UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ZHONGSHAN FUCHENG INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT CO., LTD.,

Petitioner, Civil Action No. 22-170 (BAH)

v. Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

FEDERAL REPULIC OF NIGERIA,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment Co., Ltd. (“Zhongshan”) instituted

this suit against Respondent, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”), to enforce an

arbitration award that—nearly two years after issuance—Nigeria has failed to pay. Nigeria now

moves to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)–(2), on the grounds of sovereign immunity

not exempted under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”),

et seq.

See Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Under the FSIA (“Resp’t’s Mot.”), ECF No.

24. Petitioner counters that the requirements of the FSIA’s arbitration exception are met, and

jurisdiction may therefore be exercised. See Pet’r’s Mem. Opp’n Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pet’r’s

Opp’n”), ECF No. 26. For the reasons explained below, petitioner has the better of the

arguments under the binding precedent of the D.C. Circuit, requiring denial of Nigeria’s motion

to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

1 A. Nigeria’s Seizure of Zhongshan’s Assets

The present dispute emerges from a Chinese business investment in Nigeria—once

successful enough to have garnered coverage by the Economist Intelligence Unit as an example

of “China’s economic model in Africa”—that ended in the expropriation of the company’s

assets, the flight of its executives from Nigeria after one executive was arrested at gunpoint and

physically beaten by the police, and, ultimately, a $55-million-plus arbitration award against

Nigeria. 1 The locus of the saga is a free-trade zone, called the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade

Zone, in Nigeria’s southwestern region in Ogun State, not far from Lagos.

As set forth in the arbitral tribunal’s findings of facts in its Final Award, ECF No. 2-1,

starting in 2007, Ogun State contracted with various Chinese companies, including petitioner, to

develop the subject free-trade zone. Specifically, Ogun State entered an agreement with

Guangdong Xinguang International China-Africa Investment Ltd. (“CAI”) and CCNC Group,

Ltd., pursuant to which the three entities would jointly own the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade

Zone Company (“OGFTZ”) for a period of 99 years, and CAI would lead the development of the

Zone, encompassing nearly 8 square miles of land. See Decl. of Hussein Haeri Supp. Pet.

Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral Award (“Haeri Decl. Supp. Pet.”), Ex. A, Final

Arbitration Award dated March 26, 2021 (“Final Award”) ¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 2-1. After three

years of limited progress, on June 29, 2010, OGFTZ entered an agreement with petitioner’s

parent company, Zhuhai Zhongfu Industrial Group Co. Ltd. (“Zhuhai”), giving Zhuhai control of

developing and operating a fraction of the Zone’s area into Fucheng Industrial Park.

¶¶ 6–8.

1 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s profile of the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone was referenced by the arbitral tribunal in its final award decision. See Decl. of Hussein Haeri Supp. Pet. Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral Award (“Haeri Decl. Supp. Pet.”), Ex. A, Final Arbitration Award dated March 26, 2021 (“Final Award”) ¶ 127, ECF No. 2-1; Economist Intelligence Unit, Zones of Influence (last accessed January 21, 2023), https://growthcrossings.economist.com/video/zones-of-influence/.

2 That year, Zhuhai effectively transferred its rights to petitioner, which operated in Nigeria

through its wholly-owned Nigerian subsidiary Zhongfu International Investment (NIG) FZE

(“Zhongfu”).

. 2

From 2010 until the breakdown of the relationship in 2016, Zhongfu invested substantial

assets into developing Fucheng Industrial Park. For example, to attract industrial lessees to the

Park, Zhongfu built roads, upgraded communications, sewage, and power systems, and opened

community services including a hospital, hotel, supermarket, and bank.

¶¶ 21–22. By early

2014, the Park had attracted approximately sixteen businesses.

. During this period,

CAI’s management of the overall Zone had apparently broken down, resulting in Ogun State’s

termination of the company’s participation in the OGFTZ in 2012 and appointment of Zhongfu

to take its place as part owner of the OGFTZ in 2013.

¶¶ 13–20.

Zhongfu’s woes began in April 2016, when the Secretary of Ogun State indicated in a

letter to OGFTZ—apparently on the advice of the Chinese Consulate in Lagos—that CAI had

been acquired by Guangdong New South Group (“NSG”), and that this transfer may have

somehow entitled NSG, rather than Zhongfu, to ownership of the Zone.

¶¶ 33–34. Ogun

State had received a note verbale, a diplomatic note, from the Economic and Commercial

Section of the Chinese consulate in Lagos, dated March 11, 2016, which stated that the

acquisition of CAI “will legally lead to the replacement of the management rights of the OGFTZ

which is now in the hands of [Zhongfu] to Guangdong New South Group.”

