Mills v. Statewide Grievance Committee

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Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

Syllabus The plaintiff attorney appealed from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had upheld the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal from a reprimand issued by the reviewing committee of the defendant, the Statewide Grievance Committee. The reviewing committee found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had violated, among other rules, rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits an attorney from making statements concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge that the attorney knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of those statements. The statements at issue appeared in a motion the plaintiff filed, in which he asserted, inter alia, that certain Probate and Superior Court judges who had presided over a lengthy fee dispute between the plaintiff and another attorney were unwilling “to analyze the facts and the law,” issued decisions with no “meaningful jurisprudence,” and “totally disregarded” the appli- cable law. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the Appellate Court had improperly upheld the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal from the reprimand because the reviewing committee’s finding that he had violated rule 8.2 (a) was clearly erroneous and because he satisfied his burden of producing evidence of his objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true. Held:

The Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the plain- tiff’s appeal from the reprimand, as the reviewing committee’s finding that the plaintiff had made statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity was supported by clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, was not clearly erroneous.

The record demonstrated that the judges the plaintiff criticized provided meaningful and legally supported decisions addressing the plaintiff’s claims regarding the fee dispute and that the plaintiff’s statements did not com- port with the complex factual and procedural history of the fee dispute and instead were grounded in rumor, speculation, and apparent frustration with decisions that were not in his favor.

Moreover, the reviewing committee’s decision made clear that it considered the lengthy fee dispute proceedings in deciding whether the plaintiff violated rule 8.2 (a) and weighed what actually occurred during those proceedings against the plaintiff’s assertion that the judges whom he criticized had deprived the plaintiff of due process by wilfully refusing to apply the law.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of producing any evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true, as the record belied the plaintiff’s claims that the judges who were the subject of his statements were less than diligent in their adjudication of the fee dis- pute, and the purported errors on which the plaintiff relied were insufficient to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the judges had intentionally disregarded the law.

(Two justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued October 31, 2025—officially released April 7, 2026 Procedural History Appeal from the decision of the defendant reprimand- ing the plaintiff for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Cobb, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plain- tiff appealed to the Appellate Court, Seeley, Westbrook and Sheldon, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judg- ment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Suzanne B. Sutton, for the appellant (plaintiff). Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion DANNEHY, J. In this certified appeal, we consider whether an attorney’s statements in a motion filed with the Superior Court constitute a violation of rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits lawyers in this state from making statements “concern- ing the qualifications or integrity of a judge” that they know “to be false or with reckless disregard as to [their] truth or falsity . . . .” The plaintiff, John W. Mills, who is a member of the Connecticut bar, appeals from the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal from a reprimand issued by the reviewing committee of the defendant, the Statewide Grievance Committee, for violations of rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4)1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The plain- tiff claims that the reviewing committee’s finding that he violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Con- duct was clearly erroneous because the committee failed to consider the evidence he presented that established an objective basis for the truth of his statements.2 We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following facts and proce- dural history. In July, 2019, after a prolonged and We decline to address two additional claims advanced by the plain- tiff. First, the plaintiff claims that the reviewing committee’s finding that he engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. During oral argument before this court, however, the plaintiff’s counsel stated that the plaintiff no longer challenges the reviewing committee’s determina- tion that he violated rule 8.4 (4).

Second, the plaintiff claims that the reviewing committee’s application of an objective, rather than a subjective, test in determining whether he made the statements at issue with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity was contrary to applicable law. The proper legal standard, the plaintiff claims, is the subjective test that applies to a claim for civil liability for defamation of a public figure set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). The plaintiff presents virtually no analysis, however, in sup- port of this claim. Rather, he conceded in his brief and at oral argument that, in our decision in Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 227–28, 234 n.14, 890 A.2d 509, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823, 127 S. Ct. 157, 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006), we adopted an objective standard, as have most states, which is controlling. Since Notopoulos, we have reaffirmed our use of an objective standard. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 299 Conn. 405, 412, 10 A.3d 507 (2011) (in absence of attorney’s “reasonable, objective belief in the truth of the statements,” court “will infer that the allegations were either false or made in reckless disregard to truth or falseness”). Furthermore, in the plaintiff’s principal brief, he applies solely the objective standard, contending that this court should reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court because he presented evidence of his objective, reasonable belief that the statements were true. And, in his reply brief, he states that he and the defendant “agree[d] . . . [on] the objective standard of [rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct] . . . .” The plaintiff nowhere suggests that this court should overrule Notopoulos or its progeny and, therefore, offers no explanation as to why this court should conclude that the principles underlying the doctrine of stare decisis are overcome in this instance. See generally State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 519, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008) (“[t]he doctrine of stare decisis counsels that a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent contentious fee dispute between the plaintiff and Douglas P. Mahoney, an attorney who had represented a party in a wrongful death action prior to the plaintiff under- taking that representation, the plaintiff initiated an interpleader action “[i]n an effort to have [the fee] dispute heard by a court of general jurisdiction . . . .” Following settlement conferences before Superior Court Judge Barbara N. Bellis, both attorneys agreed to a negotiated resolution of the fee dispute. In accordance with the court’s resulting order, the plaintiff submitted a motion for an order for release of funds pursuant to the agreed on distribution. In that motion, however, referring to prior judicial proceedings addressing the fee dispute, which we detail later in this opinion, the plaintiff made the following statements, which are the subject of this appeal: “While the undersigned genuinely appreciates the sincere efforts of this court [Judge Bellis] to bring this matter to a close after years of litigation, the plaintiff is nevertheless completely disillusioned and disappointed with the prior judges who have ‘heard’ this case, and their unwillingness to make any meaningful effort to analyze the facts and the law. Decision after decision was not only legally incorrect, but devoid of any meaningful jurisprudence. The plaintiff has opted to resolve this case solely because it has become apparent that, in this instance, for whatever reason, justice is not possible. In thirty years of practice, I have never seen anything like this, where the rules and the law are simply and totally disregarded.” (Emphasis in original.)

Following receipt of the plaintiff’s motion, Judge Bellis referred him to the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Coun- sel for investigation as to whether any of the plaintiff’s statements violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The chief disciplinary counsel assigned the referral to the grievance panel for the judicial district of Tolland, and, thereafter, that panel conducted the initial investiga- tion. Based on the results of that investigation, Attorney Richard Florentine, grievance counsel for the judicial reasons and inescapable logic require it” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In light of the plaintiff’s inadequate briefing, as well as his concessions at oral argument, we deem these claims abandoned. See, e.g., State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428, 444 n.12, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025). district of Tolland, filed a complaint with the defendant in accordance with our rules of practice. The complaint was assigned to the grievance panel for Bethany, New Haven, and Woodbridge, which found probable cause that the plaintiff had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Consistent with that finding, the grievance panel filed the probable cause finding and record with the defendant, which notified the plaintiff of the remote hearing to be conducted by the reviewing committee, which is a subcommittee of the defendant.

Thereafter, the reviewing committee held a hearing on the grievance complaint. Disciplinary counsel called the plaintiff as his sole witness and questioned him regarding the statements that he had made in the motion and dur- ing the underlying fee dispute. The plaintiff described the underlying dispute and explained the basis for his belief that the statements were true. In support of his claim that he had not violated any Rules of Professional Conduct, the plaintiff relied on his testimony and two exhibits from the underlying Probate Court proceedings: (1) a May, 2014 letter from Mahoney to the Probate Court, indicating that Mahoney would no longer repre- sent the estate (estate) of the decedent in the wrongful death action, and (2) Mahoney’s motion to disqualify the plaintiff as counsel, along with the estate’s objec- tion thereto, filed in the Superior Court appeal of the Probate Court decree that had awarded fees to Mahoney and the plaintiff.

The reviewing committee found that the plaintiff had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Profes- sional Conduct and reprimanded him for those violations. The plaintiff thereafter sought review by the defendant, which affirmed the decision of the reviewing committee. The plaintiff later appealed to the Superior Court, which dismissed his appeal and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that (1) the reviewing committee applied the proper legal standard in determining that the plaintiff made the statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity; Mills v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 228 Conn. App. 852, 859–60, 326 A.3d 309 (2024); (2) the reviewing commit- tee’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence; id., 865; and (3) the reviewing committee did not abuse its discretion in issuing the reprimand. Id., 868. This certified appeal followed.3

I

Before we turn to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, we note that, in rendering its decision, the reviewing committee aptly characterized the fee dispute proceed- ings underlying the plaintiff’s statements as “lengthy and involved.” A summary of the relevant background is helpful to place the matters considered by the reviewing committee in the proper context.4

In 2012, a sixteen year old boy (decedent) was killed in a bicycle accident. The decedent’s estate initially retained Mahoney, who negotiated a $50,000 settlement with the motorist’s insurance carrier in resolution of a wrongful death claim. Thereafter, the estate terminated Mahoney’s representation and retained the plaintiff, who reached a settlement on an underinsured motorist claim with the decedent’s insurance provider on behalf of the estate for $200,000. At a July, 2014 hearing, Probate Court Judge Michael R. Brandt (1) authorized the plaintiff to agree to the underinsured motorist settlement, and (2) awarded Mahoney attorney’s fees from the $50,000 settlement. In the decree awarding Mahoney attorney’s fees, Judge Brandt stated that this disbursement would conclude Mahoney’s involvement in the estate proceedings.

Judge Brandt subsequently held a hearing on Septem- ber 30, 2014, to review and approve the estate’s final accounting. At that hearing, Mahoney sought a portion of the $66,666.67 in attorney’s fees based on his efforts in reaching the underinsured motorist settlement. The Probate Court approved the final account but reserved the resolution of the distribution of the $66,666.67 of disputed attorney’s fees.

