The principal issue in this appeal is whether the statutory aggrievement principles of General Statutes § 8-8 1 extend to appeals from the decisions of historic district commissions brought pursuant to General Statutes § 7-147i. 2 The plaintiffs, Robert Mayer and Mary Pat Mayer, appeal 3 from the judgments of the trial court dismissing their appeals from two decisions of the named defendant, the Historic District Commission of the Town of Groton (commission), with respect to alterations to a barn located on real property owned by the defendants Steven Young and Caroline Young (applicants). 4 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) statutory aggrievement under § 8-8 does not extend to historic district commission appeals brought pursuant to § 7-147i ; and (2) they had failed to establish that they were classically aggrieved with respect to each of the commission's two decisions. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court. The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The plaintiffs own real property located at 50 Pearl Street in the Mystic River Historic District within the town of Groton (town). The applicants own abutting real property located at 52 Pearl Street. On May 1, 2012, the applicants sought a certificate of appropriateness from the commission that would allow them to remove nine feet, seven inches from the southern end of a historic barn located on their property, which would eliminate their need to obtain a variance from the town's lot coverage regulations in connection with plans to build an addition to their house. At a public hearing on May 15, 2012, the commission voted to grant that application for a certificate of appropriateness, despite the fact that the plaintiffs appeared and objected to the application. On May 25, 2012, the plaintiffs appealed from the commission's decision granting the certificate of appropriateness to the trial court pursuant to § 7-147i (first appeal).

While the first appeal was pending before the trial court, on September 1, 2012, the applicants requested a second certificate of appropriateness from the commission to: (1) modify the barn by removing a portion not in public view, in accordance with an accompanying architectural drawing; and (2) "modify and expand [the] existing rear addition" to the house. Specifically, the applicants sought the commission's approval of a proposal to reduce the overall footprint of the barn while leaving several of its facades intact, in order to make additional room for the contemplated addition. The commission held a public hearing on the second application on September 18, 2012. The commission then continued the hearing to a second session, held on October 16, 2012. At that hearing, the applicants withdrew the portion of the application seeking a certificate of appropriateness with respect to alterations to the main house. After some discussion, the commission found that it lacked jurisdiction over the remainder of the matter because "the portion of the [barn at issue did] not meet the definition of an exterior architectural feature that is open to view from a public street, way or place." On October 29, 2012, the plaintiffs appealed from the commission's finding of no jurisdiction to the trial court pursuant to § 7-147i (second appeal).

The trial court held a hearing on both appeals on July 22, 2014. Following testimony by the plaintiffs to establish their aggrievement in each appeal, the defendants moved to dismiss both appeals for lack of statutory or classical aggrievement. The trial court subsequently issued separate memoranda of decision granting the motions of the defendants to dismiss the two appeals.

In its memoranda of decision, the trial court first agreed with the defendants' claim that statutory aggrievement under § 8-8(a) does not apply to historic district commission appeals brought pursuant to § 7-147i. Rejecting the contrary analysis in Peeling v. Historic District Commission , Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No CV-06-4009772-S (November 1, 2006) ( 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 284 , 2006 WL 3359619 ), the trial court held that § 7-147i"is not ambiguous; it simply does not provide any alternative to proving actual aggrievement. The legislature could have but did not provide expressly, or incorporate the per se aggrievement provision in § 8-8(a)(1)...."

The trial court then turned to classical aggrievement. With respect to the first appeal, the trial court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had pleaded that they were aggrieved. The trial court nevertheless concluded that the plaintiffs had "rested their case on aggrievement without presenting any evidence of such aggrievement or citing any evidence in the record, let alone any specific testimony or exhibit in the record, from which the court could find aggrievement as a matter of fact." The court further rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on the administrative record pursuant to State Library v. Freedom of Information Commission , 240 Conn. 824 , 832-33, 694 A.2d 1235 (1997), noting the plaintiffs' failure to cite specific references to the administrative record during their case-in-chief, and stating that even if it were to search the record, the plaintiffs had failed to establish "the possibility ... that [they] have a specific personal and legal interest in the subject of the [commission's] decision which [had] been specially and injuriously affected ...." 5 Accordingly, the court rendered judgment dismissing the first appeal.

