Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff, Brenda Snell, brought this negligence action against the defendants, Johnley Sainval, a taxicab driver, his employer, Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. (Yellow Cab), and Vito Bochicchio, Jr., the sole shareholder of Yellow Cab, seeking damages for serious injuries she sustained when she was struck by a taxicab that had been stolen from Sainval by two teenagers after Sainval left the vehicle unattended with the key in the ignition in a Norwalk neighborhood known to have a higher than average crime rate. A jury trial ensued at which the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the conduct of the two thieves was a superseding cause that relieved Sainval of any liability to the plaintiff for his alleged negligence. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury, in response to interrogatories submitted to it by the trial court, found that Sainval was negligent in leaving the taxicab unattended with the key in the ignition; that, in light of the surrounding neighborhood, it was reasonably foreseeable that the vehicle would be stolen and operated in an unsafe manner; and that Sainval's negligence was a proximate cause of some or all of the plaintiff's injuries. The jury also found, nevertheless, that the defendants were not liable for the plaintiff's injuries because the accident that occurred was not within the scope of the risk created by Sainval's negligence.
The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial claiming, inter alia, that the jury's finding that Sainval's negligence constituted a proximate cause of the accident was legally inconsistent with its finding that the accident was outside the scope of the risk created by Sainval's negligence. The court denied the motion and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that (1) it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury on the doctrine of superseding cause, (2) even if the
doctrine were properly submitted to the jury, the court's instructions and interrogatories misled the jury, and (3) the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict was irreconcilable with its responses
to the interrogatories.
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
,
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. "On December 3, 2009, Sainval, who was employed by Yellow Cab as a taxicab driver, was operating a taxicab owned by Yellow Cab in Norwalk. In the early evening, he drove the taxicab to Monterey Village, a housing complex located in an area of the city with significant criminal activity. Sainval parked the taxicab and went inside one of the apartments, leaving the taxicab unlocked and unattended with the keys in the ignition.
"Two teenagers, Shaquille Johnson and Deondre Bowden, who that afternoon had been consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana, noticed the parked taxicab. Although they initially intended to steal anything of value that they could find inside the unlocked taxicab, once they observed the keys in the ignition, the two teens decided to steal the taxicab and to go on a 'joy-ride.' They drove the taxicab from Norwalk to Stamford, making one brief stop in between, with each of the teens taking a turn driving the vehicle.
"When they reached Stamford, they [encountered] traffic. At that time, Bowden was driving the taxicab. He 'kind of nodded off' and rear-ended the vehicle in front of him. Bowden, who was both 'tipsy' and 'high,' then attempted to flee the scene. In order to maneuver the taxicab around the vehicle he had struck, Bowden drove the taxicab up over the curb of the road and onto the adjoining sidewalk. In doing so, Bowden first hit a fire hydrant before striking the plaintiff with the taxicab.
"The plaintiff sustained severe physical injuries, particularly to her midsection, requiring millions of dollars in medical expenditures as of the time of trial, with additional treatments and surgeries expected. After hitting the plaintiff, Bowden never attempted to stop the vehicle; he and Johnson exited the stolen taxicab while it was still moving and fled the scene on foot, returning home by train. The police later identified the teens as the individuals involved in the hit and run of the plaintiff and arrested them.
"The plaintiff initially commenced this action solely against Sainval and Yellow Cab.
"The operative second amended complaint contains two counts relevant to the issues on appeal.
"In their amended answer, the defendants, by way of a special defense, raised the doctrine of superseding cause. The defendants pleaded that, '[i]f the plaintiff sustained the injuries and losses as alleged in her complaint, said injuries and losses were the result of the intentional, criminal, reckless and/or negligent conduct of a third party, which intervened to break the chain of causation between [Sainval's] alleged negligence and/or carelessness and the plaintiff's alleged injuries and losses.' " (Footnotes altered; footnote in original, footnotes omitted.)
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
, supra,
"[T]he court initially indicated to the parties that it was not inclined to give a superseding cause instruction to the jury because, on the basis of its reading of ...
Barry
v.
Quality Steel Products, Inc.
, [
"The defendants, however, argued that the court was focusing on the wrong criminal act. They indicated that it was not necessarily the theft of the taxicab in this case that warranted an instruction on superseding cause but the unforeseeability of the thieves' subsequent criminal conduct, namely, intentionally driving the taxicab up onto a sidewalk to evade responsibility for a rear-end collision and the ensuing criminal assault on the plaintiff. Furthermore, the defendants noted that part of the court's rationale in Barry for abandoning the doctrine of superseding cause in cases alleging that an intervening negligent act or acts contributed to a plaintiff's injuries was that apportionment of liability between tortfeasors was permitted, which would prevent a less culpable defendant from inequitably shouldering full responsibility for injuries that resulted from multiple negligent acts. The defendants contended that, unlike Barry , this case involved intervening actions of other tortfeasors that were not merely negligent but reckless and criminal. In such a case, the defendants argued, apportionment of liability is unavailable by statute; see General Statutes § 52-572h ( o ) ; and, thus, the primary policy rationale underlying the abolishment of the doctrine of superseding cause was absent. The court indicated that it would review the case law and give the issue further consideration in light of these arguments.
