MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the Court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Defendant PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (“PwC” or “defendant”) moves for dismissal of Plaintiff C. Westbrook Murphy’s (“Murphy” or “plaintiff’) remaining age discrimination claims, brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C.Code § 2-1401.01, et seq. Upon review of the pleadings, the entire record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion.1

*7BACKGROUND

1. Statutory Background

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual [who is at least forty years old] with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see id. § 681(a). Similarly, the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code § 2-1401.01, et seq., provides in relevant part, that it shall be unlawful for any employer, “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon the actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, family responsibilities, genetic information, disability, matriculation, or political affiliation of any individual ... [t]o fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any individual; or otherwise to discriminate against any individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, including promotion.” D.C.Code. § 2-1402.11.

II. Factual Background

A. The Parties

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP is engaged in the business of providing professional services throughout the United States and the world. (Compl. ¶¶4, 5.) PwC is a limited liability partnership, incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York. (Id.) PwC employs more than 20,000 individuals in the United States and has more than 2,000 individuals who are partners or principals. (Def.’s Stmt. [Docket No. 185-3] ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff C. Westbrook Murphy2 has been an employee at PwC or its predecessor firm3 since 1989. (Comply 22.) Murphy is an attorney and, before joining PwC, held various positions at the U.S. Department of Justice, at the Office of the Controller of Currency, and in private practice. (Id. ¶ 21; Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Murphy Tr. at 18.) PwC initially hired Murphy as a senior manager in the Regulatory Advisory Services (“RAS”) unit in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office.4 (CompLIffl 13, 22.) Murphy was promoted to director in 1991 and to managing director in 2004. (Pl.’s Ex. 2 (Murphy Decl.) ¶¶ 7, 12, 30-31.) Murphy was not promoted to partner or principal during the course of his employment. (Compl. ¶ 27.) *8Murphy retired from PwC on March 1, 2006. (Murphy Decl. ¶ 1.)

B. The PwC Partnership and Principals Agreement

PwC is organized and exists pursuant to the PwC Partnership and Principals Agreement (“the Partnership Agreement”), which provides that “[a]n Individual’s association with the Firm shall cease at the end of the Fiscal Year in which he or she attains age 60.” (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; Pl.’s Ex. 4, Art. 10, Sec. 10.1(a).) The term “Individual” is defined as “a person who is either a Partner or a Principal.” (Pl.’s Ex. 4, Art. 1.) The sole parties to the Partnership Agreement are the partners and principals of PwC. There is no such mandatory retirement provision for PwC employees. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Carter Tr. at 222.)

C. 2000, 2001, and 2004 Partnership Promotion Cycles in the RAS Unit

PwC has an annual partnership selection process, culminating each year in the announcement of new partners effective July 1 (the beginning of PwC’s fiscal year). (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 4.) The admission process begins in the preceding fiscal year, with the partners in each business unit of the firm identifying potential partner candidates. (Carter Tr. at 96.) During the relevant time period, Robert Bench (“Bench”), as managing partner of the RAS unit, had primary responsibility for hirings and promotions within the RAS unit.5 (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Schuler Tr. at 23-24; Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Murphy Tr. at 894-95.) When identifying potential partnership candidates, Bench, together with other RAS partners, considered the RAS unit’s business need for new partners and, assuming there was such a need, determined which of the RAS employees was best qualified to meet this need. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Bench 11/29/2006 Tr. at 50-52; Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Lewis Tr. at 155-59.)

Murphy was never identified as a possible partner candidate during the relevant years in question (2000, 2001, or 2004). (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 12.) Instead, David Al-bright, one of Murphy’s colleagues in the RAS unit, was sponsored and admitted in the 2000 partner admission cycle. {Id. ¶ 13.) No RAS unit employees were proposed or admitted during the 2001 or 2002 cycles. (Id.) Another colleague, Jeff La-vine, was proposed in the 2003 and 2004 cycles and admitted in the 2004 cycle. (Id.; see also Def.’s Ex. G; Bench 11/29/2006 Tr. at 175-76.)

III. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Murphy filed an administrative charge with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”) on March 14, 2001, delivering a copy of the charge to his supervisor the same day. (Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff Murphy, along with Plaintiff Harold Schuler (“Schuler”), filed suit on May 20, 2002, alleging violations of the ADEA, DCHRA, and the Human Rights Law of New York (“NYHRL”), Executive Law Article 15, et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 42-51.) Specifically, Murphy alleges that PwC denied him promotion to partnership in 1999, 2000, and 2001 and instead promoted younger, less experienced employees. (Id. ¶ 29.) Murphy sought to proceed on a “pattern or practice” theory on behalf of a class of purportedly similarly situated “older” employees of the firm. (See *9Compl.) On September 27, 2004, I issued a ruling on cross-motions for partial summary judgment and defendant’s motion to dismiss, significantly narrowing plaintiffs claims. See Murphy v. PriceWaterhouse-Coopers, LLP, 357 F.Supp.2d 230 (D.D.C. 2004). As a result of this decision, the only remaining claims in Murphy’s 2002 action (Civil Action No. 02-982) are his individual disparate treatment claims against PwC for non-promotion in the firm’s July 1, 2000 and July 1, 2001 partner admission cycles under the ADEA and DCHRA.6 Id. at 244. Murphy commenced a second, separate action against PwC in June 2005 (Civil Action No. 05-1054) for his non-promotion to partner during the July 1, 2004 cycle, alleging violations of the ADEA and DCHRA. Murphy’s 2004 claim has been pursued only as an individual action. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (“The failure to promote Murphy in 2004 is the subject of No. 05-1054.”).)

Defendant PwC now moves for summary judgment on Murphy’s remaining disparate treatment claims.7 PwC argues that Murphy has not produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that PwC intentionally discriminated against Murphy on the basis of his age. For the following reasons, the Court agrees.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the record demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment may support its motion by “identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). In opposing summary judgment, the “nonmoving party [must] go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ *10designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e)). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and the Court draws all reasonable inferences regarding the assertions made in a light favorable to the non-moving party, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. Legal Standard for ADEA and DCHRA Disparate Treatment Claims

Under a “disparate treatment” theory of liability of age discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his employer intentionally treated him less favorably because o/his age.8 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-10, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). Where direct evidence of discriminatory intent is not available, courts have traditionally applied the familiar burden-shifting scheme first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973): (1) the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions; and (3) the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were in reality a pretext for discrimination.9 See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 144 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (citing, among other authorities, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817).

The D.C. Circuit has recently clarified the McDonnell Douglas analysis “where an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision.”10 Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir. 2008). In such cases, a court need not — and should not — determine whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to support an inference of *11discrimination. Id. Instead, it should proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework and determine whether “the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. (citations omitted). Murphy failed to do so here. How so?

ANALYSIS

Before deciding the ultimate issue under Brady, the Court must first find that plaintiff has alleged an adverse employment action and defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the alleged discriminatory action. In this case, Murphy has alleged three adverse employment actions — his non-promotion during the 2000 partner admission cycle, his non-promotion during the 2001 cycle, and his non-promotion during the 2004 cycle.11 See Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (defining an adverse employment action as “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits”) (internal citations omitted, emphasis added). Additionally, PwC proffers several legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations for Murphy’s non-promotions. First, PwC contends that it never even considered Murphy as a possible partner candidate because he did not have the'required minimum performance evaluation ratings.12 (Def.’s Mot. *12Summ. J. at 21-22.) Second, PwC alleges that it did not believe Murphy had a genuine interest in becoming partner.13 (Id.)

