Masotti v. Bristol Savings Bank

The dispositive issue in this appeal is the validity of a bank’s exercise of its right of setoff *173against funds held in joint accounts for which the signatories were the bank’s debtor and the debtor’s spouse. The plaintiff, Elizabeth C. Masotti, filed a complaint alleging that the defendant, Bristol Savings Bank (bank), had wrongfully withdrawn funds from joint accounts of the plaintiff and her husband, Vito Masotti. In six counts, the plaintiff claimed that these withdrawals constituted a conversion, a breach of contract, negligence, a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and an unfair trade practice, and that the bank fraudulently had failed to give the plaintiff notice of its authority to make such a withdrawal. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment that the trial court granted. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The underlying facts are undisputed. The plaintiff and her husband opened three joint accounts with the bank over a period of years beginning in 1986. Substantially all of the money in these accounts was deposited by the husband. On May 4, 1990, the bank notified the plaintiff’s husband that, because he was in default on a $15,000,000 loan to Village Gate Partnership for which he had agreed to act as guarantor, the bank had put a hold on his bank accounts. On May 7, 1990, the bank exercised its right of setoff and withdrew the remaining balance in the three joint accounts. Although the bank sent certified notices of the closing of these bank accounts to both the plaintiff and her husband, the plaintiff was not shown to have received any such notification. The funds subsequently were restored by the bank in conjunction with a workout arrangement pursuant to which the husband agreed to pledge the funds as security for a new loan transaction. The plaintiff learned of the new pledge on November 1, 1990.

*174The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment with respect to each count of the plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the bank had had a right of setoff that it had been entitled to exercise with respect to the funds in the plaintiff’s joint accounts with her husband because those accounts had not been special purpose fund accounts. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff could not prevail on the first five counts of her complaint. The court further held that the plaintiff could not prevail on the sixth count of her complaint because she had failed to submit any proof to support the allegation that the bank had “deceptively induced [her] into making the Depositor’s contract.” The thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision filed by the trial court thoroughly canvassed the applicable legal principles in a manner consistent with the statute governing joint accounts; General Statutes § 36-3;1 and with our intervening case law upholding the validity of bank setoffs. See, e.g., Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, 230 Conn. 486, 646 A.2d 1289 (1994). Because that memorandum of decision fully *175states and meets the relevant arguments raised in the present appeal, we adopt the trial court’s well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on these issues. Masotti v. Bristol Savings Bank, 43 Conn. Sup. 360, 653 A.2d 836 (1994). No useful purpose would be served by a repetition of the discussion contained therein. See Advanced Business Systems, Inc. v. Crystal, 231 Conn. 378, 381, 650 A.2d 540 (1994); Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 231 Conn. 272, 273-74, 648 A.2d 877 (1994); Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Refuse Gardens, Inc., 229 Conn. 455, 458-59, 642 A.2d 697 (1994).2

The judgment is affirmed.