"[Subsequently], the court provided counsel with the latest draft of its jury instructions and also with copies of draft interrogatories that the court intended to submit to the jury. The court indicated that the current version of the instructions included a new paragraph that the court had decided to add after further consideration of the case law concerning superseding cause and its discussions with the parties. That paragraph instructed the jury to consider whether the theft of the taxicab and the resulting accident involved intentional acts that were outside the scope of the risk created by Sainval's conduct, and that if the jury found this to be so, then the defendants should not be found responsible for the plaintiff's injuries because the conduct of the two teens would have been the proximate cause of those injuries, thus relieving the defendants of any liability. The court also drafted a new, related interrogatory that asked the jury to state whether the 'accident' that occurred was outside the scope of the risk created by Sainval's act of leaving the keys in the ignition of the taxicab. The court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendants if the answer to that inquiry was yes.
"Following the close of evidence later that day, the court held a charging conference. At the charging conference, the plaintiff stated that it believed the additional paragraph added by the court to its latest draft instructions was unnecessary and confusing and that, in defining and explaining the concept of proximate cause, the court adequately had covered both foreseeability and whether Sainval's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff also stated that she did not think there was any evidence from which the jury could construe that the teens had intentionally sought to harm her. The court suggested that the additional instruction was necessary to comport with case law, referring in particular to
Sullivan
v.
Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.
,
"The defendants noted that, although the court's proposed jury instruction made reference to a special defense, it never identified that defense; in fact, the term 'superseding cause' was never used by the court. The defendants argued that they intended to reference that term in ... closing arguments and that they were entitled to a separate charge addressing their superseding cause defense. The defendants also took the position that, unlike in criminal law, tort law made no meaningful distinction between reckless and intentional conduct, and, thus, they asserted that it was inconsequential whether the criminal assault on the plaintiff was the result of intentional or reckless conduct for purposes of applying the doctrine of superseding cause.
"On December 11, 2014, prior to closing arguments, the plaintiff requested that the court change the order of the proposed interrogatories. The interrogatory that the court had added regarding scope of the risk, which the court indicated related to the special defense of superseding cause, was, at the time, interrogatory number four. Interrogatory number five at that time asked whether the plaintiff had proven that some or all of her injuries were proximately caused by Sainval. The plaintiff argued that because proximate cause was an element of her prima facie case, it made more sense for the jury to answer that interrogatory and fully establish a prima facie case before turning to any consideration of a special defense. According to the plaintiff, this would also negate the need for a retrial in the event there was a defendants' verdict on the special defense that was overturned later on appeal; all that would be required would be a hearing in damages. The defendants did not agree that a switch was necessary. The court nevertheless indicated that it would most likely make the switch and later incorporated the change in the interrogatories it submitted to the jury. The court also indicated that it had made some additional changes based [on] the positions of the parties at the charging conference, including referring to the doctrine of superseding cause by name. "After the parties concluded their closing arguments, the court read its instructions to the jury. The relevant portions of the court's instructions for purposes of the present appeal are those addressing proximate causation, which provided in relevant part as follows: 'Once you've gotten past factual causation, you need to address proximate cause. Proximate cause means that there must be a sufficient causal connection between the act or omission alleged, and any injury or damage sustained by the plaintiff.
" 'An act or omission is a proximate cause if it was a substantial factor in bringing about or actually causing the injury. That is, if the injury or damage was a direct result, or a reasonable and probable consequence of the defendant's act or omission, it was proximately caused by such an act or omission.
" 'In other words, if an act had such an effect in producing the injury that reasonable persons would regard it as being a cause of the injury, then the act or omission is a proximate cause. In order to recover damages for any injury, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that such injury would not have occurred without the negligence of the defendant.
" 'If you find that the plaintiff complains about an injury which would have occurred even in the absence of the defendant's conduct, or is not causally connected to this accident, you must find that the defendant did not proximately cause that injury.
" 'Under the definitions I have given you, negligent conduct can be a proximate cause of an injury, if it is not the only cause, or even the most significant cause of the injury, provided it contributes materially to the production of the injury, and thus is a substantial factor in bringing it about.
" 'Therefore, when a defendant's negligence combines together with one or more other causes to produce an injury, such negligence is a proximate cause of the injury if its contribution to the production of the injury, in comparison to all other causes, is material or substantial.
" 'When, however, some other causal causes contributes so powerfully to the production of an injury, as to make the defendant's negligent contribution to the injury merely trivial or inconsequential, the defendant's negligence must be rejected as a proximate cause of the injury, for it has not been a substantial factor in bringing the injury about.
" 'Or to put it another way, if you find that the injury would have been sustained, whether or not the defendant had been negligent, his negligence would not have been a proximate cause of the accident. It is your responsibility to determine which, if any, of the injuries and damages claimed by the plaintiff were proximately caused by the conduct of the defendant.
" 'The defendants have claimed that the theft and operation of the car by [Johnson] and [Bowden], and the resulting accident, constituted such an event, an event that was so overpowering in consequence as to render any possible negligence on the part of defendant Sainval relatively insignificant, and therefore not a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiff.
" 'Foreseeability of the car being stolen, something you would have considered in connection with determining whether [Sainval]
was negligent, also may be considered in this regard. It is for you to decide whether the theft of the car and subsequent manner of operation [were] so overwhelming in significance, or whether they constituted a concurrent proximate cause but not of sufficient magnitude as to render [Sainval's] negligence inconsequential.
" 'To put it another way, if you find that the theft of the car and subsequent driving of the vehicle and resulting accident were intentional acts that were not within the scope of the risk which was created by [Sainval's] conduct, then the defendant[s] could not be found responsible for the injuries to the plaintiff as the conduct of [Johnson] and [Bowden] would have been the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, thereby relieving the defendant[s] of any liability.
" 'To the extent that you find that the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the negligence of defendant Sainval was a proximate cause of any or all of the injuries and damages claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiff, as I have defined proximate cause to you, you are to proceed to determine the issues as to the amount of damages, following the rules I'm about to give you.'