. 3 In May

2 The tribunal noted in its Final Award that, although Zhongfu had apparently assumed Zhuhai’s interests in the Zone by 2010—as reflected in an October 10, 2010-dated deed entitling Zhuhai to delegate its rights and obligations to third parties—the assignment of interests between Zhuhai and Zhongfu was formalized in a January 15, 2013 document. Final Award ¶ 16, ECF No. 2-1. 3 This detail of the Chinese government’s involvement in—if not outright instigation of—Ogun State’s ejection of Zhongfu from the Zone did not detain the arbitral tribunal for long, and Nigeria apparently did not call, or even “suggest[],” that any agents of the Chinese government could be identified to provide evidence of the underlying reasons for replacement of petitioner with NSG as manager of the Zone. Final Award ¶¶ 93–94. The tribunal’s admitted lack of clarity on this element of the underlying facts is unsettling in light of the whisper in the

3 2016, according to petitioner, Ogun State purported to terminate its 2013 agreement that

appointed Zhongfu as part owner of the Zone, and reneged on the 2010 agreement that had given

Zhongfu and Zhongshan management rights of the Fucheng Industrial Park. Pet’r’s Pet. to

Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral Award (“Pet.”) ¶¶ 18–19, ECF No. 1. In July 2016, Ogun

State’s Secretary texted Zhongshan’s managing director Jianxin Han, urging him to “leave

peacefully when there is opportunity to do so,” and the following month, warrants were issued

for the arrest of Han and Wenxiao Zhao, who had served as the Chief Financial Officer of the

OGFTZ. Final Award ¶¶ 37, 39. Zhao was arrested at gunpoint, physically beaten, and detained

for ten days by police before he and Han could flee the country—unceremoniously closing the

book on Zhongshan’s management of the OGFTZ and Fucheng Industrial Park.

¶¶ 39–40.

B. Subsequent Arbitration Proceedings

Petitioner commenced an arbitration proceeding against Nigeria on August 30, 2018

pursuant to a bilateral treaty between Nigeria and China. Pet. ¶ 22–23. 4 The bilateral investment

treaty, called the Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the

Final Award’s pages that Zhongfu’s administration of the Zone might have fallen short of expectations. See, e.g.,

(noting a May 18, 2015-dated letter from the Secretary of Ogun State complaining about Zhongfu’s performance);

¶¶ 115–120 (noting that the parent companies of CAI and Zhongfu signed an “entrustment of equity management agreement” in March 2012, in which CAI’s share of the Zone would be “entrusted” to Zhongfu—a detail that the arbitral tribunal apparently found perplexing and about which it “had an initial degree of concern about the accuracy” of Zhongfu’s witness’s testimony, but that it ultimately found irrelevant). The factual findings by the arbitral tribunal, however, are not reviewable by this Court, nor are they presently challenged by Nigeria. See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

(D.D.C. 2017) (describing courts’ deferential standard in reviewing foreign arbitral awards as “allowing vacatur of an award not if ‘the panel committed an error—or even a serious error’ but ‘only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice’” (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,

, 671–72 (2010))). 4 Petitioner, via Zhongfu, initially sought relief through the Nigerian courts, initiating one lawsuit in the Federal High Court in Abuja, Nigeria, against Nigeria’s Export Processing Zones Authority (“NEPZA”), the Attorney-General of Ogun State, and another company that was a partner of the OGFTZ, see Final Award ¶ 42, and another lawsuit in Ogun State High Court against OGFTZ, Ogun State, and the Attorney-General of Ogun State,

The lawsuits sought reinstatement of Zhongfu’s management and possession of the Zone based on the 2010 and 2013 contracts, id. ¶ 43, but both proceedings “were discontinued” in March and April 2018, id. ¶ 44. Zhongfu also began arbitration proceedings in the Singapore International Arbitration Center against, inter alia, Ogun State, but that proceeding was enjoined by the Ogun State High Court. Id. ¶ 45.

4 Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of

Investments (“China-Nigeria BIT”), represents an agreement between the countries to promote

bilateral investment by guaranteeing that the other country’s investors would be treated equally

and protected from the nationalization of their investments. See generally Haeri Decl. Supp.

Pet., Ex. B, China-Nigeria BIT, ECF No. 2-2. Article 9 of the China-Nigeria BIT provides that,

when any dispute arises between one of the countries and an investor from the other country—

e.g., a dispute between Nigeria and a Chinese investor—that cannot be resolved by the parties,

either party may request that an ad hoc arbitral tribunal settle the dispute with a binding decision.

See id. at Art. 9.

