**561 In this appeal, we consider the limits of free speech on a public university campus in light of recent history that has led federal and state courts to describe threats of gun violence and mass shootings as the twenty-first century equivalent to the shout of fire in a crowded theater once envisioned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 1 See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District , 508 F.3d 765 , 772 (5th Cir. 2007) ; Milo v. New York , 59 F. Supp. 3d 513 , 517 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ; In re A.S. , 243 Wis. 2d 173 , 194, 626 N.W.2d 712 (2001). The plaintiff, Austin Haughwout, brought the present action seeking to challenge his expulsion from Central Connecticut State University **562 (university). The plaintiff now appeals 2 from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, Laura Tordenti, Ramón Hernández, Christopher Dukes, and Densil Samuda, the university officials involved in that decision. 3 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that the various statements and gestures with respect to gun violence and mass shootings that led to his expulsion from the university were true threats that are not protected by the first amendment to the United States constitution, rather than hyperbolic and humorous statements on a matter of public concern. Although a public university campus is a unique forum for the free exchange of controversial, unpopular, and even offensive ideas, we nevertheless conclude that the plaintiff's statements and gestures were true threats. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts, as found by the trial court, 4 and procedural history. "On September 17, 2015, a student at [the university] (complainant) went to the headquarters of the campus police to report a 'suspicious incident' at the student center. [The complainant] provided a written statement in which he said that [the *4 plaintiff] 'made verbal cues discussing the physical harm of another [university] student,' identified the other student as 'first on his hit list,' showed digital [photographs] of a bullet on his cell phone, and **563 'remarked that he had loose bullets at home and in his truck.' The complainant said he did not know [the plaintiff], but the statements were made in his presence. The complainant further reported that [the plaintiff] had never shown any weapons on his person, and that he has 'a habit of making hand gestures in the shape of handguns as a common gesture.'

"On September 21, 2015, the campus police interviewed another [university] student who had known [the plaintiff] since the spring semester [of] 2015 and hung around with him in a group that met at the student center. That student recounted statements by [the plaintiff] that 'someone should shoot up this school' or 'I should just shoot up this school.' [The plaintiff] was 'always' talking about guns and ammunition and 'greets everyone by pointing at them with his hand in the shape of a gun.' This student reported that [the plaintiff] had said to him that he was [the plaintiff's] 'number one target,' 'number one on my list.' [The plaintiff] 'brags constantly about his guns and ammunition, shows off pictures and boasts about wanting to bring a gun to school.' This student described these statements by [the plaintiff] as made 'jokingly' and that the group in which they hung around dismissed what he said as a joke.

"On the same day, the campus police reinterviewed the complainant, who repeated his allegations of September 17. Although [the complainant], too, described [the plaintiff's] statements as having been made 'jokingly,' he was 'alarmed' by them, had started avoiding [the plaintiff], left the student center when [the plaintiff] arrive[d] and was 'afraid for everyone's safety.'

"On September 22, the campus police interviewed a third student who related that he had heard [the plaintiff] during the preceding week state 'something like "might as well shoot up the place." ' While this student described [the plaintiff's] statement as having been made 'nonchalantly,' he was 'concerned about the context **564 of [the plaintiff's] exclamation' because [the plaintiff] had been 'upset about something' when he made it.

"The campus police interviewed [the plaintiff] on September 22, 2015, as well. While he acknowledged talking about guns a lot, he denied ever saying anything about shooting up the school, stating that 'he knows better than to mention anything like that.' He attributed the complaints against him to his position on gun rights.

"After interviewing [the plaintiff], the campus police called two of the persons they had previously interviewed and inquired why they had not contacted police upon hearing [the plaintiff's] alleged remarks about 'shooting up the school.' One said he had been told by others who heard the remark to 'take it as a joke and ignore [the plaintiff]'; the other stated that [he] 'didn't take it seriously but ... was kind of concerned.'

"[Samuda], a detective with the campus police, participated in this investigation. At its conclusion, on September 22, he applied for an arrest warrant charging [the plaintiff] with the crime of threatening in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62. The state's attorney declined the application, informing ... Samuda that probable cause for that crime was lacking. 5 [Samuda] reported the results *5 of his investigation to [Dukes, the university's director of student conduct, and] provided him with copies of the police reports. On October 1, 2015, [the plaintiff] was placed on an interim suspension by Hernández, [the university's associate dean for student affairs, because of] 'alleged behavior within our community.' " (Footnotes added and omitted.)