"Following the jury charge, the court inquired whether the parties had any additional objections to the charge other than those raised at the charge conference.
Neither party raised any additional objections. A written copy of the court's charge was made an exhibit and provided to the jury.
"The following day, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The relevant interrogatories submitted to the jury, and the jury's response[s], are as follows: '1. Did [the] plaintiff ... prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ... Sainval failed to exercise reasonable care when he left the keys to his taxicab in the vehicle, when he went inside the apartment complex at Monterey Village on the evening of December 3, 2009? [Answer] Yes ... [If the answer is 'YES,' go to interrogatory #2; if the answer is 'NO,' sign and date this form and the defendants' verdict form, and then report that you have reached a verdict.] 2. Did [the] plaintiff prove that it was reasonably foreseeable that a motor vehicle, left in a parking area of Monterey Village with the key in the ignition on the evening of December 3, 2009, might be stolen? [Answer] Yes ... [If the answer is 'YES,' go to interrogatory #3; if the answer is 'NO,' sign and date this form and the defendants' verdict form, and then report that you have reached a verdict.] 3. Did [the] plaintiff prove that it was reasonably foreseeable that if a motor vehicle were to be stolen from the parking area at Monterey Village, it might be in an accident, causing injury? [Answer] Yes ... [If the answer is 'YES,' go to interrogatory #4; if the answer is 'NO,' sign and date this form and the defendants' verdict form, and then report that you have reached a verdict.] 4. Did [the] plaintiff ... prove that some or all of the injuries she sustained on the evening of December 3, 2009, were proximately caused by the negligence of ... Sainval? [Answer] Yes ... [If the answer is 'YES,' go to interrogatory #5; if the answer is 'NO,' sign and date this form and the defendants' verdict form, and then report that you have reached a verdict.] 5. Did [the] defendant[s] prove that the accident
that occurred on December 3, 2009 was outside the scope of risk created by [Sainval's] leaving his key in the ignition of a car parked at Monterey Village? [Answer] Yes ....'
"The plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion asking the court to set aside the verdict and to order a new trial. The plaintiff argued that, despite the jury having found that the theft of the taxicab and the subsequent accident resulting in injuries were foreseeable and that Sainval's actions were a proximate cause of her injuries, the jury instructions and attendant interrogatories permitted the jury to simultaneously and inconsistently find that her being struck by the taxicab in the manner that occurred nevertheless was outside the scope of the risk created by Sainval's negligence.
"The court issued a detailed and thorough memorandum of decision denying the plaintiff's motion. The court found that there was no basis for concluding that it should not have submitted the doctrine of superseding cause to the jury in this case or that the resulting verdict and interrogatories were fatally inconsistent. The court explained that it saw 'nothing inherently inconsistent with a jury finding a "standard" proximate cause instruction satisfied, while also later finding superseding cause established when viewed from the [alternative] perspective of a charge on that point.' " (Footnotes added; footnotes omitted.)
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
, supra,
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that the doctrine of superseding cause should not have
been submitted to the jury because it applies only to superseding acts that were unforeseeable and intended to cause harm, and Bowden's reckless operation of the taxicab satisfied neither of those requirements.
The Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff's claims.
The Appellate Court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the trial court's instructions on superseding cause were so misleading as to necessitate a new trial;
The Appellate Court also relied on § 442 B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts;
In reaching its determination, the Appellate Court recognized the inherent tension
between the Restatement's definition of superseding cause, which this court has never formally adopted,
On appeal following our grant of certification, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly held that the doctrine of superseding cause applies to criminally reckless conduct. In support of this contention, the plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court's
determination conflicts with § 442 B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which this court has adopted, and with the Judicial Branch's model civil jury instruction on superseding causes; Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions 3.1-5, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf (last visited August 5, 2019);
The defendants counter that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the jury's interrogatory responses can be reconciled by applying §§ 440 and 442 B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, pursuant to which the jury reasonably could have found that Sainval's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries
and
that Bowden's and Johnson's actions were a superseding cause of the accident. The defendants further argue that, because superseding cause is a special defense that admits the allegations of a complaint but seeks to establish that the plaintiff cannot prevail; see
Coughlin
v.
Anderson
,
I
Whether the superseding cause doctrine applies to criminally reckless conduct presents a question of law, over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g.,
Barry
v.
Quality Steel Products, Inc.
, supra,
The second component of causation is proximate cause. "Philosophically, cause in fact is limitless; but for the creation of this world, no crime or injury would ever have occurred. [W. Keeton, supra, § 41] p. 264. The philosophical sense of causation includes the great number of events without which any happening [of an injury] would not have occurred ... yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes. 2 Restatement (Second), [supra] § 431, comment (a) [p. 429]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Stewart
v.
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.
, supra,
We often have observed that "[p]roximate cause results from a sequence of events unbroken by a superseding cause, so that its causal viability continued until the moment of injury or at least until the advent of the
immediate injurious force.... The terms 'intervening cause' and 'superseding cause' have been used interchangeably.... The Restatement [Second] of Torts makes clear that the doctrine is properly referred to as 'superseding cause,' and that it embodies within it the concept of an 'intervening force.' 2 Restatement (Second), [supra] §§ 440 through 453 [pp. 465-91 ]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Wagner
v.
Clark Equipment Co.
,
Thus, "[p]roximate cause establishes a reasonable connection between an act or omission of a defendant and the harm suffered by a plaintiff.... Proximate cause serves to [temper] the expansive view of causation [in fact] ... by the pragmatic ... shaping [of] rules [that] are feasible to administer, and yield a workable degree of certainty." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Stewart
v.
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.
