**472 In this certified appeal, we consider whether General Statutes § 46a-104 1 provides for an award of statutory punitive damages as a remedy for discriminatory practices under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The plaintiff, Michael Tomick, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, 2 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's decision to set aside a jury award of $500,000 in statutory punitive damages against the defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. 3

**473 Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 157 Conn.App. 312 , 115 A.3d 1143 (2015) ( Tomick II ). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly ignored the plain language of § 46a-104 in concluding that the statute does not authorize punitive damages. We disagree with the plaintiff, and conclude that § 46a-104 does not provide for an award of punitive damages. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record and the Appellate Court opinion reveal the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant as a driver. After the defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment, 4 the plaintiff filed a seven count complaint against the defendant alleging, inter alia, disability discrimination in violation of *618 General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) (1). 5 Id. at 320, 115 A.3d 1143 . Following a jury trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him, inter alia, $500,000 in statutory punitive damages. Id. at 321, 115 A.3d 1143 . On July 19, 2010, the defendant moved to set aside the verdict and the award of punitive damages. Id. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the verdict, but granted the motion to set aside the award of punitive damages. Id.

Both parties appealed from the judgment of the trial court. See generally Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 135 Conn.App. 589 , 43 A.3d 722 ( Tomick I ), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 920 , 47 A.3d 389 (2012). After a **474 remand to the trial court; see id. at 613, 43 A.3d 722 ; 6 the Appellate Court considered the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly determined that § 46a-104 does not authorize an award of punitive damages. 7 Tomick II , supra, 157 Conn.App. at 333 , 115 A.3d 1143 . In its decision, the Appellate Court began by reviewing Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 267 Conn. 524 , 526, 839 A.2d 1250 (2004), in which this court considered whether express statutory language is required to authorize an award of multiple damages. Tomick II , supra, at 336-41, 115 A.3d 1143 . Although the plaintiff claimed that the discussion in Ames regarding punitive damages was "mere dictum," the Appellate Court disagreed and determined that Ames was binding authority. Id. at 338-41, 115 A.3d 1143 . The Appellate Court read Ames as stating a common-law rule that statutory punitive damages require express statutory authority, and applied that reasoning to the question of whether § 46a-104 authorized punitive damages. 8 **475 *619 The Appellate Court turned next to statutes related to § 46a-104 and discussed instances in which the legislature specifically provided for punitive damages, in contrast to the plain language of § 46a-104. Id. at 341, 115 A.3d 1143 . On the basis of these statutes, the Appellate Court observed that the legislature knows how to provide for statutory punitive damages, when it wishes to do so. Id. Ultimately, the Appellate Court concluded that, "[b]ecause the language of § 46a-104 does not explicitly provide for punitive damages, the plaintiff is not entitled to such relief under the statute." Id. Thus, the Appellate Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the $500,000 statutory punitive damages award. Id. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that § 46a-104 is plain and unambiguous, because the phrase "legal and equitable relief," as modified by the phrase "including, but not limited to," authorizes all forms of legal and equitable relief, including punitive damages. The plaintiff further contends that the legislature included language that specifically precludes punitive damage awards in other statutes, which undercuts the Appellate Court's conclusion that the legislature intended not to allow awards of punitive damages pursuant to § 46a-104, which is silent on that point. With respect to Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, 267 Conn. 524 , 839 A.2d 1250 , the plaintiff claims that its holding is limited to General **476 Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 14-52, 9 and that it cannot be read to establish a bright line rule requiring the legislature to expressly authorize punitive damages every time it intends to make statutory punitive damages available. Finally, the plaintiff contends that his interpretation of § 46a-104 allowing for awards of punitive damages is consistent with the remedial purpose of the act to afford relief to complainants and prevent future discrimination.

In response, the defendant relies on Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, 267 Conn. at 536 , 839 A.2d 1250 , for the proposition that, under Connecticut common law, statutory punitive damages must be authorized expressly by the legislature, and because § 46a-104 does not provide such express authorization, it therefore does not permit awards of statutory punitive damages as a form of relief. The defendant compares § 46a-104 to other related human rights statutes in which the legislature specifically provided for punitive damages, to argue that the plaintiff's interpretation of § 46a-104 would render superfluous language in these other statutes, contravening the well established *620 canon of statutory construction that assumes all statutory language is meaningful. The defendant also highlights the legislative history of § 46a-104, observing that its stated purpose was to address the backlog of cases within the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), and that the topic of punitive damages under the act was never debated. Finally, the defendant contends that punitive damage awards are not necessary to accomplish the remedial purpose of the act, in light of other significant relief that may be awarded under the statute. We agree **477 with the defendant, and conclude that punitive damages are not an available remedy under § 46a-104. 10