Following an investigation by Dukes, the university commenced disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff **565 on the ground that his actions had violated four separate provisions of the university's student code of conduct prohibiting the following: physical assault, intimidation, or threatening behavior; harassment; disorderly conduct; and offensive or disorderly conduct. A hearing was held before a panel consisting of two administrators and a professor, at which the plaintiff largely denied making the statements and gestures attributed to him. See footnote 18 of this opinion. The hearing panel found, however, that the plaintiff was responsible on all charges, and decided to expel him from the university's campus. The hearing panel's decision to expel the plaintiff from the university 6 was subsequently upheld after an internal appeal. 7

The plaintiff subsequently brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. The plaintiff also sought a writ of mandamus reinstating him as a student at the university, expungement of misconduct allegations from his record, and a refund of tuition and fees that had been withheld by the defendants. The plaintiff claimed that his expulsion constituted a breach of contract, contravened an implied covenant of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law and to freedom of speech.

After a hearing, 8 the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it rejected the plaintiff's contractual **566 and due process claims, 9 and further concluded that the defendants did not violate the plaintiff's free speech rights under the federal and state constitutions. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff's "statements and gestures while in the student center at [the university] fit the definition of 'true threats,' " and "were certainly not statements that sought 'to communicate a belief or idea.' " 10 Because the plaintiff had "denied *6 almost all of these statements," and, therefore, "the record contains no direct evidence from him as to his intentions in making them"; see footnote 17 of this opinion; the trial court relied on their content and "his repeated utterances of them in a public place like the student center," and found that the plaintiff "meant to 'communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals' ... namely, the students at [the university]. Whether he actually intended to carry through on the threat is unknown and immaterial." (Citation omitted.) Given the "spate" of mass shootings at schools and universities around the country, the trial court determined that "a reasonable person ... would have seen that such repeated statements would be interpreted by the students to whom and in whose presence he made them as 'serious expressions of intent to harm or assault.' ... And, although some of the students treated [the plaintiff's] statements as a joke, at least some of them who heard these threats were 'alarmed' and 'concerned' about them and in some cases changed their behavior; e.g., coming less often **567 to the student center because of [the plaintiff's] statements." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. This appeal followed. 11

On appeal, the plaintiff, emphasizing that the first amendment "doesn't protect just the good jokes," claims that the statements, gestures, and images that he made were not true threats and, therefore, were a constitutionally protected exercise of his right to free speech. 12 Relying heavily *7 on the principles elucidated **568 in our decision in State v. Krijger , 313 Conn. 434 , 97 A.3d 946 (2014), as well as the United States Supreme Court's decision in Watts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705 , 89 S. Ct. 1399 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1969), the plaintiff contends that his statements were not true threats but, instead, were protected "jokes" or " 'political hyperbole' " akin to the satiric works of Lenny Bruce, which constituted "dark humor" with long roots in Western literature. The plaintiff emphasizes that, although it was "possible to construe [his] statements as a threat," the "more plausible interpretation is benign," given the context in which "[e]veryone who heard the statements understood them to be made jokingly," and "[n]o contemporaneous listener understood [them] to be a serious expression of an intent to cause harm." Relying on his explanations before the hearing panel to provide additional context, the plaintiff emphasizes that "none [of the listeners] reacted in a manner consistent with a serious expression of an intent to shoot members of the school community" and puts his "[j]oking that someone should shoot up the school" in the same constitutionally protected "nasty bucket as a dead baby joke." The plaintiff further argues that his statements lacked the particularity necessary to be a true threat, and that his statements-whether examined as a whole or in a "more granular way"-were ambiguous and, therefore, not true threats.