, supra,
"[A]lthough nearly every treatise involving the law of torts acknowledges the existence of the doctrine of superseding cause, it is defined differently by various scholars. For example, one treatise notes that the problem of superseding cause is not primarily one of causation but, rather, 'one of policy as to imposing legal responsibility.' [W. Keeton, supra] § 44, p. 301.... [O]ther treatises support the view that the doctrine of superseding cause is merely a more complicated analysis of whether the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. For example, one treatise states: '[Superseding] cause is merely proximate cause flowing from a source not connected with the party sought to be charged. While the term may have some descriptive value, unduly elaborate discussion of [superseding] cause as such tends to becloud rather than clarify the relatively simple idea of causal connection. When it is determined that a defendant is relieved of liability by reason of [a superseding] cause, it would appear to mean simply that the negligent conduct of someone else-and not that of the defendant-is the proximate cause of the event.' ... 1 T. Shearman & A. Redfield, Negligence (Rev. Ed. 1941) § 37, pp. 99-100." (Emphasis omitted.)
Barry
v.
Quality Steel Products, Inc.
, supra,
Accordingly, "[i]f the third person's negligence is determined to be a superseding cause of the plaintiff's injury, that negligence, rather than the negligence of the party attempting to invoke the doctrine of superseding cause, is said to be the sole proximate cause of the injury.... The circumstances under which this shifting may take place have been well-defined in our case law. Even if a plaintiff's injuries are in fact caused by a defendant's negligence, a superseding cause may break that causal connection if it so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in any
degree, produces the injury; or it must be the non-concurring culpable act of a human being who is legally responsible for such act.... If a defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant would not be relieved from liability for those injuries even though another force concurred to produce them.... Whether a superseding cause was of such a character as to prevent an act of negligence of the defendant from being a substantial factor in producing a plaintiff's injury is ordinarily a question of fact [for the jury]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Wagner
v.
Clark Equipment Co.
, supra,
In
Barry
, this court determined that the doctrine of superseding cause had outlived its usefulness in cases in which "a defendant claims that a subsequent negligent act by a third party cuts off its own liability for the plaintiff's injuries."
Barry
v.
Quality Steel Products, Inc.
, supra,
"Under the common law of joint and several liability, therefore, even a defendant whose degree of fault was comparatively small could be held responsible for the entire amount of damages, [as] long as his negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Thus, the plaintiff could collect the entire amount of his judgment from the richest defendant, or from the defendant with the deepest pocket....
"In response largely to these concerns, the legislature undertook to reform the tort recovery provisions of our civil system, by enacting [Tort Reform I], which took effect October 1, 1986. Tort Reform I replaced the common-law rule of joint and several liability with a system of apportioned liability, holding each defendant liable for only his or her proportionate share of damages." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Collins
v.
Colonial Penn Ins. Co.
,
Prior to
Barry
, the superseding cause doctrine was applied to any intervening force-be it of nature, man or beast-that a defendant claimed had superseded his own tortious conduct to such a degree that it alone was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g.,
Lombardi
v.
Wallad
,
In light of the significant changes to our tort system implemented by tort reform, however, this court determined in
Barry
"that the doctrine of superseding cause no longer serves a useful purpose in our jurisprudence when a defendant claims that a subsequent negligent
act by a third party cuts off its own liability for the plaintiff's injuries. [In such] circumstances, superseding cause instructions serve to complicate what is fundamentally a proximate cause analysis.... [B]ecause our statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants; see General Statutes § 52-572h ; and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction; General Statutes § 52-572
o
; the simpler and less confusing approach to cases ... [in which] the jury must determine which, among many, causes contributed to the [plaintiff's] injury, is to couch the analysis in proximate cause rather than allowing the defendants to raise a defense of superseding cause." (Footnote omitted.)
Barry
v.
Quality Steel Products, Inc.
, supra,
Under this approach, "the fact finder need only determine whether the allegedly negligent conduct of any actor was a proximate cause, specifically, whether the conduct was a substantial factor in contributing to the plaintiff's injuries. If such conduct is found to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's foreseeable injury, each actor will pay his or her proportionate share pursuant to our apportionment statute, regardless of whether another's conduct also contributed to the plaintiff's injury. Put differently, the term superseding cause merely describes more fully the concept of proximate cause when there is more than one alleged act of negligence, and is not functionally distinct from the determination of whether an act is a proximate cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiff." Id., at 440,
In reaching our determination in
Barry
, we expressly limited our holding to cases in which "a defendant claims that its tortious conduct is superseded by a subsequent negligent act or there are multiple acts of negligence," stating that our decision did "not necessarily affect those cases [in which] the defendant claims that an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature, or criminal event supersedes its tortious conduct."
Although we did not expressly say so at the time, we exempted unforeseeable intentional torts, forces of nature and criminal events from our holding in
Barry
because, even under our modern tort system, apportionment of liability is not available between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any other basis. See General Statutes § 52-572h (
o
) ("there shall be no apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence including, but not limited to, intentional, wanton or reckless misconduct");
Sapko
v.
State , supra,
When applicable, the doctrine merely allows a defendant to argue, and to have the jury instructed, that it is the defendant's position that some other actor is the sole legal cause of the plaintiff's injury such that, even though the defendant's conduct may have been a cause in fact of the injury in a "but for" sense, its conduct did not contribute to the production of the injury in any meaningful sense-that is, the defendant's conduct was not a substantial factor in producing the injury
and, thus, it was not a proximate cause of that injury. Furthermore, under our precedent, to say that the defendant's conduct was not a substantial factor in producing an injury is simply another way of saying that the injury was not within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's conduct.
