Clark-Bey v. State of Maryland

District Court, District of Columbia

Clark-Bey v. State of Maryland

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FILED FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FEB- 5 2013 Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Columbia Amun Ra Clark Bey, ) ) Plaintiff, )

v. ) ) Civil Action No. 13 0149 ) State of Maryland et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on review of plaintiffs pro se complaint and application

to proceed informapauperis. The Court will grant plaintiffs application to proceed informa

pauperis and will dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss an action "at any time" it determines that subject matter

jurisdiction is wanting).

Plaintiff, a Maryland resident, sues the State of Maryland, the District Court of Maryland

for Prince George's County, high-level Maryland officials, judicial officers, and a county police

officer. See Com pl. Caption. Plaintiff "demands [a] Writ of Prohibition to void judgment made

by State of Maryland, Prince George's County Circuit Court or any other court in the State of

Maryland, Incorporated." Com pl. at 1; see id. at 15 ("This action seeks the Court to issue a Writ

of Prohibition compelling Lawrence V. Hill, Jr., Chief Magistrate Judge Ben C. Clyburn ... and

any other court appointed judge to honor the Default Judgment."). Except for those statements, ,.1

the complaint makes little sense.

N 3 Jurisdiction is wanting because a federal district court is not a reviewing court and, thus,

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of a state court. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

,

1332 (general jurisdictional provisions); Fleming v. United States,

847 F. Supp. 170, 172

(D.D.C. 1994), cert. denied

513 U.S. 1150

(1995) (citing District of Columbia Court ofAppeals

v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462,482

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413,415,416

(1923)). In addition, the complaint is "patently insubstantial, presenting no federal question

suitable for decision.'" Caldwell v. Kagan,

777 F. Supp. 2d 177, 178

(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting

Tooley v. Napolitano,

586 F.3d 1006, 1009

(D.C. Cir. 2009)). A separate order of dismissal

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: January ~5, 2013 United States District Judge

2

Reference

Status
Published