With respect to the second appeal, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to plead that they were classically aggrieved by the commission's decision. The court also emphasized that the commission's decision to permit the applicants to remove a portion of the barn did not directly harm the plaintiffs, observing that they could not see that portion of the barn from their property, and there was no "claim, let alone credible evidence," that the removal of that portion of the barn "harmed the value [of the plaintiffs' property]." The trial court reiterated that the possibility that the applicants might use the space to build an addition did not render the plaintiffs aggrieved. See footnote 5 of this opinion. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the second appeal. These appeals followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded, with respect to both appeals, that: (1) the statutory aggrievement provided by § 8-8(a) does not apply to historic district commission appeals brought pursuant to § 7-147i ; and (2) they were not classically aggrieved. We address each of these claims in turn. Additional relevant facts will be set forth as necessary.

"Before we address the merits of the parties' claims, we briefly set forth the law governing aggrievement .... [P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a plaintiff's appeal. ... [I]n order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved. ...

"Standing ... is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. ...

"Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory. ... Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share. ... Second, the party must also show that the agency's decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest. ...

Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the possibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest. ...

"Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 278 Conn. 660 , 664-65, 899 A.2d 26 (2006).

I

We begin with the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the statutory aggrievement principles of § 8-8(a) do not apply to appeals from historic district commission decisions brought pursuant to § 7-147i. The plaintiffs contend that the language of § 7-147i, which provides that "[p]rocedure upon such appeal shall be the same as that defined in section 8-8," is plain and unambiguous and, as such, affording them the statutory aggrievement provided by § 8-8(a) is consistent with the purpose of that statute, because they are "distinct from other property owners due to [their] obvious interest as 'the property next door.' " The plaintiffs argue that the legislature has, for more than ten years, acquiesced in the Superior Court's construction of §§ 7-147i and 8-8(a) in Peeling v. Historic District Commission , supra, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 284 , which held that statutory aggrievement applies in historic district commission appeals. The plaintiffs further argue that the " '[e]xcept as provided' " by § 7-147i language in § 8-8"applies only to the various time periods for appeals in the listed legal proceedings" set forth in § 8-8(b), and "does not exclude statutory aggrievement in § 7-147i."

In response, the commission contends that the trial court properly determined that statutory aggrievement does not apply in appeals from historic district commissions pursuant to § 7-147i. The commission argues that, even if § 7-147i is deemed to incorporate all of § 8-8(a), the plain language of § 8-8(a) confers statutory aggrievement only on persons aggrieved by decisions of planning commissions, zoning commissions, zoning boards of appeal, or combined planning and zoning commissions. Citing a Connecticut land use treatise; see T. Tondro, Connecticut Land Use Regulation (2d Ed. 1992), pp. 547-48; the commission contends that this limited provision of statutory aggrievement in § 8-8(a) plainly and unambiguously provides that parties appealing from decisions of other types of land use agencies must prove classical aggrievement. Accordingly, the commission argues that the Superior Court's decision in Peeling is both dictum and wrongly decided. We agree with the commission and conclude that § 8-8(a) does not afford statutory aggrievement in historic district commission appeals brought pursuant to § 7-147i.

Whether §§ 7-147i and 8-8(a) combine to provide statutory aggrievement in historic district commission appeals presents a question of statutory construction over which we exercise plenary review. Gonzalez v. O & G Industries, Inc. , 322 Conn. 291 , 302, 140 A.3d 950 (2016). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. ... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter .... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 302-303 , 140 A.3d 950 .

We begin with the text of the statutes. Section 7-147i provides in relevant part that: " Any person or persons severally or jointly aggrieved by any decision of the historic district commission or of any officer thereof may, within fifteen days from the date when such decision was rendered, take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which such municipality is located .... Procedure upon such appeal shall be the same as that defined in section 8-8 ." (Emphasis added.)

