State v. Fomo

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The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ D’AURIA, J., with whom McDONALD, J., joins, con- curring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the result of parts I and II of the majority opinion and join the concurring opinion regarding the trial court’s abuse of discretion in admitting the expert opinion testimony of the state’s witness, Detective Todd McCormack. Like the concurring justice, I conclude that the trial court’s error was harmless, although I arrive at that conclusion based strictly on the weight of the state’s evidence, especially the testimony of the victim’s mother.

I disagree with part III of the majority opinion and write separately to express my continued disagreement that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a timely filed motion for a new trial simply because the court neglected to rule on that motion prior to sentencing. See State v. McCoy, 331 Conn. 561, 599–620, 206 A.3d 725 (2019) (D’Auria, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, for purposes of this case, because a majority of this court determined in State v. McCoy, supra, 586–87, that the trial court does in fact lose jurisdiction in that circumstance, I conclude that it was plain error for the trial court in the present case to fail to rule on the pend- ing motion for a new trial filed by the defendant, Frank Scott Fomo, after the jury returned its verdict but prior to sentencing. See id., 620 (D’Auria, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“accept[ing] the majority’s conclusion that there is no exception under the common law that would permit the trial court to rule on a timely filed motion for a new trial after the defendant had been sentenced, I have no trouble calling the trial court’s ‘unintentional’ loss of jurisdiction what it clearly was: plain error”).

In McCoy, this court determined that it was improper for the trial court to fail to rule on the defendant’s motion for a new trial prior to sentencing. See id., 592. However, due to “anomalies in our case law [that] may have resulted in some confusion,” the court concluded that the error was not “so clear an error as to satisfy the first prong of the plain error doctrine.” Id. I agree with the defendant that, since McCoy, it has been clear that a trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on a motion for a new trial after sentencing, and, thus, it should be patently obvious that it is error for the trial court to fail to rule on a timely filed motion. Trial courts have a fundamental obligation to decide matters properly before them. See In re Jewelyette M., 355 Conn. 102, 116, 359 A. 3d 543 (2026); see also Code of Judicial Con- duct, Rule 2.7 (“[a] judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge”); Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 338, 915 A.2d 790 (2007) (“In refusing to decide the motion before it by marking it ‘off,’ the trial court abdicated its fundamental obligation to decide all mat- ters properly presented to it. . . . [T]he court had the case and the . . . motion [at issue] properly before it. . . . [I]t was the court’s duty to determine the questions raised by the motion.”). Failure to do so clearly “affects the fair- ness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 812, 155 A.3d 209 (2017); see also State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 621 (D’Auria, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the trial court’s failure to rule on a timely filed motion for a new trial . . . clearly affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The state’s argument that the trial court’s failure to address the defendant’s motion in this case was not error because the defendant had failed to bring the motion to the attention of the trial court is, in my view, misdi- rected. On this point, I agree with the majority that “it was the trial court’s responsibility to be aware of and to rule on [the defendant’s] pending motion for a new trial before sentencing . . . .” When the state seeks to deprive an individual of his or her liberty in a criminal case, our rules of practice permit a defendant who has been found guilty to file a motion for a new trial before being sen- tenced. See Practice Book § 42-53. The defendant in this case did so. At most, the failure of the trial court to rule on the motion was a mutual mistake of both parties and the court. See State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 611–14 (D’Auria, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (unintentional loss of jurisdiction should be considered mutual mistake). As a judiciary, we can—and must—do better than hold fast to a judicially created rule that punishes the defendant for not pursuing his motion more aggressively when it prejudices neither the court nor the state to take the time to rule on the motion, even postsentencing. See id., 614 (D’Auria, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[u]ltimately, it is a question of judicial policy for this court to determine whether our common-law rule should prevent a timely filed motion for a new trial from being adjudicated”). The defendant, on the other hand, is prejudiced by the loss of one of his only remaining remedies.

The appropriate remedy here is to remand this case to the trial court with direction to rule on the defendant’s motion. It is inappropriate, in my view, for this court to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court and to conclude that the defendant’s motion was without merit simply because we have determined, exercising our standard of review, that the error was harmless. The manifest injustice in a case such as this is that the defendant has lost the opportunity to have his motion for a new trial reviewed first by the judge who presided over his criminal trial. The trial judge, having heard the witnesses’ testimony and counsel’s arguments, and having viewed the evidence and the jurors’ reactions, is in a better position than this court on appeal to assess error and prejudice. See id., 624 (D’Auria, J., concur- ring in part and dissenting in part). “It is because of this firsthand experience that trial courts are afforded discretion in deciding motions for a new trial, which we then review for abuse of that discretion. . . . Thus, the manifest injustice in this case is not necessarily that the defendant would have prevailed on his claims but, rather, that the parties and this court have lost the benefit of the trial court’s considered views of his claims . . . .” (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id. Our experi- ence might tell us that the trial court is highly unlikely to grant the motion for a new trial. But our system of justice should not succumb to this cynical (if accurate) view, permitting the trial court’s lapse to cut out the middleman and simply get to the likely inevitable result with more dispatch. I would insist that the procedures afforded to the defendant be followed.

I do not agree with the defendant, however, that the trial court’s plain error requires a reversal of his convic- tion and a new trial. As I stated in McCoy, “[t]his court has the ability to craft a remand order as justice requires . . . .” Id., 627 n.16 (D’Auria, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In my view, it is appropriate, there- fore, to remand this case to the trial court with direction to rule on the defendant’s motion for a new trial. I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. FRANK SCOTT FOMO (SC 21083)

Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.* Syllabus Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child in connection with the sexual abuse of the minor victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant had been romantically involved with the victim’s mother, N, and the abuse allegedly occurred regularly over the course of several years, both while the defendant was living with the victim and N, and after the defendant moved out of their shared residence. At trial, the state presented the testimony of the victim, N, and M, the detective who investigated the victim’s allegations of abuse. On cross-examination, both the victim and N testified about, inter alia, the positive aspects of the defendant’s relationship with the victim, which the victim and N charac- terized as warm, affectionate, and fatherlike. Subsequently, during direct examination of M, the prosecutor inquired into M’s training and experience and then asked him whether he was familiar with the term “grooming,” to which defense counsel objected. Although the state had never disclosed M as an expert witness, the trial court ultimately allowed M to offer expert testimony “just as to what grooming is,” but it precluded M from “making any reference to [what] happened between [the defendant and the victim].” M then testified that grooming was the process of “building a relationship, gaining trust, [and] developing an emotional connection with . . . younger children in order to exploit or manipulate them.” After the jury returned its guilty verdict, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based, in part, on the allegedly improper admission of M’s expert testimony. The trial court thereafter sentenced the defendant without ruling on the new trial motion. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion when it admitted M’s expert testimony on grooming and committed plain error by failing to rule on his motion for a new trial prior to sentencing. Held: The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had abused its discretion when it admitted M’s expert testimony concerning grooming because, even if the admission of that testimony was improper, the defen- dant failed to establish that the error was harmful under the circumstances of this case.