Thereafter, Judge Brandt scheduled a May, 2015 hear- ing to address the fee dispute. The plaintiff did not attend the scheduled May, 2015 Probate Court hearing on the fee dispute. Judge Brandt issued a decree on August 31, 2015 (August, 2015 decree), ordering the plaintiff (1) to distribute $40,000 of the disputed fees to Mahoney, and (2) to file an affidavit of closing of estate. The plaintiff appealed from this decree to the Superior Court, listing the decedent’s estate as the plaintiff and serving himself and Mahoney as “interested parties . . . .”

On the same day that he filed the appeal, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of closing of estate with the Probate Court. In October, 2015, Judge Brandt accepted the affidavit of closing and closed the remainder of the estate. In November, 2015, after the decedent’s estate was closed, the plaintiff filed motions to stay all Pro- bate Court proceedings in both the Probate Court and the Superior Court. Superior Court Judge Matthew Frechette denied the motion to stay filed in the Superior Court appeal, as well as the plaintiff’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.5 The plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal with the Appellate Court from Judge Frechette’s denial of his motion to stay. The Appellate Court dis- missed the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The plaintiff then filed a motion to dismiss the probate appeal that he had filed in the Superior Court, contending that the Probate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it issued the August, 2015 decree and that, as a result, the Superior Court, sitting as the Probate Court in the appeal, also lacked jurisdiction. Judge Frechette issued a written decision denying the motion. Estate of Kusmit v. Court of Probate, District of East Haven-North Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. NNH-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 31, 2016) (63 Conn. L. Rptr. 38, 42).

Mahoney subsequently moved to disqualify the plain- tiff as counsel to the estate, but, before the court could rule on the motion, the plaintiff withdrew as a party to the appeal, citing the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss as the basis. After the plaintiff’s withdrawal, Judge Frechette granted the motion to disqualify the plaintiff as counsel to the estate.

Thereafter, the probate appeal was tried de novo before Superior Court Judge Sybil V. Richards. Judge Richards issued a written decision directing the plaintiff to dis- tribute $40,000 of the disputed fee to Mahoney and the remaining $26,666.66 to the estate. Estate of Kusmit v. Mahoney, Docket No. NNH-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2017 WL 3625696, *3 (Conn. Super. July 18, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Probate Appeal of Kusmit, 188 Conn. App. 196, 204 A.3d 776 (2019). The estate, rep- resented by new counsel, appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court. Three days later, the plaintiff entered a new appearance in the Superior Court probate appeal as an interested party and filed a second, indepen- dent appeal on behalf of the estate. The Appellate Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal but heard the appeal filed by the estate. The Appellate Court ultimately dismissed the estate’s appeal, concluding that the estate was not aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court. See In re Probate Appeal of Kusmit, supra, 188 Conn. App. 203. Prior to a hearing on Mahoney’s motion for order to show cause why the plaintiff had not complied with Judge Richards’ July, 2017 order to distribute the disputed fees, the plaintiff initiated the interpleader action. After reaching a settlement in the interpleader action, the plaintiff filed his motion for order for release of funds, which contains the statements that are at issue in this appeal. As we have explained, the reviewing committee held a hearing on the grievance complaint filed against the plaintiff as a result of his statements in the motion for order for release of funds. During the hearing, the chief disciplinary counsel elicited testimony from the plain- tiff in support of counsel’s burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. At the hearing, the plaintiff described the specific words he used in his motion and their intended meanings. He noted that he placed the word “heard” in quotation marks because he questioned whether the judges heard him “in a proper judicial manner” and whether they “carr[ied] out their function with regard to [his] case . . . .” He went on to explain that his use of the word “heard” in quotation marks was intended to convey that there was no due process. The plaintiff explained that he chose the word “unwillingness” to describe the conduct of these judges and meant that they had “an unwilling- ness to address,” and “completely ignored,” the “points of law” that he claimed to have raised in pleadings or exhibits. He further testified that the reference to “jus- tice is not possible” in the motion was to suggest “some very disturbing things said by some of the people that were involved in some of these decisions . . . .” Overall, he testified that the collective meaning of his statements was to convey that he was “raising repeatedly cogent, intelligent legal arguments that were backed by legal authority, whether it be statutory or controlling case law, that were not addressed repeatedly [by the judges involved].” When asked why he failed to name any of the “prior judges” in the motion for order for release of funds, the plaintiff acknowledged that it would not be “appropriate to name judges in this pleading.” When questioned further, however, he then identified each judge by name.

Regarding Judge Brandt’s August, 2015 decree, the plaintiff explained that “legally—there was no jurisdic- tion for this to ever be heard by the Probate Court.” In his view, because Judge Brandt had approved the settlement, the contingency fee, and the fee agreement, Mahoney’s claim was not against the estate’s property but, rather, against fees the Probate Court had determined to be the plaintiff’s property.

In reference to Judge Frechette’s decisions in the Superior Court appeal, the plaintiff testified that Judge Frechette denied his motion to dismiss “despite the clear black-and-white letter of the law,” which, according to the plaintiff, was “absolutely clear . . . .” He claimed that Judge Frechette ignored the law—specifically, a decision on which the plaintiff had relied as binding law, McNamara & Goodman v. Pink, 44 Conn. Supp. 592, 696 A.2d 1328 (1997)—which Judge Frechette’s decision did not address. Although the plaintiff credited Judge Frechette with being “a smart person” who was trying to “give thought to things,” he nevertheless viewed Judge Frechette’s decision as refusing to acknowledge control- ling law, “as if [the plaintiff] didn’t say it.”

Moreover, the plaintiff explained that Judge Richards’ decision “parroted exactly what Judge Brandt said to the dollar in a very short decision absent—devoid of any analysis at all.” The plaintiff further testified that it was “incompetence” on the part of Judge Richards to award his portion of the disputed fees to the estate.

In support of his position that he had a reasonable, objective belief in the truth of his statements, the plain- tiff (1) argued that Mahoney had waived any claim to fees from the settlement proceeds of the underinsured motorist claim, (2) relied on his jurisdictional arguments, and (3) made vague references to unsubstantiated rumors “from people on the bar,” which led him to believe that there was “something going on here that isn’t right . . . .” The plaintiff testified that Mahoney’s May, 2014 letter to the Probate Court evidenced a waiver of any claim to a portion of those settlement proceeds. According to the plaintiff, no judge, in any of the proceedings concerning the fee dispute, addressed his waiver argument.

The plaintiff reiterated his position that the Probate Court never had jurisdiction over the fee dispute and that this deprived the Superior Court of jurisdiction over his appeal from the August, 2015 decree. He testified that his jurisdictional claims were denied without explanation and that it was “structurally impossible to get a proper appeal.” In his view, he knew from the beginning that “[the probate dispute] did not belong in the Superior Court” and that it “should never have . . . proceeded the way it did.” In support of the objective reasonableness of his statements, the plaintiff testified to the follow- ing unsubstantiated rumors: “I heard anecdotally some things that I don’t know that I want to get into about comments that judges have made about me that have come back to me just through, you know, hearing things from people on the bar and so on. But there’s something going on here that isn’t right, and I still believe that very strongly.” When specifically asked for any other objective factors on which he relied, the plaintiff responded that he had his “suspicions” based on information “learned in confidence,” which he did not want to repeat and, more important, did not know whether it was true.

After reviewing the plaintiff’s statements and his tes- timony against the backdrop of the lengthy and involved proceedings, the reviewing committee found that disci- plinary counsel had established by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff’s statements were made with reckless disregard as to their truth. The committee noted that none of the decisions or motions was overturned in any of the plaintiff’s appeals. It found that the plaintiff had made these statements because he was “frustrated and upset” based on his subjective belief that he “did not have due process in the matter . . . .” The commit- tee found that the plaintiff’s statements in the motion were “intended to attack the judiciary without a basis to do so.” Thus, the committee issued a reprimand on the grounds that the plaintiff had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

II

The plaintiff claims that the reviewing committee’s finding that he violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Pro- fessional Conduct was clearly erroneous. Specifically, he challenges the reviewing committee’s ultimate fac- tual finding that he made the statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. He also contends that he satisfied his burden of producing evidence of his objective, reasonable belief that the statements were true.6 We disagree.

We begin by reviewing the legal principles and the standard of review applicable to the plaintiff’s claim. In order to prove a violation of rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, disciplinary counsel must estab- lish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff made a statement that (1) concerned the “qualifications or integrity of a judge,” and (2) he knew “to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity . . . .” Rules of Professional Conduct 8.2 (a); see also Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 224 n.7, 890 A.2d 509, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823, 127 S. Ct. 157, 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006).

We have explained that a shifting evidentiary burden exists in cases in which an attorney is subject to sanctions for violating rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 299 Conn. 405, 412–13, 10 A.3d 507 (2011). “[T]he committee bears the initial burden of evidence to prove the ethics violation by clear and convincing evidence. . . . When the committee presents sufficient evi- dence to meet the burden, the burden of evidence shifts to the alleged violator. . . . [A]fter the [alleged violator] provides evidence that he had an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true, the burden shifts back to the committee to rebut that evidence and, ulti- mately, to carry its burden of persuasion and to convince the finder of fact of the truth of the claimed violation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 224 n.7.

Whether an attorney made a statement that he knew “to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity”—and thus whether he violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct—is a factual determina- tion to be made by the Statewide Grievance Committee or a reviewing committee thereof. Rules of Professional Conduct 8.2 (a); see also Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 339 Conn. 503, 520–21, 261 A.3d 722 (2021). The standard of review of a challenge to a factual find- ing made by the Statewide Grievance Committee or a reviewing committee is well established by Practice Book § 2-38 (f). “Although the [the defendant] is not an admin- istrative agency . . . the court’s review of its conclusions is similar to the review afforded to an administrative agency decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 520.