The issue of whether § 46a-104 allows an award of punitive damages as a remedy presents a question of statutory construction over which we exercise plenary review. 11 Gonzalez v. O & G Industries, Inc. , 322 Conn. 291 , 302, 140 A.3d 950 (2016). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter .... The test to determine ambiguity **478 is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 302-303 , 140 A.3d 950 . Significantly, "our case law is clear that ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation." State v. Orr , 291 Conn. 642 , 654, 969 A.2d 750 (2009).

In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with the text of the statute. Section 46a-104 provides the following: "The court may grant a complainant in an action brought in accordance with section 46a-100 such legal and equitable relief which it deems appropriate including, but not limited to , temporary or permanent injunctive relief, attorney's fees and court costs. The amount of attorney's fees allowed shall not be contingent upon the amount of damages requested by or awarded to the complainant." (Emphasis added.) Although the defendant *621 agrees that this language is expansive, it argues that the phrase "including, but not limited to" does not implicitly include relief for which express authorization otherwise is required. The plaintiff, however, contends that the term "legal ... relief" includes punitive damages, and so textually, § 46a-104 provides for punitive damages. We conclude that both interpretations are plausible, rendering § 46a-104 ambiguous.

Neither § 46a-104, the act, nor related human rights statutes define either term as used in § 46a-104. General Statutes § 1-1 (a) provides in relevant part: "In the construction of the statutes ... technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly." As such, we look to the common law to define the terms. See Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Champion Steel, LLC , 323 Conn. 254 , 265, 146 A.3d 975 (2016) ("[i]t is axiomatic that the legislature is presumed **479 to be aware of the common law when it enacts statutes").

Reading the phrase "including, but not limited to," as expansive; see Lusa v. Grunberg , 101 Conn.App. 739 , 757, 923 A.2d 795 (2007) ; and in conjunction with "legal ... relief," which is defined as money damages; see Mertens v. Hewitt Associates , 508 U.S. 248 , 255, 113 S.Ct. 2063 , 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) ; the plaintiff's reading of § 46a-104 that it provides for punitive damages is reasonable. Additionally, the legislature has been inconsistent throughout the General Statutes, in that some statutes expressly provide for awards of punitive damages; see, e.g., General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 46a-83 (g) (2); and others appear to expressly prohibit punitive damages. See, e.g., General Statutes § 47-212 (a). Section 46a-104, however, is silent with respect to punitive damages. Accordingly, we therefore look to the common law, other related statutes, and the circumstances surrounding its enactment for further guidance.

We next consider case law with respect to statutory interpretation concerning statutory punitive damage awards in Connecticut, beginning with our decision in Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, 267 Conn. 524 , 839 A.2d 1250 . In Ames , we considered whether an award of attorney's fees and punitive damages fell outside the indemnification provisions of General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 14-52 (b). 12 Id. at 526, 839 A.2d 1250 . In Ames , a plaintiff sought **480 damages for the unlawful repossession of a vehicle under General Statutes § 52-264, as well as attorney's fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.Id. at 526-27, 839 A.2d 1250 . The defendant *622 failed to appear, and the trial court rendered a default judgment, awarding treble damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiff. Id. The defendant, however, went out of business prior to satisfying the judgment. Id. at 527, 839 A.2d 1250 . As a result, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles invoked the surety bond posted by the defendant pursuant to § 14-52. Id. The plaintiff subsequently claimed that the surety bond should have been used to satisfy the judgment, including the punitive damages and attorney's fees. Id. at 527-28, 839 A.2d 1250 .

First, as to the award for attorney's fees, we held that attorney's fees were not compensable under § 14-52, because allowing such damages would be in derogation of the common-law American Rule that, absent a contractual or statutory exception, attorney's fees are not allowed to the successful party. Id. at 532-33, 839 A.2d 1250 . We observed that § 14-52 was devoid of any express language authorizing an award of attorney's fees, and as such, we declined to imply attorney's fees under the statute. Id. at 533, 839 A.2d 1250 . Next, we extended that attorney's fee reasoning to our analysis of whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover punitive damages under § 14-52. Id. at 536, 839 A.2d 1250 . Citing both DeMilo v. West Haven , 189 Conn. 671 , 675-76, 458 A.2d 362 (1983), and Alaimo v. Royer , 188 Conn. 36 , 43, 448 A.2d 207 (1982), we concluded that "[a]n award of multiple damages ... is an extraordinary remedy that is available only when the legislature expressly provides for such damages by statute....

