McNeil v. Irs Commissioner
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROBERT A. MCNEIL,
Plaintiff v.
Civil Action No. 15-1288 (CKK) COMMISSIONER, INTERNAL REVENUE, et al.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION (June 7, 2016)
Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s [15] Motion to Alter/Amend Dismissal and for Oral Argument, and Defendant’s [16] Opposition to that Motion. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has provided no basis for the Court to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal issued in this case on April 12, 2016. 1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to file “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment” within “28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Motions under Rule 59(e) are “disfavored” and the moving party bears the burden of establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001). Rule 59(e) motions are “discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has not established extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from a final judgment. To the extent that Plaintiff presents arguments that were presented previously in opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court rejects those arguments for the same reasons stated in the [13] Memorandum Opinion issued in this case on April 12, 2016—which the Court fully incorporates and makes part of this Memorandum Opinion.
To the extent that Plaintiff presents new arguments in the pending motion, the Court will not consider those arguments at this stage of the proceedings. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008) (Rule 59(e) “ ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’ ”) (citation omitted). Specifically, for the first time, Plaintiff now argues that the Anti-Injunction Act is not jurisdictional. Because Plaintiff could have, but failed to, raise this argument previously, the Court will not consider its merits. 2 See Pl.’s Mot. at 9-10 (citing Supreme Court cases from 2008 and 2011, several years prior to the filing of this case).
For all of these reasons, as well as the reasons stated in the [13] Memorandum Opinion issued in this case on April 12, 2016—which the Court fully incorporates and makes part of this Memorandum Opinion—Court’s DENIES Plaintiff’s [15] Motion.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge
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