UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IKIA TRUESDALE,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 21-cv-315 (DLF)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Ikia Truesdale brings this employment action against the District of Columbia.

Before the Court is the District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. 18. For

the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the District’s motion in part and deny it in part.

I. BACKGROUND 1

Truesdale is an African-American woman who started working for the District as a police

officer in September 2016. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, Dkt. 17. In February 2019, her supervisor, Sergeant

Ennis Jervic, “falsely accused” her of leaving her assigned location. Id. ¶ 14. When Truesdale

tried to explain herself, Sergeant Jervic “took offense.” Id. ¶ 17. Truesdale complained to her

superior, Lieutenant Patrick Brescia, that Sergeant Jervic had discriminated against her on the basis

of race and gender. Id. ¶ 18.

“Shortly after” Truesdale’s complaint, Lieutenant Brescia placed her under investigation

for the February 2019 incident, ostensibly for “Insubordination” and “Orders/Directives

1 In resolving the District’s motion to dismiss, the Court has assumed the truth of the material factual allegations in the amended complaint, see Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,

(D.C. Cir. 2011), and any documents attached to the amended complaint or incorporated by reference, see EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Violations.” Id. ¶ 19. On June 14, 2019, this investigation was resolved in Truesdale’s favor with

a disposition of “No preponderance/no discipline.” Id. ¶ 30.

While the investigation was ongoing, on April 25, 2019, Truesdale submitted a request to

accept outside employment. Id. ¶ 23. “Officers with police agencies commonly supplement their

income by engaging in outside related employment . . . and are routinely given permission to do

so as standard pattern or practice” of the Department. Id. Indeed, General Order 201.17 of the

Metropolitan Police Department states: “The . . . Department recognizes the benefits of outside

employment, both to its members and to the community. . . . The policy of the Metropolitan Police

Department is that members of the Department may engage in outside employment.” Id. ¶ 24

(omission in original). After her request was submitted, Truesdale was informed that “outside

employment requests take approximately seven days to be processed.” Id. ¶ 25. However, her

request was neither granted nor adjudicated within seven days; instead, it was denied “pending the

result of the [ongoing] investigation.” Id. ¶ 26. In response, Truesdale submitted an intake form

to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming that, among other things, this denial

of outside employment was discriminatory and retaliatory. Id. ¶ 27.

On June 15, 2019, after the investigation was resolved, Truesdale again sought processing

of her request. Id. ¶ 31. Her request was recommended for approval on June 28, 2019. Id. ¶ 32.

But, on July 2, 2019, she was placed in the Supervisory Support Program, which “again

disqualified [her] from engaging in outside employment.” Id. ¶¶ 33, 35. According to Truesdale,

the police department’s written policies did not justify placing her in the Supervisory Support

Program, and her supervisors’ proffered justifications for doing so violated the department’s

written policies. Id. ¶¶ 40–42.

2 Later, on October 23, 2019, Truesdale received a “Needs Improvement” performance

rating. Id. ¶ 48. That rating was later adjusted upwards to “Meets Expectations,” shortly after

Truesdale submitted another Equal Employment Opportunity complaint. Id. ¶¶ 50–51.

Finally, on December 2, 2019, another superior submitted a Professional Conduct and

Intervention Board Review against Truesdale to the Professional Conduct and Intervention Board.

Id. ¶ 52. The resulting review led the Board to place Truesdale on a Performance Improvement

Plan that would require “review [of] her body worn cameras weekly” and “increased supervision.”

Id. ¶ 54.

On February 3, 2021, Truesdale filed her initial complaint against the District alleging that

it had violated Title VII by unlawfully discriminating and retaliating against her, including by

subjecting her to a hostile work environment. Dkt. 1. The Court granted the District’s motion to

dismiss this complaint. Mem. Op., Dkt. 13. It held that Truesdale’s discrimination and retaliation

claims failed because she “failed to allege a materially adverse action.” Id. at 8. It also dismissed

her hostile work environment claim because her allegations did not show a severe and pervasive

pattern of harassment. Id. at 9.

Truesdale filed an amended complaint. Dkt. 17. The District now moves to dismiss the

amended complaint. Dkt. 18.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A facially plausible claim is

one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

3 misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). This standard does not amount

to a specific probability requirement, but it does require “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly,

(“Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). A complaint need not

contain “detailed factual allegations,” but alleging facts that are “merely consistent with a

defendant's liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Iqbal,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth,”

, and

the court construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Hettinga v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The assumption of truth does not apply,

however, to a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal,

(quotation

marks omitted). An “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not credited;

likewise, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.”

Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible

claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.”

.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Discrimination

To state an unlawful discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must plausibly allege

that “(i) [she] suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of [her] race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms,

(D.C. Cir. 2008).