Petitioner brought five claims against Nigeria for breaches of the China-Nigeria BIT in

the arbitral action. First, petitioner claimed that Nigeria violated its obligation of fair and

equitable treatment of Chinese investors under Art. 3(1). Pet. ¶ 23. Second, petitioner claimed

that Nigeria unreasonably discriminated against it, violating Art. 2(3), and third, that Nigeria

failed to provide the “continuous protection” afforded by Art. 2(2). Id. Fourth, petitioner

claimed that Nigeria violated its contract with petitioner, violating Art. 10(2). Id. Finally,

petitioner claimed that Nigeria wrongfully expropriated Zhongshan’s investments without

compensation, in violation of Art. 4. Id.

The London, United Kingdom-located arbitral tribunal rendered its Final Award on

March 26, 2021, finding that Nigeria had violated Zhongshan’s rights under the China-Nigeria

BIT. Specifically, the tribunal determined that Nigeria took actions that were “plainly designed

to deprive, and indeed succeeded in depriving, Zhongfu of its rights” under the 2010 and 2013

agreements. Final Award ¶¶ 125–26. In addition, the tribunal found that Ogun State, Nigeria’s

Export Processing Zones Authority (“NEPZA”), and the police—all state actors—took

5 discriminatory and coercive steps against Zhongfu that resulted in Nigeria taking possession of

Zhongfu’s investment in the country. Id. ¶¶ 125–32. Nigeria was ordered to pay Zhongshan

approximately $55.6 million in compensation for the expropriation, $75,000 in “moral

damages,” $9.4 million in interest calculated between the July 22, 2016-dated expropriation and

rendering of the award, approximately $3 million in legal fees and costs related to the arbitration,

approximately $430,000 in other costs, and post-Award interest on the preceding sums—a total

figure approaching $70 million, and growing. Pet. ¶ 33. 5

Nigeria has already tried and failed to shirk this arbitration award in the United Kingdom.

Approximately one month after the Award’s rendering, Nigeria filed an arbitration claim form in

the English High Court, collaterally challenging the Award under the English Arbitration Act on

the basis that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction. Although Nigeria later discontinued this challenge,

petitioner was still not paid the sums awarded by the tribunal. Id. ¶¶ 35–41. On December 8,

2021, petitioner commenced enforcement proceedings in the United Kingdom, and the English

court issued an order that recognized the Award. Id. ¶ 42.

C. Instant Litigation

On January 25, 2022, Zhongshan initiated the instant lawsuit, pursuant to the Federal

Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), which provides for confirmation of arbitral awards falling under

the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10,

1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (the “New York Convention”), see 9 U.S.C. § 201–207. See Pet. ¶ 1. The

FAA provides that the New York Convention is enforceable in the courts of the United States, to

which courts a party may apply for an order confirming an arbitral award issued under the

5 The Award enumerated certain of the damages—namely, the compensation, moral damages, and pre- Award interest on both—in U.S. dollars, and the legal fees and costs related to the arbitration in British pounds. As a result, the Court’s calculation of the total figure, which converted all sums into U.S. dollars, is a mere estimate.

6 Convention. Id. §§ 201, 207. In response, Nigeria filed the pending motion to dismiss for lack

of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under the FSIA, contending that no exception to the

FSIA applies because the award does not fall under the New York Convention, Resp’t’s Mot.,

ECF No. 24, which motion petitioner opposes, Pet’r’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26. With briefing now

complete, see Resp’t’s Reply, ECF No. 27, Nigeria’s motion to dismiss is now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” Gunn v. Minton,

(2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994)), and

“have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted

by Congress pursuant thereto,” Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,

(1986)). To

survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), plaintiff thus “bears

the burden of invoking the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Arpaio v. Obama,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

(1992)). “Where a

plaintiff has asserted jurisdiction under the FSIA and the defendant foreign state has asserted ‘the

jurisdictional defense of immunity,’ the defendant state ‘bears the burden of proving that the

plaintiff's allegations do not bring its case within a statutory exception to immunity.’” Belize

Social Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Phoenix

Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola,

(D.C. Cir. 2000)). Further, in deciding a

motion to dismiss on the basis of the FSIA, courts’ subject-matter and personal jurisdictional

inquiries often collapse into the same question: “If none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity

set forth in the Act applies, the District Court lacks both statutory subject matter jurisdiction and

personal jurisdiction.” Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,

, 485 n.5 (1983).

7 See also Schubarth v. Federal Republic of Germany,

, 397 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

(“Under the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists where (1) subject matter jurisdiction has been

satisfied, and (2) proper service has been effected.” (citing

(b))). Nigeria does

not contend that service was improper, so the jurisdictional challenges merge.

