UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GOCE GLIGOROV,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 21-cv-1773 (TSC)

NATION OF BRUNEI, et al.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Goce Gligorov, a Slovenian businessman, brings this action against multiple

defendants, including the Nation of Brunei, high-ranking officials and others associated with the

Brunei government, as well as private companies. Gligorov alleges seven counts arising from an

agreement he made with some of the individual defendants and other representatives of the

Brunei Government to investigate “alleged wrongful and illegal acts by other Brunei officials” in

exchange for $250,000. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 24, ECF No. 29. Defendants Audley Property

Management Company Limited, The Dorchester Group, Ltd., and Seven Properties AG (the

“Corporate Defendants”) have moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to

state a claim, and Gligorov has moved for jurisdictional discovery. Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF

No. 32; Pl.’s Mot. for Jurisdictional Discovery, ECF No. 33. For the reasons below, the court

will GRANT the Corporate Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and

DENY Gligorov’s Motion for jurisdictional discovery. The court need not reach whether

Gligorov has failed to state a claim.

Page 1 of 13 I. BACKGROUND

Defendants are the Nation of Brunei, the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA), Audley

Property Management Limited, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, Crown Prince of Brunei Al-Muhtadee

Billah, The Dorchester Group, LLC (d/b/a The Dorchester Collection), Seven Properties AG, PG

Yusof Sepiuddin, Pehin Nawawi, Pehin Yasmin, HJ Zainal, HJ Aziyan, and Anak Haji Abdul

Aziz. ECF No. 29. The Corporate Defendants own and operate properties in the U.K. and

Switzerland. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 5, 8, 9. Gligorov claims Defendants: (1) violated the civil RICO

statute,

, resulting in injury to Gligorov’s business or property,

¶¶ 45–60; (2)

engaged in a RICO conspiracy involving “money laundering, terrorist financing, mail and wire

fraud, unlawful travel in furtherance of criminal activities, material support of terrorist activities,

and other unlawful acts” that injured Gligorov’s “business or property,”

¶¶ 61–71; (3)

breached a contract to pay Gligorov $250,000 in exchange for his information about “allegations

of corruption by certain Brunei officials,”

¶¶ 72–76; (4) received unjust enrichment from their

failure to pay Gligorov for the information,

¶¶ 77–80; (5) engaged in fraud and fraudulent

inducement for inducing Gligorov to “provide them with valuable information upon the false

representation that he would be paid $250,000,”

¶¶ 81–84; (6) defamed Gligorov by “hav[ing]

INTERPOL issue a ‘Blue Notice,’” which effectively placed him on an international watch list

, 85–89; and (7) tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s “business relations or with

reasonable expectation of prospective economic advantage,”

¶¶ 90–93. Counts 1,2, and 7 are

asserted against all Defendants. ECF No. 29 at 19, 24, 29. Counts 3, 4, and 5 are asserted

against all individual Defendants and the BIA.

at 25–27. Count 6 is asserted against all

individual Defendants and Seven Properties.

.

Page 2 of 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD

In a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the “factual basis for the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Crane v. New York Zoological Soc’y,

(D.C. Cir. 1990). “‘Conclusory statements’ or a ‘bare allegation of conspiracy or agency’ do

not satisfy this burden.” Livnat v. Palestinian Auth.,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting

First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 1988)). Unlike the

presumption applied to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, in assessing a personal

jurisdiction challenge the court does not treat plaintiff’s allegations as true. Myers v. Holiday

Inns, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2013). Rather, it may receive, consider, and weigh

affidavits and other relevant materials outside of the pleadings to assist it in determining the

pertinent jurisdictional facts. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc.,

, 120

n.4 (D.D.C. 2000).

III. ANALYSIS

“To establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, a court must engage in a two-part

inquiry: A court must first examine whether jurisdiction is applicable under the state’s long-arm

statute and then determine whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional

requirements of due process.” GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000). To satisfy due process, a plaintiff must show that there are “minimum

contacts” between the defendant and the forum, establishing that the maintenance of the suit

“does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of

Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement,

(1945). Courts may

exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction “permits a court to

assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying Page 3 of 13 suit,” whereas specific jurisdiction requires an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying

controversy.” Livnat,

.

A. General Jurisdiction

A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a corporation where it is incorporated or

has its principal place of business; where it is “at home.” Daimler AG v. Bauman,

(2014). To establish general jurisdiction, a corporation’s affiliations with the forum

state must be “so continuous and systemic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum

State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

(2011) (citations

omitted). In Daimler and Goodyear, the Supreme Court established a high bar to ensure general

jurisdiction would not exist in every state in which a corporation “engages in a substantial,

continuous, and systematic course of business.” Brit UW, Ltd. v. Manhattan Beachwear, LLC,

, 60–61 (D.D.C. 2017).