In view of the nature and limited scope of M’s challenged testimony, defense counsel’s meaningful cross-examination of M, the trial court’s jury instruc- tions on credibility and expert testimony, and the corroborating evidence presented at trial, this court had a fair assurance that the admission of M’s testimony concerning grooming did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict.

With respect to the nature and scope of M’s challenged testimony, the prosecutor asked M about grooming in response to certain questions that defense counsel had posed to the victim and N about the positive aspects of the defendant’s relationship with the victim, the trial court limited M’s testimony to the definition of grooming, and, although the jury could infer from M’s definition of grooming a potential explanation for how the defen- dant’s positive conduct toward the victim could coexist with the victim’s allegations of abuse, it was not the only possible explanation for such conduct in light of M’s testimony, on cross-examination, that a “good father” also exhibits certain positive conduct toward his daughter in the normal course of the father-daughter relationship.

Whether the jury viewed the defendant’s positive conduct toward the victim as evidence of a healthy parental relationship, as the defendant argued, or as evidence of manipulation undertaken to facilitate sexual abuse, as the state advanced, ultimately depended on the jury’s assessment of the surrounding evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

Moreover, although M’s testimony defining grooming may have diminished the force of the defendant’s theory that the victim’s testimony about the positive aspects of her relationship with the defendant was inconsistent with her allegations of abuse, the concept of building the victim’s trust to facili- tate and conceal sexual abuse almost certainly would have been introduced during the prosecutor’s closing argument, and there was little possibility that the jury would not have considered that the defendant may have had an alternative motivation for his actions, even if M had not testified as to the definition of grooming.

Furthermore, M neither expressed an expert opinion about the facts of this case nor opined that the defendant’s conduct constituted grooming or that the victim exhibited behaviors consistent with having been groomed, and, therefore, M’s testimony did not constitute the type of expert opinion that has the effect of improperly bolstering the victim’s credibility or resolve any factual dispute presented to the jury.

Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the prosecutor’s limited reference to M’s definition of grooming during rebuttal argument did not suggest that the admission of M’s testimony as to that definition was harmful or that the testimony assumed a prominence in the state’s case that would be indicative of harmfulness.

To the extent the defendant argued that the admission of M’s testimony was harmful because the state’s failure to disclose M as an expert witness resulted in an unfair surprise to the defense, that argument was unpersuasive because defense counsel did not request a continuance, additional time to prepare for cross-examination, or an opportunity to retain a rebuttal expert, and because the defendant, who did not appear to challenge the accuracy of M’s definition of grooming, failed to identify what expert testimony could have been offered to effectively rebut M’s testimony.

In addition, defense counsel, on cross-examination, elicited testimony from M that some of the same conduct that may have been suggestive of grooming also could have been characteristic of a healthy parental relationship, and, given the limitations the trial court imposed on the scope of M’s testimony, it was unclear what more defense counsel could have done on cross-examination if he had been given prior notice of M’s limited testimony.

With respect to the strength of the state’s case, although it was not over- whelming, and there was no physical evidence corroborating the victim’s allegations, the state’s case was not so weak that M’s brief and general definition of the term grooming could have substantially swayed the jury’s verdict in light of the other corroborating evidence introduced at trial, including N’s testimony that the defendant had admitted to her that he was having sex with the victim.

The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion for a new trial before imposing sentence constituted plain error that warranted reversal of his conviction.

Even if this court assumed that the trial court’s failure to rule on the defen- dant’s motion for a new trial before imposing sentence was a sufficiently clear error so as to satisfy the first prong of the plain error doctrine, the defendant could not demonstrate, under the second prong of that doctrine, that the error was so harmful that a failure to reverse his conviction would result in manifest injustice.

On appeal, the defendant claimed only that the trial court’s failure to rule on the portion of his motion for a new trial in which he challenged the admis- sion of M’s expert testimony resulted in manifest injustice, and that claim necessarily failed in light of this court’s prior conclusion in this opinion that any error in the admission of M’s testimony regarding the definition of grooming was harmless. (Three justices concurring separately in one opinion; two justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in one opinion) Argued May 12—officially released September 15, 2026 Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with one count of the crime of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Klatt, J.; ver- dict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Megan L. Wade, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Rebecca R. Zeuschner, deputy assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s attorney, and Michael Riley, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

BRIGHT, J. The defendant, Frank Scott Fomo, appeals directly to this court from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Stat- utes § 53a-70 (a) (2) and two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a). The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly permitted the investigating detective to testify, as an expert witness, regarding the meaning of the term “grooming.” The defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony because the state failed to lay an adequate foundation for the detective’s expert testimony, the testimony was more prejudicial than probative, and the state failed to disclose before trial that it intended to offer the detec- tive as an expert witness.

We conclude that the defendant’s claim fails because, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in admitting the late disclosed expert testimony, the defen- dant has not established that the error was harmful. The challenged testimony was limited to a brief, gen- eral definition of the term “grooming” in response to a single question and did not include an expert opinion applying that definition to the facts of this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have a fair assurance that the admission of the challenged testimony did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict.

The defendant alternatively argues that the trial court’s failure to rule on his pending motion for a new trial prior to his sentencing constituted plain error and warrants reversal of his conviction. We conclude that this claim likewise fails. Even if we assume that the trial court’s failure to rule on the motion before sentencing constituted plain error, the defendant has not demon- strated that that error resulted in manifest injustice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

I

The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. The defendant began a romantic relationship with the victim’s mother, N, in 2010. In 2014 or 2015, N and the victim moved from Wolcott to an apartment in Waterbury.1 The defendant, who was in his early thirties at the time, moved into the apartment with N and the victim shortly thereafter. Two to three weeks after the defendant moved in, he proposed to N, and the couple became engaged to be married. During the time they lived together, N left the victim alone with the defendant on a regular basis.

Not long after the defendant moved into the Water- bury apartment, he began sexually assaulting the victim. When the victim was eleven years old, on sixth grade school picture day,2 the defendant woke her up for school after N had left for work. The defendant told the victim “to get undressed and . . . into the bed in his room.” The defendant then got on top of her, kissed her lips and body, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. It was very painful for the victim, and, when the assault was over, she went to the bathroom and “saw a lot of blood.” The defendant continued to have sexual intercourse with the victim “[r]egularly” and sexually assaulted her “definitely more than” twenty-five times while they were living in the Waterbury apartment.3

When the victim was alone with the defendant, he would often show her pornographic videos on his phone of adults engaging in sexual intercourse. While showing the victim the pornographic videos, the defendant would expose and touch his penis and ask the victim to touch his penis, which she did. The defendant would also touch the victim’s body both over and underneath her clothes, and insert his fingers into her vagina.

At some point, the defendant told N that he had a sexual fantasy of the victim watching him and N engage in sexual intercourse. On one occasion, the defendant told the victim that he was going to leave the bedroom door open while he and N had sex and that he wanted the victim to watch them. The victim watched them having intercourse for a moment but felt uncomfortable. On another occasion, the defendant, N, and the victim were driving to the beach. The victim had taken a nap in the back seat, and, when she awoke, she observed N perform- ing oral sex on the defendant while he was driving.