When a jurisdictional skirmish “present[s] a dispute over the factual basis of the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction . . . the court must go beyond the pleadings and resolve” any dispute

necessary to the disposition of the motion to dismiss. Feldman v. F.D.I.C.,

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Phoenix Consulting,

). In such situations, the “court

may properly consider allegations in the complaint and evidentiary material in the record,”

affording plaintiff “the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Id.; see also Am. Freedom Law Ctr.

v. Obama,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction . . . we ‘may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding

whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.’” (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharm.,

Inc. v. FDA,

(D.C. Cir. 2005))). Absent “evidentiary offering[s],”

Feldman,

, however, courts must seek jurisdictional assurance by accepting as

true all material “factual allegations in the complaint and contru[ing] the complaint liberally,”

and again “granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

For this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a petition to enforce a foreign

arbitral award against a foreign sovereign, two inter-related requirements must be satisfied: (1)

“there must be a basis upon which a court in the United States may enforce a foreign arbitral

8 award,” and (2) the foreign state “must not enjoy sovereign immunity from such an

enforcement.” Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of Qatar,

(D.C. Cir. 1999).

Both requirements are addressed in turn.

A. Jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act

The New York Convention is an international treaty ratified by the United States that

provides for signatory states’ recognition of arbitral awards “made in the territory of a State other

than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought.” Process &

Indus. Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria (“P&ID”),

(D.C. Cir. 2022)

(quoting New York Convention, art. I(1)). The FAA codified the New York Convention into

law, providing that “[a]n action . . . falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under

the laws and treaties of the United States,” and granted district courts original jurisdiction over

such actions.

.

For an arbitral award to “fall[] under the Convention,” two requirements—both optional

elements of the New York Convention that the United States adopted at ratification—must be

satisfied. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 487 cmts.

b, f (Am. L. Inst. 1987). First, the arbitral award must be “rendered within the jurisdiction of a

signatory country,” pursuant to the reciprocity reservation of the Convention. Creighton,

. The United Kingdom, where the at-issue arbitration award was rendered, is a

member of the New York Convention. See New York Arbitration Convention, Contracting

States, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last visited Jan. 22, 2023). Second,

pursuant to the Convention’s commercial reservation, which the United States adopted as a part

of a minority of the Convention’s signatories, the award must “aris[e] out of a legal relationship,

9 whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial.”

; Belize Social

Dev. Ltd.,

. This commercial reservation is the basis for Nigeria’s instant motion.

Nigeria argues that petitioner is “precluded from relying on the New York Convention to

recognize and enforce the Award in this Court,” because the China-Nigeria BIT giving rise to

petitioner’s arbitral award “does not establish a ‘legal relationship . . . which is considered as

commercial.’” Resp’t’s Mot. at 8, 13 (quoting Diag Human, S.E. v. Czech Republic Ministry of

Health,

(D.C. Cir. 2016)). The FAA does not define the term “commercial,”

but the D.C. Circuit has interpreted the term expansively. “In the context of international

arbitration, ‘commercial’ refers to ‘matters or relationships, whether contractual or not, that arise

out of or in connection with commerce.’” Belize Social Dev. Ltd., 794 F.3d at 103–104 (quoting

Restatement (Third) of U.S. Law of Int’l Comm. Arbitration § 1–1 (2012)); see also id. at 104

(noting the relationship between the “term’s broad compass” and “the more familiar term

‘affecting commerce’—words of art that ordinarily signal the broadest permissible exercise of

Congress’ Commerce Clause power” (quoting Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,

(2003))).

Nigeria’s attempts to cast the Final Award as arising from a non-commercial relationship

lack support in D.C. Circuit precedent. According to Nigeria, the China-Nigeria BIT is

“quintessentially sovereign” and cannot form the basis for a commercial relationship between a

private investor and either country. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 13–15; Resp’t’s Reply at 13–15. Next,

Nigeria contends that Zhongshan conceded the non-commercial character of its relationship with

Nigeria by litigating initially against Ogun State, as reflected in the arbitral record. See Resp’t’s

Mot. at 15–18; Resp’t’s Reply at 10–12; see also supra n.4. Finally, Nigeria challenges the Final

Award as being “unlike other arbitration awards routinely enforced in this Circuit” because this

10 Award did not arise from a business relationship between Nigeria and Zhongshan, but solely

from the China-Nigeria BIT. Resp’t’s Reply at 5.

Each argument is considered in turn and none is persuasive.