Practice Book § 2-38 (f) provides in relevant part that, “[u]pon appeal, the court shall not substitute its judg- ment for that of the Statewide Grievance Committee or reviewing committee as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the committee unless the court finds that substantial rights of the respondent have been prejudiced because the committee’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . . .” See also Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 520–21 (citing § 2-38 (f) and applying standard); Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, Conn. 227–31 (same).

The clearly erroneous standard of review is highly deferential. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jacob W., 330 Conn. 744, 770, 200 A.3d 1091 (2019). Indeed, “[a] court reviewing an attorney disciplinary proceeding . . . retains its inherent authority over the discipline of its officers in those instances when, despite the evidence in the record, it nevertheless is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Com- mittee v. Burton, supra, 299 Conn. 412. Consistent with Practice Book § 2-38 (f) (5), we consider whether, “in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record,” the reviewing committee’s find- ing that the plaintiff violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct in making the statements was clearly erroneous.

At the outset, we note that the plaintiff conceded both that his statements concerned the qualifications or integrity of judges and that they were prejudicial to the administration of justice. Our review, therefore, is limited to (1) whether the reviewing committee correctly found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plain- tiff had made the statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, and (2) if so, whether the plain- tiff satisfied his burden of producing any evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true. A

Depending on the nature of the statements alleged to have violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, disciplinary counsel can often satisfy his bur- den of proving that a statement was made with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity by introducing the statement into evidence and eliciting testimony from the speaker regarding the basis for that statement. See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, supra, 299 Conn. 413 (“the [committee] proved its case by plac- ing the letter to the then chief justice into evidence and examining the defendant as to the basis of her allegations contained therein”).

In the present case, the statements in the plaintiff’s motion contain three sweeping assertions: (1) the judges in the underlying cases were unwilling to analyze the facts and the law, (2) the judges rendered decisions with no meaningful jurisprudence, and (3) the judges deliber- ately disregarded the applicable rules, statutes, and case law. On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the reviewing committee’s finding that the state- ments in the plaintiff’s motion were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity is supported by clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, is not clearly erroneous. The record, as we explain, demonstrates that the various judges provided the plaintiff with meaning- ful and legally supported decisions despite his assertions to the contrary.

The plaintiff’s testimony at his grievance hearing is a good starting point. The plaintiff testified that he “[stood] by” what he said in the motion and that his asser- tions were objectively true. He testified that, “despite the clear black-and-white letter of the law,” Judge Frechette wrongly denied his motion to dismiss the appeal he had filed in the Superior Court, which was premised on his assertion that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction. The plaintiff emphasized that Judge Frechette’s ruling sup- ported the statements he had made in his motion because, in his view, that ruling was “legally incorrect” and the judge “would not address certain legal arguments.” He further testified that, in his case, a “legally incorrect” decision meant that the judge was abdicating his “con- stitutional requirement . . . [to] hear cases and provide meaningful time to analyze the facts and the law . . . .” Judge Frechette’s decision, however, explained why the Probate Court had jurisdiction over Mahoney’s claim for a portion of the attorney’s fees derived from the settlement of the underinsured motorist claim. Judge Frechette first explained that the Probate Court has “express jurisdiction” over an estate’s accounting and over the rights of the parties interested in that account- ing. He then noted that the disputed attorney’s fees constituted an administrative expense of the estate. Consistent with the Probate Court’s express authority over the final accounting of an estate, Judge Frechette explained that it was necessary for the Probate Court to determine the proper distribution of the disputed fees in order to finalize the estate’s administrative expenses. Judge Frechette also addressed the plaintiff’s secondary argument that the disputed fees were his “law [firm’s] money,” explaining that, at the time of the August, 2015 order, the fees were being held in trust on behalf of the estate and that Mahoney’s request for additional fees was addressed in the context of the estate’s final accounting.7 Judge Frechette was not the only judge in the underly- ing proceedings to provide the plaintiff with a meaning- ful and legally supported decision. Judge Richards, who presided over the probate appeal, held a trial de novo and determined the appropriate fee distribution. In her mem- orandum of decision, she explained that the “reasonable fee owed to Mahoney is $40,000, which means the estate is entitled to the remainder of the disputed fee or, in other words, $26,666 to be exact as [the plaintiff] withdrew any claim to legal fees for his representation of the estate, and [the plaintiff] is ordered to make these distributions within two calendar weeks of this decision.”8 Contrary to plaintiff’s claim that the court refused “to make any meaningful effort to analyze the facts and the law,” the record reveals that Judge Richards decided the case based in part on the fact that the plaintiff had withdrawn as a party, and, accordingly, the trial proceeded without his participation or appearance.

The plaintiff contends on appeal that the reviewing committee’s decision rested solely on the fact that the judges’ decisions were never overturned on appeal, sug- gesting that this finding was insufficient to support the committee’s finding that he had violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The plaintiff’s conten- tion, however, is belied by the committee’s decision. The committee’s decision makes clear that it considered the “lengthy and involved” fee dispute proceedings in find- ing that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.2 (a), weighing what actually took place in those proceedings against the plaintiff’s assertion that these judges deprived him of due process by wilfully refusing to apply the law. The record demonstrates that the plaintiff’s statements do not comport with the complex factual and procedural history of the fee dispute and instead were grounded in rumor, speculation, and apparent frustration with deci- sions that were not in his favor. The committee explained in its decision that the plaintiff’s statements provided “no added benefit or additional information” to the Supe- rior Court in guiding its decisions and that it was clear that the statements made were without any basis in the record.9 On the record before us, we conclude that it was not clearly erroneous for the committee to find that disciplinary counsel had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff’s statements were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.

B

Having concluded that the reviewing committee sat- isfied its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff’s statements were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, we next address whether the plaintiff satisfied his burden of providing any evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true. In order for the plaintiff to satisfy this burden, he needed to produce evidence not merely that the decisions of the judges were incorrect, but that the decisions were so lacking in legal support that the judges evinced an “unwillingness to make any meaningful effort to analyze the facts and the law.” See, e.g., Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Commit- tee, supra, 277 Conn. 230 (“[a]dverse rulings in court proceedings, and even incorrect rulings, do not in and of themselves amount to evidence of illegal or unethical behavior on the part of a judge”); see also Code of Judi- cial Conduct, Rule 2.2, comment (3) (“When applying and interpreting the law, a judge sometimes may make good faith errors of fact or law. Errors of this kind do not violate this Rule.”). that fact. We acknowledge that the reviewing committee’s decision could have more robustly set forth the committee’s bases for finding that the plaintiff’s statements had violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We decline, however, to construe its observation that none of the decisions was overturned on appeal as somehow pre- venting us from considering the remainder of the defendant’s decision, which expressly cited to the decisions of the prior judges in the Probate Court and the Superior Court, both of which had been explored in detail by disciplinary counsel in his questioning of the plaintiff during the hearing. We further decline to construe that statement as precluding us from reviewing the defendant’s decision in view of the whole record. Such an approach would be directly contrary to Practice Book § 2-38 (f) (5), which requires us to consider whether the defendant’s decision is clearly erroneous “in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

The plaintiff argues that he satisfied that burden because he demonstrated that the judges who presided over the various stages of the litigation had refused to adjudicate his claims, ignored his argument that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction, left a “trail of errors” in managing the case, and denied him appellate review. As we have explained, however, the record belies the plaintiff’s claims that the judges in the Superior and Probate Courts were less than diligent in their adjudica- tion of the cases giving rise to this disciplinary matter. Although the plaintiff cannot satisfy his burden of proving objective reasonableness simply by arguing the legal incorrectness of the decisions issued by the courts in rejecting his claims, we nevertheless address two additional arguments that he advances in support of his contention that the judges in the Superior and Probate Courts incorrectly concluded that the Probate Court had jurisdiction over the fee dispute. First, the plaintiff relies on a decision of the Superior Court, McNamara & Goodman v. Pink, supra, 44 Conn. Supp. 592, which he incorrectly characterizes as controlling jurisdictional authority from this court, to argue that the judges in the Superior and Probate Courts improperly rejected his claim that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction. Even if Pink were controlling, the plaintiff’s argument fails. Pink does not stand for the proposition that a Probate Court never has jurisdiction over attorney’s fees. Instead, that decision addresses whether attorney’s fees from a settlement are paid before the claims of other creditors to an estate. See id., 602–603.

Second, the plaintiff points to Judge Brandt’s Novem- ber, 2019 decree (2019 decree), which stated that “[t]his [c]ourt has no jurisdiction of matters outside of the estate. . . . The dispute was a conflict over [attorney’s] fees.” To provide context for the plaintiff’s argument, at the time the July, 2019 interpleader case was settled, Judge Bellis ordered the Probate Court to reopen the estate to approve the settlement. Judge Brandt issued the 2019 decree in response to the plaintiff’s subsequent petition consistent with that order. Judge Brandt noted that, at that time, the estate was closed. The remaining fee dispute between the attorneys, therefore, was a mat- ter outside of the estate, over which the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction. The plaintiff reasons that the Probate Court’s 2019 decree demonstrates his reasonable belief that his statements were true. We disagree.

The 2019 decree simply does not accomplish the task that the plaintiff claims it does. That is, the Probate Court’s conclusion regarding its jurisdiction in 2019, long after the estate had been closed and all distributions had been made, has no bearing on whether jurisdiction existed in August, 2015, when the estate remained open, and when the Probate Court acted pursuant to its author- ity and responsibility to preside over the administration of the estate, including the distribution of reasonable attorney’s fees. The plaintiff’s reliance on the 2019 decree is, therefore, inapposite.

