UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN DOE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 12-01229 (TFH)

JUDITH ROGERS, M.H.A., et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Pending before the Court is the defendants’ request to remove the pseudonymous

treatment of the plaintiff’s name from this Court’s September 10, 2020 Memorandum Opinion

[ECF No. 139]. The defendants ask that the Court replace references to “Dr. Doe” with the

plaintiff’s real name. Resp. About Proposed Withholdings In Mem. Op. at 5-7 (“Defs.’ Resp.”)

[ECF No. 137]. The plaintiff opposes the request. Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Remove the

Pseudonymous Status of the Case (“Opp’n”) [ECF No. 140]. The plaintiff contends that

removing the pseudonymous status will destroy his chances of ever securing employment as a

cardiac surgeon in the United States. Opp’n at 2 [ECF No. 140]. He also argues that, because

Peconic Bay Medical Center fraudulently submitted his name to the National Practitioner Data

Bank (“NPDB”), removing the pseudonymity of this case would compound that fraud by

exposing it to the public. Id. at 15. Alternatively, the plaintiff requests that the Court stay its

decision on pseudonymity “pending” a decision from the D.C. Circuit on the same issue. Id. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it is appropriate to remove the pseudonymous

treatment of the plaintiff’s name from this Court’s September 10, 2020 memorandum opinion.

Legal Standard

The “presumption of openness in judicial proceedings is a bedrock principle of our

judicial system” and thus parties who seek to proceed under pseudonym seek a “rare

dispensation” from the Court. In re Sealed Case,

(D.C. Cir. 2020)

(quotation omitted). “The presumption of openness is both ‘customary and constitutionally-

embedded[.]’”

at 326 (quoting In re Sealed Case,

(D.C. Cir. 2019)); see also

United States v. Microsoft Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1995). With these principles in

mind, the party seeking pseudonymity “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a

concrete need for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if

forced to proceed in its own name.” In re Sealed Case,

. “Speculative assertions

of harm will not suffice.”

Once the movant fulfills its heavy burden of showing a legitimate need for secrecy, the

court must then “balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing

interests in full disclosure.” In re Sealed Case,

. The following five non-

exhaustive factors serve as “guideposts from which a court ought to begin its analysis”:

(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature;

(2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties;

(3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;

(4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly,

2 (5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.

In re Sealed Case,

(citing James v. Jacobson,

(4th Cir. 1993)).

The court’s inquiry is “necessarily flexible and fact-driven.” In re Sealed Case,

.

Discussion

The plaintiff generally asserts that he would be harmed by “the linkage of [plaintiff’s]

name in a very public manner to the NPDB report.” Opp’n at ¶ 25. The defendants counter that

much of this information is already publicly available in other lawsuits initiated by the plaintiff,

that the public has a heightened interest in lawsuits challenging governmental programs, and that

the plaintiff’s justifications for continued pseudonymity are outweighed by the countervailing

interests favoring full disclosure. The Court agrees.

First, the Court considers whether the justification is to avoid annoyance or to preserve

privacy in a sensitive or highly personal matter. The plaintiff states that public linkage of his

name with the NDPB report would jeopardize his “little remaining chance…of ever securing

employment a cardiac surgeon in the United States.” Opp’n at ¶ 1. However, it is unclear how

maintaining pseudonymity here would “preserve privacy” when the facts underlying this case

have already been publicly disclosed by the plaintiff in other lawsuits initiated by the plaintiff.

See Defs.’ Resp. at 3-4 (discussing New York State case filings). Moreover, even putting aside

the already publicly available information, the plaintiff’s asserted privacy concerns “‘bear no

resemblance to those types of intimate or sensitive personal information’ that are traditionally

recognized under this factor, ‘such as sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy,

medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors.’” Doe v. Bogan,

, 23

(D.D.C. 2021) (quoting In re Sealed Case,

)). Lastly, the plaintiff’s concerns

about potential career harm are more akin to “annoyance and criticism that may attend any

3 litigation.” See Bogan, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 23 (finding that the plaintiff’s concerns about career

harms and embarrassment in the community are “annoyance and criticism that may attend any

litigation”). This factor thus weighs in favor of disclosure.

Second, identification does not pose any risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the

plaintiff or to innocent non-parties. The plaintiff alleges that he will not be able to practice

medicine in the United States if his name is revealed. But economic harm does not suffice under

this factor. See In re Sealed Case,

(“The asserted injuries are purely economic,

and speculative at that.”). This factor, too, weighs in favor of disclosure.

Third, the plaintiff’s age is not an issue in this matter; he is an adult.

Fourth, this action is against a governmental entity. The plaintiff has sued the

government about its conduct in maintaining and sharing reports submitted by hospitals

regarding the medical practice of physicians, which weighs heavily in favor of removing

pseudonymity. See

(noting that “[a]s many courts have recognized, there is a heighted

public interest when an individual . . . files a suit against the government”).

Fifth, there is an ongoing risk of unfairness to the government to allow the plaintiff to

continue to proceed pseudonymously in light of the plaintiff’s allegations. In the plaintiff’s

filings in connection with this dispute alone, the plaintiff disparages government employees

while proceeding pseudonymously. See Opp’n at 2 (claiming that the “bureaucrats” at the

NPDB have asked that pseudonymity be removed “[i]n an act of pure vindictiveness” because

his lawsuit “endangers their cushy sinecure as administrators of the NPDB” and that they are

“paid 6-figure salaries” to “rubberstamp” reports submitted by hospitals). This factor thus

weighs in favor of disclosure.

4 In sum, having considered the defendants’ request to replace references to Dr. Doe with

the plaintiff’s name in the Court’s September 10, 2020 Memorandum Opinion [ECF No. 137],

the plaintiff’s opposition thereto [ECF No. 140], and the entire record herein, and for the reasons

set forth above, the Court hereby grants the defendants’ request. A copy of the September 10,

2020 Memorandum Opinion that replaces references to “Dr. Doe” with the plaintiff’s real name

will be filed on the public docket.

SO ORDERED.

February 2, 2023 ________________________________ Thomas F. Hogan SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5