Opinion

This appeal is a companion to the appeal in United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 692 A.2d 742 (1997), decided today. The dispositive issues in this appeal are: (1) the scope of the authority of a municipal tax assessor to revalue and reassess personal property pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-53 (b);1 and (2) the propriety of the trial *477court’s determination that, irrespective of the scope of the assessor’s authority under § 12-53 (b), the assessor’s *478reassessments were so arbitrary as to constitute a disregard of duty, and were manifestly excessive. The *479defendants2 appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial in two consolidated cases, in favor of the plaintiff, Hubbell Incorporated.3 The defendants claim that the trial court: (1) misconstrued § 12-53, and thus unduly limited the assessor’s statutory authority; and (2) erroneously determined that the reassessment in question was invalid as a factual matter. We agree with the defendants’ first claim, which is controlled by our decision in United Illuminating Co., and disagree with their second claim. We therefore affirm the judgment.

The plaintiff brought these two actions challenging the revaluation and reassessment by the tax assessor: (1) a tax appeal, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) §§ 12-117a and 12-53 (d),4 following the Bridge*480port board of tax review’s denial of the plaintiffs appeal from the assessor’s reassessment of the plaintiffs personal property on the grand lists of October 1, 1989, October 1,1990, and October 1, 1991; and (2) an action for wrongful assessment, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119,5 claiming that the taxes assessed against the *481plaintiff as a result of those reassessments were manifestly excessive and imposed in disregard of the statutes regarding the valuation of such property. The cases were consolidated for trial, and the court made the following factual findings.

The plaintiff, a manufacturer of electrical equipment, has a place of business in Bridgeport. Since 1984, the plaintiff has filed its lists of business personal property with the assessor as required by law. These lists, provided to the assessor on standard forms, contain three categories of property: (1) machinery, equipment and tools; (2) furniture, fixtures and office equipment; and (3) computer equipment. For the tax year beginning October, 1989, the plaintiff listed the following values, which are at 70 percent of fair market value: machinery and equipment, $5,606,820; furniture and fixtures, $624,940; and computer equipment, $936,080. The total value of the property was $7,167,840. For the 1990 tax year, the comparable values were $5,379,110, $622,150, and $269,980, respectively, for a total value of $6,271,240. For the 1991 tax year, the comparable values were $5,188,700, $390,360, and $1,059,490, respectively, for a total value of $6,638,550.

In April, 1992, the city entered into a “Valuation Audit Agreement” with the defendant Century Financial Ser*482vices, Ltd. (Century), the principals of which are James Crozier and Jeffrey Coulson. This agreement provided that Century would provide certain auditing services, for which the city would pay it a flat fee of $375 per account, plus “25% of additional taxes . . . assessable by the City against any account with respect to personal property included (or which should have been included) on the city’s [G]rand List prior to the October 1, 1991 Grand List, if such additional [t]axes relate to personal property identified or the assessed value of which is subject to increase as a result of Century’s efforts. Such amount shall be paid within 30 days after Century has billed the City with respect to a particular [ajccount.”

On August 10, 1992, the plaintiff received a letter from the assessor informing the plaintiff that its October 1, 1991 personal property schedule had been selected for audit and that Century had been engaged to conduct the audit. The assessor’s letter also informed the plaintiff that it “should be prepared to furnish Century . . . with applicable records pertaining to the Grand Lists of October 1, 1989, October 1, 1990, and October 1, 1991.” Later in August, Century requested that the plaintiff supply data to support its personal property values. Within a few days, the plaintiff sent Century its worksheets and requested a meeting.

The plaintiff heard nothing further until September 15, 1992, when it received a notice from the assessor of changes in its assessments “per personal property tax audit.” These changes in assessment were as follows: the assessed value of the plaintiffs personal property as of October 1, 1989, was increased from $7,167,840 to $9,301,275; the value of its personal property as of October 1, 1990, was increased from $6,271,240 to $8,734,600; and the value of its personal property as of October 1, 1991, was increased from $6,638,550 to $7,640,270.