With respect to the plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged “trail of errors” in the proceedings, the purported errors are insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of show- ing that the judges intentionally disregarded the law. The alleged errors either involve Mahoney’s conduct (rather than the conduct of the various judges), broad claims that the judges’ decisions (which the plaintiff too did not put into evidence) were legally incorrect, or unspecified “suspicions” that the plaintiff acknowledged may not be true.10

As to the plaintiff’s last claim, that he was denied the opportunity to appeal and that this supposed denial provides evidence of his objective, reasonable belief in the truth of his statements, we note that the plaintiff’s inability to appeal from Judge Richards’ judgment was his own doing. The record reveals that the plaintiff himself was largely responsible for the failure of his claims. Perhaps the best illustration of this point is the plaintiff’s decision not to attend the May, 2015 Probate Court hearing on the fee dispute. Despite “insist[ing]” that Judge Brandt address the fee dispute, the plain- tiff voluntarily chose not to attend the hearing and not to avail himself of the opportunity to explain why he believed he deserved the entire fee. As far as the plain- tiff’s inability to appeal from Judge Richards’ decision, his withdrawal as a party to the appeal of the August, 2015 decree essentially guaranteed that result, leaving only the estate as a party to the action, which prompted the Appellate Court to dismiss the estate’s appeal for lack of standing. See In re Probate Appeal of Kusmit, supra, 188 Conn. App. 203. At most, the evidence establishes that the plaintiff raised legal arguments and that the judges explained why his arguments were not persuasive. Even if it were debatable that the plaintiff introduced some evidence that the judges may have made “good faith errors” in adjudicating the fee dispute; Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.2, comment (3);—and we conclude that he failed even to make this showing—he fell far short of carry- ing his burden of proving that the judges intentionally disregarded the facts and law. Accordingly, nothing in the record supports the plaintiff’s allegations in his statements.

C

The dissent contends that our conclusion that the reviewing committee correctly determined that the plain- tiff violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Con- duct rests on evidence outside of the record and factual findings that the committee did not make. It concludes that the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal from the committee’s decision must be reversed. But the dissent reaches that conclusion through an application of clear error review with which we respectfully disagree.

Although the dissent accurately sets forth the gov- erning standard of review of a grievance committee’s decision, its ensuing analysis departs from that stan- dard. Rather than examining all of the evidence in the record to determine whether the reviewing committee’s finding was well supported, the dissent concentrates on evidence it asserts was not part of the record. Indeed, it places considerable weight—if not dispositive weight— on the fact that neither party introduced as exhibits the memoranda of decision authored by Judges Frechette and Richards. Clear error review, however, requires something different. Our role is confined to determining whether the reviewing committee’s reckless disregard finding was supported by evidence in the record. See, e.g., Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, Liquor Control Commission, 237 Conn. App. 1, 14, 350 A.3d 1142 (2025) (appellate court’s review of agency’s determination is based on evidence presented, not on what evidence could have been presented). Absent from the dissent’s analysis is an examination of much of the relevant evidence in the record, that is, the plaintiff’s testimony at the grievance hearing. The plaintiff described at length the underlying judicial proceedings, the judges’ decisions, the context in which his accusations were made, and the intended meaning of his statements. The plaintiff’s testimony, together with his motion for an order for release of funds and the exhibits he introduced, which included what the dissent discounts as “fragmentary excerpts” of the underlying decisions, provided sufficient evidentiary support for the reviewing committee’s finding that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Profes- sional Conduct.

The dissent then contends that the reviewing commit- tee’s finding is clearly erroneous because it purportedly rested only on the observation that none of the challenged rulings was overturned on appeal. This reasoning misap- prehends both our standard of review and the commit- tee’s decision. Whether the committee’s finding that the plaintiff violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct is clearly erroneous requires examination of the evidence “on the whole record”; Practice Book § 2-38 (f) (5); not consideration of a single subsidiary observation made in the committee’s written decision. The record includes not only the committee’s decision but also the evidence received or considered, including the testimony heard by it. See Practice Book § 2-35 (i). Moreover, the committee’s decision did not rest solely on the subsid- iary fact that none of the underlying judicial decisions had been overturned. After detailing the lengthy and involved history of the underlying fee dispute, the com- mittee considered all of the evidence in the record and found, among other things, that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.2 (a) because there was no basis in the record to support the truth of the plaintiff’s statements. What the dissent would effectively require is that the committee issue a decision that recites every subsidiary finding and every piece of evidence that could conceivably support the committee’s finding that the plaintiff violated rule 8.2 (a). A decision by an administrative agency or by the committee, however, is not required to reflect the degree of analytical exposition or stylistic precision expected of an appellate court decision. See, e.g., Stratford Police Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, 343 Conn. 62, 82–83, 272 A.3d 639 (2022) (“[a]lthough the board did not issue a written decision explaining the bases on which it determined that the defendant was suitable to receive a pistol permit, there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support its conclusion”).11 Though professing confidence that its application of clear error review suffices to reverse the reviewing committee’s decision, the dissent nevertheless invokes Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943) (Chen- ery), suggesting that we improperly uphold the decision of the committee on grounds other than those on which it relied. The dissent’s effort to inject Chenery into the present discussion is misguided for two reasons.

First, Chenery is a federal administrative law decision that is predicated on the principle that a court should not intrude on a domain Congress has exclusively entrusted to an agency. Id., 88; see also Immigration & Naturaliza- tion Service v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S. Ct. 353, 154 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2002). Although we have said that our review of a grievance committee’s decision is similar to our review of a decision of an administrative agency, we have been equally clear that the grievance committee is not an administrative agency. The State- wide Grievance Committee is a committee within the Judicial Branch whose members are appointed by the judges of the Superior Court. It reviews and adjudicates complaints concerning attorney misconduct—an area over which the Judicial Branch has exclusive authority. See Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner, 318 Conn. 652, 672, 122 A.3d 592 (2015). Accordingly, reliance on a doctrine rooted in judicial deference to a coordinate branch of government is not well suited for resolving the present dispute.

Second, Chenery stands for the proposition that a reviewing court may sustain an agency’s decision only on the same basis articulated in the order of the agency itself. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., supra, 318 U.S. 87; see also Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 290, 107 S. Ct. 2360, 96 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). The principle guards against post hoc rationalization; it does not constrain a reviewing court from examining whether the agency’s stated findings are supported by evidence in the record. See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 56–57, 97 S. Ct. 2229, 53 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1977) (because record before Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) revealed substantial evidence to support SEC’s findings, and because SEC’s conclusions of law were grounded on construction of statute consistent with legislative intent, federal court of appeals improperly reversed SEC’s decision). That is all we do here. The reviewing committee expressly found that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct because he made statements in his motion with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. Our task under clear error review is limited to determining whether that finding is supported by evi- dence in the record. In concluding that it is, we do not find facts or substitute a new basis for the committee’s decision. We simply evaluate whether the committee’s finding is supported by the record as a whole.

In sum, we conclude that the reviewing committee’s finding that the statements in the plaintiff’s motion were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity was supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record and, therefore, was not clearly erroneous. We further conclude that the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of producing any evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion MULLINS, C. J., and McDONALD and ALEXANDER, Js., concurred.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ ECKER, J., with whom, D’AURIA, J., joins, dissent- ing. An attorney’s statement concerning the qualifica- tions or integrity of a judge does not violate rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct1 unless the statement is false.2 As a consequence, a truthful statement, even one made in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, simply does not violate the rule. The reviewing com- mittee of the defendant, the Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, was aware of the falsity requirement and found the statement of the plaintiff, Attorney John W. Mills, which criticized certain judicial decisions, to be false, in violation of rule 8.2 (a), for one singular and specific reason: because “none of the decisions . . . the [plaintiff] took issue with [was] overturned on any appeal.” This was the one and only basis identified by the committee in support of its finding of falsity.

The defect in the reviewing committee’s reasoning is obvious—the fact that the judicial decisions criticized by the plaintiff were not overturned on appeal comes nowhere close to establishing, by clear and convincing evidence no less, that the plaintiff’s criticisms were false. Perhaps because this reasoning does not withstand scru- tiny, the majority does not attempt to defend the actual grounds on which the committee relied to support its conclusion. Instead, the majority seeks to downplay the entirety of the committee’s rationale by calling it a “sub- sidiary observation . . . .” Part II C of the majority opin- ion. Under the rubric of “examining all of the evidence in the record to determine whether the . . . committee’s finding was well supported”; id.; the majority proceeds to build a case against the plaintiff that disciplinary counsel did not build, and thereby violates a cardinal rule of administrative law by substituting its own, very different reason for the defective reason invoked by the committee to find the plaintiff’s statement to be false. The substitute reason supplied by the majority is that, contrary to the plaintiff’s statement, the judicial deci- sions criticized by him were “meaningful and legally supported . . . .” Part II A of the majority opinion. The majority’s conclusion is flawed because, under our rules of practice, judicial review of a disciplinary decision of the defendant or one of its reviewing committees is confined to the record, and “neither the trial court nor this court takes on the function of a fact finder.” (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 226, 890 A.2d 509, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823, 127 S. Ct. 157, 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006); see also Practice Book § 2-38 (d) (“[t]he appeal shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record”);3 Practice Book § 2-38 (f) (“[u]pon appeal, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the Statewide Grievance Committee or reviewing committee as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact”).4 This restrictive standard of review precludes the majority from considering material that is not in the record, making factual findings that the reviewing com- mittee did not make, and employing reasoning not relied on by the committee. I am unable to join the majority’s departure from the principles that govern our judicial review and animate rule 8.2 (a).