**481 Accordingly, as with attorney's fees, we require explicit statutory language to support an award of punitive damages. Put simply, just as the legislature knows how to authorize an award of attorney's fees when it wishes to do so ... it also knows how to authorize an award of punitive damages." (Citations omitted.) Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, 267 Conn. at 536 , 839 A.2d 1250 . Thus, because § 14-52 did not include express statutory language to support an award of punitive damages, we declined to imply such damages. Id.

In applying the statutory interpretation approach utilized in Ames , we note that on its face, § 46a-104 does not expressly authorize an award of punitive damages, but rather, authorizes "legal and equitable relief ...." 13 To construe this language as encompassing punitive damages without expressly stating as much, as the plaintiff advocates, would be inconsistent with our approach to the statutory construction within Ames , in which we required, at least as a default rule, express statutory authorization for statutory punitive damages as a form of relief. 14

*623 Further, there is no extratextual evidence that would cause us to consider departing from the approach to **482 statutory interpretation embodied in Ames . With respect to the legislative intent, the plaintiff contends that, because the act is the state counterpart to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., § 46a-104 is remedial in nature, and as such, punitive damages are allowable to further the act's broader purpose of ending discrimination; however, a review of the legislative history behind § 46a-104 reveals no legislative intent to allow for punitive damages as a remedy for employment discrimination. Rather, the stated intent of the provision was to help alleviate the backlog of cases at the commission. See 34 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, 1991 Sess., p. 8909, remarks of Representative Joseph Adamo ("[T]he commission is very much backed up and has thousands of cases pending before it. What this basically does is if there's a case that needs-someone feels should have immediate action, it would give them the opportunity [to] seek a release from the [commission] and go directly to the court for the appropriate action."). Thus, it appears that the legislature deemed the remedies expressly authorized in the act, including back pay, compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and costs, to be sufficient to carry out its remedial purpose. 15

Reading § 46a-104 in conjunction with related human rights statutes further supports declining to imply authority to award punitive damages in this case. Specifically, **483 the legislature expressly authorized punitive damages in other human rights statutes, but did not do so within § 46a-104, and, thus, reading § 46a-104 to allow punitive damages despite the fact that it does not explicitly authorize such damages would render those express authorizations for punitive damages superfluous. "It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions.... Because [e]very word and phrase [of a statute] is presumed to have meaning ... [a statute] must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word is superfluous, void or insignificant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neighborhood Assn., Inc. v. Limberger , 321 Conn. 29 , 38-39, 136 A.3d 581 (2016). A reading of the act and related statutes reveals a multitude of instances in which the legislature expressly provided for punitive damages as a form of relief. 16 **484 General Statutes *624 (Supp. 2016) § 46a-89 (b) (1), for example, not only provides a procedure that the commission may follow to seek punitive damages in a civil case, but also expressly authorizes punitive damages awards for violations of General Statutes § 46a-64 (discriminatory public accommodations), General Statutes § 46a-64c (discriminatory housing practices), General Statutes § 46a-81d (sexual orientation public accommodations discrimination), and General Statutes § 46a-81e (sexual orientation housing discrimination). 17 The legislature did not, however, include such language authorizing awards of punitive damages in § 46a-104. See McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety , 300 Conn. 144 , 155, 12 A.3d 948 (2011) ("[o]ur case law is clear ... that when the legislature chooses to act, it is presumed to know how to draft legislation consistent with its intent and to know of all other existing statutes and the effect that its action or nonaction will have upon any one of them" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

We acknowledge the plaintiff's argument that the legislature did not expressly exclude punitive damages in the act or in related human rights statutes, including § 46a-104. 18 The other statutes upon *625 which the plaintiff **485 relies are inconsistent with those more closely related to § 46a-104. Thus, in the human rights context, the legislature expressly authorized punitive damages when it intended for that type of relief to be afforded. To read § 46a-104 to allow for awards of punitive damages when the statute does not expressly authorize those damages would be inconsistent with the rest of the act and related statutes.