Section 8-8(a)(1), in turn, defines " '[a]ggrieved person' " as "a person aggrieved by a decision of a board," 6 stating further that "[i]n the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals , 'aggrieved person' includes any person owning land in this state that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board." (Emphasis added.)

Moving beyond the definitions, § 8-8(b) then provides in relevant part: "Except as provided in subsections (c), (d) and (r) of this section and sections 7-147 and 7-147i , any person aggrieved by any decision of a board, including a decision to approve or deny a site plan pursuant to subsection (g) of section 8-3 or a special permit or special exception pursuant to section 8-3c, may take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which the municipality is located ...." (Emphasis added.)

Read together, we conclude that §§ 7-147i and 8-8 do not provide for statutory aggrievement in historic district commission appeals. Even if we assume that the reference to "procedure" in § 7-147i incorporates by reference the aggrievement provisions of § 8-8(a), the plain and unambiguous language of § 8-8(a)(1) only confers statutory aggrievement with respect to decisions of a limited array of land use agencies, namely, "a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals ...." Reading this enumeration of land use agencies to include historic district commissions would contravene the "doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another-[under which] we presume that when the legislature expresses items as part of a group or series, an item that was not included was deliberately excluded." DeNunzio v. DeNunzio , 320 Conn. 178 , 194, 128 A.3d 901 (2016). Put differently, it is well settled that "[w]e are not permitted to supply statutory language that the legislature may have chosen to omit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations , 296 Conn. 594 , 605, 996 A.2d 729 (2010).

Moreover, it is well settled that the legislature, in enacting the statutory aggrievement provision of § 8-8(a)(1), "is presumed to have acted with knowledge of existing statutes and with an intent to create one consistent body of law. ... The General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or [lack thereof] will have [on] any one of them. And it is always presumed to have intended that effect which its action or [lack thereof] produces." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 293 Conn. 382 , 398, 978 A.2d 49 (2009). This presumption is particularly apt in this case, given that § 7-147i, first enacted in 1961; see Public Acts 1961, No. 430, § 11; predated the statutory aggrievement provisions in § 8-8, which were first enacted in 1967, broadened in 1977, and reorganized in 1989. See Public Acts 1989, No. 89-356, § 1; Public Acts 1977, No. 77-470; Public Acts 1967, No. 712. The legislature's awareness of the historic district commission legislation is more than presumptive in this context, given that § 8-8(b) expressly refers to § 7-147i in carving out certain exceptions to the land use appeals procedure, in particular the appeal period and service of process.

Indeed, looking beyond § 8-8(a)(1), related statutes affecting land use appeals demonstrate that, if the legislature wanted to create statutory aggrievement in historic district cases, "it could have done so expressly." Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations , supra, 296 Conn. at 605 , 996 A.2d 729 . In particular, we note General Statutes § 22a-43(a), which allows for administrative appeals from decisions of municipal inland wetlands and watercourses commissions by "[t]he commissioner or any person aggrieved" or "any person owning or occupying land which abuts any portion of land within, or is within a radius of ninety feet of, the wetland or watercourse involved in any regulation, order, decision or action ...." Thus, we agree with the commission that the legislature's failure to provide expressly for statutory standing with respect to historic district commission appeals is significant, especially in light of the fact that the legislature has done so with respect to appeals from other municipal land use agencies. See T. Tondro, supra, p. 548 (opining that statutory aggrievement not available in historic district cases because "the legislature has provided a statutory presumption of aggrievement under some regulatory programs but not others"); accord Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority , 265 Conn. 280 , 293, 828 A.2d 52 (2003) ("[a]though the plaintiffs reside next to or near the property at issue, the housing scheme does not reflect concerns that mere proximity to public housing would bestow a specific and legal interest due to the defective notice"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1180 , 124 S.Ct. 1416 , 158 L.Ed.2d 82 (2004).