My disagreement with the majority runs deeper than a mere difference of opinion over the technical niceties of judicial review of disciplinary decisions made by a reviewing committee. The majority’s analysis does more than marshal evidence from the record to support the reviewing committee’s factual finding; it uses raw mate- rials buried in the record to construct a brand new edifice based on an analysis that the committee simply never made. The fact that the majority arrives at the same ultimate determination as the committee (i.e., that the plaintiff’s statement violated rule 8.2 (a)) does not mean that the majority has adhered to its proper role. What matters is the propriety of the committee’s analysis. When appellate review properly is limited to the record before the committee, the facts the committee found, and the grounds on which the committee relied to reach its decision in accordance with Practice Book § 2-38 (d) and (f), it is clear that the evidence before the commit- tee was insufficient to support, by clear and convincing proof, its factual finding that the plaintiff made a false statement concerning the integrity of the judiciary in violation of rule 8.2 (a). I therefore respectfully dissent. I

The factual and procedural history of this case is lengthy and complex, and there is no need to repeat it in violation of constitutional provisions, rules of practice or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the authority of the committee; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropri- ate, rescind the action of the Statewide Grievance Committee or take such other action as may be necessary. For purposes of further appeal, the action taken by the Superior Court hereunder is a final judgment.” here. In a nutshell, following a protracted and conten- tious dispute between the plaintiff and Attorney Doug- las P. Mahoney over the division of a contingency fee resulting from a wrongful death action, the plaintiff and Mahoney negotiated a settlement agreement through mediation efforts overseen by Superior Court Judge Bar- bara N. Bellis. The plaintiff submitted to Judge Bellis a written motion for an order to release the disputed funds consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement. In that motion, the plaintiff made the following state- ment: “While the undersigned genuinely appreciates the sincere efforts of this court [i.e., Judge Bellis] to bring this matter to a close after years of litigation, the plaintiff is nevertheless completely disillusioned and disappointed with the prior judges who have ‘heard’ this case, and their unwillingness to make any meaningful effort to analyze the facts and the law. Decision after decision was not only legally incorrect, but devoid of any meaningful jurisprudence. The plaintiff has opted to resolve this case solely because it has become appar- ent that, in this instance, for whatever reason, justice is not possible. In thirty years of practice, [the plaintiff has] never seen anything like this, where the rules and the law are simply and totally disregarded.” (Emphasis in original.)

Judge Bellis referred the plaintiff to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and a subcommittee of the defendant, the reviewing committee, held a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff’s statement violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. At the hearing, the plaintiff was the sole wit- ness, and only two exhibits were admitted into evidence: (1) a letter from Mahoney to the Probate Court and the plaintiff dated May 13, 2014, and (2) a September 16, 2016 motion to disqualify the plaintiff from representing the estate of Connor Kusmit, and the estate’s objection thereto, in Estate of Kusmit v. Court of Probate, District of East Haven-North Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. NNH-CV-XX-XXXXXXX- S.5 In response to questioning before the committee, the plaintiff discussed various memoranda of decision issued by the Probate Court and the Superior Court in connection with the fee dispute prior to its settlement, and the reasons why the plaintiff believed that those decisions were wrongly decided. Neither the plaintiff nor disciplinary counsel offered those judicial decisions into evidence or detailed the legal or factual grounds on which the judges relied to arrive at their conclusions in those decisions. The decisions are not part of the certi- fied contents of the record in this matter. See Practice Book § 2-38 (c).

Although the plaintiff’s statement did not identify by name any of the judges criticized, the plaintiff testi- fied that his statement referred in relevant part to the following judges: (1) Probate Court Judge Michael R. Brandt, who presided over the administration of the estate receiving the wrongful death proceeds and initially apportioned $40,000 of the $66,666.66 in attorney’s fees to Mahoney, (2) Superior Court Judge Matthew E. Frechette, who denied the plaintiff’s motions to stay the Probate Court proceedings and to dismiss the Probate Court appeal in connection with the apportionment of attorney’s fees, and (3) Superior Court Judge Sybil V. Richards, who presided over the Probate Court appeal and, following a trial de novo, issued a memorandum of decision apportioning the attorney’s fees in the same amount as had Judge Brandt. As previously indicated, the decisions issued by these judges were not offered or entered into evidence at the disciplinary hearing, and there was no inquiry or other effort at the hearing by disciplinary counsel or the members of the reviewing committee to examine the substance or reasoning of any of those judicial decisions.

For example, in the course of the hearing, disciplinary counsel asked the plaintiff about his motion to dismiss the Probate Court appeal, which had been denied by Judge Frechette. The plaintiff testified that he thought Judge attorney’s fees to Mahoney. Mahoney moved to disqualify the plaintiff from representing the estate in that matter.

Frechette was “a smart person” who “tries to . . . give thought to things.” The plaintiff maintained, however, that Judge Frechette’s denial of the motion to dismiss was “legally incorrect” and “ignored the current law” because he did not address “one case in particular that Judge [Beverly J.] Hodgson decided, I think it’s called Pink. And [the case was] cited . . . to Judge Frechette.” See generally McNamara & Goodman v. Pink, 44 Conn. Supp. 592, 696 A.2d 1328 (1997). According to the plaintiff, Pink stands for the proposition that, once a settlement check has been deposited “in the attorney’s IOLTA account . . . the client does not have a posses- sory right to the contingency fee. Upon deposit, that is no longer estate money; that’s law firm money,” such that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction over the fee dispute. The plaintiff explained that Judge Frechette’s memorandum of decision “was legally and factually incorrect and devoid of any meaningful jurisprudence” because it did not address Pink.

In response to questioning, the plaintiff also discussed the memorandum of decision authored by Judge Richards apportioning the attorney’s fees. The plaintiff explained his belief that Judge Richards’ decision was likewise “legally incorrect,” made no “meaningful effort to ana- lyze the facts and law,” and was “devoid of any meaning- ful jurisprudence” because, at the evidentiary hearing, “the underlying [Probate Court] decision [was admitted] as a full exhibit over . . . objection, and then . . . [the] decision [subsequently issued by Judge Richards] after all of that is exactly to the dollar of what Judge Brandt said [in the Probate Court]. That’s not a trial de novo.” Disciplinary counsel thereafter asked the plaintiff whether he had filed an appeal from the Superior Court decisions at issue, and the following colloquy occurred: “[The Plaintiff]: I can’t recall. “[Disciplinary Counsel]: Okay. Well, that appeal was sustained, I mean, dismissed, wasn’t it? [The Appellate Court] found that the decision of Judge Richards was correct. “[The Plaintiff]: I don’t believe there was ever a sub- stantive finding that . . . wound up in [an Appellate Court] decision, no. “[Disciplinary Counsel]: Well, what happened to the appeal? “[The Plaintiff]: I don’t know . . . to be honest with you. I think it was dismissed, I think. I certainly know there’s no published opinion on what Judge Richards did.”6 Disciplinary counsel also elicited testimony from the plaintiff that he “lost all” of his arguments and that none of the challenged decisions was “ever overturned on any kind of appeal or by another judge.” At no point in the proceedings did the parties ask the reviewing commit- tee to take judicial notice of the judicial decisions about which the plaintiff testified or the pleadings in those underlying cases.

In closing argument at the hearing, disciplinary coun- sel argued that the plaintiff’s statement violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct because the plaintiff had “made conclusory allegations against judges in a pleading filed with the court [i.e., the motion for an order filed with Judge Bellis] without any factual support.” Disciplinary counsel maintained that the plaintiff had “every opportunity to explain all of the factual information he was relying [on] when he made these allegations against all of these judges. He provided no objective information other than the fact that he couldn’t believe that they weren’t granting his motion and . . . they were disagreeing with him in their decisions. Even if a judge is wrong and is overturned on appeal, it doesn’t mean that he is corrupt or that he has abandoned his obligation to act as a . . . Superior Court judge. . . . [A]nd that hasn’t even happened in this case. Not one of the decisions that he complains about has been overturned on appeal. . . . [T]he statement speaks for itself. All you’ve got to do is read the statement. You can’t make a claim like that about Superior Court judges [who] have completely abandoned their obligations to perform their duties without any evidence, and we haven’t heard anything other than, ‘I’m not happy with their rulings, how could they rule against me like that?’ ” (Emphasis added.) Disciplinary counsel’s position was that the fal- sity of the plaintiff’s statement was on its face obvious and self-proving.

The reviewing committee evidently was persuaded by disciplinary counsel’s argument. It issued a written decision concluding that the plaintiff’s statement vio- lated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from making “a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . .” The committee explained its reasoning as follows: “In the [plaintiff’s] motion for an order, the [plaintiff] represents that ‘decision after decision was not only legally incorrect, but devoid of any meaningful jurisprudence.’ The [plaintiff] also repre- sented that ‘the rules and the laws are simply and totally disregarded.’ However, none of the decisions or motions the [plaintiff] took issue with [was] overturned on any appeal. The [plaintiff], in making the representations that he did, made false statements concerning the integ- rity of the judiciary.” (Emphasis added.) The committee further found that the plaintiff’s false statement was made with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity because “[t]he record is clear that the [plaintiff] intended to write the statement that he did, and stood by what he wrote. While the [plaintiff] may not have named any specific judges in the matter, it was clear that the [plaintiff] intended to attack the judiciary without a basis to do so.” Lastly, the committee found that the plaintiff’s statement “attack[ing] . . . the integrity of the judiciary” also “constitute[d] conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, a clear violation of rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” The committee therefore reprimanded the plaintiff “for violating rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4).”

The reviewing committee’s decision was affirmed by the defendant on review; see Practice Book § 2-35 (k); and the trial court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, reasoning that clear and convincing evidence supported the committee’s decision because the allega- tions in the plaintiff’s statement “clearly attack the judges’ competence and alleged faithfulness to the law, thereby attacking the integrity of the Probate Court and the Superior Court,” and because “none of the decisions or motions that the plaintiff took issue with was overturned on appeal.” Mills v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 228 Conn. App. 852, 862–63, 326 A.3d 309 (2024).

The Appellate Court concluded that it did not need to resolve the plaintiff’s claim that “his statements were true because the courts committed legal error” on the ground that, “even if the plaintiff genuinely believed that the Probate Court and the Superior Court misapplied the law or issued incorrect decisions, he should have raised those issues directly rather than disparaging the courts in a later motion for [an] order.” Id., 864. This court granted certification to appeal to determine whether “the Appellate Court properly [upheld] the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal from his reprimand by the defendant . . . on the basis of rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .” Mills v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 351 Conn. 903, 903–904, 329 A.3d 240 (2025).