1. The Award’s Basis in the China-Nigeria BIT Does Not Render the Parties’ Legal Relationship Per Se Non-Commercial

Nigeria asserts the bold argument that, as a matter of law, the China-Nigeria BIT cannot

form the basis of an arbitral award that falls within the coverage of the New York Convention’s

commercial reservation. Resp’t’s Mot. at 13–15. Nigeria urges a distinction between “certain

direct contractual arrangements between sovereigns and investors, which are subject to the New

York Convention, and international treaties, which are not.” Resp’t’s Reply at 17. The parties

do not dispute that the China-Nigeria BIT is a treaty and, under Nigeria’s reasoning, falls in the

latter category. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 14 (observing that “the Nigeria-China Treaty is

comprehensively focused on regulating state conduct in the protection of investments” and is not

“a commercial agreement between Petitioner and Nigeria”). Nigeria claims to derive this

hardline distinction from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. Resp’t’s Reply at

17–18; Resp’t’s Mot. at 14 (“‘international agreements,’ like the Nigeria-China Treaty, that

involve ‘two or more states’ and are ‘governed by international law’ are ‘not subject to the New

York Convention’ because they are not commercial” (quoting, barely, Restatement (Third) of

Foreign Relations Law §§ 301, 487 cmt. f)).

Nigeria, however, has cherry-picked the quoted text out of context. The relevant portion

of § 487 comment f from the Restatement reads in full as follows:

Ordinarily, arbitration of a controversy of a public international law character, such as a

boundary dispute or a dispute about interpretation of or performance under an

international agreement (see § 301), is not subject to the New York Convention, and an

11 award resulting from such an arbitration is not subject to enforcement through civil

courts. See § 904 and Comment e thereto.

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 487 cmt. f. Nigeria reasons that, as an

“international agreement” under Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 301, the China-

Nigeria BIT is “‘not subject to the New York Convention’ because [it is] not commercial.”

Resp.’s Mot. at 14 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 487). Yet, this

comment does not broadly exclude all international agreements from the Convention’s scope, as

Nigeria apparently reads the text. Rather, the comment only excludes controversies “of a public

international law character,” citing § 904 of the Restatement (“interstate arbitration”), which

concerns only arbitrations between states. Of course, this arbitration took place between Nigeria

and Zhongshan, a private actor—not two states.

Moreover, the remainder of the comment makes clear the extremely narrow scope of the

commercial reservation’s exclusion, which as noted does not cover all arbitrations arising under

international agreements. Indeed, earlier in the same comment, the Restatement expressly

advises that “[d]isputes arising out of investment agreements are not excluded by” the

commercial reservation. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 487 cmt. f. The

Restatement goes on to explain that this reservation merely “excludes arbitration agreements and

awards arising out of matrimonial or custody disputes, disputes concerning succession to

property, and labor disputes, and for the United States also other disputes excluded from the

United States Arbitration Act under

.”

(emphasis added). See also Island

Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc.,

(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“Research

has developed nothing to show what the purpose of the ‘commercial’ limitation was. We may

12 logically speculate that it was to exclude matrimonial and other domestic relations awards,

political awards, and the like.”). 6

Nigeria’s novel argument contradicts U.S. courts’ regular confirmation of arbitral awards

rendered under similar treaties. According to the logic of Nigeria’s argument, any arbitral award

rendered pursuant to a sovereign state’s violation of a treaty created under public international

law would be “per se noncommercial,” Resp’t’s Mot. at 17, and fall outside of the New York

Convention. See also Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (arguing that BITs, “as international agreement[s]

governed by and applying public international law, fall[] outside the ambit of the New York

Convention as a matter of U.S. foreign relations law”). The D.C. Circuit has confirmed many

arbitral awards in which sovereign nations have been found to breach treaty—rather than

contract—obligations. See, e.g., Tatneft v. Ukraine,

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (confirming

arbitral award rendered pursuant to Ukraine-Russia BIT); Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador,

, 203–204 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (confirming arbitral award rendered pursuant to BIT between

United States and Ecuador); LLC Komstroy v. Republic of Moldova,

, *1–2

(D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2019) (confirming arbitral award pursuant to multilateral Energy Charter

Treaty); Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

, 105–

108 (D.D.C. 2017) (confirming arbitral award resulting from Venezuelan expropriation of

investments pursuant to BIT between Canada and Venezuela); Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela,

, 118–120 (D.D.C. 2015) (confirming arbitral award

rendered pursuant to BIT between Canada and Venezuela). This Court declines to swim

6 Nor does Nigeria’s citation to the Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration support its argument, since this Restatement likewise embraces a broad definition of arbitral agreements, disputes, and awards that are “commercial” in nature. See Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of Int'l Comm. and Inv'r-State Arbitration § 1.1, cmt. e (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft 2019) (“[A] dispute or award may be commercial even though one of the parties to it is a sovereign State and even though the dispute arises out of public regulatory acts.”).

13 upstream against the common practice of confirming arbitral awards rendered pursuant to

violations of treaties based on respondent’s cherry-picked and partial quotation from a

Restatement.