We further disagree with the plaintiffs' reliance on the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, under which "we may infer that the failure of the legislature to take corrective action within a reasonable period of time following a definitive judicial interpretation of a statute signals legislative agreement with that interpretation." State v. Courchesne , 296 Conn. 622 , 717, 998 A.2d 1 (2010). Specifically, the plaintiffs rely on the legislature's failure to amend §§ 7-147i or 8-8(a)(1) in response to Peeling v. Historic District Commission , supra, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 284 , in which the Superior Court concluded that the reference in § 7-147i to the " 'procedure' " in § 8-8"clearly states the legislature's intent to incorporate the statutory aggrievement standards of ... § 8-8 and makes them applicable to appeals from the actions of historic district commissions." 7 Although we have applied the doctrine of legislative acquiescence to Superior Court decisions, we have done so only with respect to the limited array of significant trial court decisions that the Reporter of Judicial Decisions has officially published in the Connecticut Supplement. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 51-215a (a); see also State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1 , 20 n.15, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (en banc) ("the fact that [ State v. Doe , 46 Conn.Supp. 598 , 765 A.2d 518 (2000) ], is a Superior Court decision not binding statewide does not detract from its status at that time as the only published authority construing [General Statutes] § 46b-38c"); accord State v. Courchesne , supra, at 717-18, 998 A.2d 1 (unnecessary to apply presumption of legislative acquiescence because legislative history demonstrated General Assembly's approval of two published Superior Court decisions adopting common-law "born alive rule"). Because Peeling lacks the precedential imprimatur and enhanced public notice that attends official publication in the Connecticut Supplement, we decline to presume the legislature aware of it for purposes of legislative acquiescence. 8 Finally, we acknowledge the plaintiffs' reliance on the policy underlying statutory aggrievement, as expressed in the legislative history of § 8-8(a)(1), namely, to eliminate the often formulaic litigation of the aggrievement issue by immediate neighbors to project proposals. 9 Extension of statutory aggrievement might well be consistent with expectations of those who purchase real property in historic districts. See General Statutes § 7-147a(b) ; Gibbons v. Historic District Commission , 285 Conn. 755 , 761-62, 941 A.2d 917 (2008). The plain and unambiguous language of §§ 7-147i and 8-8(a) does not, however, allow for implementation of this policy by way of statutory interpretation. Particularly "[i]n areas where the legislature has spoken ... the primary responsibility for formulating public policy must remain with the legislature," and "[i]t is not the function of courts to read into clearly expressed legislation provisions which do not find expression in its words ...." 10 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Whiteman , 204 Conn. 98 , 103, 526 A.2d 869 (1987). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs were not statutorily aggrieved under §§ 7-147i and 8-8(a)(1).

II

We next turn to the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly determined that they had not established classical aggrievement in either appeal. Before addressing the plaintiffs' specific claims, we note the following generally applicable legal principles and the relevant standard of review. As indicated previously, the "fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. ... Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ... has been adversely affected. ...

"Mindful that it is a fundamental concept of judicial administration that no person is entitled to set the machinery of the courts in operation except to obtain redress for an injury he has suffered or to prevent an injury he may suffer, either in an individual or a representative capacity ... [a plaintiff is] required to plead and prove some injury in accordance with our rule on aggrievement. ... Accordingly, [i]t [is] the function of the trial court to determine ... first, whether the [plaintiff's] allegations if they should be proved would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law, and second, if as a matter of law they would constitute aggrievement, then whether [the plaintiff] proved the truth of [the] allegations. ... Although the question of whether a party is aggrieved presents a question of fact in cases involving disputed facts ... the question of whether the pleadings set forth sufficient facts, if presumed true, to establish a party's aggrievement presents a question of law over which we exercise plenary review." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 317 Conn. 515 , 526-27, 119 A.3d 541 (2015).

A

We begin with the plaintiffs' challenge to the trial court's conclusion in the first appeal, namely, that they did not prove that they were classically aggrieved by the commission's May 15, 2012 decision to allow the applicants to remove nine feet, seven inches from the southern end of the barn. Relying on State Library v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, 240 Conn. at 832-33 , 694 A.2d 1235 , the plaintiffs first contend that the trial court improperly declined to consider the facts in the administrative record, in particular Robert Mayer's testimony before the commission about the significant reduction of the plaintiffs' property value that would be caused by the applicants' proposed house addition, which would block the water views from the plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs also claim that they were aggrieved by "gross procedural defects" during the proceedings before the commission, such as defective notice of hearings and the commission's failure to follow its own procedures.