Gligorov fails to show that any of the Corporate Defendants are “at home” in the District

of Columbia. None of them are incorporated in this district, nor do they have their principal

places of business here. ECF No. 38 at 3. Indeed, Gligorov concedes that Audley Property

Management Company Limited is based in London, U.K., Dorchester Group Ltd. is

headquartered in London, U.K., and Seven Properties AG is located in Meilen, Switzerland.

ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 5, 8, 9. Gligorov asserts—without any factual support—that there is a

“substantial connection between the [United States] and the defendants in that they do substantial

business in United States through various hotels and companies.” Id. ¶ 16. But he alleges only

that the Corporate Defendants have hotels in California and New York. Id. This is insufficient

to establish that the Corporate Defendants engaged “in a substantial, continuous, and systematic

Page 4 of 13 course of business” in the District of Columbia. Consequently, this court does not have general

jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

“Acts sufficient to subject a non-resident defendant to specific personal jurisdiction

resulting from conduct within the District of Columbia are determined by the due process clause

and enumerated by the District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13–423.” Bigelow v.

Garrett,

(D.D.C. 2018). This court may exercise specific jurisdiction

over a non-resident defendant if a plaintiff demonstrates that: “(1) the defendant transacted

business in the District of Columbia; (2) the claim arose from the business transacted in the

District; (3) the defendant had minimum contacts with the District; and (4) the Court’s exercise

of personal jurisdiction would not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.’” Dooley v. United Techs. Corp.,

(D.D.C. 1992), abrogated on other

grounds by FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008), (citing Int’l

Shoe Co.,

).

Gligorov has not established that the Corporate Defendants have engaged in any

conduct that brings them within the jurisdiction of this court under D.C. Code § 13–423.

Instead, he offers two alternative bases for personal jurisdiction: the RICO Act and Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

1. Jurisdiction Based on RICO Statute

The federal RICO statue,

, grants a district court jurisdiction over a

non-resident defendant if “personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts is established as to

at least one defendant,” and “it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties

residing in any other district be brought before the court.” FC Inv. Grp. LC, 529 F.3d at 1099–

Page 5 of 13 1100, overruled on other grounds by Erwin-Simpson v. Air. Asia Berhad,

(D.C.

Cir. 2021). “Congress has expressed a preference in § 1965 to avoid, where possible, haling

defendants into far flung fora.” Id. at 1100. Merely invoking the statute does not confer

personal jurisdiction, and the court must still make its determination under the D.C. long-arm

statute and the Constitution. Collingsworth v. Drummond Co. Inc., No. CV 19-1263,

, at *7 n.4 (D.D.C. May 29, 2020), aff'd,

(D.C. Cir. 2021).

Gligorov argues that the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the Corporate

Defendants based on its jurisdiction over the Nation of Brunei because Brunei has an embassy

in the District of Columbia and this court has jurisdiction over Brunei under the terrorism

exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),

. ECF No. 34 at

12.

Under the FSIA, a foreign sovereign is presumptively immune from suit in the United

States. TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine,

(D.C. Cir. 2005).

This presumption is only defeated if the plaintiff demonstrates that one of the exceptions to

immunity under the FSIA applies: (1) waiver, (2) commercial activities, (3) takings contrary to

international law, (4) succession, gifts, and rights in real property, (5) noncommercial torts, (6)

arbitral awards, and (7) terrorism.

. Moreover, the FSIA confers upon district

courts personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns where proper “service has been made under

§ 1608” of the Act. TMR Energy Ltd.,

(holding district court properly asserted

personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereign where service was proper, and the case came within

one of the FSIA exceptions to immunity). The state-sponsored terrorism exception is codified

under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and provides that a foreign state is not immune from suit in any case

“[1] in which money damages are sought [2] against a foreign state [3] for personal injury or

Page 6 of 13 death that was [4] caused by [5] an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage

taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of

material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign

state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” 28 U.S.C. §

1605A.

Gligorov claims that Brunei, and specifically its embassy, “finance[d] and support[ed]

certain terrorist organizations th[r]ough the use of the secret and confidential diplomatic and

communication services located at the Brunei Embassy.” ECF No. 34 at 4. Brunei has not been

served, but even if service is properly effectuated, this court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction

over Brunei under the terrorism exception to the FSIA because Gligorov does not seek money

damages for personal injury or death, but rather for violation of the RICO Act, breach of

contract, unjust enrichment, fraud and fraudulent inducement, defamation, and tortious

interference. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 45-93. Consequently, the terrorism exception does not apply to

Brunei and the court cannot extend personal jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants under

the RICO statue,

(d).