*483The trial court found that Century, in reaching these reassessed values, “did little more than to take the plaintiffs business personal property statements and arbitrarily switch ‘computer equipment’ with ‘furniture and fixtures,’ which depreciates more slowly.” The court also found that Century had no coherent explanation for its actions, that it had no legitimate reason for the switch, and that Century never examined the plaintiffs personal property or visited the plaintiffs facility. In addition, the court found that the documentation presented did not support Century’s actions, and that the evidence presented to the court persuaded it that the plaintiffs classifications and valuations were correct. Finally, the court found that, at the time of Century’s actions, the assessor was suffering from a serious illness, from which he has recovered, that any action he took with respect to these matters was purely formal, and that he was unable effectively to exercise his discretion and judgment at the time.

The court specifically noted that the defendants’ case “is handicapped to the extent that [they have] had to rely on the testimony of one of the principals of Century,” namely, Crozier. Relying particularly on the 25 percent contingency fee provision of the agreement between Century and the city, the court found that “Century’s methodology is so indefensible and its interest in distorting data so evident that the evidence and testimony presented is not worthy of belief.”

With regard to the plaintiffs legal claim, the trial court ruled that “§ 12-53 applies to claims where property was omitted from a return but not to claims relating to the valuation of property included in a return.” With regard to the plaintiffs claim that the assessments made were manifestly excessive, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the assessments were arbitrary and in plain disregard of the assessor’s duty, both because of the limitations of § 12-53 and as a factual matter. In effect, *484therefore, the trial court ruled that, even if the assessor had the authority under § 12-53 to revalue property that had been included on a prior list, the reassessments in this case were manifestly excessive, and the plaintiff’s valuations were correct. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on both its tax appeal from the board of tax review and its action under § 12-119. This appeal followed.

The defendants raise three claims on appeal. Their first claim is that the trial court misconstrued § 12-53 by limiting its scope to omitted property. The defendant’s next two claims address the court’s determination that the reassessments were arbitrary and manifestly excessive. Their second claim is that the court in effect improperly determined that the contingency fee agreement between the city and Century was against public policy, and that the court improperly refused to consider Crozier’s testimony based on that improper determination. Finally, the defendants claim that the court misconstrued Crozier’s function and thereby improperly rejected the reassessment.

We agree with the defendants’ first claim. This issue is controlled by our decision today in United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, supra, 240 Conn. 432, in which we held that a municipal tax assessor’s authority under § 12-53 (b) is not limited to omitted property, and that the assessor has the authority under that statute to revalue previously assessed personal property.

We disagree, however, with the defendants’ second claim, namely, that the court in effect improperly determined that the agreement with Century was invalid as contrary to public policy, and that the court improperly “refused to consider Crozier’s testimony because of Century’s contingent fee contract,” because these claims are based on a misreading of the trial court’s memorandum of decision. The court specifically did *485not rale that the contract was invalid as against public policy, and did not refuse to consider Crozier’s testimony because of the contract. The court, as it was permitted to do, simply took the contract into account in determining Crozier’s credibility and the reliability of Century’s methodology, a methodology that, by the trial court’s unchallenged finding, the assessor in effect adopted because of his then serious illness.

It is true that, in an extensive footnote, the trial court noted the possibility that a financial audit based on a contingency fee agreement might violate principles of due process, even given de novo review by the courts. The trial court also noted that “appellate courts of other states have reached disparate conclusions as to whether contingent fee agreements violate public policy.” The court noted further, however, that such a claim was not properly before the court, because in the trial court’s view such a claim ought to be made by way of an action for declaratory judgment, with due notice to other interested parties subject to similar compensation agreements.

We neither reject nor endorse the trial court’s dicta regarding the public policy implications of such a contract and the procedures by which such a contract may be challenged. We note them only to demonstrate that the trial court did not conclude that the agreement violated public policy, and did not refuse to consider Crozier’s testimony based on any such conclusion.

