UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EVA MAE GIVENS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 20-307 MURIEL BOWSER, in her official (EGS/ZMF) capacity as Mayor, Washington, D.C., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Movants Eugene P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser, and

Anthony D. Givens (collectively, “Movants”) submit this motion

asking the Court to reconsider its Memorandum Opinion and Order

adopting Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s Report and

Recommendation (“R. & R.”) and granting Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. See Movants’ Mot. Recons., ECF No. 48.1 Upon careful

consideration of the motion, opposition, and reply thereto, the

applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court hereby

DENIES Movants’ motion.

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of the filed documents. 1 II. Background

A. Factual

The background of this dispute was set forth in the Court’s

prior opinion and will not be repeated here. See Givens v.

Bowser, No. CV 20-307 (EGS/ZMF),

(D.D.C. Sept.

30, 2022). In short, Eva Mae Givens (“Ms. Givens” or

“Plaintiff”) was a nursing home resident who applied for

Medicaid benefits on February 26, 2019 to pay for her medical

expenses, including her nursing home care. Am. Compl., ECF No.

16 ¶¶ 1, 24. Along with her application, she submitted copies of

unpaid medical bills totaling $40,184 and argued that these

unpaid bills qualified for a PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 25.

On May 17, 2019, the District of Columbia (the “District”)

determined that Ms. Givens was eligible for Medicaid benefits

but did not provide an appropriate PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 26.

Consequently, beginning February 1, 2019, she was required to

pay $2,044 per month for her nursing home care, and she was

unable to use that money to pay off the $40,183.93 in unpaid

bills. Id.

On June 6, 2019, Ms. Givens filed a request with the

District’s Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) for a fair

hearing to address the District’s failure to approve her request

for a PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 28. OAH called the hearing nine

months after Ms. Givens filed her request and eventually

2 dismissed the case with prejudice in December 2020. See Notice

of Suppl. Authority, ECF No. 24-1 at 3.

B. Procedural

Ms. Givens filed this Section 1983 suit against Defendants

on February 5, 2020, see generally Compl., ECF No. 1; and

amended her Complaint on June 3, 2020, see generally Am. Compl.,

ECF No. 16. On July 1, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to

Dismiss the First Amended Complaint. See generally Defs.’ Mot.

Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. Compl., ECF No. 18. Ms. Givens filed her

opposition, see Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s First Am.

Compl., ECF No. 20; and Defendants filed a reply thereto, see

Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. Compl.,

ECF No. 22. The Court referred this case to Magistrate Judge

Faruqui for full case management, see Minute Order (Oct. 13,

2020); who, on May 3, 2021, issued his R. & R. recommending that

the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, see R. & R., ECF

No. 28 at 15.

Before Magistrate Judge Faruqui issued his R. & R., Ms.

Givens died. See Suggestion of Death, ECF No. 26. On May 16,

2021, Ms. Givens’ three children—Movants here—moved to be

substituted as plaintiffs, to file a second amended complaint,

and to object to the R. & R. See generally ECF No. 29.

Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted their motion to substitute as

3 plaintiffs for the limited purpose of objecting to the R. & R.

See Minute Order (June 16, 2021).

Movants raised several objections to the R. & R, see

generally Objs. by Eugene P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and

Anthony D. Givens to Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s May 3.

2021 R. & R., ECF No. 33; to which Defendants responded, see

Defs.’ Resp. Objs. Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s R. & R.,

ECF No. 36. The Court then issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order

adopting the R. & R. and granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

See Givens,

, at *8; Order, ECF No. 46.

On October 28, 2022, Movants filed this Motion for

Reconsideration. See Movants’ Mot. Recons., ECF No. 48; Eugene

P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and Anthony D. Givens’ Mem. of

Law in Supp. of Mot. Recons. (“Movants’ Mot.”), ECF No. 48-1.

Defendants filed their opposition on November 17, 2022, see

Defs.’ Opp’n Movants’ Mot. Recons. (“Defs.’ Opp’n), ECF No. 50;

and Movants replied on November 25, 2022, see Eugene P. Givens,

Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and Anthony D. Givens’ Reply Mem. of Law

in Further Supp. of Mot. Recons. (“Movants’ Reply”), ECF No. 51.

The motion is now ripe and ready for adjudication.

III. Legal Standard

A. Motion for Reconsideration

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly

address motions for reconsideration. See Sieverding v. U.S.