In early 2017, the defendant moved out of the Water- bury apartment and began living in an apartment in Willimantic. The defendant and N ended their roman- tic relationship but continued to have sexual relations. After the defendant moved out, he remained in the vic- tim’s life4 and continued to sexually assault her. The victim sometimes went with N to visit the defendant at his residence in Willimantic. On one occasion, the vic- tim accompanied N to the defendant’s home, and N left to pick up Chinese food for dinner. While N was gone, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim. When N returned with the food, the victim ran to the bathroom because she was scared, but the defendant attempted to continue the assault despite N’s being present in the home. Thereafter, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim at his Willimantic home on several occasions, though the victim could not remember the exact number. During the time when the abuse was occurring, the victim began engaging in self-harm, which included intention- ally scratching her arms. The victim, however, did not tell anyone that the defendant was sexually abusing her because she was scared.

In 2018, N and the victim left the Waterbury apart- ment and moved back to Wolcott, where they lived with one of N’s friends and her daughter. Around this time, the victim’s mental health declined, and she began cut- ting herself. In March 2019, a teacher saw the victim cut- ting herself and reported it. The victim was subsequently admitted to St. Vincent’s Medical Center for inpatient treatment and counseling based on her suicidal ideation and self-harm. While the victim was receiving inpatient care, she was asked by hospital staff if she had ever been sexually assaulted. For the first time, the victim disclosed that she had been sexually assaulted by the defendant. When N learned of the victim’s disclosure, she “wasn’t exactly surprised” because—in addition to the fantasies that the defendant shared with N about the victim watch- ing them have intercourse—he told N that he was hav- ing sex with the victim when they lived together in the Waterbury apartment. N did not ask the victim about it because the defendant told her not to, and N continued to leave the victim alone with the defendant. After the victim’s disclosure, N was interviewed by the Department of Children and Families (DCF). N informed DCF about the defendant’s sexual fantasies involving the victim but did not tell anyone that the defendant had engaged in sexual contact with the victim because she was wor- ried she would get into trouble herself. N told DCF that she remained in a relationship with the defendant after learning about his sexual fantasies involving the victim and did not otherwise intervene because “the sex [with the defendant] was really good.” N did not cooperate with the police investigation in part because DCF had already made a finding of neglect against her, and she was scared that she would be arrested if she admitted to knowing about the sexual abuse.

After her disclosure, the victim participated in a foren- sic interview at Waterbury Youth Services. She met with a counselor and provided a statement about the defendant’s abuse, and the interview was video and audio recorded. Todd McCormack, the investigating detective, observed the forensic interview through a one-way mir- ror and took notes. He subsequently prepared a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.

The state charged the defendant with one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2), one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1), and another count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2).

In July 2024, the defendant’s case was tried to a jury. At trial, the state called three witnesses: the victim, N, and McCormack. During cross-examination of the victim, defense counsel elicited testimony about posi- tive aspects of her relationship with the defendant. The victim testified that, during the time period in which the defendant was sexually abusing her, he was kind to her, helped her with her homework, attended her sporting events, bought her a dog, and often cooked for her. Defense coun-sel questioned the victim about a school assignment in which she created a character called “Captain Awesome” modeled after the defendant “because he always comes to the rescue and helps when- ever there’s a problem . . . .” Counsel elicited testimony from the victim that there was a time when the defendant was “a positive influence” in her life and that, during that time, she “felt cared for” by the defendant. The victim answered in the affirmative when counsel asked: “[D]o you remember going out [to the defendant’s so- called man cave] on [her] own voluntarily and cuddling with him like he was . . . somebody [she] cared about, whether it was a father figure or not?” The victim also agreed that, “if [she was] feeling somewhat lonely or abandoned,” she would “go and . . . seek [the defendant] out and sit with him and hug him . . . .” The victim fur- ther testified that she was happy to see the defendant when he attended her birthday party in June 2017. She recalled hugging him and “[v]aguely” remembered that he had given her a birthday gift. Defense counsel also elicited testimony from N that the defendant and the victim “had a warm and affectionate relationship . . . .” N agreed that the defendant treated the victim as if he was the victim’s father: he often helped her with her homework, he encouraged her in her cheerleading activities, and the victim would frequently hug and cuddle with him.

Following the testimony of the victim and N, McCor- mack testified that, in 2019, he was a detective assigned to the Waterbury Police Department’s special victims unit, where he investigated “[d]ozens” of sexual assaults. He stated that he had received specialized training con- cerning “sexual assaults, dealing with victims who were children, [and] abuse cases,” including “training for dealing with children who are victims of crimes.” The prosecutor then asked McCormack: “During your train- ing and experience, and in your experience as . . . an officer, are you familiar with the term ‘grooming’?” The question drew an immediate objection from defense counsel, and the court excused the jury.

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel argued that any testimony regarding grooming was irrelevant and “far more prejudicial than probative . . . .” Counsel contended that the jury already had the factual testimony before it and that “introducing . . . something that’s going to be defined by a police officer” had no rel- evance based on the testimony already presented. The prosecutor responded: “[T]he defense did open the door by inquiring [of] both [N] and [the victim] about how . . . the defendant treated the victim. Buying [the victim] a puppy, treating her really nice, always being kind to her. I believe that does go to grooming. And I was just going to ask [McCormack for] a broad definition of grooming, not as it applies to this particular case.”

The trial court then asked the prosecutor whether he was offering McCormack as “some type of expert witness,” to which the prosecutor replied: “Yes, as a police officer . . . [based on] [h]is training and experience in investigating sexual assault cases.” Defense counsel reiterated his objection, arguing that the proposed testimony impli- cated concerns that had previously been discussed off the record regarding expert testimony in child sexual assault cases. Counsel argued: “For this officer now to say, even without a hypothetical question, that, because there’s certain—well, he’s going to give a definition of grooming. And there’s . . . no foundation. . . . [I]t’s intru- sive without being probative. And it’s along those same lines . . . why we don’t use these so-called sex experts . . . to substitute their evaluation for [that of] the jur[y].” The court overruled defense counsel’s objection, explaining: “[B]ased on the testimony . . . so far regard- ing [McCormack], [the court believes that] he does seem to have some expertise in the field [and] that [he has had] training and experience for . . . close to twenty years [as] part of . . . the special victims unit . . . basically dealing with claims of sexual assault and, in particular . . . claims of sexual assault involving children. He’s . . . indicated what training he’s had and . . . the number of . . . investi- gations that he’s done . . . in [cases involving] complaints of [this] nature regarding sexual assault. So, I’m going to find him [to be] an expert, and I’m going to allow him to testify just as to what grooming is. He’s not making any reference to what’s happened between [the defendant and the victim].” (Emphasis added.) The prosecutor agreed that McCormack would offer expert testimony only “on that one narrow issue . . . .” The court further noted that expert testimony regarding the behaviors of child sexual assault victims has been allowed previously due to the “rather secretive and unusual” nature of the crime and that the case law supports allowing the state to present testimony regarding “these particular, peculiar aspects” of child sexual abuse crimes. Thus, the court concluded that it would “allow [McCormack] to testify [as an expert witness] on this one characteristic.”