II

The majority affirms the judgment of the Appellate Court, albeit for reasons different than those articulated by the Appellate Court and the reviewing committee.

The majority relies on excerpts from the memoranda of decision authored by Judges Frechette and Richards to conclude that the plaintiff’s statement violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, even though the memoranda of decision were not admitted into evidence, made part of the record, or relied on by the committee in arriving at its decision. Nonetheless, the majority stakes its conclusion on selective quotations from these decisions contained in Mahoney’s motion to disqualify the plaintiff in the Superior Court and in the defendant’s reply to the plaintiff’s request for review of the decision of the committee to hold that Judges Frechette and Rich- ards “provided the plaintiff with meaningful and legally supported decisions despite [the plaintiff’s] assertions to the contrary.” Part II A of the majority opinion.

The majority’s analysis is flawed because it is substan- tially and materially based on evidence that is not part of the record in contravention of Practice Book § 2-38 (d). Relatedly, the majority relies on reasoning that appears nowhere in the reviewing committee’s decision and thereby “substitute[s] its judgment for that of the . . . reviewing committee” as to the falsity of the allegations in the plaintiff’s statement in violation of Practice Book § 2-38 (f). When appellate review is properly limited to the contents of the record and the reasons given by the committee, there is insufficient evidence in this case to support the committee’s factual finding that the plain- tiff made a false statement in violation of rule 8.2 (a). I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court with direction to sustain the plaintiff’s appeal.

A

Rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct pro- vides in relevant part that “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . .” As explained in the commentary to the rule, “[a]ssessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attor- ney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.” Rules of Professional Conduct 8.2, commentary. Thus, a lawyer violates rule 8.2 (a) if he or she (1) makes a false statement, (2) that he or she knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity, and (3) the statement concerns the qualifications or integrity of a judge.

Disciplinary counsel had the initial burden of produc- ing clear and convincing evidence establishing a viola- tion of rule 8.2 (a). See, e.g., Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 226. “Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Once disciplinary counsel has fulfilled the burden of establishing a violation of rule 8.2 (a), “the burden of evidence shifts to the alleged violator . . . [to] pro- vide evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 224 n.7. Importantly, the alleged violator “has no burden to carry until [disciplinary counsel] presents clear and convincing evidence of the violation.” Id. After disciplinary counsel has satisfied the threshold burden of proving the three elements constituting a rule vio- lation, and “after the [alleged violator then] provides evidence that he had an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true, the burden shifts back to [dis- ciplinary counsel] to rebut that evidence and, ultimately, to carry [his] burden of persuasion and to convince the finder of fact of the truth of the claimed violation.” Id. Whether the plaintiff made a false statement is a ques- tion of fact. See, e.g., Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 339 Conn. 503, 520, 261 A.3d 722 (2021).

In reviewing the reviewing committee’s factual find- ings, “neither the trial court nor this court takes on the function of a fact finder. Rather, our role is limited to reviewing the record to determine if the facts as found are supported by the evidence contained within the record and whether the conclusions that follow are legally and logically correct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 226. Judicial review “is similar to the review afforded to an administrative agency decision,” and “the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the . . . reviewing committee as to the weight of the evi- dence on questions of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 227. The decision of the committee must be upheld unless the court determines that “the com- mittee’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, proba- tive, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . . .” Practice Book § 2-38 (f) (5); see also Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 520 (“[f]actual findings of the reviewing committee are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard”).

B

Resolution of this appeal turns on whether there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the reviewing committee’s factual finding that the following allegations in the plaintiff’s statement were false:7 (1) “[d]ecision after decision was not only legally incorrect, but devoid of any meaningful jurisprudence,” and (2) “the rules and the laws are simply and totally disregarded.”8 (Emphasis omitted.) The committee found these state- ments to be false on the sole ground that “none of the decisions or motions the [plaintiff] took issue with [was] overturned on any appeal.” Rather than reviewing the ground on which the committee actually relied to arrive at its factual finding regarding falsity, the majority looks under stones buried elsewhere in the record to locate fragmentary traces to support an alternative ground that was not considered, analyzed, or decided by the committee. The following discussion explains why the majority’s analysis contravenes the limited standard of review set forth in Practice Book § 2-38 (d) and (f). The record evidence is insufficient to support, by clear and convincing proof, a reasonable inference that the plaintiff made a false statement when he expressed his view that Judges Frechette and Richards issued decisions that were legally incorrect and devoid of meaningful jurisprudence. The memoranda of decision are not in the record, and, without them, it is impossible to find under the present circumstances that the plaintiff’s statement was false. Falsity is a relational concept that depends on establishing a material deviation from the truth, and the falsity of a factual statement can be established only by comparing the statement to the reality it allegedly misrepresents. In this case, the memoranda of decision criticized by the plaintiff provided the essential points of comparison necessary to demonstrate the falsity of the plaintiff’s criticism. Yet, apparently because dis- ciplinary counsel mistakenly believed that the falsity of the plaintiff’s statements was either presumed or self-evident, those memoranda were not presented as evidence during the disciplinary proceeding and were not included as part of the record.9

Given that the judicial decisions at issue are not in the record, the majority resorts to an unorthodox and indirect method for establishing that the content of those decisions (or at least two of them) proved the fal- sity of the plaintiff’s statement. The majority places great weight in particular on a handful of fragmentary excerpts from Judge Frechette’s memorandum of deci- sion quoted in the procedural background section of a motion filed by Mahoney to disqualify the plaintiff from representing the estate in the appeal to the Superior Court of the attorney’s fee dispute.10 Unlike the actual decision issued by Judge Frechette, Mahoney’s motion to disqualify is in the record, and, although neither the motion nor its reference to Judge Frechette’s decision was relied on directly or indirectly as the basis for the reviewing committee’s finding of a rule violation, the majority contends that these “limited portions of [Judge Frechette’s] decision [in Mahoney’s motion], in addition to the other evidence in the record, which includes the plaintiff’s testimony, suffice to support the reviewing committee’s finding that the plaintiff violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Footnote 7 of the majority opinion.

The majority’s analysis is flawed in multiple respects. First, as I will discuss in part II B 2 of this opinion, the reviewing committee did not rely on the plaintiff’s testi- mony or the memoranda of decision authored by Judges Frechette and Richards to find the plaintiff’s statement to be false, and the committee’s decision contains no sug- gestion whatsoever that this material played any role in its factual finding. Although judicial review includes “the whole record”; Practice Book § 2-38 (f) (5); whole record review does not permit an appellate court to substitute its own judgment as to the legal significance of those facts for that of the committee. In my view, the majority engages in precisely the kind of post hoc rationalization of the underlying committee decision that it acknowledges is impermissible under administrative law principles. Moreover, turning judicial review of administrative decisions on its head, the majority relieves the committee of its responsibility to articulate the basis for an alleged rule violation because this court will do the work to comb through the record to make the required findings.

Second, and of equal importance, the majority conflates the reviewing committee’s factual finding as to falsity with the committee’s factual finding as to whether the plaintiff made a false statement with the requisite men- tal state (i.e., knowingly or recklessly). The committee did not rely on the plaintiff’s testimony to arrive at its factual finding regarding falsity; it relied solely on the evidence demonstrating that “none of the decisions or motions the [plaintiff] took issue with [was] overturned on any appeal.” Only after finding the plaintiff’s state- ment to be false did the committee consider the plaintiff’s testimony, finding that “[t]he record is clear that the [plaintiff] intended to write the statement that he did, and stood by what he wrote. While the [plaintiff] may not have named any specific judges in the matter, it was clear that the [plaintiff] intended to attack the judiciary without a basis to do so” and, therefore, that he made his statement “with reckless disregard as to its truth . . . [in] violation of rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Profes- sional Conduct.” It is the majority, not the committee, that finds the plaintiff’s statement to be false because the plaintiff’s hearing testimony demonstrates that the statement was “grounded in rumor, speculation, and apparent frustration with decisions that were not in his favor.”11 Part II A of the majority opinion. In doing so, the majority impermissibly “takes on the function of a fact finder.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 226.

Third, the quotations from Judge Frechette’s memo- randum of decision that Mahoney selected in support of his motion to disqualify, which the majority relies on to uphold the decision of the reviewing committee on different grounds, do not come close to providing a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude, by clear and convincing evidence no less, that Judge Frechette’s deci- sion was legally correct, contained meaningful jurispru- dence, and regarded the rules and the law. In fact, the excerpt from Judge Frechette’s memorandum of decision quoted in Mahoney’s motion is unaccompanied by any citation to legal authority and therefore does not prove that the allegations in the plaintiff’s statement were false in violation of rule 8.2 (a).12 Moreover, even if the quotations cited by Mahoney had contained legal sup- port, that evidence would not demonstrate that Judge Frechette’s decision was legally correct, contained mean- ingful jurisprudence, and considered the relevant legal principles. To resolve that issue, it would be necessary to carefully consider the legal arguments raised by the parties in support of their respective claims. The record reflects that the plaintiff’s legal claim was that the Pro- bate Court did not have jurisdiction to resolve the fee dispute by apportioning the total amount of attorney’s fees between the plaintiff and Mahoney. The quoted material is focused on the Probate Court’s jurisdiction to determine and approve the total amount of the attor- ney’s fees owed by the estate, not the Probate Court’s jurisdiction to apportion the total amount of those fees in resolution of the fee dispute between the plaintiff and Mahoney. Although the memorandum of decision refers to Mahoney’s request for fees, it does not identify a legal basis, much less a “meaningful jurispruden[tial]” basis, establishing the Probate Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the division of fees between two attorneys. With respect to Judge Richards’ memorandum of decision, the majority seeks to import it into the record via quoted material contained in the defendant’s reply to the plaintiff’s request for review, which was filed after the reviewing committee already had issued its decision. See Practice Book § 2-35 (k) (providing for review by Statewide Grievance Committee “[w]ithin thirty days of the issuance to the parties of the final decision by the reviewing committee”). Because these quotations were not in the record at the time the reviewing committee found the plaintiff’s statement to be false, the commit- tee did not and could not have relied on this information to arrive at its factual finding. For the same reason, the majority cannot rely on this material, post hoc, to uphold the decision of the committee.