In response, the commission argues, inter alia, that there was no evidence of classical aggrievement because the record established only the mere proximity of the plaintiffs' home to the applicants' property, which is insufficient as a matter of law. Relying on Water Pollution Control Authority v. Keeney , 234 Conn. 488 , 662 A.2d 124 (1995), the commission then contends that, even if the court searches the administrative record pursuant to State Library v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, 240 Conn. at 832 , 694 A.2d 1235 , the evidence of aggrievement is entirely speculative because there is no claim that a reduction of the barn's size would obstruct the plaintiffs' water views and that this concern relates to only the effect of the contemplated addition, which was not a matter before the commission at that time. The commission also argues that the plaintiffs' claims of damage to their property value are founded only on the hearsay statements of unnamed professionals, cited in Robert Mayer's statements before the commission. See footnote 15 of this opinion. Finally, the commission contends that the plaintiffs' allegations of procedural defects, including defective notice of the public hearing, do not establish classical aggrievement. We agree with the commission, and conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs did not prove that they were classically aggrieved in the first appeal.

Even if we look to the evidence in the administrative record before the commission, as urged by the plaintiffs, 11 we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved parties in the first appeal. Assuming, without deciding, that the first prong of the aggrievement test-namely, a specific, personal and legal interest in the commission's decision-is satisfied because of the adverse impact of the applicants' proposed addition on the plaintiffs' property values 12 by virtue of its effect on their water views, 13 the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the second prong of the test-namely, that such an interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the challenged action. "Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ... has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , supra, 317 Conn. at 526 , 119 A.3d 541 .

Although the adverse effect on the plaintiffs' legally protected interest need not be certain to establish aggrievement, it nevertheless is well settled that, even when property values are at issue, "speculative concern ... even if true [does] not rise to the level of aggrievement. Allegations and proof of mere generalizations and fears are not enough to establish aggrievement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Water Pollution Control Authority v. Keeney , supra, 234 Conn. at 496 , 662 A.2d 124 ; see also, e.g., Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill , 175 Conn. 483 , 497, 400 A.2d 726 (1978) (trial court properly found no aggrievement when no credible evidence of "likely depreciation" of plaintiffs' property and "no credible evidence of any other adverse effect in their property, if any, resulting from the proposed activity"); Joyce v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 150 Conn. 696 , 698, 187 A.2d 239 (1962) (after finding supporting testimony by realtor unpersuasive, trial court properly rejected plaintiff's concern that grant of permit to open doctor's office would "depreciate the value of his property, which was about 350 feet from the doctor's premises"); Goldfisher v. Connecticut Siting Council , 95 Conn.App. 193 , 198-200, 895 A.2d 286 (2006) (upholding finding of no aggrievement because trial court properly credited testimony of defendant's appraiser that alteration of "special and somewhat unique" view from plaintiff's property by construction of cell tower would not have lowered his property value, rather than testimony to contrary by plaintiff's appraiser); Olsen v. Inland Wetlands Commission , 6 Conn.App. 715 , 719, 507 A.2d 495 (1986) (trial court reasonably found that property assessor's testimony that "commission's approval of the application would depreciate the value of [the plaintiff's] property" was "purely speculative and insufficient to establish aggrievement").

The Appellate Court's decision in Wallingford v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 146 Conn.App. 567 , 79 A.3d 115 , cert. denied, 310 Conn. 964 , 83 A.3d 346 (2013), is a particularly apt example of when the effects of a land use agency's decision are too speculative to render an objecting party aggrieved for purposes of an appeal. In Wallingford , the Appellate Court held that a town was not aggrieved by a neighboring town zoning board's grant of a use variance, grounded in a "conceptual site plan" that would have increased traffic congestion on the town's streets, because the town's "concerns as to traffic are, at present, premature" insofar as the site plan had not yet been approved.