After the jury returned, McCormack testified that he was familiar with the term “grooming,” and, based on his training and experience, he defined it as the pro- cess of “building a relationship, gaining trust, [and] developing an emotional connection with . . . younger children in order to exploit or manipulate them.” On cross-examination, defense counsel asked McCormack: “So, having nothing to do with the facts in this case, so that’s clear, just talking about fathers in general . . . does . . . a good father exhibit certain types of positive conduct to his daughter in the normal course of the father-daughter relationship?” McCormack answered: “A good father, yes.”

The defendant then testified in his own defense. Fol- lowing the parties’ closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury. After the court excused the jury to begin deliberations, defense counsel objected to the portion of the jury charge on the testimony of expert witnesses.5 Defense counsel argued that he “was never advised, in writing or otherwise, that there was going to be an expert witness. [McCormack] was just identified as a police officer . . . . I don’t think the proper foundation was laid for his expertise.” The court questioned why defense counsel had not raised the issue earlier, noting that, on the preced- ing Friday afternoon, the court had discussed with the parties its intent to give an expert witness instruction and provided the parties with a copy of the proposed jury instructions. The court again provided the parties with a copy of the proposed instructions that day before the charge was delivered.

Defense counsel responded that he had objected during trial to McCormack being qualified as an expert and that the court had overruled that objection. Counsel main- tained that McCormack did not qualify as an expert and that his testimony should not have been admitted, and counsel reiterated that he had not been advised before trial that the state intended to introduce expert testi- mony.6 The court replied: “Well, I don’t disagree with that, but, again . . . the time to raise that objection has long passed.” The court explained that “the rulings on the evidence are the rulings on the evidence. That’s something separate. But, in terms of the instructions, it was abundantly clear to both parties that [the court] was going to give the expert witness charge because [McCormack] had been allowed to testify as an expert witness.” Counsel responded that he had considered the considered by you, but it is not controlling [on] your judgment. You are also to consider [the expert’s] general credibility in accordance with the instruction on credibility applicable to all witnesses. In this case, you were provided expert testimony by the following witness: Officer Todd McCormack.” instruction “a fait accompli” once the court overruled his objection to McCormack’s providing expert testimony. Following deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty on all charges, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to a total effective sentence of thirty-five years of imprisonment, execution suspended after fifteen years, followed by twenty years of probation.

II

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of McCormack as to the definition of “grooming.” Spe- cifically, he argues that (1) McCormack lacked sufficient qualifications to testify as an expert, and the state failed to lay an adequate foundation for the court to qualify him as such, and (2) the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its probative value. The defendant argues that McCormack’s expert testimony was prejudicial because the state had represented that it did not intend to call any expert witnesses and failed to disclose McCor- mack as an expert witness prior to trial, resulting in an unfair surprise to the defendant. The defendant further argues that the testimony was prejudicial because it allowed McCormack, the detective who investigated the case and prepared the arrest warrant, to implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim.

In response, the state argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting McCormack’s limited expert testimony defining “grooming.” The state first contends that the defendant preserved only his claim that the testimony was unduly prejudicial and that his challenge to the foundation for qualifying McCormack as an expert is unpreserved because defense counsel objected at trial on relevance and prejudice grounds, not on the adequacy of McCormack’s qualifications.

Alternatively, the state argues that, even if reviewed, the foundational challenge fails because McCormack’s training as a police officer and former special victims unit detective investigating child sexual assault cases sufficiently qualified him to testify regarding the defi- nition at issue.

Finally, the state argues that “any prejudice the defen- dant suffered as a result of McCormack’s testimony was either low or nonexistent” because McCormack gave only a brief, one sentence definition of “grooming,” and the trial court limited his expert testimony to defining that term.

Even if we were to assume that the trial court’s admis- sion of McCormack’s expert testimony about the defi- nition of “grooming” was an abuse of discretion, we nevertheless conclude that the defendant’s claim fails because he cannot meet his burden of establishing harm under the circumstances of this case.

“When an improper evidentiary ruling is not consti- tutional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . . . [W]hether [an improper ruling] is harmless in a particular case depends [on] a number of factors, such as the impor- tance of the . . . testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine the impact of the . . . evidence on the trier of fact and the result of the trial. . . . [T]he proper standard for determining whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless should be whether the jury’s verdict was substantially swayed by the error. . . . Accordingly, a nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ayala, 333 Conn. 225, 231–32, 215 A.3d 116 (2019). The defendant argues that the admission of McCor- mack’s expert testimony was harmful because this case lacked physical evidence and turned entirely on witness credibility. He contends that McCormack’s testimony “became extremely significant” to the state’s case because it “sought to reconcile [the victim’s] testimony about having a positive relationship with the defendant with her allegations of abuse.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) According to the defendant, the testimony therefore “had the effect of bolstering the [victim’s] credibility” in much the same manner as the improperly admitted expert testimony that we found harmful in State v. Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770, 811–13, 51 A.3d 1002 (2012), particularly when considered together with the prosecutor’s reliance on McCormack’s definition during rebuttal argument. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The state responds that any error was harmless because the testimony was general in nature and limited in scope, defense counsel cross-examined McCormack, the jury received proper credibility and expert witness instruc- tions, and the state’s case was strong, notwithstanding the lack of physical evidence.

Upon review of the record, we have a fair assurance that the admission of McCormack’s limited expert tes- timony regarding the definition of “grooming” did not substantially affect the verdict. We first consider the nature and scope of the challenged testimony in the context in which it was presented to the jury.

On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testi- mony from both the victim and N, emphasizing positive aspects of the defendant’s relationship with the victim, including the victim’s view of the defendant, at times, as a positive influence in her life. This testimony supported the defense theory that the defendant’s affectionate and supportive relationship with the victim was inconsistent with her allegations that he repeatedly sexually abused her. It was in response to that line of questioning that the prosecutor sought to have McCormack provide “a broad definition of grooming, not as it applies to this particular case.”

The trial court limited the testimony accordingly. Although the court qualified McCormack as an expert, it ruled that he could testify only “as to what grooming is” and expressly prohibited him from making “any ref- erence to what’s happened between [the defendant and the victim].” The prosecutor confirmed that the expert testimony would be confined to “that one narrow issue . . . .” Consistent with those limitations, McCormack testified only that “grooming is building a relationship, gaining trust, [and] developing an emotional connection with . . . younger children in order to exploit or manipu- late them.” The prosecutor asked no further questions related to grooming and subsequently resumed question- ing McCormack about his role in investigating the case. Thus, the jury heard only a single, generalized definition of the term “grooming.”