When judicial review is confined to the record, it is clear to me that the evidence before the reviewing committee was insufficient to establish by clear and convincing proof that the allegations in the plaintiff’s statement were false. Assuming, without deciding, that the allegations in the plaintiff’s statement concerned the integrity of the judiciary13 and were not the expression of an opinion protected by the first amendment to the United States constitution,14 I note that the mere fact that the judicial decisions criticized by the plaintiff were not overturned on appeal is not enough to demonstrate the falsity of the plaintiff’s statement. Not every judicial decision that has not been overturned on appeal is ipso facto legally correct and meaningfully analyzed, especially if appellate review was unavailable or the substantive merits of the issue decided never were reached.15 At the very least, unless a judicial decision has been affirmed on its substantive merits, a fact finder cannot assess whether it was legally correct and meaningfully analyzed without examining the full text of the relevant memorandum of decision and considering the claims raised by the parties, the facts in the record, and the prevailing case law. The committee did not and could not have conducted the requisite analy- sis because neither the pleadings nor the memoranda of decision criticized by the plaintiff were admitted into evidence. The committee’s factual finding as to the falsity of the plaintiff’s statement is unsupported by the record evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. The defendant appears to contend that, pursuant to Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004), Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, supra, 277 Conn. 218, and Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 299 Conn. 405, 10 A.3d 507 (2011), the falsity of the plaintiff’s statement may be presumed, and the burden was on the plaintiff to rebut the presump- tion of falsity by producing objective evidence establish- ing the truth of his statement. I do not construe our case law so broadly. In Burton v. Mottolese, supra, 49–50, this court held that an attorney’s statement accusing a judge of gender bias was false because, among other reasons, the attorney “knowingly misrepresented to the court in [an] affidavit that [certain female plaintiffs in the underlying case] had commented on the preferential treatment the males involved in the underlying case were receiving.” At an evidentiary hearing, however, “the trial court credited the testimony of [one of the female plaintiffs] denying that she had ever made allegations of gender bias against the court, over the testimony of the [attorney].” Id., 51. Because there was evidence in the record to support the finding of falsity, “the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the [attorney] violated [rule] 8.2 . . . .” Id. The court did not hold that the alleged violator in a disciplinary proceeding has the burden of demonstrating that the statements at issue are true, although I acknowledge that it also does not express the contrary holding.

In Notopolous v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 218, this court explicitly recognized that “[t]he burden is on [disciplinary counsel] to establish the occurrence of an ethics violation by clear and convinc- ing proof”; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 226; and confirmed that the alleged violator “has no burden to carry until [disciplinary counsel] presents clear and convincing evidence of the violation.” Id., 224 n.7. In that case, a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee determined that an attorney’s letter accusing a Probate Court judge of being a “financial predator” and extorting money from an estate without legal authority; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 221 n.4; violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Con- duct. See id., 219–20. On appeal, the attorney claimed that there was insufficient evidence to establish the violations by clear and convincing proof because the only evidence presented to the reviewing committee was the letter and the attorney’s testimony regarding the letter. See id., 222–25. This court disagreed, concluding that the record evidence, which included “the language of the [attorney’s] accusatory letter, the [attorney’s] testi- mony, [the Probate Court judge’s] complaint, paperwork documenting the relationship between the parties, and the [attorney’s] failure to make his allegations through more appropriate judicial channels”; id., 230; belied the attorney’s allegations of extortion by demonstrating that the Probate Court judge “had demanded that the [attor- ney] pay fees for court-appointed agents of the Probate Court” as authorized by law. Id., 229. Moreover, the only factual support for the attorney’s allegations concerning the Probate Court judge’s “potentially criminal action”; id.; was the attorney’s “disagreement with a number of [the judge’s] decisions over the course of the probate proceedings,” which did not in and of itself “amount to evidence of illegal or unethical behavior on the part of [the] judge.” Id., 230. Accordingly, this court concluded that “the [reviewing] committee’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that the [attorney] violated rule 8.2 (a) was not clearly erroneous.” Id., 230–31.

Notopolous did not place the burden on the attorney to establish the truth of his statement. To the contrary, as I have indicated, this court emphasized that “[t]he burden is on [disciplinary counsel] to establish the occurrence of an ethics violation by clear and convincing proof”; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 226; and plainly stated that the attorney “has no burden to carry until [disciplinary counsel] presents clear and convincing evi- dence of the violation.” Id., 224 n.7. A violation of rule 8.2 (a) includes proof of falsity, and I read Notopolous to hold that there was sufficient evidence for the review- ing committee to find by clear and convincing proof that the attorney’s allegations of extortion were false because there was evidence in the record that the money demanded by the Probate Court judge was for legitimate Probate Court fees and, therefore, not extortionate. See id., 229–30. Having fulfilled its burden of production as to all elements of the violation, including falsity of the statement, the burden of production then shifted to the attorney to provide “an objective, reasonable belief that the assertions [in his letter] were true.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Id., 228. Because the attorney failed to fulfill his burden of establishing that he had an objec- tive, reasonable belief in the truth of his statement, it was reasonable for the reviewing committee to infer that the attorney made the false statement either knowing it was false or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. This burden shifting framework makes sense if applied correctly. Once disciplinary counsel has adduced suffi- cient evidence to establish the actus reus of a violation of rule 8.2 (a) (i.e., that an attorney made a false statement concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge), it is reasonable for the fact finder to infer that the attorney made the false statement with the requisite mens rea (i.e., knowingly or recklessly) in the absence of proof to the contrary. After all, it is the speaker of the state- ment who should know whether there was “an objective basis for the [statement]” and is in the best position to produce that information.16 Statewide Grievance Com- mittee v. Burton, supra, 299 Conn. 413.17 Thus, it may be reasonable for the reviewing committee to infer that an attorney who makes a false statement concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge did so either knowingly or recklessly, unless the attorney can present evidence to establish a factual basis for his or her claims. See Notopoulous v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 227–28.

The foregoing legal analysis is strongly reinforced by the constitutional principles that are implicated by rule 8.2 (a). Construing our precedent to require an attor- ney affirmatively to establish the truth of his or her statement concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge jeopardizes the free expression of core political speech protected by the first amendment. As the United States Supreme Court stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), “[a] rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to a comparable self-censorship. Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the [speaker], does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. . . . Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. . . . The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the [f]irst and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 279; see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1986) (“the allocation of the burden of proof will determine liability for some speech that is true and some that is false, but all of such speech is unknowably true or false,” and, when “the scales are in such an uncertain balance . . . the [c]onstitution . . . tip[s] [the balance] in favor of protect- ing true speech” on matters of public concern (emphasis in original)). Unduly burdening the speech of attorneys, who are “the very class of people in daily contact with the judicial system” and “most calculated to be intimately familiar with this aspect of the government process,” not only infringes on attorneys’ first amendment rights to criticize the government, but also on “the public’s [f]irst [a]mendment right to hear what [the attorney] has to say . . . clearly strik[ing] at the center of the concerns of the [f]irst [a]mendment . . . .” State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 967 (Okla. 1988); see also In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1085 (Colo. 2000) (“[r]estrictions on attorney speech burden not only the attorney’s right to criticize judges, but also hinder the public’s access to the class of people in the best position to comment on the functioning of the judicial system”). Finally, even if, as the defendant suggests, our case law may be construed to relieve disciplinary counsel of the burden of producing evidence demonstrating the falsity of an attorney’s statement concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, I would strictly limit any such presumption of falsity to unsubstantiated allegations of judicial corruption, bias, or criminality. See, e.g., State- wide Grievance Committee v. Burton, supra, 299 Conn. 412–13 (corruption); Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 229–30 (criminal conduct); Burton v. Mottolese, supra, 267 Conn. 46 (bias). Such generalized allegations are “at or near the very top in seriousness, for [they kill] the very soul of judging— fairness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Mottolese, supra, 49. Moreover, wholly conclusory allegations of judicial corruption, bias, or criminality are easy to make but difficult to disprove. Cf. Langadi- nos v. American Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2000) (requiring specificity when pleading civil rights violations because “charges of discriminatory intent are difficult to disprove and can greatly harm a defendant’s reputation”).

The present case does not involve unsubstantiated allegations of judicial corruption, bias, or criminality. Instead, the plaintiff alleged that “[d]ecision after deci- sion was not only legally incorrect, but devoid of any meaningful jurisprudence,” and that “the rules and the laws are simply and totally disregarded.” (Emphasis omit- ted.) As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, alleging that a judge’s decision was “wrong on [the] law” is not the same as alleging that a judge is “corrupt or venal or stupid or incompetent.” In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 635, 79 S. Ct. 1376, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1473 (1959); see id. (The evidence was insufficient to establish that the attor- ney impugned the judge’s integrity by alleging that he was “wrong on [the] law” because such an allegation was of “no matter; appellate courts and law reviews say that of judges daily, and it imputes no disgrace. Dissenting opinions in [the United States] [R]eports are apt to make [such] speech look like tame stuff indeed.”). Allegations that judicial decisions are legally incorrect, devoid of meaningful jurisprudence, and in disregard of the rules and the law “are the staple of appellate briefs, and can- not without more constitute ethical violations.” Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 304 (6th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[a]ttorneys should be free to challenge, in appropriate legal proceedings, a court’s perceived partiality without the court misconstruing such a challenge as an assault on the integrity of the court”).