Id., at 576-77, 79 A.3d 115 . The Appellate Court emphasized that "the plaintiff's failure to show how it is injured by the use variance itself is what precludes a finding of aggrievement in this case. Instead, the plaintiff claims aggrievement based on a mere proposal, which at this moment in time has not been approved, and is of no force or effect. Any injury premised on an unapproved site plan at this juncture remains speculative." Id., at 577, 79 A.3d 115 .

In the present case, all that the commission's May 15 decision did was approve the applicants' planned reduction of the size of the barn, an action that by itself raised no possibility of harming the plaintiffs' economic interests stemming from their water view. The commission's May 15 decision did not approve-or even consider-the addition itself. 14 Moreover, Robert Mayer's testimony before the commission, upon which the plaintiffs rely heavily, focused solely on the impact of the contemplated addition on the plaintiffs' property values, and was not directed to the proposed barn alterations by themselves. 15 This renders the effect of the commission's actual decision purely speculative with respect to the plaintiffs' property values and, therefore, insufficient to establish classical aggrievement as to the first appeal.

Finally, the alleged procedural irregularities and public notice defects on the part of the commission similarly do not render the plaintiffs aggrieved parties. It is well settled that such procedural deficiencies, even if they cause the loss of an opportunity to be heard, do not by themselves establish classical aggrievement. 16 See, e.g., Andross v. West Hartford , 285 Conn. 309 , 341, 939 A.2d 1146 (2008) ; see also Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority , supra, 265 Conn. at 293 , 828 A.2d 52 ("consistent with the statutory requirement to provide general notice to the community, the defective notice not only affected the plaintiffs, but also every other resident of [the city], who, for whatever reason, wished to be heard"); Brouillard v. Connecticut Siting Council , 52 Conn.Supp. 196 , 206, 39 A.3d 1241 (2010) (plaintiff cannot challenge "procedural irregularities, constitutional infirmities, and errors" without first establishing "classical aggrievement, which would permit him to appeal"), aff'd, 133 Conn.App. 851 , 38 A.3d 174 , cert. denied, 304 Conn. 923 , 41 A.3d 662 (2012). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the first appeal for lack of classical aggrievement.

B

The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court improperly concluded that they had failed to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate aggrievement with respect to the second appeal, in which they challenged the commission's October 16, 2012 determination that it lacked jurisdiction over the proposed facade alteration to the barn. In arguing that they adequately pleaded aggrievement, the plaintiffs rely on the following factual allegations: (1) their property abuts the applicants' property; and (2) the commission's defective process and lax enforcement practices in considering the application ultimately harmed their property values. In response, the commission, relying heavily on Connecticut Independent Utility Workers, Local 12924 v. Dept. of Public Utility Control , 312 Conn. 265 , 92 A.3d 247 (2014), and Wucik v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 113 Conn.App. 502 , 967 A.2d 572 (2009), argues that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs failed to plead aggrievement in their administrative appeal. The commission emphasizes that the second appeal contains only allegations of substantive and procedural errors by the commission in considering the second application, and that even those allegations claiming improper public notice may be raised only by an " 'aggrieved person' " under the extended statute of limitations provided by § 8-8(r). 17 We agree with the commission, and conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs failed to plead their aggrievement adequately in the second appeal.

"In order to prevail on the issue of aggrievement, [t]he trial court must be satisfied, first, that the plaintiff alleges facts which, if proven, would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law, and, second, that the plaintiff proves the truth of those factual allegations. ... The mere statement that the appellant is aggrieved, without supporting allegations as to the particular nature of the aggrievement, is insufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 266 Conn. 531 , 542-43, 833 A.2d 883 (2003) ; see also Wucik v. Planning & Zoning Commission , supra, 113 Conn.App. at 508-509 , 967 A.2d 572 (trial court properly dismissed zoning appeal because failure to plead " any allegations as to the particular nature of the aggrievement" rendered evidentiary hearing on that point unnecessary [emphasis in original] ). "Although the question of whether a party is aggrieved presents a question of fact in cases involving disputed facts ... the question of whether the pleadings set forth sufficient facts, if presumed true, to establish a party's aggrievement presents a question of law over which we exercise plenary review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , supra, 317 Conn. at 527 , 119 A.3d 541 .