In response, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's statements and gestures were true threats under State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 434 , 97 A.3d 946 , because "a reasonable hearer or receiver of the expressive conduct would believe [that he] was expressing a serious intent to commit an act of unlawful violence." Relying on, inter **569 alia, Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District , 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002), and State v. DeLoreto , 265 Conn. 145 , 827 A.2d 671 (2003), the defendants contend that the plaintiff's comments and gestures are reasonably understood as a true threat, given his access to weapons and the fact that the students who witnessed them evinced their fear insofar as some stopped going to the student center, others went to the police, and, "while several of them verbally agreed to provide testimony or information at [the plaintiff's] campus disciplinary proceeding, only one showed up, and he became notably agitated and fearful, and refused to appear before the disciplinary panel when he learned [the plaintiff] would be present, leaving abruptly." The defendants argue that, although the plaintiff's threats were directed at particular individuals, including one student whom he had described as his " 'number one target,' " the nature of the threats struck more broadly because they implicated the randomness that is the "fear inducing phenomenon" of mass shootings. The defendants also contend that the record does not support the plaintiff's contention that his statements and gestures were humor, political satire, or political expression with respect to gun control, largely because he "did not make any such claims before the [university's] hearing panel, instead claiming that there was something about his personality that caused people to lie about him and his activities, and that the evidence against him was the result of a personal vendetta by a particular student to have him expelled." Ultimately, the defendants *8 claim that the plaintiff's "words and gestures, as received by reasonable hearers or recipients, did not relate to any important public policy issue, and [the plaintiff's] manner of expression, reasonably heard as true threats, was clearly out of bounds on a college campus ...." We agree with the defendants and conclude that the trial court properly found that the plaintiff's statements and **570 gestures were true threats not protected by the first amendment.

"The [f]irst [a]mendment, applicable to the [s]tates through the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment, provides that Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow free trade in ideas-even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.... Thus, the [f]irst [a]mendment ordinarily denies a [s]tate the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine [that] a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence....

"The protections afforded by the [f]irst [a]mendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the [c]onstitution.... The [f]irst [a]mendment permits restrictions [on] the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 448-49 , 97 A.3d 946 ; see also United States v. Alvarez , 567 U.S. 709 , 716, 132 S. Ct. 2537 , 183 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2012) (observing that "content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar," including "advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action," obscenity, defamation, "speech integral to criminal conduct," "so-called fighting words," child pornography, fraud, true threats, and "speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent ... although a restriction under the last category is most difficult to sustain" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted] ).

**571 The first amendment permits states to restrict 13 true threats, which "encompass those statements [through which] the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.... The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur....

"Thus, we must distinguish between true threats, which, because of their *9 lack of communicative value, are not protected by the first amendment, and those statements that seek to communicate a belief or idea, such as political hyperbole or a mere joke, which are protected.... In the context of a threat of physical violence, [w]hether a particular statement may properly be considered to be a [true] threat is governed by an objective standard-whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.... [A]lleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and reaction of the listeners." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 449-50 , 97 A.3d 946 ; see also Virginia v. Black , 538 U.S. 343 , 359-60, 123 S. Ct. 1536 , 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003) ; Watts v. United States , supra, 394 U.S. at 707-708 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 . **572 "[T]o ensure that only serious expressions of an intention to commit an act of unlawful violence are punished, as the first amendment requires, the state [actor] must do more than demonstrate that a statement could be interpreted as a threat. When ... a statement is susceptible of varying interpretations, at least one of which is nonthreatening, the proper standard to apply is whether an objective listener would readily interpret the statement as a real or true threat; nothing less is sufficient to safeguard the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. To meet this standard [the state actor is] required to present evidence demonstrating that a reasonable listener, familiar with the entire factual context of the defendant's statements, would be highly likely to interpret them as communicating a genuine threat of violence rather than protected expression, however offensive or repugnant." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 460 , 97 A.3d 946 ; see also State v. Taupier , 330 Conn. 149 , 173, 193 A.3d 1 (2018) (true threat inquiry is objectively judged from perspective of reasonable listener, and first amendment does not require speaker to have specific intent to terrorize), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 1188 , 203 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2019). Because the true threats doctrine has equal applicability in civil and criminal cases, case law from both contexts informs our inquiry. See New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue National , 273 F.3d 184 , 196-97 (2d Cir. 2001).