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) allows a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a

defendant “(1) for a claim arising under federal law, (2) where a summons has been served, (3) if

the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of any single state court, (4) provided that the

exercise of federal jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution (and laws) of the United

States.” Mwani v. bin Laden,

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Determining whether a defendant

is subject to the jurisdiction of a court “of any state” does not require the court to “traipse

through the 50 states, asking whether each could entertain the suit.” Mwani,

Page 7 of 13 (quoting ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP,

(7th Cir. 2001)). If a

“defendant contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses to identify any other

where suit is possible, then the federal court is entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2).”

Here, there is no dispute that at least some of Gligorov’s claims arise under federal law,

as Count 1 and 2 allege violations of the federal RICO statute. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 45–71. The

Corporate Defendants do not assert that there is jurisdiction over them in any single state. ECF

No. 32. Assuming service was effectuated properly, the only remaining inquiry is whether the

exercise of federal jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution.

Whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Constitution for purposes of Rule

4(k)(2) depends on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole

to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k) advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendments; see also Adams v.

Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta,

, 651–52 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding court had

personal jurisdiction over defendant with sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole);

ISI Int’l,

(“So far as the Constitution is concerned, the right question is whether

[defendant] has contacts with the United States—as it plainly does.”). The Due Process Clause

“protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum

with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations,’” Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz,

(1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co.,

), and “requir[es]

that individuals have ‘fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction

of a foreign sovereign,’”

(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,

(1977)). “Where a

forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented

to suit there, this ‘fair warning’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully

Page 8 of 13 directed’ his activities at residents of the forum,”

(quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc.,

(1984)), “and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate

to’ those activities,”

(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,

(1984)).

In Mwani v. bin Laden, the D.C. Circuit Court held that the district court had personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2) over a foreign terrorist and terrorist organization in an

action brought by Kenyan victims and family members of victims of a bombing outside the

American embassy in Kenya.

. Although the bombing occurred in Kenya, the

Court found that the foreign terrorist and terrorist organization purposely directed their activities

at U.S. residents because the bombing was intended to “cause pain and sow terror in the

embassy’s home country, the United States.”

The Court also found that the litigation arose

out of injuries from or related to the bombing, giving the defendants fair warning that they would

be subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

In contrast, in Ofisi v. Al Shamal Islamic Bank, No. CV 15-2010 (JDB),

, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2019), plaintiffs alleged that BNP Paribas, S.A. (“BNPP”), Al

Shamal Bank, the Republic of Sudan, and al Qaeda conspired to defeat U.S. economic sanctions

on Sudan by bombing U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The district court found that

plaintiffs failed to establish that Al Shamal Bank had sufficient minimum contacts with the

United States in connection with any conspiracy to defeat U.S. sanctions or in connection with

the bombing.

at 5–6. Similarly, the court found that plaintiffs failed to establish that Al

Shamal Bank “purposefully directed” activities at the United States.

(“The ‘purposefully

directed’ activities plaintiffs pled in connection with the bombing are al Qaeda’s, not Al

Shamal’s.”). The complaint’s only specific allegation concerning sanctions-related conduct was

Page 9 of 13 that BNPP, not Al Shamal, had contacts with the United States by processing transactions

through financial institutions.

(“notably absent are similar specific factual allegations

that Al Shamal transacted with banks in the United States or had any contact with agencies like

OFAC or other U.S. institutions, in connection with sanctions-related misconduct.”). Similarly,

the only specific, non-conclusory allegations concerning Al Shamal and the bombing was that Al

Shamal was affiliated with, and invested in by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and maintained

and serviced al Qaeda bank accounts.

. Consequently, the court held that “such indirect

contacts [were] too attenuated to establish specific jurisdiction” over the bank.

.

Other Circuits have also considered whether to exercise personal jurisdiction under Rule

4(k)(2) over a foreign defendant based on the defendant’s contact with the United States, and

required some knowing participation by the foreign defendant. See e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks

on Sept. 11, 2001,

(2d Cir. 2013) (finding allegations that foreign defendants

knowingly maintained bank accounts for individuals associated with a terrorist organization were

insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction absent any showing that defendants expressly aimed

their conduct at the United States); U.S. S.E.C. v. Carrillo,

(11th Cir. 1997)

(finding personal jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendant that fraudulently offered and sold

securities to United States residents).