Nigeria attempts to explain away courts’ application of the New York Convention in

other cases involving treaties similar to the China-Nigeria BIT by arguing that many of those

treaties explicitly reference the New York Convention, and that the parties in other cases agreed

that the Convention applied to their dispute. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 15. Neither of these

scattershot attempts to distinguish those cases is persuasive. First, Nigeria does not explain why

a treaty’s mere reference to the New York Convention rescues an arbitral award from the treaty’s

“public international law character” that Nigeria claims would exclude such a treaty-based

arbitral award from confirmation. Referencing the New York Convention, after all, does not

transform a treaty into a contract between a state and private actor. This argument is particularly

perplexing given that, in one of the cases upon which Nigeria relies as support for this point, the

treaty at issue merely refers to the New York Convention to discuss the Convention’s

requirement that parties agree in writing to arbitration, rather than the Convention’s commercial

reservation. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (citing Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador,

(D.D.C. 2013)); Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 12-cv-1247 (JEB),

Decl. of Edward G. Kehoe, Ex. 1, U.S.-Ecuador BIT at art. VI(4)(b), ECF No. 4-1. 7 Second,

respondent cites to Crystallex Int’l Corp.,

, seeming to argue that the New

York Convention applied in this case because the respondent did not object to the court’s

jurisdiction. Resp’t’s Mot. at 15. This argument ignores that, in Crystallex, as here, the

7 Further, as petitioner notes, not all arbitral awards that have been confirmed in the D.C. Circuit arise from treaties that expressly reference the New York Convention. See Pet’r’s Opp’n at 17 (noting that the Russia-Ukraine BIT at issue in Tatneft,

, “does not mention that the New York Convention applies to enforcements of awards arising under it”).

14 applicability of the New York Convention folded into the question of the court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction and, thus, whether Venezuela consented to jurisdiction is irrelevant since “[i]t is

axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived” and “a federal court must raise the

issue because it is ‘forbidden—as a court of limited jurisdiction—from acting beyond [its]

authority.’” Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic, Ministry of Health,

(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting NetworkIP, LLC v. F.C.C.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008)), rev’d on

other grounds,

(D.C. Cir. 2016). Nigeria makes no convincing argument to

explain away the crush of cases that undercut its theory.

2. The Arbitration Record Does Not Prove That the Dispute was Non- Commercial

Nigeria next turns to the record of the underlying arbitration to argue that the dispute was

non-commercial, asserting a new distinction between what it calls “Treaty Claims” and

“Commercial Claims.” In support of this argument, Nigeria recounts that petitioner had initially

brought claims in the Nigerian courts and the Singapore International Arbitration Center

(SIAC)—the latter pursuant to a clause in the 2013 agreement—alleging breach of contract

claims under its series of agreements with Ogun State. See Resp’t’s Reply at 10; see also Final

Award ¶¶ 43–45. Nigeria describes petitioner’s discontinuance of both proceedings as a

“tactical[]” decision to “proceed exclusively with the Treaty Claims” and “abandon the

Commercial Claims.” Resp’t’s Reply at 10. As a result, as Nigeria’s argument goes, the Final

Award was based on Nigeria’s sovereign, rather than commercial, conduct—or, by way of

analogy to the limits of the Commerce Clause, the country’s use of its police power, rather than

commerce power. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 15–18; Resp’t’s Reply at 11–12.

The flaw in this argument stems from predication on a false dichotomy between

sovereign and commercial conduct in the context of the New York Convention. A similar

15 argument was considered and rejected by the D.C. Circuit in Belize Social Dev. Ltd. v.

Government of Belize,

, 104–105 (D.C. Cir. 2015). There, Belize argued that, in

granting a private telecommunications company tax and duty exemptions pursuant to an

agreement, “it exercised ‘powers peculiar to sovereigns’ as opposed to ‘powers that can also be

exercised by private citizens,’ and thus its actions were not commercial.”

at 105 (quoting

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,

(1992)). This argument attempted to

define the commercial reservation by reference to the FSIA’s “commercial activity” exception,

(a)(2), under which a foreign state is only held to “engage[] in commercial

activities when it acts in the manner of a private player within the market.” Belize Social Dev.

Ltd.,

. The D.C. Circuit rejected this narrow view of the commercial reservation,

holding that “[u]nlike with the FSIA, Congress was not codifying the restrictive theory of foreign

sovereign immunity when it ratified and implemented the New York Convention.”

.

Instead, because the Convention’s “purpose was to ‘encourage the recognition and enforcement

of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts’ . . . ‘commercial’ in the context

of international arbitration refers to matters which have a connection to commerce.”