Consequently, the sole remaining question under Brady is whether plaintiff has “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. In making this determination on pretext, a court must consider whether the jury could infer discrimination from (1) the plaintiffs prima facie case, (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation, and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff. Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 992-93 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C.Cir. 1998)). “The plaintiff need not present evidence in each of these categories in order to avoid summary judgment. Rather, the court should assess the plaintiffs challenge to the employer’s explanation in light of the total circumstances of the case.” Short v. Chertoff, 555 F.Supp.2d 166, 172 (D.D.C. 2008) (citations omitted).

In this case, Murphy attempts to directly challenge PwC’s proffered explanations and to bolster his claim of intentional discrimination with additional evidence. He, however, has failed to rebut PwC’s legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations and has not presented sufficient evidence to support a finding by a reasonable jury of intentional discrimination based on age. See Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901 (D.C.Cir. 2006).

I. Evidence Rebutting PwC’s Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Explanations

A. Murphy’s Lack of Absolute Qualifications

To rebut PwC’s explanation that Murphy did not meet the RAS unit’s minimum requirements for partner (ie., being a sustained “1” rated performer), Murphy does not present evidence that he in fact was a “1” rated performer.14 Instead, he alleges that RAS had no such requirement for partnership candidates. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 26.) To support this claim, Murphy points to an informational guide for the Banking, Financial Services and Assurance practice groups as purportedly setting out a lower standard for promotion. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 26-27.) This, however, proves little. That these practice groups may have had lower *13minimum standards for promotion in certain instances does not mean that the RAS unit follows such standards or that such standards are even relevant to the analysis here. See Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1557 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (finding the partnership admission procedures in department other than plaintiffs to be irrelevant); see also Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (department’s failure to follow written regulations in selection process was not sufficient to support finding of pretext).

In fact, Murphy has presented no evidence to rebut PwC’s contention that the RAS unit, to which Murphy belonged, in fact required a higher standard for partnership promotion. Murphy does not dispute that the partnership consideration process for RAS employees began within the RAS unit, at the recommendation of Bench and later Lewis. (See Def.’s Stmt ¶¶ 5-7.) Nor does he rebut Bench’s and Lewis’ testimony that the RAS unit considered only “1” rated performers as potential partnership candidates. (See Bench 11/26/2006 Tr. at 170-71, 185-86; Lewis Tr. at 175-76, 178-79.) Moreover, Bench and Lewis’s testimony is corroborated by the fact that, during the relevant time period, only those employees who were sustained “1” rated performers were proposed as partnership candidates from RAS.15 Simply put, Murphy does little to rebut PwC’s proffered explanation that he was denied partnership because of his lack of qualifications.

B. Murphy’s Lack of Interest

Additionally, Murphy has presented no evidence to rebut PwC’s contention that it did not believe Murphy was genuinely interested in making partner.16 See Morgan, 328 F.3d at 654 (finding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing discriminatory intent where he offered no evidence to rebut defendant’s contention that it was unaware of plaintiffs continued interest in a directorship position). To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Murphy’s conduct was inconsistent with his purported desire to be promoted to partner. Specifically, Murphy voluntarily relinquished all of his managerial responsibilities as director for an indefinite period beginning in December 1999, (Murphy Tr. at 169-70, 731, 707-09); expressed an interest in obtaining an early retirement or working on a part-time basis in 2000, (id. at 135-47); and only articulated his interest in partnership consideration when his request for early retirement was rejected in March 2001, (id. at 418).17 Given all *14this, PwC’s belief that Murphy was not genuinely interested in making partner certainly seems reasonable and Murphy has provided no evidence to the contrary. See Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 531 (D.C.Cir. 2007) (“We review not ‘the correctness or desirability of the reasons offered but whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.’ ”) (quoting Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183).

II. Other Evidence of Discrimination

Murphy is not limited to directly challenging PwC’s proffered rationales. He can also “avoid summary judgment by presenting other evidence, direct or circumstantial, that permits an inference of discrimination.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 899.