Here, the allegations in Gligorov’s Second Amended Complaint regarding the Corporate

Defendants’ contact with the United States are similar to the plaintiffs’ allegations in Ofisi in that

they are mostly conclusory, indirect, and lacking in specifics. Gligorov alleges that “individual

Brunei defendants and the BIA used the Dorchester Group’s bank accounts, with [their]

knowledge and cooperation, to conceal and launder substantial amounts of cash, which were then

used to finance terrorist organizations.” ECF No. 29 ¶ 8. He also alleges that individual

Page 10 of 13 defendants and the BIA used Seven Properties AG “to conceal and launder money used for the

financing of terrorist organizations and other illegal activities.” ECF No. 29 ¶ 9. He does not

specify whether the Corporate Defendants’ bank accounts were in the United States or whether

any transaction was purposefully directed at residents of the United States, nor does he say what

the “illegal activities” were. Gligorov also alleges that the Corporate Defendants made “safe

houses” and “safe rooms” in their hotels available so that the Individual Defendants, members of

the Brunei government, and representatives of Corporate Defendants could, inter alia, create a

“campaign to damage and destroy Plaintiff’s reputation and business.” See id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 29–31,

37, 51. But again, he does not allege that any of the “safe houses” were located in the United

States. Id. ¶¶ 29, 20. He alleges only that the Dorchester Group maintained “safe rooms” in two

of their California hotels and that at least one meeting to “discuss the threat posed to

defendants…and to destroy Plaintiff’s reputation and credibility… too[k] place at the Beverly

Hills Hotel.” Id. ¶ 37. Gligorov cites no facts to indicate that the Dorchester Group knew about

these alleged activities, much less participated in them. “[P]laintiffs must allege far more than

that [a foreign defendant] acted as ‘passive conduit through which [] monies’ were transferred, or

even that it provided services ‘to an organization openly hostile to the United States.’” Ofisi, No.

CV 15-2010 (JDB),

, at *8. Gligorov has not shown that the Corporate

Defendants aimed their conduct at the United States, and therefore this court cannot exercise

personal jurisdiction over them.

C. Jurisdictional Discovery

Perhaps cognizant of the scant factual basis for jurisdiction, Gligorov has moved for

leave to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. ECF No. 33.

Page 11 of 13 “This Circuit's standard for permitting jurisdictional discovery is quite liberal,” and such

discovery is permissible even when plaintiffs have “not made out a prima facie case of

jurisdiction.” Diamond Chem. Co. v. Atofina Chems., Inc.,

(D.D.C.

2003); see also Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt,

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting

district court’s “broad discretion” to order jurisdictional discovery). To engage in jurisdictional

discovery, a plaintiff “must have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to

show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” FC Inv. Grp. LC, 529 F.3d at

1093–94 (citation omitted). “Mere conjecture or speculation” is not enough, however. Id. at

1094. The scope of discovery lies in the district court’s discretion, and it may refuse

jurisdictional discovery when it does “not see what facts additional discovery could produce that

would affect [the] jurisdictional analysis.” Mwani,

(affirming the district court’s

decision to deny jurisdictional discovery where additional discovery would not have changed

whether court could exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant).

Here, Gligorov’s motion for jurisdictional discovery rests on speculation that the

Corporate Defendants have sufficient contacts with the United States, and his requests are broad

in scope. ECF No. 33 at 1. He seeks to have each Corporate Defendant disclose the location of

their bank accounts, hotels, and other businesses in the United States.

He also seeks the

hotels’ “registration records,” as well as “phone records, emails and/or fax transmissions,

relating to any occupancy of rooms” within the hotels, without any limitation as to date or

location.

But none of this information would help to show whether the Corporate

Defendants “purposefully directed” activities toward the United States that resulted in the alleged

injuries and that this litigation “arises out of or relate” to those activities. See Burger King

Page 12 of 13 Corp.,

. Thus, Gligorov has not proffered a sufficient basis for jurisdictional

discovery and his motion will be denied.

Because the court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Corporate

Defendants, it need not reach the Corporate Defendants’ remaining arguments. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2); see also Ghebreyesus v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, No. 21-CV-02865

(CRC),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2022) (finding plaintiffs’ claims should be

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and that the court did not need to address defendants’

other arguments).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court will GRANT Corporate Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction, ECF No. 32, and will

accordingly DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery, ECF No. 33.

Date: January 31, 2023

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

Page 13 of 13