The plaintiff asserts, nonetheless, that our conclusion that the doctrine retains vitality in such cases is inconsonant with our past adoption of the negligence principles contained in § 442 B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which, as we previously indicated, states that, "[if] the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought about through the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is not within the scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct." 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 442 B, p. 469. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, "under § 442 B, in order for another force to relieve the defendant of liability, that force must be both (1) intentionally caused by a third person and (2) not within the scope of the risk." To be sure, this court has applied § 442 B in cases in which a defendant has claimed that his
or her negligence was superseded by the intentionally harmful acts of a third party. In all of the cases in which we have applied § 442 B, however, we relied on it solely for the proposition that the plaintiff could still prevail if he or she were able to establish that the intentionally harmful act was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's negligence. See, e.g.,
Stewart
v.
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.
, supra,
Thus, contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, § 442 B establishes that a defendant is liable "if the plaintiff's harm results from a hazard because of which the defendant's conduct was negligent";
Cuneo
v.
Connecticut Co.
, supra,
We also disagree with the plaintiff that the Judicial Branch's model civil jury instructions on superseding cause support the conclusion that the doctrine applies only to acts that were intended to cause harm. As the Appellate Court stated in rejecting this contention, "[t]he model instructions are not intended to be authoritative. As provided on their title page, the model instructions
are only meant to provide guidance; their legal sufficiency is not guaranteed. See Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions [supra] ('This collection of Civil Jury Instructions is intended as a guide for judges and attorneys in constructing charges and requests to charge. The use of these instructions is entirely discretionary and their publication by the Judicial
Branch is not a guarantee of their legal sufficiency.' ...) Rather than adhering to any particular format, jury instructions must be appropriately tailored to reflect the circumstances of the particular case and to adequately guide the jury. See
Sullivan
v.
Norwalk
,
We note, moreover, that the model jury instructions on superseding cause found on the Judicial Branch website are revised only to 2008 and, consequently, do not reflect our subsequent cases clarifying that the superseding cause doctrine remains a viable defense in any case in which apportionment is unavailable, and that even an act of negligence can constitute a superseding cause in such a case. It is for reasons like these that we previously have cautioned that the civil jury instructions found on the Judicial Branch website are intended as a guide only, and that their publication is no guarantee of their adequacy. See, e.g.,
State
v.
Reyes
,
II
Having concluded that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the doctrine of superseding cause applies to criminally reckless conduct, we now must consider whether that court also was correct in concluding that the jury's responses to the fourth and fifth interrogatories are legally consistent and, therefore, that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. Although we ordinarily review the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict under an abuse of discretion standard; e.g.,
Label Systems Corp.
v.
Aghamohammadi
,
As we previously indicated, in concluding that the jury's interrogatory responses were reconcilable, the Appellate Court relied primarily on §§ 440 and 442 B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which it interpreted as establishing that an injury could be proximately caused by an actor's negligent conduct but not be within the scope of the risk created by that conduct. Although the Appellate Court acknowledged that its interpretation
of these provisions of the Restatement (Second) was at odds with this court's statement in
Barry
that "superseding cause" is simply another way of saying "sole proximate cause," the court ultimately concluded that the "sole proximate cause" language in
Barry
was not intended "as a repudiation of the Restatement's broader definition" of the term and that
Barry's
"iteration of the doctrine ... does not expressly preclude that in certain cases factually distinct from that considered by the court in
Barry
, the impact of the defendant's initial negligence will not be so diminished by the later intervening act as to fully negate the initial negligence as a substantial factor in causing the harm at issue."
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
, supra,
We do not disagree with the Appellate Court that the fundamental policy underlying the superseding cause doctrine is essentially the same under the Restatement's explication of the doctrine and under the exposition of the doctrine found in the governing precedent of this court. As we explained, however, the terminology employed by the Restatement (Second) and by this court in explaining the doctrine are materially different. In particular, under the Restatement (Second), negligent conduct that is
found to be a proximate cause of the injuries sustained
may nevertheless be rendered so relatively inconsequential in light of a later superseding cause that that superseding cause is deemed to relieve the original tortfeasor of liability. Under our precedent, by contrast, a finding that conduct constitutes a superseding cause renders
the original negligence so insignificant in relation to that superseding cause that the original negligence cannot be deemed to be a proximate cause of the injuries. Thus, our precedent simply does not contemplate a situation in which the original negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in producing the injuries if there is a finding of a superseding
cause. Indeed, we consistently have described a superseding cause as an intervening force that "
prevent
[
s
]
an act of negligence of the defendant from being a substantial factor in producing a plaintiff's injury
...." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Craig
v.
Driscoll
,
Although, as the Appellate Court noted, the trial court's jury instructions were imperfect, the jury nevertheless was instructed in accordance with this court's precedent on the doctrine of superseding cause. Thus, the jury was
not
instructed that it could find that Sainval's negligence was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries
and
that Bowden's and Johnson's actions were a superseding cause of the injuries. To the contrary, the jury was instructed that only if it found that Sainval's negligence was
not
a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries could it find that Bowden's and Johnson's actions were a superseding cause of those injuries. See
Suarez
v.
Dickmont Plastics Corp.
,
To reinforce the latter point, the court explained that a finding of superseding cause "
precludes a finding that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries
" and that, "[t]o the
extent that you find that the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the negligence of ... Sainval was a proximate cause of any or all of the injuries and damages claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiff, as I have defined proximate cause to you,
you are to proceed to determine the issues as to the amount of damages, following the rules I'm about to give you
." (Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding these instructions, the jury found
both
that Sainval's negligence was a proximate cause of some or all of the plaintiff's injuries
and
that Bowden's and Johnson's
actions were a superseding cause of the injuries. We cannot say with any confidence, therefore, that the jury followed the trial court's instructions with respect to the issue of causation.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the case to that court for a new trial.
