Jordan v. Los Angeles Police Department

District Court, District of Columbia

Jordan v. Los Angeles Police Department

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JAMES JORDAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-0026 (UNA) ) LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, ) ) Defendants )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s application for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, and pro se complaint, ECF No. 1. The Court will grant

the in forma pauperis application and dismiss the complaint without prejudice pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2)(B)(ii), by which the Court must dismiss a case “at any time” if it determines

that the action is frivolous.

Generally, plaintiff alleges that he has been and continues to be harassed by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the Los Angeles Police Department, and other law enforcement

agencies. For example, the FBI allegedly “is . . . terrorizing plaintiff through an illegal warfare

chemical system,” Compl., Ex. (ECF No. 1-1) at 4 (page numbers designated by CM/ECF), is

“cyberhacking [his] medical records[,] email account, [and] cell phone,”

id.,

and is responsible

for hacking microprocessors in his car, see

id. at 20

, such that the vehicle’s warning lights can be

triggered, brakes can be disabled, radio stations can be changed, and the engine can be disabled

remotely, see

id. at 20-21

. In addition, law enforcement officers in Los Angeles allegedly are

responsible for “blackballing, terrorism, stalking, and various other illegal activities,”

id. at 23

,

prompting plaintiff to Leave Los Angeles and move elsewhere., see

id. at 24

. And, plaintiff

1 alleges, he sleepwalks as a result of “some kind of mental manipulation/wave system,” or

“chemical weaponry, wave, [or] brain computer interface.”

Id. at 12

. As compensation for the

injuries defendants have caused, plaintiff demands an award of $6 million, among other relief.

See

id. at 13

.

“A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis

either in law or in fact” is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325

(1989). On review

of the complaint, the Court concludes that its factual allegations are incoherent, irrational or

wholly incredible, rendering the complaint subject to dismissal as frivolous. See Denton v.

Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 33

(1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the

facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]”), and the Court cannot

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a frivolous complaint, Hagans v. Lavine,

415 U.S. 528, 536-37

(1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without

power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and

unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v.

Newburyport,

193 U.S. 561, 579

(1904)); Tooley v. Napolitano,

586 F.3d 1006, 1010

(D.C. Cir.

2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality”).

A separate order will issue.

DATE: January 19, 2023 /s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

2

Reference

Status
Published