Finally, the plaintiff's reliance on Title VII and other federal laws is unavailing. We have recognized that our legislature intended, in general, to make the act complement the provisions of Title VII. See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance , 322 Conn. 154 , 160, 140 A.3d 190 (2016). Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, parties **486 claiming employment discrimination under Title VII were not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244 , 252, 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). Congress, however, specifically amended Title VII by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to provide for compensatory and punitive damages. 19 Id. at 247 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 . Despite Congress taking affirmative steps to provide expressly for punitive damages, the Connecticut legislature has not yet followed suit. Had the legislature intended for § 46a-104 to provide for statutory punitive damages, it could have amended the state statute to reflect the changes to its federal counterpart, and remains free to do so.

Accordingly, in light of Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, 267 Conn. 524 , 839 A.2d 1250 , and a close reading of the text of § 46a-104 in relation to other related human rights statutes, we conclude that § 46a-104 does not authorize an award of punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's decision to set aside the jury's award of punitive damages.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

*626 In this opinion ROGERS, C.J., and ZARELLA and EVELEIGH, Js., concurred.

PALMER, J., with whom McDONALD, J., joins, dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion **487 that General Statutes § 46a-104 1 does not authorize an award of statutory punitive damages as a remedy for discriminatory practices under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. Guided by the well established principles under which we construe the act, including affording it a liberal construction in favor of employees and reading it consistently with federal employment discrimination laws, in particular, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012), I believe that reading § 46a-104 to authorize punitive damages in appropriate cases is the better construction because it would further the purposes of the act by deterring particularly severe cases of discriminatory conduct in the workplace. Moreover, those portions of this court's decision in Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 267 Conn. 524 , 839 A.2d 1250 (2004), on which the majority relies in concluding that § 46a-104 does not authorize a punitive damages award, are dicta that I now believe were incorrect. I therefore would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the trial court's decision to set aside the jury's award of statutory punitive damages in the amount of $500,000 to the plaintiff, Michael Tomick. See Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc ., 157 Conn.App. 312 , 341, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 2 **488 I agree with the majority's statement of the background facts and procedural history of this case. I also agree with the majority that, in determining whether § 46a-104 authorizes an award of punitive damages, "[w]e apply plenary review to this question of law, and well established principles of statutory construction" under General Statutes § 1-2z. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance , 322 Conn. 154 , 159, 140 A.3d 190 (2016). I turn first to the statutory text, as § 1-2z requires. Section 46a-104 provides: "The court may grant a complainant in an action brought in accordance with section 46a-100 such legal and equitable relief which it deems appropriate including, but not limited to, temporary or permanent injunctive relief, attorney's fees and court costs. The amount of attorney's fees allowed shall not be contingent upon the amount of damages requested by or awarded to the complainant." (Emphasis added.) The majority correctly concludes *627 that § 46a-104 is ambiguous when read in context, thus permitting resort to extratextual evidence to determine whether it authorizes punitive damages. Unlike the majority, however, I conclude that the "legal ... relief" authorized by § 46a-104 can include punitive damages.

As the majority acknowledges, at least as a starting point, the term "legal relief" means damages, and, in the absence of further qualification or evidence of a contrary legislative intent, has been "commonly understood to include compensatory and punitive damages." Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Center, Inc ., 921 F.2d 108 , 111 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 812 , 112 S.Ct. 60 , 116 L.Ed.2d 36 (1991) ; see also id. at 111-12 (considering intentional nature of retaliatory discharge and holding that punitive damages are available **489 under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 [b] [1988], which provides for "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the antiretaliation provision of 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a) (3) (1988) ], including without limitation employment, reinstatement or promotion and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Greathouse v. JHS Security, Inc ., United States District Court, Docket No. 11-CV-7845 (PAE) (GWG), 2015 WL 7142850 (S.D.N.Y. November 13, 2015) (concluding that punitive damages are available under antiretaliatory provision of federal Fair Labor Standards Act); Jones v. Amerihealth Caritas , 95 F.Supp.3d 807 , 818 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (same); Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc ., 206 W.Va. 18 , 31-35, 521 S.E.2d 331 (1999) (phrase "legal ... relief" in West Virginia Human Rights Act authorizes punitive damages); cf. Harris v. Richards Mfg. Co ., 675 F.2d 811 , 814 (6th Cir. 1982) (civil rights statute authorizing "actual and punitive damages" gives rise to claim for "legal relief" creating right to jury trial under seventh amendment); but see Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc ., 208 F.3d 928 , 934-36 (11th Cir. 2000) (observing that " '[l]egal relief' is certainly a broad formulation" but disagreeing with Seventh Circuit's decision in Travis on basis of other language in Fair Labor Standards Act, which it viewed as representative of Congress' intent that damages be compensatory, including liquidated damages provision), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 975 , 121 S.Ct. 1609 , 149 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001).