In this opinion D'AURIA, MULLINS and KAHN, Js., concurred.
"Bowden admitted during his trial testimony that he had pleaded guilty to larceny, assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment, and evading responsibility with death or serious injury resulting."
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
, supra,
"The plaintiff filed a separate civil action alleging negligent security practices by the companies that purportedly owned and managed Monterey Village. That action was consolidated with the present case but later was settled and withdrawn prior to trial. The jury nevertheless heard evidence pertaining to one of those companies, Vesta Management Corporation, and was instructed that it could consider for apportionment purposes whether and to what extent its negligence was also a cause of the plaintiff's injuries."
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
, supra,
"The operative complaint contained four additional counts directed at Yellow Cab and its owner and sole shareholder, [Bochicchio]. These additional counts alleged that Bochicchio had, among other things, misdirected assets away from Yellow Cab's accounts in an effort to keep funds away from the plaintiff. The counts sounded in fraud and fraudulent transfer, and sought to 'pierce the corporate veil' between Yellow Cab and Bochicchio in the event Yellow Cab was found vicariously liable to the plaintiff for damages. The parties agreed with the court's decision to proceed with a bifurcated trial in which the additional counts would be presented to the jury only if the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the negligence counts and awarded damages."
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
, supra,
As we explain more fully in part II of this opinion, the trial court determined that "foreseeability" for purposes of determining negligence and "scope of the risk" for purposes of applying superseding cause were different concepts, in part, on the basis of § 440 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the notes accompanying Connecticut Civil Jury Instruction 3.1-5, which describe "superseding cause" as "any cause intervening between the time of the defendant's allegedly tortious conduct and that of the plaintiff's claimed injury [that], although not disproving that the defendant's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's claimed injury, prevented the defendant's conduct from being considered a legal cause of that injury." Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions 3.1-5, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf (last visited August 5, 2019). Specifically, the trial court understood the latter statement to mean that the superseding cause doctrine is a special defense that admits the truth of the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint, including the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, but seeks to demonstrate that the plaintiff cannot prevail against the defendant.
This paragraph of the jury charge, along with the four paragraphs of the charge that follow, represents the trial court's instructions on superseding cause, even though the court did not expressly use the term "superseding cause" in those paragraphs.
Although the fifth interrogatory contains no express reference to the term "superseding cause," it is that doctrine that is the subject thereof.
Although we have never adopted the Restatement's definition of superseding cause, we note that it has appeared as dicta in a handful of this court's opinions. See, e.g.,
Levesque
v.
Bristol Hospital, Inc.
,
Connecticut Civil Jury Instruction 3.1-5 provides: "The defendant claims that he did not legally cause the plaintiff's alleged injury because that injury was produced, in material part, by a superseding cause. A superseding cause is any intentionally harmful act, force of nature, or criminal event, unforeseeable by the defendant, [that] intervenes in the sequence of events leading from the defendant's alleged negligence to the plaintiff's alleged injury and proximately causes that injury. Under our law, the intervention of such a superseding cause prevents the defendant from being held liable for the plaintiff's injury on the theory that, due to such superseding cause, the defendant did not legally cause the injury even though (his/her) negligence was a substantial factor in bringing the injury about. Therefore, when a claim of superseding cause is made at trial, the plaintiff must disprove at least one essential element of that claim by a fair preponderance of the evidence in order to prove, by that standard, its own conflicting claim of legal causation.
"In this case, the defendant claims, more particularly, that < describe alleged intervening conduct or event claimed to constitute a superseding cause > was a superseding cause of the plaintiff's alleged injury, and thus that (his/her) own negligence did not legally cause that injury. Because such intentionally harmful (conduct/force of nature/criminal event), if unforeseeable by the defendant, would constitute a superseding cause of the plaintiff's alleged injury if it occurred as claimed by the defendant and if it proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff must disprove at least one essential element of that claim by a fair preponderance of the evidence in order to prove that the defendant legally caused that injury. The plaintiff can meet this burden by proving either 1) that the conduct claimed to constitute a superseding cause did not occur as claimed by the defendant, either because it did not occur at all or because it was not engaged in with the intent to cause harm; or 2) that such conduct was foreseeable by the defendant, in that the injury in question was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's conduct; or 3) that such conduct was not a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's alleged injury. These, of course, are questions of fact for you to determine based on the evidence. Keep in mind, however, that the defendant does not have any burden to prove the existence of a superseding cause. The burden at all times rests [on] the plaintiff to disprove the defendant's claim of superseding cause as a necessary part of (his/her) proof that the defendant legally caused the plaintiff's injury." (Emphasis in original.)
Although the legal question of whether Sainval owed a duty to the plaintiff is not before us, we previously have stated that, when a defendant claims that an independent intervening force superseded his own negligence, "the question of legal causation is practically indistinguishable from an analysis of the extent of the tortfeasor's duty to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ruiz
v.
Victory Properties, LLC
, supra,
We note that several years before we decided
Sapko
, in
Archambault
v.
Soneco/Northeastern, Inc.
,
Thus, in light of our precedent and the trial court's instructions predicated on that precedent, we disagree with the Appellate Court that the jury properly could find simultaneously that Sainval's actions were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and that Bowden's and Johnson's actions were a superseding cause of those same injuries. As we explain more fully in part II of this opinion, under our case law, a finding that conduct constitutes a superseding cause renders the original negligence so insignificant in relation to that superseding cause that the original negligence cannot be deemed to be a proximate cause of the injuries and, therefore, cannot be deemed to be a substantial factor in producing the injuries.