In determining whether the trial court properly found that the defendant's statements and gestures were true threats, we recognize that, although we ordinarily review findings of fact for clear error, "[i]n certain first amendment contexts ... appellate courts are bound to apply a de novo standard of review.... [In such cases], the inquiry into the protected status of ... speech is one of law, not fact.... As such, an appellate court is compelled to examine for [itself] the ... statements [at] issue and the circumstances under **573 which they [were] made to [determine] whether ... they ... are of a character [that] the principles of the [f]irst [a]mendment ... protect.... [I]n cases raising [f]irst [a]mendment issues [the United States Supreme Court has] repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion [in] the field of free expression.... This rule of independent review was forged in recognition that a [reviewing] [c]ourt's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles .... [Rather, an appellate court] must also in proper cases review the evidence to *10 make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied.... Therefore, even though, ordinarily ... [f]indings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, [appellate courts] are obliged to [perform] a fresh examination of crucial facts under the rule of independent review." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 446-47 , 97 A.3d 946 ; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254 , 284-86, 84 S. Ct. 710 , 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). We emphasize, however, that "the heightened scrutiny that this court applies in first amendment cases does not authorize us to make credibility determinations regarding disputed issues of fact. Although we review de novo the trier of fact's ultimate determination that the statements at issue constituted a true threat, we accept all subsidiary credibility determinations and findings that are not clearly erroneous." State v. Krijger , supra, at 447, 97 A.3d 946 ; see id., at 447-48, 97 A.3d 946 (noting that independent review is applied to version of remarks at issue that fact finder credited).

To frame our independent analysis, we note that the trial court concluded that the student witnesses' statements supported findings that the plaintiff (1) "made frequent shooting hand gestures as a form of greeting **574 to students in the student center," (2) "with his hand in a shooting gesture, [he] aimed at students and made firing noises as they were walking through the student center," (3) "wondered aloud how many rounds he would need to shoot people at the school and referred to the fact that he had bullets at home and in his truck," (4) "showed off pictures of the guns he owned and boasted about bringing a gun to school," (5) "referred specifically and on more than one occasion to his 'shooting up the school,' " (6) "during a test of the school's alarm system stated that 'someone should really shoot up the school for real so it's not a drill,' " (7) "named as his 'number one target' a particular student in the student center," and (8) "made specific reference to a shooting at an Oregon community college where several students had been killed and wounded, stating that the Oregon shooting had 'beat us.' " Having reviewed the record, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the totality of the plaintiff's comments and gestures would reasonably be understood to be a true threat of gun violence at the university. 14

Although most of the plaintiff's comments were individually not an "explicit threat," that phrasing does not render them protected speech, because "rigid adherence **575 to the literal meaning of a communication without regard to its reasonable connotations derived from its ambience would render [statutes proscribing true threats] powerless against the ingenuity of threateners who can instill in the *11 victim's mind as clear an apprehension of impending injury by an implied menace as by a literal threat.... Thus, a determination of what a defendant actually said is just the beginning of a threats analysis. Even when words are threatening on their face, careful attention must be paid to the context in which those statements are made to determine if the words may be objectively perceived as threatening." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 452-53 , 97 A.3d 946 . Put differently, even veiled statements may be true threats. See United States v. Dillard , 795 F.3d 1191 , 1200-1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (District Court incorrectly concluded that defendant's statement in letter to abortion clinic physician that "an unidentified 'someone' might place explosives under [physician's] car" was not true threat because ambiguous statement without "direct statement of personal intent" may be true threat given other factors, including local history of violence); United States v. Bly , 510 F.3d 453 , 456-59 (4th Cir. 2007) (letter sent by former doctoral student was true threat to university board members and academic officers when it made demands and [1] stated that " 'bullets are far cheaper and much more decisive' " than legal action as " '[a] person with my meager means and abilities can stand at a distance of two football fields and end elements of long standing dispute with the twitch of my index finger,' " [2] stated that " 'it would be a shame to brutalize [thesis advisors] in order to guarantee that I receive a hearing of my story and a form of justice,' " and [3] enclosed "copies of firearms practice targets with bullet holes near their centers," despite disclaimer stating that " '[t]hese comments are not to be interpreted as illegal brandishing of a firearm, blackmail, or **576 extortion' "); see also United States v. Voneida , 337 Fed. Appx. 246 , 248-49 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding jury finding that college student transmitted threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875 [c] when he posted, inter alia, following statements on his personal social media page two days after Virginia Tech mass shooting: [1] " 'Someday ... I'll make the Virginia Tech incident look like a trip to an amusement park' "; [2] "expressed '[shock]' that after the Virginia Tech [shooting] his classmates 'were actually surprised that there are people out there who would shoot them if given the opportunity' "; [3] " 'lost my respect [for] the sanctity of human life' "; and [4] included tributes to Virginia Tech shooter as martyr, with wish that shooter's " 'undaunted and unquenched' wrath would 'sweep across the land,' " particularly given fearful reactions by multiple students at his university and elsewhere who viewed post and contacted police).