Although the jury could infer from McCormack’s defi- nition of the term “grooming” a potential explanation for how the defendant’s positive conduct toward the victim could coexist with the victim’s allegations of abuse, it was not the only possible explanation for such conduct. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from McCormack that such positive conduct was consistent with the behavior of a good parent. Spe- cifically, defense counsel asked McCormack: “So, having nothing to do with the facts in this case, so that’s clear, just talking about fathers in general . . . does . . . a good father exhibit certain types of positive conduct to his daughter in the normal course of the father-daughter relationship?” McCormack responded: “A good father, yes.” Thus, McCormack’s testimony did not express a view that the defendant had groomed the victim. Instead, it left the jury with two equally plausible explanations for the defendant’s affectionate conduct. Whether the jury viewed the defendant’s positive conduct toward the victim as evidence of a healthy parental relationship, as the defendant argued, or as evidence of manipula- tion undertaken to facilitate sexual abuse, as the state advanced, ultimately depended on the jury’s assessment of the surrounding evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

In addition, the concept of building the victim’s trust to facilitate and conceal sexual abuse almost certainly would have been introduced during the prosecutor’s clos- ing argument, even if McCormack had not defined the term “grooming.” The idea that perpetrators of sexual assaults on children treat their victims well in order to gain their trust and to keep them from disclosing the abuse is hardly a novel concept. Although McCormack’s testimony introducing the definition of the term “groom- ing” into the case may have diminished the force of the defendant’s argument that the victim’s testimony about positive aspects of the relationship she shared with the defendant was inconsistent with her allegations of abuse, there is little possibility that the jury would not have considered that the defendant may have had an alterna- tive motivation for his actions.

In arguing to the contrary, the defendant relies prin- cipally on State v. Favoccia, supra, 306 Conn. 770. He argues that, because the state’s case lacked physical evidence and depended on the victim’s credibility, McCor- mack’s testimony assumed the same significance as the improperly admitted expert testimony we found harmful in Favoccia. See id., 811–13. He contends that, because McCormack was the investigating detective in the defen- dant’s case, his definition of “grooming” “sought to rec- oncile [the victim’s] testimony about having a positive relationship with the defendant with her allegations of abuse” and, thus, like the expert testimony in Favoccia, “had the effect of bolstering the [victim’s] credibility . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We are not persuaded.

McCormack’s testimony in this case bears no resem- blance to the expert testimony in Favoccia. The expert in Favoccia—a school psychologist and forensic inter- viewer who had reviewed the complainant’s video- recorded forensic interview, police reports, and other case materials—permissibly testified about the general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children. See State v. Favoccia, supra, 306 Conn., 780–85. The expert, however, also opined that the complainant herself exhibited several of those characteristics; the expert expressed the opinions that the complainant’s disclosure was accidental and fit the characteristics of typical delayed disclosure, and that the complainant attempted to make herself unattractive to the defen- dant and remained polite and respectful toward him as mechanisms of coping with sexual abuse. See id., 776–77, 782–85. We concluded that, “[w]hen [the expert] went beyond a general discussion of character- istics of sexual abuse victims and offered opinions . . . as to whether this particular complainant in fact exhib- ited the specified behaviors, her testimony crossed the line of permissible expert opinion”; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 805; and “created a significant risk that the jury would consider [the expert’s] testimony as an imprimatur on the complainant’s allegations . . . .” Id., 806.

In concluding that the erroneous admission of the expert testimony was harmful, we emphasized that, “given the import of the complainant’s credibility and the defendant’s substantial attacks [on] it, [the expert’s] testimony . . . became extremely significant to the state’s otherwise ‘not particularly strong’ case, particularly insofar as it had the effect of bolstering the complainant’s credibility by explaining behaviors that she exhibited, some of which might otherwise be viewed by laypersons as belying the truth of her accusations . . . .” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 811–12. The prosecutor’s reliance on the expert’s testimony during rebuttal summation to explain the complainant’s behaviors reinforced that prejudicial effect. See id., 812–13.

Unlike the expert in Favoccia, McCormack never expressed an expert opinion about the facts of the pres- ent case. Although he provided a definition of the term “grooming,” he did not opine that the defendant’s con- duct constituted grooming or that the victim exhibited behaviors consistent with having been groomed. Nor was he asked to apply the definition he provided to the facts of this case, either directly or in response to a hypotheti- cal resembling the evidence. Thus, McCormack’s testi- mony did not provide the jury with the type of expert opinion that, in Favoccia, had the effect of improperly bolstering the victim’s credibility. The jury therefore remained responsible for deciding, without the aid of expert opinion, whether the defendant’s conduct fit McCormack’s abstract definition of “grooming”—and, more fundamentally, whether the victim’s testimony was credible. The challenged testimony therefore did not resolve any factual dispute presented to the jury; it merely defined a term that the jury could consider, or reject, in light of the evidence.7

The prosecutor’s reference to McCormack’s testimony during rebuttal likewise does not alter our conclusion. During the state’s rebuttal summation, the prosecutor argued to the jury: “[Y]ou heard testimony from [McCor- mack] about what grooming is . . . [t]he action or behavior used to establish emotional connection with a minor. I’d argue to you, that’s what [the defendant] did.” The prosecutor further argued: “[The defendant] used that connection to sexually assault [the victim]. He gained her trust. She was damaged. She liked him. She didn’t deny it when she was on the stand. . . . [H]e gained . . . her trust, and then he had sexual contact with her. . . . The . . . defense’s [whole] case paints the defendant [as] father of the year. Sergeant Awesome, Captain Awesome. He was nice to her. He made . . . her favorite dinners [for her]. She sat on his lap. He developed a trusting bond with her. He gains access to her to normalize the sexual assaults. I would argue to you, so she doesn’t talk.”

We have previously expressed that “[w]e think it [is] significant in evaluating harm to look to see how the state used [the challenged] evidence in its closing argu- ment.” State v. Ayala, supra, 333 Conn. 235. Likewise, we have explained that the “state’s frequent and repeated emphasis on [such evidence] during its closing and rebut- tal arguments indicates that [the] admission was not harmless.” State v. Culbreath, 340 Conn. 167, 195, 263 A.3d 350 (2021); see also State v. Sawyer, 279 Conn. 331, 360–61, 904 A.2d 101 (2006) (finding harmful error in part because state repeatedly emphasized improperly admitted evidence during closing argument), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 953 A.2d 45 (2008). The prosecutor’s use of McCormack’s testimony during rebuttal does not reflect that sort of repeated reliance. The challenged testimony was mentioned only once, in clear response to defense counsel’s extensive argument during summation that the defendant’s affectionate, fatherlike relationship with the victim did not “square up” with the victim’s allegations of sexual abuse. See, e.g., State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 717, 793 A.2d 226 (2002) (“[t]he state may . . . properly respond to infer- ences raised by the defendant’s closing argument” (inter- nal quotation marks omitted)). The prosecutor did not return to McCormack’s testimony throughout summa- tion or otherwise treat it as an independent basis on which the jury should find the defendant guilty. She invoked McCormack’s testimony only to urge the jury to draw a different inference from evidence that the defense itself had emphasized during closing argument.

McCormack’s testimony served principally to pro- vide a label for the state’s theory that the defendant’s positive conduct toward the victim was undertaken for a manipulative purpose. As we previously discussed, even without McCormack’s testimony, the state remained free to argue from the evidence that the defendant’s display of kindness, affection, and support toward the victim reflected an effort to gain the victim’s trust and to make the sexual abuse easier to commit and conceal. Such an inference could be drawn directly from the fac- tual testimony presented at trial, and whether the jury accepted or rejected that theory depended entirely on its assessment of the evidence and witness credibility. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor’s limited ref- erence to McCormack’s definition of “grooming” during rebuttal does not suggest that McCormack’s testimony assumed the sort of prominence in the state’s case that we have previously found significant in determining that an evidentiary error was harmful.