"It is important to understand that the pleading requirement is not merely a matter of form. Rather, it provides an opportunity for the opposing party to answer in denial, thereby placing the jurisdictional fact[s] into dispute for the court's resolution. Memoranda of law are not pleadings. Although this court has made a few passing references to parties' briefs or memoranda in connection with the issue of aggrievement, these references simply acknowledge that such sources may provide a context from which a reviewing court can determine which reasonable inferences may be drawn from facts alleged in the pleadings." Connecticut Independent Utility Workers, Local 12924 v. Dept. of Public Utility Control , supra, 312 Conn. at 281 , 92 A.3d 247 .

We conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs did not adequately plead aggrievement in the second appeal. We note first that the plaintiffs pleaded that they are the "owners of a tract of land, with a building and outbuilding thereon ... which abuts the property of [the applicants]." In the absence of a basis for statutory aggrievement, "[t]he allegation, even if proved, merely that the plaintiffs' property lies in close proximity to the area involved in the commission's action would not be enough" to establish their classical aggrievement. Hughes v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 156 Conn. 505 , 508, 242 A.2d 705 (1968) ; see, e.g., Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority , supra, 265 Conn. at 293 , 828 A.2d 52 .

The other facts alleged by the plaintiffs do not establish aggrievement in relation to the second appeal. First, the plaintiffs alleged that, during the September 18, 2012 hearing before the commission, the applicants presented material with respect to the modification to the barn, and two proposals for the rear addition; the commission then advised the applicants that it "could not approve multiple requests for the same application." The plaintiffs then alleged that the commission heard objections and received evidence with respect to the new application, including that: (1) the applicants violated the commission's procedural rules by submitting a third application within the same year with respect to the same building "already acted on by the [c]ommission without a significant change in circumstances"; (2) the applicants had failed to provide adequate supporting materials for the application; and (3) "any argument that [the commission] did not have jurisdiction regarding the [ninety year old] historic barn was invalid since at least one side of the building was admitted to be in the view of the public." The plaintiffs also alleged that the commission improperly handled the second part of the application, concerning the addition itself, which the applicants then withdrew on the advice of the commission. The plaintiffs then claimed that, after the hearing was continued to October 16, 2012, the commission improperly disregarded evidence supporting its jurisdiction over the barn and the violation of its own procedures. 18 The plaintiffs also claimed that these procedural errors constituted a due process violation. Ultimately, the plaintiffs claimed that the commission acted illegally and abused its discretion when it improperly determined that the applicants' proposed " '[p]otemkin-style' " facade "met the spirit of [its] design criteria and that [it] had 'no jurisdiction' regarding the proposed alteration."

Having reviewed the facts pleaded in relation to the second appeal, there is no allegation that the alteration of the barn to create a new facade harmed any legal interest of the plaintiffs. Although the plaintiffs allege that the alteration of the barn would facilitate the construction of an addition that is beyond the historic character of the district, they do not in any way claim that this alteration would harm the plaintiffs' interest in their property. Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs rely on the procedural irregularities and public notice issues caused by the deficient allegations, there is no factual allegation demonstrating how those procedural deficiencies adversely affected the plaintiffs. In the absence of a basis for statutory aggrievement, such public notice deficiencies, as noted previously, even if they cause the loss of an opportunity to be heard, do not by themselves confer a basis for classical aggrievement. See, e.g., Andross v. West Hartford , supra, 285 Conn. at 341, 939 A.2d 1146 ; Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority , supra, 265 Conn. at 292-93 , 828 A.2d 52 ; Brouillard v. Connecticut Siting Council , supra, 52 Conn.Supp. at 206 , 39 A.3d 1241 . Given the plaintiffs' failure to plead their aggrievement, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the second appeal. 19

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.