The defendants’ third claim relies to some extent on a reassertion of the contention that the trial court “could not arrive at a fair and impartial determination as to the credibility of the witnesses because of an erroneous determination that the contract under which the auditor performed was against public policy.” We have already indicated that this contention is based on a misreading of the trial court’s decision.

*486In addition, however, the defendants also challenge the trial court’s finding that “the characterization or classification by the plaintiff in its personal property statements was at all times correct.” The difference between the plaintiffs and the defendants’ methodology was that the plaintiffs valuation of its computers was based on a five year depreciation schedule, whereas the defendants insisted on a seven year depreciation schedule. In this regard, the defendants argue that the trial court’s determination was erroneous because: (1) the plaintiff never supplied the auditor with sufficient information regarding its depreciation methodology; and (2) the plaintiff did not use the depreciation schedule for computers “mandated by the City as approved by [the office of policy and management]. ”6 We disagree.

We have recently reaffirmed that, in a tax case challenging the assessment of personal property, the taxpayer is entitled to de novo review by the court of the fair market value of the property, but that such review is triggered by the fulfillment of the taxpayer’s obligation to supply the tax assessor with the facts upon which valuations may be based. Xerox Corp. v. Board of Tax Review, 240 Conn. 192, 204, 690 A.2d 389 (1997). In the present case, the plaintiff fulfilled its obligation to supply appropriate information to the taxing authorities by providing the assessor with lists of its taxable property containing estimates of the fair market value of that property, and by complying with Century’s audit.

In addition, along with its original personal property lists, the plaintiff attached a document indicating the plaintiffs reliance on a five year depreciation schedule for its computers, “based on book depreciation guidelines and [Internal Revenue Service] guidelines.” This document further explained that “[b]ecause a high *487degree of technological obsolescence is applicable to the . . . equipment, the . . . stated formula more clearly reflects the fair market value” of the equipment. Moreover, during the audit performed by Century the plaintiff supplied additional material to Century. The plaintiff sent Century the worksheets that supported the 1989-91 lists supplied to the assessor by the plaintiff, and offered to make available to Century its “tab runs,”7 for review by Century at a mutually convenient time, an offer that Century never pursued. Finally, the evidence indicates that, during its audit, the plaintiff demonstrated to the assessor that Century had arrived at the increased assessments by reversing the depreciation schedules for computer equipment and furniture.

The defendants’ reliance on the Handbook for Connecticut Assessors (Connecticut Association of Assessing Officers, Office of Policy and Management of the State of Connecticut and Institute of Public Service of the University of Connecticut, 1992 Ed.), is misplaced. The passage from the handbook cited by the defendants does not mandate any particular depreciation schedule; it simply points out that, in a given case, the depreciation allowed for federal income tax purposes may not be the same as that appropriately allowed for personal property tax purposes.8 Indeed, the same *488passage also states that “not all personal property necessarily decreases in value with age. Also, items which may have unusually short economic lives (such as certain specialized equipment, computer equipment and video tapes) may decrease in value at a more rapid rate than other items of personal property.” (Emphasis added.) Id., c. 10, p. 9. Ultimately, the value of property for personal property tax purposes is a question of fact, to be determined on de novo review by the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion BERDON, KATZ and PALMER, Js., concurred.

concurring. I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

I disagreed with the majority’s application of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-53 (a) and (b) to other than omitted personal property in United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 692 A.2d 742 (1997), and Southern Connecticut Gas Co. v. Bridgeport, 240 Conn. 469, 692 A.2d 771 (1997), arid continue to express that position in this case.

This case illustrates the abuses to which the ruling in United Illuminating Co. could lead in the cases of other taxpayers where the taxing authority may wish to use a bounty hunter to valúate personal property, to go back three years and to add a 25 percent penalty.

I concur in the judgment.