The majority also acknowledges that the legislature's use of the phrase "including, but not limited to," which precedes the list of remedies in § 46a-104, reflects an intent to be expansive with respect to the judicial relief available for employment discrimination. This is because the "word 'includes' is a term of expansion," and the "phrase 'but shall not be limited to,' when 'coupled **490 with the enumeration of specific or illustrative acts of ... conduct,' " evinces the legislature's intent that the statute include "a wide range" of remedial options, with those listed in the statute being illustrative rather than exclusive. Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc . v. Commissioner of Revenue Services , 304 Conn. 204 , 215, 38 A.3d 1183 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 425 , 184 L.Ed.2d 255 (2012) ; see also, e.g., State v. Jones , 51 Conn.App. 126 , 137-38, 721 A.2d 903 (1998) (definition of drug paraphernalia in General Statutes [Rev. to 1995] § 21a-240 [20] [A], which used phrases " 'such as' and 'including, but not limited to,' " indicated legislature's "clear intention that the items listed in the definition do not constitute an exhaustive or exclusive list," meaning that listing of "pipe with a screen" did not evince legislative intent "that a possessor of a marijuana pipe be able to escape liability by merely removing a screen, *628 which does not apparently effect its use in any way"), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 958 , 723 A.2d 814 (1999).

Particularly illustrative of the breadth we attribute to this language is Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education , 270 Conn. 665 , 855 A.2d 212 (2004), in which this court considered whether General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 46a-86 (c) authorized the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission) to award "personal compensatory damages," such as for emotional distress, caused by a public school district's act of discriminating against a student on the basis of his race in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 46a-58 (a). Id. at 685-86, 855 A.2d 212 . General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 46a-86 (c) provides: "In addition to any other action taken hereunder, upon a finding of a discriminatory practice prohibited by section 46a-58, 46a-59, 46a-64, 46a-64c, 46a-81b, 46a-81d or 46a-81e, the presiding officer shall determine the damage suffered by the complainant, which damage shall include, but not be limited to , the expense **491 incurred by the complainant for obtaining alternate housing or space, storage of goods and effects, moving costs and other costs actually incurred by him as a result of such discriminatory practice and shall allow reasonable attorney's fees and costs." (Emphasis added.) In rejecting the defendants' claim that the commission's authority was limited to the " 'specifically enumerated' " damages in General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 46a-86 (c); Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education , supra, at 701, 855 A.2d 212 ; the court emphasized the importance of the phrase "include, but not be limited to"; (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) id. at 702, 855 A.2d 212 ; as indicative of the legislature's intent to provide for an expansive array of remedies under General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 46a-86 (c), particularly in light of "the broad remedial purpose of the statute." Id. at 703, 855 A.2d 212 ; see also id. at 689, 855 A.2d 212 (observing that "broad range of constitutional rights" encompassed by General Statutes [Rev. to 1997] § 46a-58 [a] "suggests that an award of compensatory damages for a violation thereof need not necessarily be confined to easily quantifiable monetary losses"). Recognizing the potential deterrent effect of damages awards, the court also considered the "general" purpose of the human rights statutes, namely, "to construct a remedy for discrimination that will, so far as possible, eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 694, 855 A.2d 212 .

Insofar as I agree with the majority that there are two plausible readings of § 46a-104, thereby rendering it ambiguous with respect to the authorization of punitive damages, I look to extratextual sources as an aid to understanding the meaning of the statute. As the majority observes, the available legislative history is silent on the question before us, but, in contrast to the majority, I do not deem that silence dispositive evidence that "the **492 legislature deemed the remedies expressly authorized in the act, including back pay, compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and costs, to be sufficient to carry out its remedial purpose." Text accompanying footnote 15 of the majority opinion. I do agree with the majority that a comparison of § 46a-104 to related statutes is instructive in divining the legislature's intent, although I am persuaded by the arguments of the commission, as amicus curiae, to focus specifically on a comparison with General Statutes *629 (Supp. 2016) § 46a-86 (b). 3 As distinguished from § 46a-104, which governs the remedies available to a court upon a finding of employment discrimination, General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 46a-86 (b) governs the commission's remedial authority upon a finding of employment discrimination. In contrast to the breadth of § 46a-104, General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 46a-86 (b) authorizes the commission only to supplement orders of hiring or reinstatement with up to two years of back pay, subject to adjustment for "[i]nterim earnings, including unemployment compensation and welfare assistance or amounts which could have been earned with reasonable diligence on the part of the person to whom back pay is awarded ...." General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 46a-86 (b). Section 46a-104, however, imposes far fewer constraints on a court's authority to fashion a financial remedy for discrimination. **493 This, of course, suggests that the legislature is well aware of how to cabin a tribunal's remedial authority in cases of employment discrimination when it desires to do so. See, e.g., Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 232 Conn. 91 , 112-13, 653 A.2d 782 (1995) (considering limited remedies provided by General Statutes [Rev. to 1995] § 46a-86 [b], and holding that "[t]he enactment of [§ 46a-104 ] strongly indicates ... that the legislature did not intend to authorize [the commission] to award ... damages" for emotional distress arising from employment discrimination). Accordingly, the majority's decision effectively adding language to § 46a-104 limiting the scope of the damages available to compensatory damages runs afoul of the principle that we generally do not supply statutory language that the legislature appears to have chosen to omit. 4 *630 E.g., **494 Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations , 296 Conn. 594 , 605, 996 A.2d 729 (2010).