The defendant further argues that the admission of McCormack’s testimony was harmful because, due to the lack of pretrial disclosure designating McCormack as an expert witness, “the defendant was unprepared to examine McCormack on cross-examination or [to] refute his testimony by calling a defense expert. As a result, [McCormack’s] testimony essentially went unchallenged by the defendant (save one question).” We are not per- suaded by this argument for two reasons. First, after the court allowed McCormack to provide a general definition of “grooming,” defense counsel did not request a continu- ance, seek additional time to prepare for cross-examina- tion, or ask for an opportunity to obtain a rebuttal expert. See, e.g., State v. Brett B., 186 Conn. App. 563, 608, 200 A.3d 706 (2018) (rejecting defendant’s claim of unfair surprise, “most importantly” because defendant failed to request continuance, thereby “depriv[ing] the court of the opportunity to assess the situation and to exercise its discretion” to grant defendant additional time to con- sult an expert or to conduct additional research), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 961, 199 A.3d 560 (2019). Second, the defendant has not identified what contrary expert testimony could have been offered to rebut McCormack’s single sentence definition. Because the defendant does not appear to challenge the accuracy of McCormack’s explanation of what grooming is, it is unclear what any rebuttal expert would have said to refute McCormack’s definition, especially given that he did not apply that definition to the facts of this case. Indeed, the definition McCormack gave for grooming is similar to the com- mon dictionary definition of the word, as used in this context. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dic- tionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 713 (defining “groom” as “to build a trusting relationship with (a minor) in order to exploit them [especially] for nonconsensual sexual activity”); Cambridge Dictionary, available at https:// dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/grooming (last visited September 9, 2026) (defining “grooming” as “the criminal activity of becoming friends with a child in order to try to persuade the child to have a sexual relationship”); see also United States v. Bindues, 741 F. Supp. 3d 967, 1008 (D.N.M. 2024) (“[t]here is . . . general agreement that grooming identifies a cluster of behaviors whereby a sexual abuser attempts to facilitate the victim’s abuse”), appeal filed (10th Cir. August 15, 2024) (No. 24-2117).

Additionally, it is not clear, given the strict limitations the trial court imposed on the scope of McCormack’s tes- timony, how defense counsel would have examined him differently within the bounds of permissible cross-exam- ination. As discussed, on cross-examination, defense counsel elicited McCormack’s agreement that “[a] good father” engages in certain types of positive conduct in the normal course of the father-daughter relation- ship, demonstrating that, although McCormack defined “grooming” with reference to certain positive conduct undertaken for a manipulative purpose, that same con- duct could also be indicative of a normal, healthy parental relationship. To the extent that the state, by providing a definition of “grooming” through McCormack, suggested that the jury draw an inference that the defendant’s positive treatment of the victim was for a sinister pur- pose, defense counsel was able to refocus the jury on the contrary inference. We can see little more that defense counsel could have done, even if he had more notice of McCormack’s limited testimony. Accordingly, in these circumstances, the defendant has failed to establish that the claimed surprise was harmful.

Finally, we consider the strength of the state’s case. It is undisputed that the state did not present any phys- ical evidence corroborating the victim’s allegations. Although the absence of physical evidence bears on our assessment of the state’s case, we repeatedly have rec- ognized that “a [sexual abuse] case is not automatically weak just because” there is a “lack of conclusive physical evidence corroborating [the] sexual assault,” especially when there is other corroborating evidence introduced at trial. State v. Felix R., 319 Conn. 1, 18–19, 124 A.3d 871 (2015). Indeed, “[t]he sexual abuse of children is a crime [that], by its very nature, occurs under a cloak of secrecy and darkness. It is not surprising, therefore, for there to be a lack of corroborating physical evidence . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gary S., 345 Conn. 387, 419, 285 A.3d 29 (2022).

Because there was no physical evidence, the defendant argues that the case “turned entirely on the credibility of [the victim]” and, therefore, “was not particularly strong.” The defendant’s characterization of the state’s case as turning entirely on the victim’s credibility over- looks the corroborative and independent evidence sup- plied by N’s testimony. To be sure, the victim’s credibility was of central importance in this case. She testified at length about repeated instances of sexual abuse by the defendant and other inappropriate sexual conduct occur- ring over the course of several years. On cross-examina- tion, defense counsel attacked the victim’s veracity in an attempt to persuade the jury that she had fabricated the allegations of sexual assault.

The state’s evidence, however, was not limited to the victim’s account. Most significant, N testified that the defendant had admitted to her that he was having sex with the victim. If credited, that testimony constituted independent evidence supporting the victim’s allega- tions. Beyond that admission, N also provided firsthand testimony that substantiated other portions of the vic- tim’s testimony. She testified that the defendant had told her about his sexual fantasies of the victim watching him and N engage in sexual intercourse, a fact N had previ- ously disclosed to DCF. N also described the incidents in which she performed oral sex on the defendant while he was driving and the victim was napping in the backseat and in which she and the defendant left the bedroom door open while they were having sexual intercourse.

The corroborative evidence supplied by N distinguishes this case from one resting solely on a victim’s uncor- roborated allegations.8 Cf. State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 57–58, 905 A.2d 1079 (2006) (improper exclusion of evidence with respect to victim’s prior sexual conduct was harmful because “there was no independent physi- cal evidence of the [alleged sexual] assault and no other witnesses to corroborate [her] testimony, [such that] her credibility was crucial to successful prosecution of the case”). Although we do not characterize the state’s case as overwhelming, neither was it so weak that McCormack’s brief, general definition of “grooming” could have sub- stantially swayed the jury’s verdict.

Viewed in the context of the entire trial, the challenged testimony played only a peripheral role. The jury heard a single abstract definition of “grooming,” unaccompa- nied by any expert opinion applying that concept to the facts, assessing the victim’s credibility, or resolving any disputed issue. The verdict instead turned on the jury’s assessment of the victim’s detailed testimony, N’s corroborating testimony, and the defendant’s denial. McCormack’s expert testimony on direct and cross-exam- ination merely offered a different lens through which the jury could view the defendant’s positive conduct toward the victim depending on whether the jury believed the defendant had acted with criminal intentions. Consider- ing the limited scope of the challenged testimony, the meaningful cross-examination, the court’s instructions, and the corroborating evidence presented at trial, we have a fair assurance that the admission of McCormack’s definition of “grooming” did not substantially affect the verdict. Accordingly, any evidentiary error was harmless.

III

Alternatively, the defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error by sentencing him without first ruling on his pending motion for a new trial.

