Peyton v. Berryhill
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TABITHA PEYTON, Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 17-1803-JDB
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
Before this Court is a Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui,
dated February 28, 2021, recommending that this Court grant plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees
in part and award a sum of $10,098.30. The Court agrees with this outcome and will adopt this
Report and Recommendation in full.
In adopting Judge Faruqui’s Report and Recommendation, the Court understands his
recommendation to be based on an individualized analysis of the facts of this case and the specifics
of the fee request at issue. The Court does not understand Judge Faruqui to have applied a
presumption of unreasonableness for requests outside of a “guideline range” of twenty to forty
hours in “routine” cases. This Court will not adopt such a presumption here. A default rule setting
a presumptive upper limit on fees for “routine” Social Security cases may be inconsistent with the
individualized consideration required in assessing motions for attorneys’ fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act. See Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
690 F.3d 1132, 1136(9th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (“[I]t is . . . an abuse of discretion to apply a de facto policy limiting social
security claimants to twenty to forty hours of attorney time in ‘routine’ cases. . . . While district courts may consider [a guideline range] in determining the reasonableness of a specific fee request,
courts cannot drastically reduce awards simply because the attorney has requested compensation
for more than forty hours or make reductions with a target number in mind.”); see also Brooks v.
Berryhill, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-436 (CKK/GMH),
2017 WL 10716887, at *12 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2017)
(rejecting notion that a social security claimant bears “the burden of showing that his or her case
should be treated as ‘above average,’ and therefore eligible for compensation higher than the
average for past fee awards”), adopted by District Court,
2019 WL 120767(D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2019).
The Court does not understand Judge Faruqui’s Report and Recommendation to have
applied or endorsed such a default rule, and it adopts his recommendation in full based on his well-
reasoned assessment of the facts of this case. Accordingly, upon consideration of [29] the Report
and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Faruqui, the absence of any objections thereto, and
the entire record herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in full; it is further
ORDERED that [26] plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART; it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff be awarded a total of $10,098.30 in attorneys’ fees; and it is
further
ORDERED that judgment be entered accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge Dated: August 24, 2021
Reference
- Status
- Published