Other well established principles governing the construction of the act further persuade me that § 46a-104 should be read to authorize awards of punitive damages. The act is a remedial statutory scheme, and any "ambiguities [therein] ... should be construed in favor of persons seeking redress thereunder ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance , supra, 322 Conn. at 165, 140 A.3d 190 . This is particularly so in the present case because an award of punitive damages advances the goal of the act, which is to "rid the workplace of discrimination ...." Sullivan v. Board of Police Commissioners , 196 Conn. 208 , 216, 491 A.2d 1096 (1985) ; see also Vollemans v. Wallingford , 103 Conn.App. 188 , 197 n.7, 928 A.2d 586 (2007) ("[t]he noble purpose of [the act] ... [was] to create an effective **495 machinery in this state for the elimination of discrimination in employment" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), aff'd, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008). Punitive damages awards support the act because the legislature "contemplate[d] not merely compensating victims of discrimination for violations of their human rights, but preventing violations of these rights. Prevention requires deterrence-and deterrence ... requires the possibility of a penalty for those whose actions are sufficiently culpable." Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc ., supra, 206 W.Va. at 33 , 521 S.E.2d 331 ; see Rice v. CertainTeed Corp ., 84 Ohio St.3d 417 , 421, 704 N.E.2d 1217 (1999) (observing that state employment discrimination statute had "a deterrent component concerned with preventing socially noisome business practices"); see also Ulbrich v. Groth , 310 Conn. 375 , 455 n.64, 78 A.3d 76 (2013) ("punishment and deterrence are proper purposes of an award of punitive damages under [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. ]"); *631 Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education , supra, 270 Conn. at 695 , 855 A.2d 212 (award of compensatory damages, when "statutorily authorized, does more than remedy the past discrimination; it also serves as an important social deterrent to future discriminatory conduct").

Moreover, giving effect to the broad language chosen by the legislature in crafting the appropriate remedies also is consistent with the principle that, whenever possible, we construe the act to "complement the provisions" of Title VII, the federal employment discrimination statute. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance , supra, 322 Conn. at 160, 140 A.3d 190 . With no statutory language in § 46a-104 precluding awards of punitive damages under the act or otherwise cabining the type of damages available, I would construe that statute's capacious text in accordance with the legislature's general intent that the act be **496 construed consistently with federal antidiscrimination law, which does specifically authorize courts to award, in cases of intentional discrimination, punitive damages, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. 5 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a) (2012).