4 Dep’t of Just., No. CV 09-562 (JDB),

, at *1

(D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2010) (citing Lance v. United Mine Workers of

Am. 1974 Pension Tr.,

(D.D.C. 2005)).

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) permits district courts to construe

motions for reconsideration as motions to alter or amend the

judgment under Rule 59(e). See Emory v. Sec’y of Navy,

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (explaining that “[s]uch

treatment is appropriate even though the movant does not specify

under which rule relief is sought”).

Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or

amend a judgment within twenty-eight days of the entry of that

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions are

“discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court

finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law,

the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear

error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone,

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). These motions are

“disfavored,” and the moving party bears the burden of

establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief

from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus,

(D.D.C. 2001) (citing Anyanwutaku v. Moore,

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). Rule 59(e) does not provide a

5 vehicle “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry

of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,

, 485 n.5

(2008) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).

B. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A

district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition.” Id. 72(b)(3); see also

(b)(1)(C)

(“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.”). A district court “must determine de novo

any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been

properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “If, however,

the party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply

reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the [R. &

R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v. Brown,

(D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted). “Under the clearly

erroneous standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled

to great deference and is clearly erroneous only if on the

entire evidence the court is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of

6 Columbia, No. CV 16-1920 (CKK),

, at *3 (D.D.C.

Sept. 12, 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made

and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections

which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the

magistrate judge are not properly objected to and are therefore

not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA,

(D.D.C. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). The Court reviewed Movants’ objections de novo.

IV. Analysis

A. Movants Have Standing to Move for Reconsideration of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order

Courts have routinely held that only parties have standing

to bring motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). See,

e.g., In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig.,

(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that non-party had no standing to

bring Rule 59(e) motion after having been denied intervention).

The parties do not dispute this principle. See generally Defs.’

Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 8-9; Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 2-3.

Instead, they disagree whether Movants are parties within the

meaning of the rule.

Defendants assert that Movants are non-parties because: (1)

Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted their motion to be substituted

7 as plaintiffs only “‘for the limited purpose of objecting to the

[R. & R.],’ and nothing else”; and (2) Movants never moved to

intervene in the case pursuant to Rule 24. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No.

50 at 9 (quoting Minute Order (June 16, 2021)). In reply,

Movants argue that Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s Minute Order

permitting them to be substituted as plaintiffs for the purpose

of objecting to the R. & R. “plainly encompasses” a motion for

reconsideration of this Court’s ruling on those objections.

Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 3. They further contend that

Defendants are too late to object to the Minute Order,

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)); and that their failure to move

to intervene “is irrelevant,”

The Court is persuaded that Movants are parties for

purposes of this motion. In the Minute Order at issue,

Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted Movants’ motion to be

substituted as plaintiffs “for the limited purpose of objecting

to the [R. & R.].” Minute Order (June 16, 2021). In other words,

with respect to their objections to the R. & R., Movants are

plaintiffs in the case. There is no reason why Movants should

lose that status now because they ask the Court to take a second

look at their objections to the R. & R. See Cobell v. Jewell,

(D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that “the typical

motion for reconsideration . . . asks a court to take a second

look at an issue that was previously raised and ruled upon”),

8 aff’d in part, vacated in part,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

The Court therefore concludes that Movants are parties for

purposes of this Motion for Reconsideration and have standing to

file a Rule 59(e) motion.

B. The Court Will Not Amend Its Prior Memorandum Opinion or Order

Movants argue that the Court’s Memorandum Opinion adopting

the R. & R. and granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be

amended for two reasons. See Movants’ Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 4-6.

First, they argue that it was “clear error” to dismiss the case

with prejudice and “ignore[]” their pending motion for leave to

file a Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 5. Second, they assert

that “reconsideration is necessary to prevent the manifest

injustice” of Defendants’ continuing failure to make timely

decisions following Medicaid hearings. Id. at 6. For the reasons

below, the Court DENIES Movants’ Motion for Reconsideration.

1. The Court Did Not Clearly Err in Dismissing the First Amended Complaint with Prejudice

Movants first argue that the Memorandum Opinion is clearly

erroneous because it dismissed the First Amended Complaint with

prejudice despite the pending motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint. See id. at 4-6. For support, they cite D.C.