The Circuit recently clarified that an employer’s action need only “affect[] an employee’s terms,

4 conditions, or privileges of employment” to constitute an adverse action sufficient to support a

discrimination claim. Chambers v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (en

banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(a)(1)). “The plain text of Title VII requires no more.” Id. at

875. This standard is “capacious” and “evince[s] an intent to strike at the entire spectrum of

disparate treatment in employment.” Id. at 874 (cleaned up).

Some of the District’s actions alleged in the amended complaint still do not constitute

adverse actions. Subjecting Truesdale to “excessive supervision,” Am. Compl. ¶ 59, and placing

her on a Performance Improvement Plan, id. ¶ 74, “fall into the category of a supervisor’s ordinary

workplace exercise of authority that [do] not adversely affect the conditions of [a plaintiff’s]

employment.” Heavans v. Dodaro, No. 22-cv-836,

, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,

2022).

But the District’s investigation of Truesdale and its placement of Truesdale in the

Supervisory Support Program do constitute adverse employment actions. At least as alleged in

the amended complaint, these actions prevented Truesdale from taking advantage of a “routinely

granted” “standard benefit and condition of employment” at the department—namely, “permission

to engage in outside employment.” Am Compl. ¶¶ 23–24. They therefore affected Truesdale’s

terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. See Liu v. Georgetown University, No. 22-cv-

157,

, at *6 (D.D.C. July 6, 2022) (denial of an opportunity to present research

results at professional conferences deemed to be an adverse employment action where the privilege

“attached specifically to [the plaintiff’s] position or . . . office”).

Further, Truesdale has also sufficiently alleged that the District’s actions were taken on the

basis of her sex and race. Specifically, she alleges that the investigation against her was unfounded

and discriminatory because “similarly situated males were not subjected to discipline for the same

5 alleged conduct.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22. She further alleges that her placement in the Supervisory

Support Program was discriminatory because she had already been exonerated from any

investigation, so her placement in the program violated the District’s written policies.

¶¶ 35–

42, 61. Most importantly, she identifies at least two white male officers, including one of the same

rank, who “did not face discipline for engaging in the same conduct.”

¶¶ 20–21. Though these

allegations are minimal, they are sufficient to satisfy causation at the pleading stage. See Fennell

v. AARP,

, 127–28 (D.D.C. 2011) (plaintiff sufficiently alleged termination

was discriminatory where he “alleged that his job performance . . . was impeccable” and

“identifie[d] three allegedly similarly situated white employees, and one similarly situated female

employee, who engaged in comparable conduct but were not treated in alike manner”).

Because Truesdale has sufficiently pleaded a plausible discrimination claim, the Court will

deny the District’s motion to dismiss Count I of the amended complaint.

B. Retaliation

To adequately plead a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff “must [allege] (1) that

[she] engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that [she] suffered a materially adverse action

by [her] . . . employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the two.” Howard R.L. Cook & Tommy

Shaw Found. for Black Emps. of Library of Cong., Inc. v. Billington,

(D.C. Cir.

2013). To allege that she suffered a materially adverse action, a plaintiff must allege that the action

“well might . . . dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Baird v. Gotbaum,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The action need not “affect the terms and conditions of employment,”

(quoting

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,

(2006)), but it must “result in tangible

6 job consequences like a change in pay, position, or promotional opportunities,” Heavans,

, at *9.

As with Truesdale’s discrimination claim, the District’s actions also constitute adverse

actions sufficient to support a retaliation claim. Truesdale alleges that the District subjected her

to “unfair insubordination investigations,” placed her in the Supervisory Support Program “in

violation of written . . . policy,” and thereby prevented her from taking outside employment. Am.

Compl. ¶ 75. Not only did these actions deny her a standard benefit of her employment, but they

also resulted in lost income. Id. ¶ 76. The financial harm resulting from these actions constitutes

a tangible consequence sufficient to dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected

activities. See Cogdell v. Murphy, No. 19-2462,

, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2020)

(“A denial of a request for several weeks of advanced sick leave that costs a significant portion of

[the employee’s] monthly salary is an action that could well dissuade a reasonable worker from

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The District’s arguments otherwise are unpersuasive. It is true that the instigation of an

investigation alone may not be an adverse action. See Runkle v. Gonzales,

,

226–27 (D.D.C. 2005). But an investigation can become actionable if, as here, it results in

“materially adverse consequences . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the

plaintiff had suffered objectively tangible harm,” King v. Holder,

, 151–52

(D.D.C. 2015); see also Douglas v. Donovan,

(D.C. Cir. 2009). One such

“objectively tangible harm” is a financial impact, Douglas,

; Russell v. Principi,

(D.C. Cir. 2001), which Truesdale has alleged here. Her allegations are neither

“conclusory” nor “speculative.” See Def.’s Reply at 3, Dkt. 22. Accepting the truth of Truesdale’s

7 allegations and granting all reasonable inferences in her favor, as the Court must, see Cogdell,

, at *11, she has plausibly alleged an adverse action.