We note that the plaintiff urges us to adopt § 34 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, published in 2010, which she asserts "merges the viable concepts related to superseding cause (foreseeability and proximate cause) officially into a [single] proximate cause (or scope of liability) analysis without the confusion and prejudice related to use of the superseding cause doctrine." Section 34 of the Restatement (Third) provides: "When a force of nature or an independent act is also a factual cause of harm, an actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious." 1 Restatement (Third), Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 34, p. 569 (2010). Because the plaintiff did not raise this claim in either the trial court or the Appellate Court, it is not properly before us. Even if it were, however, as the Appellate Court noted, our recent case law "reflects a jurisprudential move toward embracing" the more modern approach to superseding cause prescribed in § 34 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
, supra,
We note that the plaintiff's argument also founders on
Kiniry
v.
Danbury Hospital
,
Section 302 B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal." 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 302 B, p. 88.
Section 448 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime." 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 448, p. 480.
Section 449 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby." 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 449, p. 482.
Section 435 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled "Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of Its Occurrence," provides in relevant part: "If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable." 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 435 (1), p. 449.
Ruiz
v.
Victory Properties, LLC
, supra,
As § 442 B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates, however, if all of the facts were the same except that an adult intentionally had dropped the concrete on the child's head, the defendant's liability would turn on whether an adult committing such an act was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's failure to remove the accumulated debris from its property. Such a case undoubtedly would be resolved in the defendant's favor on a motion for summary judgment because it seems clear that a jury reasonably could not find that such an act was a foreseeable risk of the defendant's negligence.
Section 442 B provides a good illustration of this principle. "A negligently leaves an excavation in a public sidewalk, creating the risk that a traveler on the sidewalk will fall into it. B, passing C on the sidewalk, negligently bumps into him, and knocks him into the excavation. A is subject to liability to C." 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 442 B, illustration (5), p. 471. If, however, all of the facts are the same except that B intentionally pushes C into the hole, A would not be liable. Id., illustration (7), p. 471. This is true even though the injuries sustained by C in the second example are identical to the injuries sustained in the first. A is not liable in the second instance because the hazard that made A's conduct negligent did not include the risk that a third party would be induced to push someone into the excavated area. Cf.
Stewart
v.
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.
, supra,
No doubt this problem stems, at least in part, from the admonition at the conclusion of the fourth interrogatory, which, in direct contradiction to the court's charge, effectively instructed the jury to consider, in connection with the fifth interrogatory, whether "the accident that occurred ... was outside the scope of the risk created by [Sainval's] leaving his key in the ignition" only if it had found, in response to the fourth interrogatory, that the plaintiff had proven "that some or all of the injuries she sustained ... were proximately caused by the negligence of ... Sainval." In accordance with the court's charge, however, once the jury found that Sainval's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, there could be no finding of a superseding cause. Thus, the interrogatories merely should have queried the jury whether the plaintiff had proven that Sainval's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries or, instead , whether Bowden's recklessness in driving onto a sidewalk after striking a vehicle in front of him fell outside the scope of the risk created by Sainval's negligence because it was not reasonably foreseeable that someone stealing the taxicab would operate it in such a manner.
Concurring Opinion
I agree with the majority's well reasoned opinion and the result it reaches. I write separately for two reasons. First, and most significantly, I am troubled by the unnecessary and unfortunate prolixity of our superseding cause doctrine, or what remains of it. I understand that the majority is unable completely to escape the gravitational pull of existing doctrine, because the court's ability to chart a new course, even with respect to the common law, is constrained by the arguments raised by the parties, who themselves are constrained by the perceived limitations imposed by our own precedent. In my view, the majority opinion nonetheless makes progress, incomplete but not insignificant, toward a more sensible and simplified doctrine. This concurring opinion primarily is intended to highlight the particular aspects of the majority opinion that I believe can be built on in future cases so that the job of doctrinal reconstruction might be completed. The second reason I write is to note my disagreement with two minor points contained in the majority opinion.
I
The confusion generated by the superseding cause doctrine is easier to identify than to resolve. Causation, while a simple everyday word, is by no means a simple concept, in law or elsewhere, and its application to various questions of legal liability and damages has vexed our profession for at least the past one hundred years.
The majority has done admirable work clarifying doctrinal connections, resolving doctrinal tensions, sorting through conflicting authorities, and bringing the light of common sense to its subject matter. Yet even after that work has been accomplished, the reader would be forgiven if he or she feels unprepared to submit a model jury instruction to replace Connecticut Civil Jury Instruction 3.1-5. If the doctrine remains challenging for lawyers and judges, moreover, one can only imagine what a lay jury will make of it. Perhaps the guidance
provided by the majority opinion will help produce more reliable trial outcomes in the future than the verdict in the present case.
First, the majority has clarified that the fundamental principle animating the doctrine of superseding cause is that a negligent actor will not be relieved of liability by the intervention of another force-in most cases, the reckless or intentional misconduct of a third party-if the type of harm sustained by the plaintiff is within the scope of the risk that made the actor's conduct negligent. This basic insight, in my opinion, best identifies the critical operative principle underlying the doctrine of superseding cause in terms that can be understood and applied without inordinate difficulty. As the majority notes, the Restatement (Third) of Torts evidently has reached this conclusion in its treatment of superseding cause by abandoning the traditional doctrine in favor of an analysis fundamentally based on a scope of the risk analysis. See footnote 12 of the majority opinion; see also 1 Restatement (Third), Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 34, p. 569 (2010).