Circuit authority that “dismissal with prejudice is warranted

only when a trial court determines that the allegation of other

facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly

9 cure the deficiency.” Belizan v. Hershon,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Firestone,

). They

contend that their proposed second amended complaint “contain[s]

allegations that clearly allege that Defendants have a pattern

or practice of failing to decide Medicaid Fair Hearings within

the required time frames” and “therefore satisf[ies] the

inherently transitory exception to the mootness doctrine.” Id.

at 5. Moreover, they continue, they did not unduly delay in

moving for leave to file the new complaint and have not

“‘repeatedly failed’ to cure deficiencies.” Id.

Defendants respond by distinguishing D.C. Circuit

precedent. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 9-11. First, they

clarify the holding in Belizan, explaining that the Belizan

court held that dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate

because the district court failed to consider the plaintiffs’

motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Id. at 10 (citing

Belizan,

). Defendants argue that Belizan does

not control the outcome here because Movants are not plaintiffs

and cannot be plaintiffs unless and until the Court grants their

motion to be substituted as plaintiffs. Id. at 10-11. For

additional support, they cite other D.C. Circuit precedent

holding that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate “[w]hen a

plaintiff fails to seek leave from the District Court to amend

its complaint.” City of Harper Woods Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Olver,

10

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Gov’t of Guam v.

Am. President Lines,

, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Drake

v. FAA,

(D.C. Cir. 2002)); see Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF

No. 50 at 10.

The Court is persuaded that it did not clearly err in

dismissing the First Amended Complaint with prejudice. D.C.

Circuit authority makes clear that dismissal with prejudice is

inappropriate when: (1) the plaintiff has moved for leave to

amend her complaint; and (2) the court “determines that the

allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” Belizan,

. Movants have not satisfied the first prong. They

are not plaintiffs, cf. Minute Order (June 16, 2021) (granting

motion to substitute as plaintiffs “for the limited purpose of

objecting to the [R. & R.]”); and only a party may move to amend

the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Movants argue that

they did “everything possible” to be substituted as plaintiffs

and to amend the First Amended Complaint. Movants’ Reply, ECF

No. 51 at 4. However, this argument ignores Movants’ failure to

object to Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s order granting their

substitution motion in part, staying briefing on their motion

for leave to amend the complaint, and withholding consideration

of their substitution motion for all other purposes. See Docket

for Civ. Action No. 20-307; see also LCvR 72.2(b) (requiring

11 that parties object to rulings by a magistrate judge within 14

days). Thus, because no plaintiff had a pending motion to amend

the complaint at the time of dismissal, the Court did not

clearly err in dismissing the First Amended Complaint with

prejudice.2

2. Reconsideration is Not Necessary to Prevent Manifest Injustice

Movants also argue that “reconsideration is necessary to

prevent the manifest injustice of the Defendants’ continuing

pattern of violations of the [timeline] requirements.” Movants’

Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 6. They do not expand on this statement in

either their opening memorandum or reply brief. See generally

id. at 1-6; Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 1-13.

In their opposition briefing, Defendants concede that

“‘courts have not precisely defined what constitutes manifest

injustice.’” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 12 (quoting Piper v.

U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2004), as

amended (May 13, 2004)). Even so, they contend that Movants’

argument is insufficient, reasoning that the manifest injustice

standard would be met in every case if a movant could simply

argue that she did not receive the relief she sought.

2 Because Movants are not plaintiffs with a pending motion to amend their complaint, the Court need not address their remaining arguments that their proposed second amended complaint cures the deficiencies of the First Amended Complaint. See Movants’ Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 5-6. 12 Although the caselaw does not define the term, courts

regularly make clear that “manifest injustice is an

exceptionally narrow concept in the context of a Rule 59(e)

motion.” Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). “[A] manifest injustice does not

result merely because a harm may go unremedied.” Slate v. Am.

Broad. Companies, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2013)

(citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State.

Council of Carpenters,

(1983)). Rather,

manifest injustice “must entail a clear and certain prejudice to

the moving party” and “also a result that is fundamentally

unfair in light of governing law.” Id. at 35-36.

The Court concludes that Movants have not met this high

bar. They argue that manifest injustice will result because they

cannot maintain their class fair hearing claim. See Movants’

Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 6. They do not explain how dismissal here

prejudices them, nor do they account for how dismissal “is

fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.” Slate,

. Stated differently, Movants have not met

their burden to demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” that

warrant relief. Niedermeier,

. Accordingly,

the Court does not need to amend its earlier Memorandum Opinion

and Order to prevent manifest injustice.

13 V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Movants’ Motion

for Reconsideration, ECF No. 48.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge March 26, 2023

14