Given his express statements that he had access to firearms and ammunition, the plaintiff's statements and gestures-especially when viewed in the context that they provide for each other-are within the realm of those that have been deemed true threats, especially in the contemporary context of school shootings. We find particularly illustrative the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60 , 647 F.3d 754 , 756-57 (8th Cir. 2011), which considered whether statements sent by a public school student to another student via instant message were true threats, rendering his suspension not a first amendment violation. In D.J.M. , the court concluded that the following statements, when viewed in their entirety, were reasonably viewed as "serious expressions of intent to harm," rather than "in jest out of teenage frustration": [1] that the student admitted "he was depressed at being rejected by a romantic interest; [2] his 'access to weapons' which *12 made his threats 'believable'; [3] [the instant **577 message recipient's] report that [the student] said he intended to take a gun to school to shoot everyone he hates and then himself; [4] his expressed 'desire to kill at least five classmates'; [5] his telling [the instant message recipient he] 'wanted [their town] to be known for something'; and [6] [the instant message recipient's] growing concern that caused her to contact a trusted adult about his threats." Id., at 762-63 . The court rejected the student's reliance on Watts v. United States , supra, 394 U.S. at 705 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 , and held that a reasonable recipient would find these statements threatening-despite the fact that the immediate recipient responded humorously with "lol" 15 -because the student had described individual targets of his threat, indicated his access to a .357 Magnum that he could borrow from a friend, and the recipient was concerned enough to tell a trusted adult, who informed school officials, later resulting in the student's suspension and inpatient psychiatric evaluation. D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60 , supra, at 758, 762-64. The Eighth Circuit concluded that, in "light of the [school district's] obligation to ensure the safety of its students and reasonable concerns created by shooting deaths at other schools such as [those in] Columbine and the Red Lake [Indian] Reservation ... the [school district] did not violate the [f]irst [a]mendment by notifying the police about [the student's] threatening instant messages and subsequently suspending him after he was placed in juvenile detention." Id., at 764. Put most succinctly, the court emphasized that the first amendment "did not require the [school district] to wait and see whether [the student's] talk about taking a gun to school and shooting certain students would be carried out." Id.

Numerous other cases support the reasonableness of concern over threats of gun violence in the educational **578 setting because "knowledge by the target of a threat that the defendant had the means to carry out the threat can support the inference that the target would reasonably interpret the threat to be serious." (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 183 , 193 A.3d 1 ; see Lovell v. Poway Unified School District , 90 F.3d 367 , 372-73 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that "any person could reasonably consider the statement '[i]f you don't give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you,' made by an angry teenager [to school guidance counselor], to be a serious expression of intent to harm or assault," especially "when considered against the backdrop of increasing violence among school children today"); People v. Diomedes , 382 Ill.Dec. 712 , 13 N.E.3d 125 , 134-39 (Ill. App. 2014) (e-mail sent by student to anti-bullying activist, although " 'an expression of teenage despair,' " was true threat because they did not have confidential therapeutic relationship, student expressed wish for certain "specific individuals to die and suffer," student had history of making at least one prior threat, and there was no indication that statement was made in hyperbole or jest), appeal denied, 396 Ill.Dec. 180 , 39 N.E.3d 1006 (Ill. 2015) ; State v. Trey M. , 186 Wash. 2d 884 , 888-90, 906-907, 383 P.3d 474 (2016) (concluding that juvenile's statements to his therapist, later repeated to police officer, that he planned to take his grandfather's nine millimeter gun from a cabinet and bring it to school to shoot boys who had bullied and teased him, and if he could not get gun to use bombs, was true threat given specificity of access to *13 weapons, fear expressed by boys who were on juvenile's "hit list," juvenile's confession to making bombs, and communication of time and location of planned shooting), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 313 , 199 L. Ed. 2d 207 (2017) ; In re A.S. , supra, 243 Wis. 2d at 182-83, 194 , 626 N.W.2d 712 (juvenile's statements, made in "very matter of fact manner" while playing video games at local youth center, that he would bring guns and "do something **579 similar" to Columbine school shooting, while sparing some classmates and killing and raping certain specified teachers and police officers, were true threats when listeners were frightened, and there was no indication in context or statements that they were "hyperbole, jest, or political dissent"); see also Feminist Majority Foundation v. Hurley , 911 F.3d 674 , 691-92 (4th Cir. 2018) (rejecting university's defense in Title IX case that first amendment "circumscribed" its ability to respond to "online harassment and threats suffered" by member of campus women's organization, because threatening online messages were true threats, including those threatening to " 'euthanize,' " kill, and sexually assault organization's members "where the backdrop of the threatening messages is a campus environment purportedly conducive to sexual assault, and those messages target persons by name and location"); Walker v. Suarez , United States District Court, Docket No. 15-CV-01960 (RBJ), 2016 WL 309454 (D. Colo. January 26, 2016) (threat to shoot down helicopter was true threat when it was made against specific individual on multiple occasions and by person with "access to guns" who had purchased rifle scope on same day), appeal dismissed, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 16-1055 (10th Cir. May 02, 2016).