Finally, a construction of § 46a-104 to authorize the punitive damages award in this case accords with persuasive sister state authority on this point, in particular, decisions from the highest state courts of Ohio and West Virginia. 6 Particularly instructive *632 is **497 Haynes v. Rhone- Poulenc, Inc. , supra, 206 W.Va. 18 , 521 S.E.2d 331 , in which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered the availability of punitive damages for disability based employment discrimination under statutory language very similar to that set forth in § 46a-104 (a). The statute at issue in Haynes provided for injunctive relief and "affirmative action which may include, but is not limited to , reinstatement or hiring of employees, granting of back pay or any other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. In actions brought under this section, the court in its discretion may award all or a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable [attorney's] fees and witness fees, to the complainant." (Emphasis added.) W. Va. Code Ann. § 5-11-13 (c) (LexisNexis 2013). In concluding that "allowing an award of punitive damages gives the statute's language its literal meaning and makes it unnecessary to apply rules of construction or interpretation," the court emphasized that "punitive damages are well within the broad spectrum of remedies made available by the phrase 'any other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,' because the term 'any legal relief' necessarily includes punitive damages." Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc ., supra, at 32, 521 S.E.2d 331 . The court also emphasized the liberal construction accorded the antidiscrimination provision, and the deterrent value of punitive damages in preventing employment discrimination. See id. at 32-33 , 521 S.E.2d 331 . Finally, the West Virginia court rejected the majority's approach in the present case in rejecting the **498 employer's comparative reliance on other human rights statutes, in particular, the housing discrimination statute expressly providing for both " 'actual and punitive damages ....' " Id. at 34 , 521 S.E.2d 331 . Rather, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the "remedial provisions of both [the employment and housing discrimination statutes] provide for essentially the same broad range of legal and equitable remedies, using different words to accomplish the same purpose." Id. ; see also Rice v. CertainTeed Corp ., supra, 84 Ohio St.3d at 418-21 , 704 N.E.2d 1217 (punitive damages are available under Ohio's state employment discrimination statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.99 [West 2007], which authorizes "a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief," given "plain meaning" of broad statutory language without "restrictive modifier" on type of damages). Consistent with these authorities, I would conclude that § 46a-104 authorizes an award of punitive damages in appropriate employment discrimination cases. 7 **499 *633 In reaching its contrary conclusion, the majority deems the broad language of § 46a-104 and extratextual evidence insufficiently specific to authorize an award of punitive damages under Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, 267 Conn. 524 , 839 A.2d 1250 , which it deems to embody this court's "approach to statutory interpretation" with respect to punitive damages. The majority describes Ames as a "persuasive baseline position"; footnote 14 of the majority opinion; and states that Ames "required, at least as a default rule, express statutory authorization for statutory punitive damages as a form of relief." Text accompanying footnote 14 of the majority opinion. The majority's analysis is a faithful and logical application of Ames . I believe, however, that the analysis in Ames on which the majority relies is legally flawed dictum that in fact does not furnish a "persuasive baseline position" for analyzing punitive damage issues. 8 Footnote 14 of the majority opinion.

In Ames , we considered whether the plaintiff could recover "not only actual damages but also punitive damages and attorney's fees"; Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, 267 Conn. at 531 , 839 A.2d 1250 ; under a surety bond furnished by a automobile dealer pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 14-52 (b) 9 " 'as indemnity for any loss sustained by any person by reason of ... such licensee going out of business.' " Id. at 530, 839 A.2d 1250 . The claim against the bond in Ames arose from the dealer's allegedly wrongful repossession of the plaintiff's car. See id. at 526, 839 A.2d 1250 . The plaintiff then obtained a default judgment for compensatory damages, treble damages for theft under General Statutes § 52-564, and attorney's fees under CUTPA, General Statutes § 42-110g (d). See id. at 526-27, 839 A.2d 1250 . We rejected the plaintiff's argument that the phrase " 'any loss' contained in § 14-52 (b) (4) 'is **500 an all encompassing term [that] contains no hint of an exception.' " Id. at 531, 839 A.2d 1250 . Using a variety of terms to describe the damages giving rise to the claim, we addressed what we deemed to be the "claim that [the plaintiff was] entitled to recover punitive damages against a surety bond furnished in accordance with § 14-52," observing that, "[i]n particular, the plaintiff [sought] indemnification under § 14-52 for the treble damages that she was awarded pursuant to § 52-564." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 536, 839 A.2d 1250 . We then concluded: "An award of multiple damages , however, is an extraordinary remedy that is available only when the legislature expressly provides for such damages by statute. E.g., DeMilo v. West Haven , 189 Conn. 671 , 675-76, 458 A.2d 362 (1983) ; Alaimo v. Royer , 188 Conn. 36 , 43, 448 A.2d 207 (1982). Accordingly, as with attorney's fees, we require explicit statutory language to support an award of punitive damages . Put simply, just as the legislature knows how to authorize an award of attorney's fees when it wishes to do so ... it also knows how to authorize an *634 award of punitive damages ." 10 (Citation **501 omitted; emphasis added.) Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, at 536, 839 A.2d 1250 .