The following additional facts are relevant. After the verdict but prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based in part9 on “[t]he [trial] court’s ruling [that] permitted the state to present, and later argue, an undisclosed expert witness’ definition of the term ‘grooming’ to the jury,” which the defen- dant argued “constitute[d] an error of constitutional magnitude and an error that was materially injurious and overwhelmingly prejudicial to the defense during trial.”10 The defendant never asked for a hearing or rul- ing on that motion, including at his sentencing hearing on November 18, 2024. On June 6, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for articulation, asking the trial court to articulate whether it had ruled on the motion for a new trial and, if so, the court’s factual and legal basis for that ruling. The state did not oppose the motion. On June 23, 2025, the trial court issued an articulation, explaining that, because defense counsel did not ask to be heard on the motion for a new trial and did not raise it before the court at any time after it was filed with the clerk’s office, the court had not ruled on the motion.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion for a new trial constituted plain error and, accordingly, warrants reversal of his conviction. Relying on State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 561, the defendant argues that, because a trial court loses jurisdiction after sentencing, the court’s failure to rule on his motion before imposing a sentence consti- tuted clear error that satisfies the first prong of the plain error doctrine. The defendant argues that the court’s failure to rule on his motion before sentencing resulted in manifest injustice, fulfilling the second prong of the plain error doctrine, because the motion was predicated on a claim that he contends was meritorious—that the court improperly admitted McCormack’s late disclosed expert testimony on grooming. He contends that the state’s failure to disclose McCormack as an expert witness in advance of trial violated Practice Book §§ 40-311 and 40-11 (a) (3)12 and the court’s disclosure order, deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to prepare and present his defense, and, incorporating his earlier arguments regard- ing harm, substantially affected the verdict. Accord- ingly, the defendant argues that the court’s failure to rule on the motion before sentencing was so harmful that it necessitates reversal of his conviction and a new trial. The state responds that the defendant cannot satisfy either prong of the plain error doctrine. As to the first- prong, the state argues that McCoy did not hold that a trial court’s failure to rule on a pending motion for a new trial before sentencing constitutes clear error as a matter of law. As to the second prong, the state argues that the defendant cannot establish manifest injustice because his motion for a new trial was meritless. Specifically, the state contends that the claim underlying the motion was not timely preserved, and, in any event, the claim fails because the trial court properly admitted McCormack’s testimony, and the defendant cannot demonstrate preju- dice from any late disclosure.

The following legal principles guide our analysis. “[T]he plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is so obvi- ous that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 812, 155 A.3d 209 (2017). “An appellant cannot prevail under the plain error doctrine unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice. . . . It is clear that an appellate court addressing an appellant’s plain error claim must engage in a review of the trial court’s actions and, upon finding a patent error, determine whether the grievousness of that error qualifies for the invocation of the plain error doctrine and the automatic reversal that accompanies it.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 591.

We begin with the first prong. In McCoy, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial after the jury returned its verdict but before sentencing. Id., 565. At the sentenc- ing hearing, defense counsel attempted to argue the motion, but, because the trial transcript was not yet available, defense counsel and the trial court agreed to postpone argument on the motion. Id., 575. Defense counsel did not, however, request to postpone the sen- tencing itself, and the court proceeded to sentence the defendant out of respect for the family members of the victim in attendance at the hearing. Id., 575–76, 592. Several months later, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction over the case because the defendant had been sentenced. Id., 576.

On appeal, we explained that a trial court loses jurisdic- tion once the defendant’s sentence is executed, absent a constitutional or legislative grant of authority; id., 586–87; and concluded that the trial court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the defendant’s motion for a new trial for lack of jurisdiction. Id., 589. We further recognized that “it was improper for the trial court to neglect ruling on the defendant’s motion for a new trial prior to the execution of his sentence . . . .” Id., 592. Nevertheless, in light of potential confusion created by anomalies in the case law at the time regarding the court’s jurisdiction, we could not conclude that “it was so clear an error as to satisfy the first prong of the plain error doctrine.” Id.

In the present case, the defendant argues that McCoy resolved any such anomalies in our case law and that it is now clear that it is plain error for a trial court not to rule on an outstanding posttrial motion, such as the motion for a new trial filed in the present case, before imposing sentence. The state argues that, because the defendant never expressly asked the court to rule on his motion for a new trial, as the defendant in McCoy did, the court’s failure to address the motion was not error, or at least not plain error.

We need not decide in the present case whether the trial court’s failure to rule on the defendant’s motion for a new trial constituted a sufficiently clear error to satisfy the first prong of the plain error doctrine. As in McCoy, “even if that error were deemed to be clear,” we conclude that the defendant’s claim fails under the second prong because, in light of our conclusion in part II of this opinion that any error in admitting McCormack’s late disclosed expert testimony was harmless, the defen- dant cannot demonstrate “that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 592–93.

Although we recognized in McCoy that there are ben- efits to having the trial judge, as opposed to a reviewing court, decide a motion for a new trial in the first instance, we explained that the absence of such a ruling does not, by itself, establish manifest injustice. Id., 593; see id., 595. Rather, because the claimed error is not structural, the defendant “must demonstrate how the error harmed him.” Id., 595. To assess that harm, “we must look at the substance of the motion to see if it has any merit.” Id., 596; see id. (“it would be truly bizarre if a court’s failure to rule on a meritless or frivolous motion for a new trial could amount to an error so harmful that a manifest injustice has occurred”). Applying that principle, we held that the defendant had not established manifest injustice because the claims raised in his motion for a new trial were the same claims of prosecutorial impropriety that we had reviewed and rejected. Id., 593–94; see id., 597. Consistent with McCoy, we now examine the sub- stance of the defendant’s motion for a new trial to deter- mine whether the trial court’s failure to rule on that motion before sentencing resulted in manifest injustice. Although the defendant’s motion initially raised three grounds for relief; see footnote 9 of this opinion and accompanying text; on appeal, he argues only that the court’s failure to rule on the portion of the motion chal- lenging the admission of McCormack’s late disclosed expert testimony resulted in manifest injustice.13 Because the defendant does not rely on the remaining grounds asserted in his motion to establish manifest injustice, we confine our analysis to his claim concerning the admis- sibility of McCormack’s expert testimony.

As we explained in part II of this opinion, even if we were to assume that the trial court improperly admit- ted McCormack’s testimony regarding the definition of “grooming,” any such error was harmless. Although we agree that it was the trial court’s responsibility to be aware of and to rule on the pending motion for a new trial before sentencing, we have had the opportunity to review, and reject, the only claim that, according to the defendant, rendered the trial court’s failure to rule on the motion a manifest injustice. See State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 597. Accordingly, the defendant has failed to raise any doubt with respect to the validity of his conviction, and we cannot conclude that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion for a new trial before sentencing warrants relief under the plain error doctrine. The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion MULLINS, C. J., and ALEXANDER and DANNEHY, Js., concurred.

elicit expert testimony from McCormack, thereby depriving the defense of a meaningful opportunity to counter McCormack’s opinion with its own expert. He further argued that there was a lack of an adequate foundation for McCormack to testify as an expert and that his definition of “grooming” improperly addressed the ultimate issue in the case by impermissibly explaining the victim’s and N.V.’s characterizations of the relationship between the defendant and the victim. Additionally, he argued that the prejudice was compounded when the prosecutor relied on McCormack’s testimony during rebuttal argument and when the court instructed the jury that McCormack had testified as an expert witness.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ ECKER, J., with whom McDONALD and D’AURIA, Js., join, concurring. I agree with much of the majority opinion. I write separately to make it clear that the trial court erroneously admitted the expert opinion testi- mony of the state’s witness, Detective Todd McCormack, regarding the definition of the term “grooming.” The evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion for two reasons.