(quoting

TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P.,

(D.C. Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, as

Zhongshan correctly posits, “there can be no debate that the multimillion-dollar investment that

Petitioner made in Nigeria to develop, manage and operate a free trade zone near Lagos was

connected with commerce.” Pet’r’s Opp’n at 5–6. See Belize Social Dev. Ltd.,

(holding that “taxes Belize levies against a company . . . have a connection with commerce . . . as

do the duties Belize charges”).

3. No Underlying Contract Between Nigeria and Zhongshan is Required

Finally, Nigeria urges that the “Award at issue is unlike other arbitration awards routinely

enforced in this Circuit” because “it arose neither from a commercial agreement between 16 Petitioner and Nigeria, nor from a contractual or other business relationship between them.”

Resp’t’s Reply at 5. To be sure, nearly every case enforcing an arbitration award against a

foreign sovereign in this Circuit has involved an underlying contract or business agreement

between the petitioner and foreign sovereign. See, e.g., P&ID,

(describing

underlying twenty-year natural gas supply and processing agreement between Irish engineering

company and Nigeria); Diag Human,

(describing underlying “Framework

Agreement” between arbitration parties Czech Republic and foreign blood plasma company by

which company supported modernization of Czech Republic’s blood plasma supply and services

in exchange for share of the total volume of plasma produced); Belize Social Dev. Ltd., 794 F.3d

at 100–01 (involving underlying agreement between Belize and petitioner’s predecessor-in-

interest, a telecommunications company, pursuant to which company would purchase property

from Belize); Gebre LLC v. Kyrgyz Republic,

, *2 (D.D.C. June 14, 2022)

(foreign company signed series of license agreements with Kyrgyz authorities to mine rare earth

elements). In contrast, Nigeria is correct—and petitioner does not dispute, see Pet’r’s Opp’n at

15 n.8—that the underlying agreements leading to Zhongshan’s investments in the Zone and

Industrial Park “[were] formed with OGFTZ and Ogun State, not Nigeria.” Resp’t’s Reply at 7

(emphasis in original).

This distinction drawn by Nigeria between the parties involved in the facts underlying the

arbitral award at issue (i.e., involving a business arrangement between a private party and part of

a sovereign country) versus previous awards confirmed in this Circuit (i.e., involving business

arrangements between a private party and a sovereign country), falls short of showing that the

instant parties’ legal relationship is therefore not commercial. As the FAA provides, a legal

relationship need not arise from contract to be commercial, see

, with the crucial

17 factor being that “the subject matter [of the arbitration] is commercial.” Stati v. Republic of

Kazakhstan,

(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou

Zhen Hua Shipping Co.,

(2d Cir. 2001)). Here, the subject matter of the

underlying arbitration related to commerce: Zhongshan’s status as a foreign investor in Nigeria,

pouring millions of dollars into developing the free trade zone, “has an obvious connection to

commerce.” Diag Human,

(describing “the provision of healthcare technology

and medical services” as having “an obvious connection to commerce” based on health care’s

role in the “global economy”).

Notably, Nigeria focuses principally on urging adoption of its characterization of the

parties’ relationship as non-commercial. See, e.g., Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (“The record of the

arbitration confirms the non-commercial nature of the parties’ legal relationship that is the

foundation for the Award.”) (emphasis added); Resp’t’s Reply at 14–15 (arguing that petitioner’s

agreements with Ogun State cannot “dictate whether the extrinsic legal relationship between

Nigeria and Petitioner is commercial for purposes of the New York Convention” and urging that

“[t]he conditions in question here . . . rendered the legal relationship between Nigeria and

Petitioner fundamentally noncommercial”). Only passingly, in reply, does Nigeria allude to the

absence of a direct contractual or business relationship between Zhongshan and Nigeria as

precluding the existence a “legal relationship” between the parties—a condition precedent to the

requirement that the arbitral award “aris[e] out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not,

which is considered as commercial.”

; see Resp’t’s Reply at 14 (noting that “no

independent legal relationship existed between Nigeria and Petitioner regarding [the latter’s]

investments” in service of its argument that Nigeria’s conduct was “sovereign” rather than

commercial).

18 Regardless, the parties plainly shared a “defined legal relationship, whether contractual or

not,” Diag Human,

, based on the China-Nigeria BIT. In Diag Human, the D.C.

Circuit held that, even if failing to qualify as a contract, a “Framework Agreement” between a

blood plasma company and the Czech Republic created a legal relationship, because the

Agreement “explicitly contemplated which parties it would obligate, the extent of the

obligations, the remuneration exchanged for meeting the obligations, and the legal framework to

govern the arrangement.” Diag Human,

. The China-Nigeria BIT, too, creates a

legal framework “entitling [Chinese investors] to the standards of treatment guaranteed by”

Nigeria. Pet’r’s Opp’n at 7. Further, the treaty constitutes “an already-binding arbitration

contract” between Nigeria and China, with investors from both countries, including petitioner,

acting as the equivalent of third-party beneficiaries, BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina,

(2014), or at the very least, the treaty operates as Nigeria’s “standing offer to all

potential [Chinese] investors to arbitrate investment disputes,” Chevron,

.