Given the nature of the allegations in the plaintiff’s statement, there is no rebuttable presumption of falsity, and, consequently, disciplinary counsel bore the burden of producing evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff’s allegations that “[d]ecision after decision was not only legally incorrect, but devoid of any meaningful jurispru- dence,” and that “the rules and the laws are simply and totally disregarded” were false. (Emphasis omitted.) For the reasons explained herein, disciplinary counsel failed to fulfill his burden of production, and the evidence in the record is insufficient to support the reviewing com- mittee’s factual finding that the plaintiff had made a false statement in violation of rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

I am confident that the reasons set forth in part II B of this opinion provide a basis for reversal without engaging in further analysis. I am also convinced, how- ever, that reversal is required for an additional reason. Even if the record could somehow be construed to contain evidence of falsity based on the plaintiff’s testimony and the content of memoranda of decision that were never made part of the record, a reviewing court nonetheless is precluded from “substitut[ing] its [own] judgment for that of the . . . reviewing committee as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 227; accord Practice Book § 2-38 (f). This prohibition bars a reviewing court from relying on facts not found or reasoning not set forth in the committee’s decision, regardless of whether it is reversing or affirming the committee’s decision.

Although there is no Connecticut precedent directly on point, I find persuasive the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943) (Chenery). In Chenery, the United States Supreme Court held that “[t]he grounds [on] which an adminis- trative order must be judged are those [on] which the record discloses that its action was based,” as reflected by “the [agency’s own] opinion.” Id., 87. Confining judicial review to the reasons articulated by the agency does “not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct although the lower court relied [on] a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason” because, when “the correctness of the lower court’s decision depends [on] a determination of fact [that] only a jury could make but [that] has not been made, the appellate court cannot take the place of the jury. Like considerations govern review of administra- tive orders. If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment [that] the agency alone is authorized to make and [that] it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judg- ment. For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot intrude [on] the domain [that the legislature] has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 88.

The Chenery doctrine, as it is commonly known, is a foundational and “now-bedrock principle” of adminis- trative law. Food & Drug Administration v. Wages & White Lion Investments, LLC, 604 U.S. 542, 587, 145 S. Ct. 898, 221 L. Ed. 2d 436 (2025); see also Calcutt v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 598 U.S. 623, 629, 143 S. Ct. 1317, 215 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2023) (“[a] reviewing court . . . is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under the Chenery doctrine, judicial review is limited to “the reasons [the agency] actually articulate[d],” and courts “will not affirm based on evidence that may appear in the record but that was not relied on in the [agency’s] decision because [they] can- not know how the [agency] would have viewed evidence [it] did not analyze. . . . To assume a hypothetical basis for the [agency’s] determination, even one based in the record, would usurp [the agency’s] role.” (Citation omit- ted.) Lin v. Dept. of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 400 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Bagdonas v. Dept. of Treasury, 93 F.3d 422, 426 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The . . . court has no power to ‘cure’ the agency’s failure to fulfill its responsibilities by combing the record on its own in search of a theory that might support the agency’s decision. Chenery forbids such judicial [second-guessing] . . . .”).

This court has cited Chenery’s progeny with approval and stressed the importance of limiting judicial review to the precise grounds articulated by an administra- tive agency in support of its decision. In Lee v. Board of Education, 181 Conn. 69, 434 A.2d 333 (1980), this court stated that “[a] court reviewing an administrative determination cannot engage in surmise and conjecture to determine whether the decision was lawfully reached.” Id., 82, citing Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196–97, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947) (Chenery II). In Chenery II, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the “simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . that a review- ing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it con- siders to be a more adequate or proper basis.” Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., supra, 332 U.S. 196. Consistent with the Chenery doctrine, the court in Lee declined to supply facts not found and legal conclusions not reached by the administrative agency. Instead, the court reversed the decision of the agency and remanded for further proceedings, in keeping with the bedrock principle that it is the role of the agency, not the reviewing court, to try the case, to find the facts, and to apply the law. See Lee v. Board of Education, supra, 81–82 and n.12, 84.

As the majority correctly observes, an administra- tive agency is not required to articulate the basis for its decision with “the degree of analytical exposition or stylistic precision expected of an appellate court deci- sion.” Part II C of the majority opinion. And, if the basis of an administrative agency’s decision is ambiguous or unclear, a reviewing court may rely on the “evidence in the administrative record to support [the agency’s] conclusion.” Stratford Police Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, 343 Conn. 62, 83, 272 A.3d 639 (2022); see id., 82–83 (“[a]lthough the board did not issue a written decision explaining the bases on which it determined that the defendant was suitable to receive a pistol permit, there is substantial evidence in the admin- istrative record to support its conclusion”). However, “[w]hen an administrative agency specifically states its reasons, the court should go no further because it could reasonably be inferred that this was the extent of its findings. To go beyond those stated reasons invades the [fact-finding] mission of the agency by allowing the court to cull out reasons that the agency may not have found to be credible or proven.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gibbons v. Historic District Commission, 285 Conn. 755, 771, 941 A.2d 917 (2008); cf. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Pizzoferrato v. Mansions, LLC, 354 Conn. 273, 287–88, A.3d (2026) (declining to imply factual finding in decision when it was not included either expressly or by implication); Channon v. Sanford Co., 70 Conn. 573, 581–82, 40 A. 462 (1898) (same). The observation that a reviewing committee is not an administrative agency is true but misses my point. With full awareness of that difference, this court nonethe- less has emphasized that the same principles of judicial review apply in both contexts. Thus, “the court’s review of [a reviewing committee’s] conclusions is similar to the review afforded to an administrative agency decision,” and a reviewing court is precluded from “substitut[ing] its [own] judgment for that of the . . . reviewing com- mittee as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”18 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 277 Conn. 227. Here, the reviewing committee clearly and unequivocally articulated the factual basis for its decision, finding that the allegations in the plaintiff’s statement were false for one reason: because the undisputed evidence in the record established that “none of the decisions or motions the [plaintiff] took issue with [was] overturned on any appeal.” Because the committee specifically stated the basis for its factual finding, it is reasonable to “[infer] that this was the extent of its findings,” and “[t]o go beyond [that] stated [reason] invades the [fact-finding] mission of the [committee] . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gibbons v. Historic District Commis- sion, supra, 285 Conn. 771. Under these circumstances, our precedent teaches that it is not the proper role of the court to comb the record to find factual support for a different reason why the plaintiff’s statement could be deemed false—because the memoranda of decision authored by Judges Frechette and Richards were legally violated the rules of professional responsibility, with no deference to the committee’s legal determination. After all, the defendant does not have exclusive authority to investigate and determine attorney mis- conduct; the judges of the Superior Court have inherent authority “to supervise the conduct of their own officers . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Mottolese, supra, 267 Conn. 27; see also Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner, 318 Conn. 652, 672, 122 A.3d 592 (2015) (“[r]egulation of the actual practice of law . . . remains the sole province of the judiciary”).

But, for better or for worse, that is not the course that we have taken; our rules of practice and our case law have instead codified and applied the bedrock principles of administrative law to review disciplinary deci- sions made by the defendant and its reviewing committees. Compare Practice Book § 2-38 (d) and (f), with General Statutes § 4-183 (i) and (j); see also Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 234, 578 A.2d 1075 (1990) (“[a]ppeals to the court from the determinations of administrative, legislative and quasi-judicial bodies are limited to a review of the record to determine if the facts as found are supported by the evidence contained within the record and whether the conclusions that follow are legally and logically correct” (emphasis added)). Regard- less of its origins in the separation of powers doctrine, the Chenery doctrine effectuates the commands of Practice Book § 2-38 (d) and (f) to confine judicial review “to the record” and to refrain from substituting the court’s own “judgment for that of the . . . reviewing committee as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” Having codified and adopted these rules, we are bound to follow them. correct and cited meaningful jurisprudence. The com- mittee was not asked to and did not find the plaintiff’s statement to be false for this reason, and the majority cannot “usurp [the committee’s] role” by providing an alternative, “hypothetical basis for the [committee’s] determination, even one based in the record . . . .” Lin v. Dept. of Justice, supra, 428 F.3d 400.

III

When appellate review is confined to the evidence in the record, the facts the reviewing committee found, and the conclusions the committee reached in accordance with our rules of practice and prevailing case law, I con- clude that the evidence was insufficient to establish, by clear and convincing proof, that the plaintiff had made a false statement of fact concerning the integrity of a judge in violation of rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Profes- sional Conduct. Although I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the committee, I wish to make clear that I do not approve of the alle- gations in the plaintiff’s statement. In my view, the allegations were intemperate and inappropriate. Nor do I believe that attorneys who criticize judges or their judi- cial decisions are immune from discipline, particularly when those criticisms are factually incorrect, person- ally abusive, or otherwise prejudicial to the administra- tion of justice. Even without being demonstrably false, such statements may violate rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in relevant part that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the adminis- tration of justice . . . .”19 Additionally, depending on the nature of the allegations and the context in which they are made, they may run afoul of other disciplinary rules governing attorney conduct. See, e.g., Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1 (“[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”); Rules of Professional Conduct 3.5 (4) (“[a] lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal or ancillary proceedings such as depositions and mediations”); Rules of Profes- sional Conduct 3.6 (a) (“[a] lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be dis- seminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter”). Requiring disciplinary counsel to fulfill the burden under rule 8.2 (a) of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that an attorney knowingly or recklessly made a false statement concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge should not be understood to grant attorneys carte blanche to make unfounded or grossly incendiary statements disparaging judges or their decision-making.

Because I disagree with the majority that the record evidence was sufficient to support, by clear and convinc- ing proof, the reviewing committee’s factual finding that the plaintiff had made a false statement concerning the integrity of the judiciary in violation of rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, I dissent.