In my view, we drew two false equivalencies in Ames in comparing punitive damages to statutory attorney's fees and statutory multiple damages awards and, unfortunately, used loose drafting language in arriving at our conclusion. First, it was improper to assume that the same analysis applies to punitive damages and statutory attorney's fees. In contrast to attorney's fees awarded pursuant to a statutory exception to the American Rule, a punitive damages award, whether at common law 11 or pursuant to statute, requires the plaintiff to prove "a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Vandersluis v. Weil , 176 Conn. 353 , 358, 407 A.2d 982 (1978) ; see Ulbrich v. Groth , supra, 310 Conn. at 446 , 78 A.3d 76 (noting in **502 case involving CUTPA that "the flavor of the basic requirement to justify an award of punitive damages is *635 described in terms of wanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Second, and perhaps more significantly, in Ames , we improperly used the doctrinally distinct terms multiple damages and punitive damages interchangeably. This rendered inapt our reliance on Alaimo v. Royer , supra, 188 Conn. 36 , 448 A.2d 207 , in which this court concluded that the terms "punitive damages" and "exemplary damages" are "merely alternate labels for the same remedy," which is distinct from statutory provisions authorizing multiple damages, such as treble damages for theft under § 52-564. 12 Id. at 42-43, 448 A.2d 207 . Indeed, in Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co ., 275 Conn. 72 , 881 A.2d 139 (2005), this court followed Alaimo and concluded that an arbitrator had the authority to award statutory double damages for unpaid wages under General Statutes § 31-72 ; id. at 92, 98-99, 881 A.2d 139 ; despite the submission providing that he was "not authorized or entitled to include as part of any award ... special, exemplary or punitive damages or amounts in the nature of special, exemplary or punitive damages regardless of the nature or form of the claim or grievance that has been submitted to arbitration ...." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 76, 881 A.2d 139 ; see also Caulfield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co ., 31 Conn.App. 781 , 786 n.3, 627 A.2d 466 (insurance **503 policy exclusion for punitive and exemplary damages did not encompass statutory multiple damages under General Statutes § 14-295 for injuries, death or property damage arising from enumerated traffic violations), cert. denied, 227 Conn. 913 , 632 A.2d 688 (1993). It is, therefore, at best imprecise to refer to statutory multiple damages as "punitive" in the absence of "express designation by the legislature" to that particular effect. See Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co ., supra, at 91-92 n.10, 881 A.2d 139 (surveying punitive damage statutes and observing that some specifically limit punitive damages awards to "multiples of compensatory damages," whereas others provide no such limit).

Finally, beyond being legally flawed, the foregoing discussion in Ames with respect to whether the plaintiff could recover her punitive damages award and attorney's fees against the bond required by § 14-52 was a non sequitur that was dictum. See, e.g., Cruz v. Montanez , 294 Conn. 357 , 376-77, 984 A.2d 705 (2009). In Ames , we simply did not need to consider whether a particular remedy, such as attorney's fees or punitive damages, was statutorily authorized, in order to determine whether those portions of the judgment constituted a "loss" within the meaning of § 14-52. First, the plaintiff in Ames had already been awarded those remedies in the underlying litigation, and the only question was whether she could collect them against the bond. See Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, 267 Conn. at 526-27 , 839 A.2d 1250 . Thus, the real crux of the statutory construction of § 14-52 lay in our review of the legislative history of that provision, which, we observed, reflected the legislature's view that the bond *636 simply provide "some financial security" for customers to "obtain reimbursement for money owed to them." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 537, 839 A.2d 1250 . In addition to citing Restatement principles governing the law of sureties; see **504 Ames v. Commis sioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, at 538-39 n.11, 839 A.2d 1250 , citing Restatement (Third), Suretyship and Guaranty § 73, pp. 290-91 (1996) ; which preclude the collection of penalties beyond the original obligation, we also noted the relatively small bond amount required under § 14-52 specifically, and compared other surety statutes, such as those governing state and municipal construction contracts; see Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , supra, at 537-38, 839 A.2d 1250 ; to indicate that, "had the legislature intended for the dealer's bond to indemnify consumers beyond their actual or compensatory damages, the legislature likely would have mandated a significantly larger bond, as it has done in other statutory contexts." Id. at 537, 839 A.2d 1250 . In my view, this analysis, which was more focused on the purpose and history of § 14-52, indicates that our consideration in Ames of whether attorney's fees and punitive damages were viable remedies under § 14-52 was merely dictum. I thus do not believe that we should be bound or even guided by Ames in considering whether § 46a-104 authorizes awards of punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. 13 **505 In sum, I would conclude that § 46a-104 authorized the jury's punitive damages award in the present case. Consequently, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court with direction to remand the case to the trial court to direct judgment with direction to render judgment reinstating that award.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.