My preliminary view, as yet untested in the adjudicatory setting in Connecticut to the best of my knowledge, is that the reformulated approach to causation set forth in the Restatement (Third) may hold promise. Time will tell.
Second, just as under ordinary negligence rules, the defendant is liable for harm as long as his or her negligence was a substantial factor in producing it, even if the defendant did not foresee, nor reasonably could have foreseen, the extent of the harm or the particular manner in which it occurred.
Third, the possibility remains that the explicit equivalency the majority emphasizes between the doctrines of superseding cause and sole proximate cause may contain the seed for future development of a simplified doctrine. The majority makes a persuasive case that this court's repeated references to superseding cause as equivalent to sole proximate cause is not the result of loose language but actually means what it says: if a third party's conduct amounts to a superseding cause of a plaintiff's harm, then it is the sole proximate cause of that harm, and the negligent defendant is not a proximate cause at all. The question therefore arises why the superseding cause doctrine is needed at all, that is, why not simply ask the jury in such a case whether the intervening force was the sole proximate cause of the harm? It seems to me that this is a question worth asking, although I have no view about how it should be answered because it was neither raised nor briefed by the parties.
II
My disagreement with the majority involves two minor aspects of its opinion. First, I see no reason to engage in the analysis appearing in footnote 10 of the majority opinion, which contains an extensive, and I
believe unnecessary, discussion regarding
Archambault
v.
Soneco/Northeastern, Inc.
,
My concern here is not with the substance of the majority's criticism of the Archambault analysis as it relates to Barry and the doctrines of sole proximate cause and superseding cause; it seems clear to me that Archambault misreads Barry . My point, rather, is that the current status of Archambault is not before us, and the context of that case is sufficiently unusual that I do not believe that we should suggest any corrections to its holding until we are presented with a live controversy raising the particular issues and considerations implicated by that unusual setting. Perhaps, as the majority appears to suggest, Archambault went off course by holding that the defendant was not entitled to raise a defense on the basis of superseding cause. But there are other possibilities as well, and I believe that we should not indicate a view on the subject in the present case because the scenario in Archambault is different and may be sui generis; see footnote 6 of this concurring opinion; and because the proper treatment of that scenario has not been briefed by the parties.
Second, although I agree with the majority's conclusion that the existing model civil jury instruction on superseding cause; see Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions 3.1-5, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf (last visited August 5, 2019); provides an erroneous statement of the law and, therefore, does not assist the plaintiff's argument, I wish to add my gloss to ensure that the majority's message is not misunderstood as a wholesale disavowal of the model instructions. Although the model civil jury instructions are "not intended to be authoritative";
Snell
v.
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
,
I respectfully concur.
See W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 41, pp. 263-64 ("There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion [than the issue of causation]. Nor, despite the manifold attempts [that] have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet any general agreement as to the best approach. Much of this confusion is due to the fact that no one problem is involved, but a number of different problems, which are not distinguished clearly, and that language appropriate to a discussion of one is carried over to cast a shadow upon the others." [Footnote omitted.] );
The overwrought treatment of superseding cause contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts-which devotes no less than fifteen separate sections to the topic-illustrates the point. See 2 Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 440 through 453, pp. 465-91 (1965) ; see also part I of the majority opinion (discussing relevant provisions of the Restatement [Second] ). The Restatement (Third) of Torts contains a far more concise treatment of the topic. See 1 Restatement (Third), Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 34, p. 569 (2010). The question of whether to adopt the principles set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts is not presently before us. See footnote 12 of the majority opinion.
I intend no criticism of the trial court or the jury in this case. The record demonstrates that the trial court did its best under difficult conditions to fashion a coherent jury instruction and useful jury interrogatories from the assorted pieces of the doctrinal jigsaw puzzle remaining in disarray on the table since tort reform was enacted; see Public Acts 1987, No. 87-227; Public Acts 1986, No. 86-338; and
Barry
v.
Quality Steel Products, Inc.
,
Section 34 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts addresses the specific topic of superseding cause, but it must be read in conjunction with several other provisions of the Restatement (Third) that establish and explain the relevant principles of causation. See, e.g., 1 Restatement (Third), supra, § 29, p. 493 ("[a]n actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct [negligent]"). To be clear, although I believe that a transition to a "scope of the risk" analysis would simplify and clarify the superseding cause doctrine, such a modification would not eliminate all of the complexities and difficulties that arise in these cases. The primary remaining challenge is to determine the "appropriate level of generality or specificity to employ in characterizing the type of harm" that is within the scope of the risk or risks that made the actor negligent. Id., comment (i), p. 504 (entitled "Understanding and characterizing the risk of harm"); see also id., § 34, comments (d) and (e), pp. 572-74.
See, e.g.,
Ruiz
v.
Victory Properties, LLC
,
In
Barry
v.
Quality Steel Products, Inc.
,
I call the Archambault situation unusual because it falls between the cracks of the otherwise comprehensive apportionment scheme set forth in the comparative fault statute, General Statutes § 52-572h. On the one hand, unlike the nonparty intentional tortfeasors in the present case, the potentially at-fault nonparty in the Archambault scenario is not expressly excluded from the apportionment scheme pursuant to § 52-572h ( o ), because the claim against the plaintiff's employer, if it could be brought, would be based on a theory of negligence. On the other hand, the potentially at-fault nonparty in Archambault is not subject to apportionment as a "settled or released [person]" pursuant to §§ 52-572h (f) (4) and (n).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Brenda SNELL v. NORWALK YELLOW CAB, INC., Et Al.
- Cited By
- 17 cases
- Status
- Published