The plaintiff also contends that the requisite particularity is lacking, because "[n]o one indicated a particularized fear. All concern and worry [were] generalized." We disagree. First, this argument is inconsistent with the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had in fact identified one specific student as " 'number one' " on the plaintiff's " 'hit list,' " and the statement had been communicated to that student directly. Although that student believed that the statement was made " 'jokingly,' " he nevertheless was " 'alarmed' " by it and was sufficiently concerned for everyone's safety to contact the university police. Second, this argument reads too **580 narrowly the boilerplate proposition that a true threat is "a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 449 , 97 A.3d 946 . The fear of indiscriminate and random death and injury that results from mass shootings, like Sandy Hook, Virginia Tech, and Columbine, transcends any one specific individual and is shared by any one of the many people who must frequent a public place-such as a university student union-that has been the subject of a threat. See State v. Pelella , 327 Conn. 1 , 11, 16-17, 170 A.3d 647 (2017) ("[A] threat need not be imminent to constitute a constitutionally punishable true threat" because "a prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.... Indeed, [t]hreatening speech ... works directly the harms of apprehension and disruption, whether the apparent resolve proves bluster or not and whether the injury is threatened to be immediate or delayed." [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] ).

Indeed, the relative frequency of these mass shootings informs the reasonableness *14 of viewing the plaintiff's remarks, which were apparently unmoored to political or other discourse, as true threats. See, e.g., D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60 , supra, 647 F.3d at 764 (noting school district's "obligation to ensure the safety of its students and reasonable concerns created by shooting deaths at other schools such as [those in] Columbine and the Red Lake [Indian] Reservation"); Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District , supra, 306 F.3d at 625-26 and n.4 (letter authored by student expressing his "wish to sodomize, rape, and kill" his ex-girlfriend was true threat justifying suspension "in the wake of Columbine and Jonesboro," rendering it "untenable" that school officials learning about **581 the letter "would not have taken some action based on its violent and disturbing content"). It is no wonder that, especially in an educational setting, threatening statements about mass shootings are the equivalent of, "in the words of [Justice] Holmes, [a cry of] 'fire' in a crowded theater." In re A.S. , supra, 243 Wis. 2d at 194 , 626 N.W.2d 712 ; see, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District , supra, 508 F.3d at 772 ; Milo v. New York , supra, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 517 ; see also State v . Parnoff , 329 Conn. 386 , 426, 186 A.3d 640 (2018) ( Kahn, J. , concurring) (recognizing that, in current times, "the threat of gun violence is tasteless, shameful, and all too real").

The plaintiff argues, however, that "[n]o contemporaneous listener understood the statements to be a serious expression of an intent to cause harm," and that "[e]veryone who heard the statements understood them to be made jokingly." We disagree with the plaintiff's reading of the record. Although the narrative in the police reports that were evidence before the hearing panel indicates that some students elected to treat the plaintiff's remarks as made in jest, that narrative also indicates that some of those same students nevertheless were sufficiently perturbed to contact the university police, with one complaining witness apparently so fearful for his safety that he refused to appear as a witness at the university's disciplinary hearing. Given the objective nature of the inquiry, the listener's reaction of concern or fear need not be dramatic or immediate, and the apparently mixed emotions of the listeners are not dispositive. See D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60 , supra, 647 F.3d at 758, 762-63 (teenage recipient of instant message with threats responded "lol," but was also concerned enough to tell trusted adult); Lovell v. Poway Unified School District , supra, 90 F.3d at 372-73 (The court noted that a school guidance counselor had "stated repeatedly that she felt threatened" when confronted, and that "[t]he fact that she chose not to seek help instantly is not dispositive.

