is consistently ethical and regulatory. CUTPA, by contrast, is primarily addressed to the pragmatic concerns of the public; it emphasizes prevention of injury to the consumer of legal services and redress to those injured by attorney misconduct. See General Statutes § 42-110d (e); see also Steele & Nimmer, “Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation.” American Bar Foundation Research J. 917, 923 (1970). *526CUTPA in no way relieves attorneys of the ethical duties imposed on them by the code.16 For the conduct that CUTPA declares illegal, it provides distinctly separate remedies, different both in purpose and in form from the scheme of regulation envisaged by the code. We recognize that CUTPA’s distinct form and purpose do not, by themselves, guarantee that the judiciary’s disciplinary power will continue to operate in an unhindered fashion. The defendant has not, however, demonstrated the contrary. A priori, there is no reason why the code and CUTPA cannot coexist.17

*527The present case is a facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute which has a sphere of operation that need never intrude upon the exclusive province of the judiciary to control the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court. We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that, at some time in the future, a more difficult confrontation will have to be resolved.18 Judicial restraint counsels us to await that event. For today, we need only hold that the application of the commissioner to pursue her inquiry into the alleged misconduct of this defendant was authorized by CUTPA and that CUTPA, in the present circumstances, is not unconstitutional.

*528There is error, the judgment is set aside and the ease is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion Shea, Sponzo and Spada, Js., concurred.

(concurring). I agree that the legal profession may, under certain circumstances, be subject to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act; General Statutes §§ 42-110a through 42-110q; and that in these circumstances the act is constitutional. I also agree that the defendant by its activity was engaged in a trade or commerce within the meaning of § 42-110a (4) and that therefore it was subject to investigation by the plaintiff for alleged violations of the act. I do not construe the court’s opinion as saying more than this. Other problems are reserved for another day. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788n, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1975).