Nigeria cannot and does not explicitly dispute that the BIT thus creates a legal relationship—

even if not a contractual one—between the parties.

B. Nigeria Is Not Immune Under the FSIA.

Having established that this matter falls under the New York Convention, and thereby the

FAA, the next question is whether Nigeria is immune from suit under the FSIA. The FSIA is “a

comprehensive statute containing a ‘set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every

civil action against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.’”

Republic of Austria v. Altmann,

(2004) (quoting Verlinden,

).

The FSIA “provides, with specified exceptions, that a ‘foreign state shall be immune from the

jurisdiction of the courts of the United States . . . .” Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v.

19 Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co.,

(2017) (quoting

).

Accordingly, “subject matter jurisdiction in any [FSIA] action depends on the existence of one of

the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.” Verlinden,

.

At issue here is the arbitration exception,

(a)(6), which permits U.S.

courts to confirm an arbitration award rendered outside of the United States in certain instances. 8

The exception provides, in pertinent part:

A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or

of the States in any case . . . in which the action is brought . . . to confirm an award made

pursuant to . . . an agreement to arbitrate, if . . . the agreement or award is or may be

governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force . . . calling for the

recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.

(a)(6). For the Court’s jurisdiction to attach pursuant to the arbitration

exception, “the existence of an arbitration agreement, an arbitration award and a treaty governing

the award are all jurisdictional facts that must be established.” LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic of

Moldova,

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing Chevron,

). As to these

three requirements, petitioner bears “a burden of production” to support a claim that the

8 Congress amended the FSIA in 1988 to include the arbitration exception, ensuring that foreign agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards governed by certain treaties would be enforceable in U.S. courts, even against sovereigns. See Process & Indus. Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria,

, 10 (D.D.C. 2020), aff’d on other grounds,

(D.C. Cir. 2022). This exception facilitated the participation of U.S. courts in upholding the international arbitration system that has flourished since the post-World War II era, designed to facilitate cross-border investments and business dealings. The conventional wisdom undergirding the international arbitration system is that promising foreign investors an efficient and fair alternative dispute-resolution mechanism outside of potentially biased local courts would encourage foreign direct investment, insulated from the uncertainties created by the host country’s domestic politics and law. See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITS Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 Harv. Int’l L. J. 67, 68–79 (2005) (arguing that arbitration provisions in BITs are a “mechanism that gives important, practical significance to BITs, a mechanism that truly enables these bilateral treaties to afford protection to foreign investment,” and that BITs have promoted foreign direct investment in developing countries and the United States); Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L. J. 1049 (June 1961) (detailing the reasons for the United States’ ratification of the New York Convention).

20 arbitration exception applies; “the burden of persuasion rests with the foreign sovereign claiming

immunity, which must establish the absence of the factual basis by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Chevron,

.

Petitioner has met its burden of production as to all three requirements under the

arbitration exception. First, as to the existence of the arbitration agreement, petitioner has

alleged, without dissent from Nigeria, that both parties consented to the arbitration—Nigeria via

Art. 9 of the China-Nigeria BIT, which provided that either party may submit a dispute to an ad

hoc tribunal, and Zhongshan via filing a Request for Arbitration. Pet. ¶¶ 24–25. See Stati,

(“All that is required is that the petitioner make a ‘prima facie showing that

there was an arbitration agreement by producing the [treaty] and the notice of arbitration.’”

(quoting Chevron,

)). Petitioner has also met its burden as to the second and

third requirements by producing the Final Award and referring to the New York Convention.

See Final Award, ECF No. 2-1; see also Creighton, 181 F.3d at 123–24 (describing the “New

York Convention [as] ‘exactly the sort of treaty Congress intended to include in the arbitration

exception’” (quoting Cargill Int’l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko,

(2d Cir.

1993))). Nigeria, meanwhile, has failed to discharge its burden of persuasion to establish that

this arbitral award falls outside the scope of the New York Convention, for the reasons stated

supra, in Part III.A. Resultantly, the Court finds that the arbitration exception to the FSIA

applies, stripping Nigeria of sovereign immunity and establishing the Court’s subject-matter and

personal jurisdiction over the case.

21 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Republic of Nigeria’s Motion to Dismiss is

DENIED. An order consistent with the Memorandum Opinion will be entered

contemporaneously.

Date: January 26, 2023

__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL Chief Judge

22