**582 She did report the conduct to [an assistant principal] within a few hours, before she went home that day. Exhibiting fortitude and stoicism in the interim does not vitiate the threatening nature of [the student's] conduct, or [the guidance counselor's] belief that [the student had] threatened her."); see also State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 158-59, 191-92 (reader of e-mail containing threat to judge mentioned her concern to several people, but waited several days and gathered additional information before disclosing it to attorney for further action).

To this end, we also disagree with the plaintiff's argument that his statements and gestures were ambiguous and more properly interpreted as benign jokes or political hyperbole that are protected by the first amendment, including the numerous innocent explanations that he proffers for them on a more granular basis, such as the existence of a gun emoji to justify his use of images of firearms and ammunition. These arguments reflect the plaintiff's attempts *15 to seek shelter under the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Watts v. United States , supra, 394 U.S. at 706 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 , the leading true threats decision in which a Vietnam War protestor, after being drafted, stated at a public rally in Washington, D.C., three years after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, that, " '[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.' " In concluding that this statement was political hyperbole protected by the first amendment, rather than a true threat, the Supreme Court noted the conditional nature of the statement, and that it was made at a public rally on a matter of great public concern to an audience response of laughter. Id., at 707-708 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 . The Supreme Court emphasized that even "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials" should not be prohibited given the "background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should **583 be uninhibited, robust, and wide open ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 708 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 ; see also State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 450 , 97 A.3d 946 . Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiff-in theory-that not all references to school violence necessarily will constitute true threats unprotected by the first amendment. 16 *16 The plaintiff's attempt to cast the present case as one of political hyperbole and humor akin to Watts is particularly unpersuasive in light of his strategy before the trial court and university hearing tribunal. Specifically, the plaintiff expressly elected to forgo a formal **584 bench trial by allowing the trial court to rely on the facts found during the university's disciplinary proceedings and an earlier motion hearing that had focused on certain due process issues not relevant to the present appeal. 17 The evidence contained in that record provides **585 virtually no factual support for his claim that his statements were political hyperbole or poorly stated satire. Compounding this is the fact that the record reveals that the plaintiff's elected strategy before the university's hearing panel consisted of (1) denying outright that he made the statements at issue, and (2) framing the university proceedings against him as a political and personal persecution, 18 rather *17 than defending the specific **586 statements as artistic or political hyperbole. 19 Put differently, the plaintiff's prior disavowal of the statements is inconsistent with his claim that they were spoken to make a political point. Accordingly, the record, although adequate for review of the plaintiff's constitutional claims, simply does not contain factual support for his argument that his statements and gestures would reasonably be understood as political hyperbole or humor, rather than a true threat. 20 *18 We acknowledge that "[f]reedom of speech needs breathing space to survive.... And vigilant protection of [f]irst [a]mendment rights is nowhere more vital than at public universities, which are peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.... For those reasons... policies that formally or informally suppress protected expression at public universities raise serious [f]irst **587 [a]mendment concerns.... And while we are mindful of universities' obligations to address serious discrimination and harassment against their students, we also are attentive to the dangers of stretching policies beyond their purpose to stifle debate, enforce dogma, or punish dissent." 21 *19 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Abbott v. Pastides , 900 F.3d 160 , 179-80 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 1292 , 203 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2019) ; see also Healy v. James , 408 U.S. 169 , 180, 92 S. Ct. 2338 , 33 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1972) ; NAACP v. Button , 371 U.S. 415 , 433, 83 S. Ct. 328 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963). Nevertheless, in the absence of any facts mooring the plaintiff's statements to political or **588 artistic hyperbole, and given his stated access to weapons and ammunition, a reasonable person hearing the plaintiff's statements and viewing his gestures at a school in the same state as Sandy Hook would be more than justified in understanding his statements as a physical threat to the "great bazaars of ideas" themselves. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason University , 149 F. Supp. 3d 602 , 627 (E.D. Va. 2016). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff's statements were true threats that were not protected by the first amendment. 22

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.