First, the state failed to timely disclose McCormack as an expert witness in violation of our rules of criminal procedure, which require the state, at the request of the defendant, to timely disclose the identity of all of its witnesses, “unless such time is extended by the judicial authority for good cause shown . . . .” Practice Book § 40-13 (a). Not only did the state fail to disclose McCor- mack as an expert witness in response to the pretrial motion for disclosure filed by the defendant, Frank Scott Fomo, but the prosecutor affirmatively assured the defen- dant prior to trial, in open court, that no expert testimony would be offered by the state. Despite this assurance, midway through trial, the state successfully introduced the expert testimony of McCormack on the definition of grooming, even though no good cause existed to justify the state’s late disclosure.1 See State v. Mallozzi, 355 Conn. 84, 97, 359 A.3d 125 (2026) (“it is incumbent on the [party seeking to admit late disclosed evidence] to make a showing of good cause for any late disclosure” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The state’s failure to fulfill its criminal discovery obligations with respect to expert witness testimony appears to be a recurrent problem that has arisen with sufficient frequency to indicate the need for greater vigilance by our trial courts and greater attention by other supervisory authorities, including the Rules Committee of the Superior Court, which this court recently suggested “should give serious consideration, with the input of the criminal defense bar and the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, to creating a more formalized expert disclosure process.” Id., 96 n.5; see also, e.g., State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428, 458–62, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025); State v. Hargett, 343 Conn. 604, 640–41, 275 A.3d 601 (2022); State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 812–14, 224 A.3d 886 (2020). The admission of McCormack’s expert testimony was erroneous for a second reason. As the investigating police officer in the defendant’s criminal case, McCormack offered fact testimony about the investigation into the defendant’s alleged crimes. By allowing him to offer expert testimony as well, the trial court’s ruling impli- cated the dangers posed by a “hybrid” or “dual” witness who wears two hats—one as an investigating police offi- cer and the other as an expert on criminal conduct. See own advantage. Instead, defense counsel cross-examined the victim and her mother regarding the nature of the defendant’s relationship with the victim, which is standard fare in virtually every case of this kind. The nature of the defendant’s relationship with the victim was the focal point of the criminal trial, as one would expect, and it is incon- ceivable that defense counsel’s cross-examination was unanticipated and opened the door to otherwise inadmissible expert testimony. “The doctrine of opening the door cannot, of course, be subverted into a rule for injection of prejudice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 13, 509 A.2d 493 (1986). Nor is it a license to disregard our rules of criminal discovery. As this court has reminded the state repeatedly, “[c]riminal discovery is not a game. It is integral to the quest for truth and the fair adjudication of guilt or innocence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428, 461, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025).

State v. Tomlinson, 340 Conn. 533, 553 n.7, 264 A.3d 950 (2021) (“[t]he line between expert testimony and fact testimony . . . may be difficult to discern given that experts may rely on their own experiences in reaching their opinions”). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has cautioned, trial courts “must be especially vigilant in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony [when] . . . a law enforcement official is called on to testify as a fact witness but also functions as an expert for the government. . . . Although this type of dual testimony is not objectionable in principle . . . the government confers on law enforcement officials in this position an aura of special reliability and trustwor- thiness surrounding expert testimony, which ought to caution its use.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2004). The combination of fact and opinion testimony coming from one witness “require[s] mental gymnastics of the jurors in determining when [the hybrid witness] was testifying as an expert and when he was not, risking confusion, particularly absent an adequate explanation of the bases for [the hybrid witness’] lay opinions to distinguish them from his expert opinions.” United States v. Williams, 827 F.3d 1134, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. United States, 580 U.S. 1083, 137 S. Ct. 706, 196 L. Ed. 2d 579 (2017). Moreover, the issuance of a jury instruction on expert testimony may lead “the jury reasonably to assume that all of [the hybrid witness’] opinion testimony was based [on] his expertise and not merely on his own perceptions of events presented to the jury.” Id. Because “juries tend to give great credence and weight to what . . . experts say”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Raynor, 337 Conn. 527, 548, 254 A.3d 874 (2020); trial “courts and counsel should take appropriate measures to minimize the problems that may arise from [dual role] testimony . . . .” United States v. Moralez, 808 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2015).

Measures exist to reduce the risk of juror confusion in cases involving a hybrid witness, but none of them was employed in the present case. These measures include but are not limited to (1) the issuance of jury instructions cautioning the jury about the distinction between fact and expert testimony; see, e.g., United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 745 (6th Cir. 2006); (2) structuring a hybrid witness’ testimony to make it “clear when the witness is testifying as to facts or when he is offering his expert opinion”; United States v. Tucker, 714 F.3d 1006, 1016 (7th Cir. 2013); (3) establishing the proper foundation for the hybrid witness’ expert as opposed to lay opinions; see, e.g., United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2012); and (4) not referring to the hybrid witness as an expert witness to “[ensure] that trial courts do not inadvertently put their stamp of authority on [the witness’] opinion . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee notes to 2000 amendment.

Finally, as a cautionary note, I observe that it is possible that the trial court may have induced the problematic use of McCormack as an expert witness by first suggesting to the prosecutor that McCormack’s testimony concerning grooming was of an expert nature.2 See United States v. Christian, supra, 673 F.3d 712–13 (“[t]he dual testimony situation places an especially heavy burden on the [trial] court to ensure that the jury understood its function in evaluating the evidence, particularly [when] the conduct [in] question may appear innocent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). At trial, the prosecutor asked McCor- mack, “[d]uring your training and experience, and in your experience as . . . an officer, are you familiar with the term grooming?” Defense counsel objected, the jury was excused, and the trial court asked the prosecutor whether he was offering McCormack “as some type of expert witness . . . .” The prosecutor responded, “[y]es, as a police officer . . . [based on] [h]is training and experience in investigating sexual assault cases.” There is no way of knowing whether the prosecutor would have sought on his own to offer McCormack’s testimony as an expert opinion, but, in retrospect, it would have been better if the idea had not been injected in the first instance by the trial court.

To summarize, despite the absence of any ameliorative measures to mitigate the risk of juror confusion, the absence of any advance notice to the defendant, and the absence of any finding of good cause to justify the state’s nondisclosure of McCormack’s expert testimony, the trial court admitted McCormack’s expert testimony over the objection of defense counsel. Under these circumstances, the admission of McCormack’s expert testimony was an abuse of discretion.

Although it was error to admit McCormack’s expert testimony on grooming, I fully agree with the majority that, in the present case, the error was harmless because we have “a fair assurance that the error did not substan- tially affect the verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ayala, 333 Conn. 225, 232, 215 A.3d 116 (2019). I therefore concur.