instructed the jury, as stated in the bill of exceptions; the substance of which is that if they *450should be of opinion, from the evidence, that the claim of the plaintiff (if he has any) arose in consequence of money advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant, (who was then a slave) to purchase his freedom, and that he was afterwards manumitted by his master before the institution of this suit, and that the defendant, after the institution of this suit, acknowledged the debt in the presence of Harris, a witness, the plaintiff could not support the present action.

dissented, because he was of opinion that the defendant might make a valid promise, (subsequent to his emancipation) grounded upon the consideration of the money advanced while the defendant was a slave, and still this claim would be in consequence of such advance of the money, and that such promise would become a new contract made subsequent to his manumission, and therefore not within the Act of Assembly. He also inclined to the opinion that the acknowledgment to Harris was a fact from which the jury might infer an express promise by the defendant subsequent to his emancipation, and before the suit brought. See Williams v. Brown, 3 B. & P. 72, Heath, J’s., opinion.