A. Relative Qualifications

Murphy attempts to prove discriminatory motive by demonstrating that he was more qualified for promotion to partnership than Albright (promoted in 2000) or Lavine (promoted in 2004).18 In Holcomb, our circuit court “concluded a factfinder could infer discrimination if the evidence showed a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff significantly better qualified for the job but nevertheless failed to offer the position to her.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897 (citing Aka, 156 F.3d at 1295). The theory is that “if the employer made an error [in judging the plaintiffs qualifications] too obvious to be unintentional, perhaps it had an unlawful motive for doing so.” Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183; see also Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897 (“In order to justify an inference of discrimination, the qualifications gap must be great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.”) (citing Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C.Cir. 2003)). “Short of finding that the employer’s stated reason was indeed a pretext, however— and here one must beware of using 20/20 hindsight — the court must respect the employer’s unfettered discretion to choose among qualified candidates.” 19 Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986) (warning that district judge does not sit as a “super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions”)).

In support of his contention that he is significantly better qualified than Albright or Lavine, Murphy provides a lengthy analysis of his own purported qualifications for partner and gives his personal views on the relative qualifications of Albright and Lavine. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 9-25.) Murphy’s submission, however, does not support a finding that the “qualifications gap” between himself and Albright, or Lavine, was so great as to show pretext. To the contrary, both Albright and Lavine received exceptional annual performance ratings in the years leading to their partnership proposals. (Def.’s Exs. F, G, H.) Murphy, on the other hand, received mediocre marks *15in those years.20 (Def.’s Exs. J, K, L, M.) Since these performance ratings were assigned based on each employee’s relative standing within his/her peer group, it makes perfect sense that the top-rated employees (in this case, Albright and La-vine) would be proposed as partnership candidates. (See Pl.’s Ex. 39, at PwC 01147.) Moreover, Albright and Lavine’s exceptional performance ratings were justified by their broad subject matter expertise, which allowed them to “win and lead significant engagements,” (Lewis Tr. at 104), and their high levels of chargeable time, (Bench 11/29/2006 Tr. at 118, 160-66). In contrast, Murphy “was often not productively ... engaged” and “needed someone to provide him with work.” (Lewis Tr. at 90-92; see also id. at 176-81 (noting that Murphy had 1,100 hours of unehargeable time in one year); Murphy Tr. at 673-76 (same).)

Based on the record presented to the Court, Murphy has not produced sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that a reasonable employer would have found him significantly better qualified for partner than either Albright or Lavine. Murphy simply has not shown that the “qualifications gap” was “great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897.

B. Partner Retirement Provision

Finally, Murphy alleges that he faced a “no-partner-over-60-rule” and that PwC has a blanket policy against considering individuals over a certain age for partner. {See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) Plaintiff, however, has provided insufficient proof that such a policy exists21 and instead relies heavily on *16the mandatory retirement provision in the Partnership Agreement as proof of PwC’s discriminatory motive. (Id.) This reliance, however, is misplaced. The Partnership Agreement is not a policy barring older candidates from partnership, but instead is an agreement among the partners at PwC, requiring only those individuals subject to the agreement to retire in the fiscal year in which they turn 60. (PL’s Ex. 4.) It is binding only on the partners and principals of the firm and no similar retirement provisions exist for employees.22 (Id.) As the Court previously noted, because the Partnership Agreement “neither addresses nor binds the plaintiffs in any way,” it “cannot form the sole basis of a ‘disparate treatment’ theory.”23 Murphy, 357 F.Supp.2d at 249.

CONCLUSION

Considering the entire record, the strength of PwC’s legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale, and the evidence relating to pretext, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could not conclude from all of the evidence that Murphy’s non-promotions in 2000, 2001, and 2004 were made for a discriminatory reason. Murphy has not provided evidence sufficient to rebut PwC’s legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations for his non-promotions and has not met his burden in proving discriminatory intent.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order consistent with this ruling accompanies this Opinion.