Further, that Truesdale worked for the American Psychological Association in April and

May 2019, see Def.’s Mem. at 10, Dkt. 18, is irrelevant because she was allegedly barred from

taking additional outside employment between April 25, 2019, when she submitted her request,

Am. Compl. ¶ 12, and June 28, 2019, when her request was recommended for approval, see Def.’s

Ex. C, Dkt. 18-3. And even though the District eventually approved her outside employment

requests on July 2, 2019, see Def.’s Mem. at 10; see Am. Compl. Ex. C, Dkt. 17-3, it immediately

disqualified her from taking any outside employment when it placed her in the Supervisory

Support Program on the very same date, Am. Compl. ¶ 33; see Ex. D, Dkt. 17-4. It may be that,

at a future stage of the proceedings, the evidence will show that Truesdale was able to accept

outside employment earlier than she has alleged. At this stage, however, the Court must assume

the truth of Truesdale’s allegations and grant all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Cogdell,

, at *11.

Truesdale has also sufficiently alleged the remaining elements of a retaliation claim. She

alleges that she twice participated in protected activity causally linked to an adverse action. First,

she reported Sergeant Jervic’s behavior to Lieutenant Brescia, id. ¶ 65, and “[s]hortly after” she

was placed under investigation “on . . . false grounds,” id. ¶ 66. Second, she submitted an Equal

Employment Opportunity intake form, id. ¶ 27, and less than a month later, she was allegedly

placed in the Supervisory Support Program in retaliation, id. ¶ 72. At least at the motion to dismiss

stage, these allegations of temporal proximity are sufficient to support a causal connection between

Truesdale’s protected activity and any adverse actions. See Holcomb v. Powell,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing a presumption of causation where “the employer had knowledge of

8 the employee’s protected activity, and . . . the adverse [] action took place shortly after the

activity”); Rattigan v. Gonzales,

(D.D.C. 2007) (“This Court has often

followed a three-month rule to establish causation on the basis of temporal proximity alone.”).

Because Truesdale has sufficiently pleaded a plausible claim for retaliation that can survive

a motion to dismiss, the Court will deny the District’s motion to dismiss Count II of the amended

complaint.

C. Hostile Work Environment

To state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that her

employer “subjected [her] to ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that [was]

‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create[d] an

abusive working environment.’” Baloch v. Kempthorne,

(D.C. Cir. 2008)

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,

(1993)). The acts in question must be both

(1) of sufficient severity or pervasiveness and (2) “adequately linked such that they form a coherent

environment claim.” Menoken v. Dhillon,

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). As to the

former requirement, because Title VII is not a “general civility code,” the conduct “must be [so]

extreme [as] to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City

of Boca Raton,

(1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In

assessing whether a hostile work environment exists, “courts consider the totality of the

circumstances, including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Richardson v. Petasis,

(D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S at 23).

9 In her amended complaint, Truesdale alleges that the District’s actions, including

subjecting her to “excessive supervision,” denying the opportunity to engage in outside

employment, assigning her to the Supervisory Support Program, and other “discriminatory and

harassing treatment,” were “so pervasive as to fundamentally alter the conditions of [her]

employment.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80–82. But these allegations are virtually identical to the

allegations in her initial complaint that the Court already deemed not “sufficiently severe to

support a hostile work environment claim.” Mem. Op. at 10–11. Increased supervision and

negative performance reviews are “work-related actions by supervisors,” which, without more,

“typically” are not “sufficient for a hostile work environment claim.” Munro v. LaHood,

(D.D.C. 2012); see also Nurriddin v. Bolden,

(D.D.C.

2009) (dismissing hostile work environment claim based on employer’s “interference with [the

plaintiff’s] work,” “multiple failures to promote,” denial of leave requests, and “discussions to end

[the plaintiff’s] eligibility for workers’ compensation and to terminate his employment”); Laughlin

v. Holder,

, 219–21 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing hostile work environment

claim where the employer repeatedly failed to promote the plaintiff, interfered with her efforts to

hire staff, “manipulated her performance evaluations, denied her bonuses to which she was

entitled,” and more).

Moreover, as alleged, the District’s actions are also not sufficiently connected to support a

hostile work environment claim. Truesdale’s hostile work environment claim is based on the same

allegations that form the basis for her discrimination and retaliation claims. See Am. Compl. ¶¶

79–82. “[C]ourts have been hesitant to find a claim for hostile work environment when a

complaint contains no allegations of discriminatory or retaliatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult

. . . and relies instead on incidents of allegedly discriminatory non-promotions and other

10 performance-based actions.” Outlaw v. Johnson,

(D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned

up); Munro,

(dismissing claim where the plaintiff “sa[id] nothing about the

nature of . . . disparate acts that would permit [the] Court to ‘transform’ them into a hostile work

environment claim”). The Court will therefore grant the District’s motion to dismiss Count III of

the amended complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Secretary’s motion to dismiss in part and

denies it in part. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum

opinion.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge January 25, 2023

11